REDISCOVERING GOD WITH TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT

A Contemporary Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri Śaiva Philosophy

David Peter Lawrence

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SUNY series, Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions
Paul J. Griffiths and Laurie L. Patton, editors

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For Prof. Rastogi,
With gratitude for all of
your help and your friendship
over the years.
David
Hong Kong
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For my parents and my teachers,
and for Caroline

Contents

Foreword

David Lawrence's work, like all the volumes in this series, is both constructively philosophical (it has an argument of its own to make) and deeply engaged with the texts of a non-Western philosophical tradition—in this case those of the monistic Śaivites of Kashmir. It is difficult to separate the constructive and exegetical parts of Lawrence's work. This is as it should be, for Lawrence wants both to restate and to argue in support of the central metaphysical claim of his Indian interlocutors, which is that it is impossible coherently to deny God's existence. This goal makes Lawrence's work perhaps the most strictly metaphysical of those so far published in this series.

Lawrence provides, we think, the most detailed, accurate, and philosophically acute restatement of the central metaphysical claims of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (the two principal theorists of the monistic Kashmiri Śaiva school) yet available in any Western language. This is a great virtue because this school's theorists are the architects of a subtle, complex, and challenging metaphysical system. It is a system of great internal complexity, the full understanding of which requires mastery (or at least a very substantial knowledge) of almost every significant school of Indian philosophical thought. Abhinavagupta, especially, is remarkable for the range of his learning: in addition to the specifically philosophico-theological works that are the focus of this study, he composed works on linguistics, grammar, ritual, dance, literary theory—and more. Understanding his work sufficiently well to interpret it adequately therefore requires substantial learning of a strictly Sanskritic kind, and Lawrence uses his own erudition and Sanskrit learning effectively to elucidate the complex intellectual context of Abhinavagupta's thought.

Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's thought is hardly known as yet to those outside the charmed circle of Sanskritists and Indologists.

Its philosophical bite is even less well understood, but it is deep and of considerable interest to all philosophers concerned with the nature of transcendental argument. Since most of the interpretive work on Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta to date has dealt with historical and textual questions, or with the ritual context and implications of their thought, Lawrence's book is a vital step in making the more strictly philosophical aspects of this thought available to a readership without technical qualifications in Sanskrit or Indian studies.

Rediscovering God also comes at an opportune time so far as contemporary English-language philosophy is concerned. The last three decades have seen a renewed interest in transcendental argument, both in the philosophy of religion, which is, historically speaking, its place of origin and proper home, but also in metaphysics proper. In addition to the work of Alvin Plantinga (especially in *The Nature of Necessity,* 1974) and Charles Hartshorne (*Anselm's Discovery,* 1965), who were pioneers in this renaissance, there is an increasing flood of recent work, of which a representative sample is Graham Oppy's *Ontological Arguments* (1995). Lawrence's detailed and serious treatment of the topic from a basis of engagement with Indian materials should therefore find many points of contact in contemporary anglophone philosophy, and is likely to enrich that discussion significantly.

Rediscovering God is more than an exegetical work, however. Lawrence thinks that Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva were right in at least one central point, which is that all arguments that fail to recognize God as a condition of the possibility of their framing must necessarily be incoherent. This means, he thinks, that Abhinavagupta and Utpaladeva provide essential tools for the decisive refutation of skepticism. It doesn't mean that these tools are found only in these particular Indian forms of thought; it is an additional strength of this book that Lawrence can and does indicate the points of congruence and difference between monistic Śaiva thought on these topics and some of the major trends in Western philosophical thinking, and that in the process of doing so he often sheds light on the thought of individuals who have probably never before been considered together. Both Abhinavagupta and Bernard Lonergan, for example, are illuminated in this book, and in ways that both would almost certainly approve of.

Lawrence's metaphysical emphasis scarcely needs an apology; it is part of the comparative philosophy of religions as we understand it to treat all elements of the philosophical enterprise, and metaphysics is among the more interesting of these. That it is also a mode of phi-

losophizing that requires the theses for which it argues to be necessarily true if they are true at all, and that among these theses is the existence of God, surely only adds to its interest.

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Acknowledgments

This book, a revision of my 1992 University of Chicago Divinity School Ph.D. dissertation, would not have been possible without a great deal of help from a number of people. First I thank the editors of the SUNY Series, Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions. Paul Griffiths has provided much valuable advice about revising the work, with regard to both my substantive philosophical arguments and the overall structure of the presentation. I have also found Laurie Patton's detailed comments and suggestions in these same areas very helpful. Thanks are likewise due to the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their useful comments.

At Chicago, I am greatly indebted to my dissertation committee. Paul Griffiths was also one of the co-chairs of that committee. I began working with him during the last year of writing, and then also he gave me detailed and sensitive advice on developing my philosophical arguments throughout the study. Wendy Doniger, the other co-chair, helped me relate my work to the interpretive concerns of the history of religions, and was a wise adviser throughout my years in graduate school. David Tracy through his guidance, as well as in his theological and hermeneutic writings, gave invaluable assistance in my formulation of the book's theoretical frameworks concerning interpretation, philosophical rationality, and recognition.

Originally, I had on my committee the late Bimal Krishna Matilal. I first worked with Professor Matilal while he was in Chicago in 1983–84. With him I studied Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (IPVV), the *Spanda Kārikās*, Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, and the Buddhist-Naiyāyika debates. Between January and May 1991, I visited Professor Matilal in Oxford on a grant from the University of Chicago Committee on Southern Asian Studies. Professor Matilal answered many of my difficult questions, and confirmed the main features of my inter-

pretation. It happened that my visit coincided with the recurrence of his terminal cancer. Those who were there know his superhuman dedication in arranging to meet his students while extremely ill. He died about ten days after we said good-bye. Professor Matilal's contributions to Indian philosophy, comparative philosophy, and Indology are of course enormous. I might add that he was a great inspiration for me in settling on Indian philosophy as my academic specialty.

During the early eighties in Chicago I did some of my beginning work on Pāṇini, Bhartṛhari, and Abhinavagupta's aesthetics and philosophy with Edwin Gerow. Throughout my time in Chicago, I was assisted by several grants from the university's Committee on Southern Asian Studies.

A lot of the Sanskrit scholarship presented here was done while I was in India between March 1987 and March 1989 on an American Institute of Indian Studies Junior Research Fellowship. There also I had excellent teachers. With Hemendra Nath Chakravarty of Varanasi, a student of Gopinath Kaviraj, I studied intensively Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (IPK), Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (IPV), and Utpaladeva's *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi;* and also sections of Abhinava's IPVV, *Tantrāloka, Tantrasāra,* and scriptures and other works.

With Navjivan Rastogi of the Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics and Śaiva Philosophy at Lucknow University I studied the sections of the IPK, IPV, and IPVV on action and causality. We also had invaluable discussions on several key features of my overall interpretation of the system. With Srinarayan Mishra of Banaras Hindu University I studied the discussions of memory and recognition in the same IPK, IPV, and IPVV, along with background discussions in various Nyāya works. We also studied Utpaladeva's *Sambandhasiddhi,* and the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* and *Kriyāsamuddeśa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya.* With Radheshyam Chaturvedi of Banaras Hindu University I studied the whole *Śivadṛṣṭi* of Somānanda. I also had useful shorter series of conversations about the Śaiva-Buddhist arguments with the late Swami Yogindrananda of Varanasi and Ram Shankar Tripathi of Sanskrit University.

While writing up my dissertation in the summer and fall of 1990, I studied the *Kārakāhnika* of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* with Saudmini Deshmukh of Maryland. I also mention that while in Oxford with Professor Matilal in 1991 I had one long and helpful discussion of the religious-historical context of the Pratyabhiñā system with Alexis Sanderson.

The revision of the dissertation as a book has been done at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), where I

have been an assistant professor of humanities since fall 1992. Here I have benefited from working through some of my ideas with the students in my graduate seminars on Comparative Philosophy of Religions, Religious Theories of Language, and Relativism and Dialogue in Cross-Cultural Interpretation.

I have also been assisted by an HKUST Direct Allocation Grant. This enabled me to make trips to India in winter 1993 and spring 1994, during which I again consulted my former teachers Hemendra Nath Chakravarty, Srinarayan Mishra, and Navjivan Rastogi about a number of difficult interpretive questions. Professor Rastogi was particularly helpful in sharing with me detailed comments on the entire manuscript. The grant also permitted me to bring Professor Rastogi to Hong Kong in fall 1993. During this visit we continued our discussions of various aspects of my interpretation, and also engaged in further research together on the backgrounds to the Pratyabhijñā in Naiyāyika and Buddhist theories of recognition.

While working on this book, I benefited from developing some of the material herein as conference papers; these papers were then revised as journal publications. These are "Tantric Argument: The Transfiguration of Philosophical Discourse in the Pratyabhijñā System of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta," presented at the 22nd Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison, Wisconsin, 1993, enlarged in *Philosophy East and West* 46 (April 1996); "Śiva's Self-Recognition and the Problem of Interpretation," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, 1994, enlarged in *Philosophy East and West* 48 (April 1998); and "The Mythico-Ritual Syntax of Omnipotence," presented at the 24th Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison, Wisconsin, 1995, enlarged in *Philosophy East and West* 48 (October 1998).

I thank my parents for their great support during graduate school and since then. I also thank my wife, Caroline, for all her encouragement in bringing this project to completion.

I am deeply indebted to all of the people mentioned, and to others too numerous to list. However, any errors I have made are naturally my own responsibility.

Abbreviations

APS	*Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* by Utpaladeva
BIPV	*Bhāskarī*, by Bhāskarakaṇṭha, commentary on IPV
DMS	*Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra*, falsely attributed to Śaṅkara
DMSM	*Mānasollāsa*, commentary on DMS, falsely attributed to Sureśvara
IPK	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* by Utpaladeva
IPKV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* by Utpaladeva, commentary on IPK
IS	*Īśvarasiddhi* by Utpaladeva
IPV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* by Abhinavagupta, commentary on IPK
IPVV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* by Abhinavagupta, commentary on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*
SD	*Śivadṛṣṭi* by Somānanda
SDV	*Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti* by Utpaladeva, commentary on SD
SN	*Spandanirṇaya* by Ksemarāja, commentary on *Spanda Kārikās*
SS	*Sambandhasiddhi* by Utpaladeva
TA	*Tantrāloka* by Abhinavagupta
TAV	*Tantrālokaviveka* by Jayaratha, commentary on TA
TS	*Tantrasāra* by Abhinavagupta
VPP	*Virūpākṣapañcāśikā* by Virūpākṣanātha
VPPV	*Virūpākṣapañcāśikāvṛtti* by Vidyācakravartin, commentary on VPP

Chapter 1

Introduction

> In fact, one may—this simple proposition, which is often forgotten, should be placed at the beginning of every study which essays to deal with rationalism—rationalize life from fundamentally different basic points of view and in very different directions. Rationalism is an historical concept which covers a whole world of different things.
>
> —Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*

This book interprets the contemporary significance of the Pratyabhijñā, "Recognition," apologetics for monistic Śaivism of the Kashmiri thinkers Utpaladeva (c. 900–950) and Abhinavagupta (c. 975–1025). I will investigate the characteristics of the Pratyabhijñā as philosophical discourse and the ways in which it advances Indian discussions of interpretation. The main Pratyabhijñā theories will be presented as cogent argumentation of the transcendental or metaphysical variety, in that they demonstrate necessary truths, the denials of which are contradictory.[1] These necessary truths include a kind of interpretive realism, as opposed to interpretive skepticism. They also comprise—as integral to the realistic stance—the existence and aspects of the nature of God, along with a way of experiencing God.

The first and chief task of this chapter will be the initial formulation of a problem and a methodology. I will review contemporary dilemmas about specifically cross-cultural interpretation, such as those central to religious studies. Then I will adduce transcendental considerations, in certain ways anticipatory of the main substantive arguments, to the effect that comparative, "foundationalist" philosophical dialogue is the most critical means available for addressing these dilemmas.

The next task will be to provide an overview of the rest of the book. I will briefly describe how my model of philosophical dialogue elucidates and is corroborated by the discourse of the Pratyabhijñā system. I will also endeavor to give the reader a preliminary understanding of the Indian debates on interpretation and recognition, and Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta's theory of divine self-recognition.

The Problem of Interpretation as Cross-Cultural

This study will present the Pratyabhijñā philosophy as giving us a viable answer to a problem that, while an enduring human concern, has assumed a radical importance in the contemporary "postmodern" intellectual era: Does interpretation refer to some reality and, if so, how does it? In my formulation of this problem, interpretation should be understood in the broadest sense as comprising all media articulating meaning, including language, imagination, symbols, metaphors, narratives, and so on, identifying a world of entities and nonentities, events, and values.

The question of whether there are grounds of "rationality" should be understood as a subspecies of the problem of interpretation. Rationality may be defined as the founding in reason(s) for ideas and actions. It is interpretations in the form of assumptions, rules, or axioms that determine what will count as a reason. These include widespread logical principles such as noncontradiction as well as specialized styles of inference, various sorts of justifications of action, and ex post facto analyses of the rationality of ideas and behaviors. Such interpretations, even when conceived in a situational or fallibilistic manner, posit some sort of "reality" as their grounds.

A preliminary treatment of the problem of interpretation is necessary even before we can consider the Śaiva approach to it, for this book itself is an exercise in "cross-cultural" interpretation. In a sense, the issue of cross-cultural interpretation is merely another specific example of the problem of interpretive reference. As such the questions center around whether and how members of one culture can interpret the "reality" in the worldview, behavior, rationality, and other features of another culture.

However, in a deeper sense the cross-cultural problem epitomizes one of the most important sets of considerations motivating present reflections on the general issue of reference. Interpreting another culture inevitably brings one into conflict with that culture's interpretations of itself. A crucial feature of the postmodern dilemma

is precisely a sense of the *great difficulty of arbitrating between a plurality of interpretations.* The very fact of difference raises doubt about whether anyone is right.

The landmarks in the growing challenge of interpretive plurality scarcely need mention. The multifaceted conflict between "tradition" and "modernity" is still deepening and spreading—science, history, and other secular theories of culture have repeatedly come into conflict with traditional religious beliefs, and modern social, economic, and political systems have challenged traditional values. Modern transportation, communication, trade, and politics have also led to more and more frequent interactions and confrontations between different societies. An ethical valuation of the diversity of viewpoints has come from democratic and liberal-social understandings of human rights and equality. The development of individualism associated with democracy and capitalism has likewise contributed to a sense of the value of plurality for its own sake.

Another set of intellectual considerations have developed in a manner both encouraged by, and independent of, the sensitivity to plurality. These are a variety of conceptions of what may be called "nonepistemic factors" of interpretation. When there is disagreement between interpretations, it is a likely presumption that something other than truth or reality must be motivating a lot of people to interpret the world in their peculiar ways. Traditional examples include the delusive evil will posited by monotheistic religions, and attachment and karma as posited by various kinds of Hinduism and Buddhism. Such religious ideas are obviously not important to most contemporary theories of interpretation.

The types of nonepistemic factors analyzed in contemporary cultural studies reflect rather the effort of various disciplines to imitate the *causal analysis characteristic of science and technology.*[2] Even when not so candidly identified, ostensibly empirical causes, functionalities, or motivations form the basic terms of explanation of the mainstream disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, for example, literary theory, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, history, and so forth. The classic "hermeneutics of suspicion" of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, are really only more iconoclastic examples of a widespread orientation. The manifest explanatory successes of these various analyses greatly strengthen the worry about how any interpretation epistemically connects to reality.[3]

Presently there are very influential in the academy a number of skeptical theories of interpretation, which either explicitly deny the

reference of interpretation to reality or so emphasize the considerations mentioned that they effectively preclude it. One of the most common names for such theories is "cultural relativism." The various expressions of such skepticism share the basic approach of explaining the plurality of interpretations as epistemically arbitrary, each interpretation being determined within the holistic "contexts" defined by one or another set of nonepistemic factors.[4] No view of reality, principle of reason, or norm of behavior is more correct than any other. According to the usually egalitarian objectives of cultural relativism, the idea of universal truth is only an unfair strategy to privilege one set of views over others.[5]

The nonepistemic causes of interpretation emphasized by relativists are a subset of those described in the mainstreams of the humanities and social sciences, but the mode of explanation is more reductionistic. To simplify, we may say that these factors are of two basic types. First, many theories emphasize such factors as are intrinsic to the medium of interpretation or cultural expression itself. Whereas earlier theories adverted to categories of subjectivity, the most influential of such analyses now are in terms of language and related semiotic systems, and what are considered their exemplary artifacts.

Thus the classic relativism of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf reduces the cross-cultural diversity of perception, concepts, and logic to the grammars of different languages.[6] The language games of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* are determined by rules conceived—as the name indicates—simultaneously as grammatical and as having the manifestly arbitrary character of the procedures of games.[7] The deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida radicalizes the nonepistemic trajectory of Saussurian structuralism. Interpretation is determined entirely by a play of differences between signs, without any semantic anchorage to objective presence.[8]

Among exemplary interpretive artifacts emphasized reductionistically, one important category is narrative. Thus Jean-François Lyotard argues that it is by means of narrative that claims of knowledge are legitimated. Attempting to carry the modern incredulity toward traditional narratives to its proper conclusion, he repudiates the modern "metanarratives" of the progress of human reason in favor of a relativism or "paralogy" of local narratives.[9] Thomas Kuhn's famous category of the paradigm, as model for scientific research and theorization, is another kind of exemplary interpretive artifact given a nonepistemic causal role.[10]

The other basic way in which interpretations have been contextualized, sometimes in a manner complementary to the first, and

sometimes to its exclusion, is in the more extrinsic terms of social-historical situations. Wittgenstein thus correlated his language games with various "forms of life," and Thomas Kuhn related paradigms to the practices of normal science and the innovations of scientific revolutions. While a variety of social causes are identified, the most influential in current relativist theories are the conceptions of power and legitimation of Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Émile Durkheim.

The basic trajectory toward skepticism of social-contextual analysis comes out clearly in the development of the discipline of the sociology of knowledge. From Max Scheler, to the "strong program" of Karl Mannheim, to the classic programmatic statement of the strong program by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's, *The Social Construction of Reality*, there is a progressively complete explanation of beliefs in terms of nonepistemic social causes. While the latter still eschews relativism, as the title of the book suggests, reality is viewed entirely as produced by society.[11] The effect is the same. Barry Barnes and David Bloor brought this approach to its logical (!) conclusion in unequivocally identifying truth and reasons with social causes.[12]

One of the most influential formulations presently of the dominant reduction of truth to power, that of Michel Foucault, may be understood in terms of this same trajectory. For Foucault, ideas are so fully determined by power that there is no possibility of using an ideology critique to separate truth from distortion. He describes the confrontation of interpretations with the model of *war*. Foucault has the manifestly nonskeptical political agenda of fighting hegemony in pursuit of a more equitable distribution of power.[13] However, because he has so thoroughly reduced truth to power, the relativist consequence appears unavoidable.

All of these contemporary skeptical theories raise difficult problems for those who believe in noncontingent truths, values, and principles of reason. Any attempt to describe a reality independent of interpretations will be only one option among a virtually unlimited plurality of others.[14] And each interpretation within this plurality will be explained by relativists as generated from the contexts of one or another set of nonepistemic factors.

Transcendental Parameters of Cross-Cultural Interpretation

I am in strong agreement with relativists about the great difficulties affecting interpretation/cross-cultural interpretation, and I am equally sympathetic with their advocacy of tolerance for conflicting interpretations against the imperialistic imposition of unity. However, I maintain

that the relativist thesis is not required to address these concerns and objectives. This is fortunate, for transcendental argumentation will be developed throughout this book which demonstrates that interpretive skepticism per se is wrong. At present we will only consider enough of such argumentation as will be needed to justify the alternative approach to interpretive divergence taken here.

The oldest, but no less cogent, criticism of skeptical positions is that they are self-referentially contradictory—as is exemplified by Epimenides' paradox of the Cretan asserting that "All Cretans are liars." This criticism points to the fact that the thesis that interpretations are relative is itself an unacknowledged nonrelative or universal claim. The unacknowledged universalism of the relativist theory extends to the *reasons* that are adduced for it: Plurality is presumably a state of affairs not relative to the relativist's own outlook. So presumably are the nonepistemic causes that are alleged completely to determine interpretation. As Edward Farley explains regarding the latter:

> The anomaly of an absolute skepticism about truth, knowledge, or reality apprehension is that it must appropriate what it rejects to make its case—namely the sphere of the interhuman. There is a common element in various attempts to deny or eliminate truth as a feature of the human transaction with things. This is the initial restrictive placing of truth (and knowledge, reality) in a prereality individual whose capacities for truth must then be demonstrated. The enterprise then is to indicate a number of causalities (cultural relativities, brain physiology, genetic predispositions) whose interventions hold reality and truth in abeyance. It is obvious to the point of banality that reality-positing must occur to make the case for such interventions.[15]

Because relativism denies itself, it is simply wrong. This failure demonstrates the antithesis that universal claims in interpretation are unavoidable.

The transcendental parameters of cross-cultural interpretation may be further elucidated by considering a couple of other antirelativist arguments. We may first turn to the philosopher of language Donald Davidson, who in his classic article "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" and in other writings has argued against the coherence of the very notion of incommensurable schemes of interpretation.[16]

Davidson begins his analysis by identifying ostensible conceptual schemes with languages. However, he grants that more than one natural language could express a conceptual scheme. So he expands

the linguistic model to identify conceptual schemes with "sets of intertranslatable languages."[17] He interprets the relativist thesis of the incommensurability of different schemes as untranslatability.[18] Davidson's refutation of relativism, then, involves demonstrating that there are necessary characteristics of all languages/sets of languages that preclude their being untranslatable to other languages/sets of languages.

Now a language is a medium expressing meanings. Davidson observes that an important feature of meaning is its dependence upon beliefs about what is true. "Meaning, as we might loosely use the word, is contaminated by theory, by what is held to be true."[19] As he elaborates elsewhere:

> A belief is identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is this pattern that determines the subject-matter of the belief, what the belief is about. Before some object in, or aspect of, the world can become part of the subject matter of a belief (true or false) there must be endless true beliefs about the subject-matter.[20]

This brings the inquiry to the nature of truth. Davidson attacks the common attempt to explain truth as a correspondence between a language or scheme and some uninterpreted reality. We cannot use language to show how language is connected with what is nonlinguistic. According to Davidson, notions such as organizing or fitting the facts, evidence, or sensory experience, do not in any way further our understanding of truth.[21]

The truth of a linguistic statement can only be expressed in terms of truth conditions identified in another linguistic statement. Davidson makes a virtue of this necessity by further developing the semantic theory of truth of Alfred Tarski.[22] Tarski argues that truth for a language will comprise all what he describes as equivalences of the form T. This may be explained as follows: A sentence *p* is given the name or description *X*. The form T is written: *X* is true if, and only if, *p*.[23] To quote an example and explanation from Davidson: "The sentence 'My skin is warm' is true if and only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, or a piece of evidence."[24] For Tarski this equivalence is stated in what constitutes a metalanguage in relation to the language in which *p* has been made.[25] Davidson explains that if the original statement is not in English, the second expression (here *p*) will be its translation into English.[26]

This understanding of truth means that the battle is over for a coherent idea of an alternative conceptual scheme:

> Convention T suggests, though it cannot state, an important feature common to all the specialized concepts of truth. It succeeds in doing this by making essential use of the notion of translation into a language we know. Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used, there does not seem to be much hope for a test that a conceptual scheme is radically different from ours if that test depends upon the assumption that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of translation.[27]

In this way Davidson is able to justify the strong contention: "Nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech behavior."[28]

Davidson has shown that some agreement between divergent systems of interpretation is necessary even to make sense of their differences. Davidson makes his own formulation of what W. V. O. Quine has called a "principle of charity" that is necessary for successful interpretation. We must assume a great deal of common truth in order to interpret the different views of others:

> The method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, nor can it; its purpose is to make meaningful disagreement possible, and this depends entirely on a foundation—*some* foundation—in agreement. The agreement may take the form of widespread sharing of sentences held true by speakers of "the same language," or agreement in the large mediated by a theory of truth contrived by an interpreter for speakers of another language. . . .
>
> Charity is forced on us:—whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters. . . .
>
> We make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimizes agreement."[29]

The German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel has also made various transcendental arguments in support of a kind of cross-cultural interpretive realism, which he calls "transcendental pragmatics." One of Apel's arguments involves the use of certain ideas of Wittgenstein against the relativist implications of that thinker's own *Philosophical Investigations*, to "think with Wittgenstein against Wittgenstein and beyond Wittgenstein."[30] Apel takes his stand on Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private, solipsistic language. According to Wittgenstein, such a language is impossible because the rules of language games are publicly defined within their respective forms of life.

Apel contends that Wittgenstein's own near-behavioristic description of the diversity of language games, along with his criticisms of the abuse of language, also suffer from a "methodological solipsism." To avoid the predicament, Wittgenstein's theory must participate with the language games he describes in an encompassing, universal language game:

> From Wittgenstein's insight that (meaningful talk about) following a rule is, in principle, dependent on the context of a public language game it follows that the describer of a language game must participate, in a certain sense, in the language game to be described. . . .
>
> A language game must be postulated by which, in principle, communication with all language games and forms of life is possible without getting dependent on the different, and eventually incommensurable, paradigms of the different forms of life; rather the postulated language game must provide itself a paradigm or ideal norm for judging all other language games.[31]

Apel calls this universal language game the "transcendental language game." According to Apel, at the same time as a person acquires any language, he or she must acquire this transcendental game as "something like the deep structure."[32] Included in this game are "along with some rules of logic and the existence of a real world, something like the transcendental-pragmatic rules or norms of ideal communication."[33] This game cannot be denied:

> The individual cannot step into or out of the "institution" of this transcendental language game of critical argumentation in the same we suppose he can in the case of empirical "language games" and "institutions" as "forms of life" (Wittgenstein).[34]

Even the decision not to participate in the transcendental language game *requires this game for its very intelligibility:*

> Reason in no way needs to replace, through a decision, its rational justification, as is demanded by decisionism. For it can always confirm its own legitimation through reflection on the fact that it presupposes its own self-understanding of the very rules it opts for. Popper's assertion that irrationalism can be defended without self-contradiction because one can refuse to accept the argument is simply false, since the defense of irrationalism actually refutes the attempt to refuse to engage in argumentation. . . . The effective

> refusal to engage in rational argumentation (or a corresponding self-understanding) . . . is an act of self-negation and, moreover, self-destruction. . . . Even in such a case, however, the person making the decision must himself presuppose the denied principle so long as he understands his own decision as such. Otherwise, philosophical decisionism . . . could not treat the act of denying reason as an intelligible choice.[35]

Philosophy as Cross-Cultural Dialogue

All of these arguments demonstrate that we cannot avoid making noncontingent, universal claims in interpretation, but they have not demonstrated what claims should be made. Even if we agree with Apel that the transcendental language game requires "along with some rules of logic and the existence of a real world, something like the transcendental-pragmatic rules or norms of ideal communication" it is not clear what are the reality, logic, and communicative rules.

However, all interpretations, including all cross-cultural interpretations and all theories of interpretation, do rest on concrete premises about these matters. As we have seen, relativists (self-contradictorily) posit as the noncontingent reality their own understanding of relativity, along with the fact of plurality and various nonepistemic causes. While relativism is usually advocated in the defense of "open-mindedness," because it does not acknowledge its own claims, it succumbs to the very problems it criticizes in an insidious way. Relativism may thus do severe violence to the views of those whom it is supposed to defend. Most people in history have not understood their views to be no more true than any others, or to depend only upon a collection of nonepistemic sociocultural causes.[36] If someone else's views are framed as intrinsically "neither wrong nor right" they will never have to be taken as a serious challenge to one's own.

It seems that most of those arguing against relativism are attempting to defend the claims of modern science, technology, and social-political thought.[37] Donald Davidson is still continuing the tradition of analytic philosophical empiricism. He thus indicates an end to interpretive charity:

> We get a first approximation to a finished theory by assigning to sentences of a speaker conditions of truth that actually obtain (in our own opinion) just when the speaker holds these sentences true. The guiding policy is to do this as far as possible, subject to considerations of simplicity, hunches about the effects of social

> conditioning, and of course our common-sense, or scientific, knowledge of explicable error.[38]

Apel's "pragmatics"—like other formulations of pragmatism, from the more skeptical version of Rorty, to the more rationalist one of Habermas—is partially intended to admit a healthy dose of fallibilism into the interpretive enterprise. Like the other pragmatisms it is also very much articulating a modern "this worldly" ethics correlated with science, technology, and economic and political rationalization.

I am not saying that there is not much universal truth in modern science, technology, and sociopolitical thought or that there is something wrong with being practical—but only want to point out the inevitable biases in these antirelativist theories. In particular I doubt that they are adequate to the fair assessment of the radically divergent truth claims of the world's religions, whether these be ethical, metaphysical, mystical, or eschatological.

Where are we left? There must be some reality but there are enormous disagreements about what it is, and our views often seem to be determined by motives other than the pursuit of truth. I believe that one of the reasons why many gravitate toward either closed universalist or relativist positions is that these views make things seem *easy*. Either *a, b, c* is reality or there is no reality. However, there is no logical compulsion for a problem to have an easy answer. I maintain rather that, if we are interested in addressing the dilemma, we are faced with the very messy task of attempting to mediate divergent interpretations about what is the universal reality.

This is a process of dialogue or conversation. I believe that the discipline that is most rigorously dialogical and is best suited to the problems of arbitrating between views is *philosophy*. For philosophy, as I understand it, is the effort to formulate one's views or arrive at new views about various issues in such a manner that the views are explicitly justified by deeper or universal criteria. In other words it is an effort to determine by rational argument what universal claims pertaining to experience, facts, morality, and even rationality, are truly universal.

By requiring such a search for criteria, my definition of philosophy is deliberately "foundationalist."[39] The transcendental arguments against skepticism show that assumptions about "foundations"—noncontingent truth, reality, logic, and so on, are unavoidable. Philosophy is only an effort to argue explicitly about them. At the programmatic level, no claims about foundations are excluded, whether these be sense

experience, principles of action, intuition, the words of the Buddha, or the Bible. Sometimes—but not always—arguments about foundations will be transcendental, such as my own that there must be foundations, and those that will be advocated later for the monistic Śaiva soteriology.

Many kinds of discourse are called philosophy for a variety of reasons. According to some understandings, all grand views about the world and life are philosophical. My definition stipulatively includes and excludes discourse from the category of philosophy on the basis of the degree of reflexivity about underlying premises for views and the effort to make explicit justification for particular ones over their alternatives. Discourses that are excluded are not judged to be "wrong" or "inferior." It is just that the concern here is with discourses—of which there are many examples—addressing certain problems of intelligibility.

Would my definition exclude antifoundationalist and skeptical philosophical arguments? Whether their proponents like it or not, I believe that these arguments would be *included* in my definition. For these rigorously argued, descriptive, and prescriptive theories about interpretation, as I have explained, are necessarily adverting to ostensibly universal foundations. Perhaps some skeptics could accept my definition provided that the foundations they adduce were understood in a paradoxically self-erasing manner. Thus a Mādhyamika as well as a deconstructionist may acknowledge that they use realist and rationalist concepts to lead us beyond such concepts. Whether or not the various kinds of skeptical arguments are viable is a subject of philosophical debate.

Since the nineteenth century, there has been the development of increasingly sophisticated dialogue between Western philosophies and non-Western philosophies—for example, of India, China, Islam, and so on—an area sometimes called "comparative philosophy." Another term for such inquiry that addresses the frequently religious orientations of the world's philosophies is "comparative philosophy of religion."[40] These dialogical efforts represent important steps in the development of a global arena of philosophical exchange, especially one in which Western philosophers will take the thought of other cultures seriously. However, I believe that the emphasis on comparison does not represent a novel turn as much as the elucidation and advancement of an integral feature of all philosophical inquiry to address our greater experience of cultural differences.

Philosophies throughout the world since ancient times have been comparative within their somewhat more limited domains. The entire

philosophical quest of discovery and justification is motivated to a large extent by the "comparative" encounter with the "otherness" or "doubt" of conflicting interpretations. Jean-Pierre Vernant has thus shown how the development of a sphere of public democratic debate in ancient Greece was decisive to the origination of pre-Socratic philosophical speculations.[41] Christian philosophy has been repeatedly stimulated by its historic confrontations with Hellenistic, Jewish, Muslim, modern scientific and historical thought, and now other cultures' religions and philosophies.[42] South Asian philosophy throughout its history has likewise been stimulated by the intellectual confrontations between different schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, and now Western thought. What Robin Horton has called the "inter-theoretic competition" basic to science[43] seems to be even more crucial to the development of philosophical reflexivity and foundationalist/criteriological inquiry.

Within current discussions of comparative philosophy, Paul Griffiths has made one of the most influential cases for the universal presumptiveness of philosophical argument. Griffiths describes philosophy in its character of transcending historical context as "denaturalized discourse"—a character that he states is ideal-typical. He explains the pursuit of this ideal on the basis of a conception of the nature of philosophy as presenting unambiguous and easily assessable propositions, as developed through Aristotle, Gottlob Frege, and contemporary anglophone philosophy, which he calls the "propositional mythos." He explains: "The perfectly denaturalized language, towards which the Aristotelian propositional mythos propels us, is no language at all but rather a universe of disembodied *noemata*, changelessly reflecting reality."[44] Though apparently less categorical than myself, he likewise states that denaturalized discourse "tends also to foundationalist in that it looks for certain and indubitable foundations (impressions, ideas, sensibilia, etc.) upon which all knowledge is based."[45]

I believe that the effort to achieve universal intelligibility of many of the religious philosophies of other cultures may be further illuminated by some of the reflections of contemporary Western theology.[46] The Catholic theologian David Tracy has distinguished philosophical theology, which he calls fundamental theology, from systematic theology and practical theology in a manner addressing problems of cross-cultural interpretation and rationality.[47] Further supporting the account here of philosophy as a dialogical effort to give rigorously explicit justificatory criteria for particular interpretations is his explanation that "fundamental theology is concerned with the *most abstract possibilities*

and necessities that *are* fundamental for understanding some of the necessary presuppositions of systematic and practical theologies."[48]

Fundamental theology is primarily addressed to, follows the standards, and addresses the substantive concerns of the academy. Thus, although it may argue on behalf of a particular religious tradition, it is methodologically detached from the religious and ethical commitments and presumptions regarding truth of the other two types of theology.[49] Tracy explains that

> In terms of modes of argument, *fundamental* theologies will be concerned principally to provide arguments that all reasonable persons, whether "religiously involved" or not, can recognize as reasonable. It assumes, therefore, the most usual meaning of public discourse: that discourse available *(in principle)* to all persons and explicated by appeals to one's experience, intelligence, rationality and responsibility, and formulated in arguments where claims are stated with appropriate warrants, backings and rebuttal procedures.[50]

At the same time he acknowledges that because of its historical and linguistic nature this effort is intrinsically problematic or uncertain.[51]

The Hermeneutic Circularity of Philosophical Inquiry

Great emphasis should be given to the qualifications that the project of a universally intelligible discourse is *problematic* and *ideal typical*. It is at this point that there should be developed in a nonrelativist fashion the insights of cultural and historical contextualism. Every work of philosophical reasoning is a product of a finite effort, reflecting the assumptions, purposes, and activities of humans in a particular situation.

While I have argued that "nonepistemic factors" cannot be entirely determinative of interpretation, this is not to deny that their operation is very real and pervasive. Pace Foucault, there is no way of avoiding the earlier modern projects of thinkers such as Marx and Freud, of consciousness enhancement or ideology critique, to separate these from the "epistemic factors." We must attempt to correct systematic distortion resulting from a variety of human motivations, psychological, social, economic, political, and so on.

With regard to a primary focus of many contemporary theories of culture—power—the difficult effort must be made to minimize the distorting role of this motive in philosophical inquiry. The practice of

philosophical discourse requires the pursuit of what Jürgen Habermas has called an "ideal speech situation" in which participants are given equal ability to express their own views and question each other. Paul Griffiths has argued similarly about the situation necessary for the conduct of proper interreligious apologetics. Such apologetics should not intend to justify ethnic superiority or a program of cultural, economic, or military imperialism. The desire to win an argument must be tempered by a valuation of learning the truth, wherever it lies.[52]

While in some ways more difficult, the same ideal should inform interpretations of the thought of those who are distant, deceased, or otherwise unable to respond—whether these interpretations are adverse or sympathetic, as in the case of my approach to the Pratyabhijñā system. Such interpretations gain from being produced in a context of free historical as well as philosophical inquiry. It should go without saying that I welcome responses to my interpretation of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism along with other systems of thought from South Asian, Western, and other scholars. I especially welcome criticisms from representatives of the interpretive skepticisms that I endeavor to refute.

However, the historicity of philosophy is much more than a matter of motivations that may distort the truth. There is always a limit to how far one can go in attempting to find rational grounds for beliefs. Philosophical inquiry follows the basic pattern of hermeneutic circularity. Whether engaging in apologetics for a particular view, or attempting to find answers to questions about which he or she is undecided—the philosopher must always begin and end in an orientation toward life—conceptual, ethical, religious, personal, and so forth—that is his or her own.

This basic hermeneutic circularity has an important consequence with regard to general considerations of philosophical method. Many common, but not invariable, patterns are found in philosophical methods throughout the world, such as adherence to the principles of material implication and noncontradiction. However, the details of philosophical method are ultimately inseparable from the substantive positions explicitly or implicitly maintained by the philosopher.[53] One naturally believes in methods that support one's views, and believes in views that are justified by one's methods.

It is a truism that consensus is never achieved about philosophical matters. Nobody possesses the single discourse within which all issues will be decided. Philosophical discussion involves a continuous reevaluation of the arguments for particular views, that is, the factual

premises as well as the types of inferences for different conclusions. Since there is always the possibility of the articulation of otherness in the form of philosophical doubt, the process is intrinsically open-ended.

The open-ended, fallibilistic nature of philosophy is entirely compatible with its character as a foundationalist inquiry. There is no incompatibility even between transcendental argument and fallibilism. All claims are subject to doubt at the programmatic level. If an argument is cogent it will simply have to be reformulated against objections, hopefully with some refinement in expression.[54]

While they will always be subject to contention, the "relativization of relativism," as discussed above, suggests that universally valid knowledge and values are approachable asymptotically. Beyond the common assumed reality demonstrated by Davidson and Apel, it seems likely that most intelligent viewpoints, in their very divergence, should contain a great deal of truth. The ramifications of the easily forgotten insight of Max Weber that there are a number of different points of view and directions of rationality extend far beyond sociological analysis.[55] So also do those of his seminal insight—"his revelation that there are historically consequential affinities and conflicts among independently varying manifestations of rationalization."[56]

This all suggests the banal but usually ignored idea that complex views and behaviors are likely to be right and wrong, "absolutely" rational and irrational in a number of complex ways. There can be no "instant rationality"[57]—absolutist, relativist, or otherwise—that provides a neat account of everything. At the most general level in the study of other philosophies, we should be content with an ever more informed and differentiated consideration of the many ways in which various beliefs and behaviors are rational/correct and irrational/incorrect.[58] This is the spirit in which I hope the reader will take my argumentation in the course of this book on behalf of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical theology.

The Pratyabhijñā Philosophical Discourse

The methodological discussion that has occupied most of this chapter will help to define one of the book's most basic research objectives, to examine the characteristics of the Pratyabhijñā system as a kind of philosophical discourse. The Pratyabhijñā was articulated in the context (understood nonreductively) of the philosophical "academy" of medieval South Asia. Though medieval India did not have as radical a sense of interpretive plurality as the postmodern world, there was

a sensitivity to the problems of cross-cultural, that is, interreligious understanding in the historical development of philosophy. Over many centuries, the diverse schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism created a sphere for themselves "dialogically" to argue their positions not simply by citing traditional authorities but by using reasoning (*yukti, tarka,* etc.). Insofar as they pertained to soteriology, we may understand the theories propounded in these debates as varieties of fundamental religious speculation.[59] The Śaivas can further be classified with a number of Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina thinkers Matilal has called the "*pramāṇa* theorists," whose discussions focused around the formulation of critical epistemology (which they took to be inseparable from developing a proper ontology).

Though differences always remained, there emerged a number of convergences about methods and experiential and rational criteria for philosophical justification spanning the various Indian schools. The Śaivas endeavor to adhere to the most widely accepted of argumentative standards in Hinduism. Gautama summarized these standards in the *Nyāya Sūtra* as sixteen categories (*padārtha*) pertaining to philosophical discussion, and the various commentators on this text further elaborated them.[60] Abhinavagupta explains that the Pratyabhijñā system derives its very power to convince others through following these categories. In adhering to these rules for discussion of the philosophical academy, the Śaivas abstracted their thought away from concerns with iconographic symbolism and social-ritual action that are predominant in their esoteric tantric tradition. Thus their fundamental theology is intended to be exoterically intelligible, in virtue of being denaturalized.

As I have said, the specific methodological features of any effort of philosophical rationalization will be inseparable from the substantive positions advanced. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta understand their apologetics as much more than a detached intellectual exercise. The Pratyabhijñā, like many other philosophical and nonphilosophical theologies around the world, is given a place within the tradition's soteriology. For the Śaivas the philosophical method, at the same time as it is an ostensibly universal argument, is a conceptually internalized form of tantric and yogic praxis, which fully elicits the student's realization of identity with Śiva.[61] Further, philosophical speculation is ultimately framed by them as an expression of the very myth of Śiva emanating and enjoying the universe as His Power and Consort Śakti.[62] In a characteristically tantric manner they thus "transfigure" the academic discussion between worldviews.

The extension of the full load of Śaiva symbolism and ritual depends on an ambitiously correlational philosophical agenda. The Pratyabhijñā theory may be characterized at the most basic level, along with some of the more ambitious forms of Western philosophical theology, as a transcendental or metaphysical inquiry. What is especially of significance for us is that this transcendental argument directly addresses the problem of the reference of interpretations to reality. The Śaivas do not merely attempt to show that their soteriology is justified in a manner parallel to other interpretations, but rather that God—as experienced and worshipped by them—is necessary for properly understanding the entire interpretive process.

A South Asian Epistemological Approach to Interpretation

Sanskritic philosophies over many centuries seem to have been at least as occupied with the problem of interpretive reference as contemporary Western thought. However, although they did address the problems of interpretive plurality in the development of procedures of philosophical debate, these did not constitute their chief concern. Debates about interpretation were rather instigated by a variety of skeptical theories that were propounded for *soteriological* reasons. Most of these skepticisms were advocated by schools of Buddhism, as efforts to carry forward their tradition's early soteriological emphases on impermanence and on the dangers inherent to speculation.[63] Hindu "mysticism" was also sometimes philosophically rationalized with skeptical theories, for example, the Advaita Vedānta school of Śrīharṣa, which made heavy use of Mādhyamika dialectic.

The Śaivas were particularly concerned with refuting the sophisticated epistemological and ontological theorization of the school known as "Buddhist logic," which has often been compared with the phenomenalism of David Hume.[64] As we shall see, according to the Buddhist logicians our only valid cognition is direct perception of a flux of evanescent unique particulars. These thinkers claim that there are no grounds in the particulars for interpretations that generalize them into enduring objects and types of object. In polemics spanning several centuries before the Pratyabhijñā system, the Buddhist logicians attempted to refute as invalid generalizations many of the commonsensical and religiously significant conceptions held by the Hindu schools—external objects, ordinary as well as ritual action, an enduring Self, God, the sacred language of revelation, and so forth.

A particular development in the debates was crucial in defining the immediate intellectual problematics that the Pratyabhijñā thinkers attempted to resolve in their philosophical theology. The entire process of interpreting experience came to be viewed by both Buddhists and Hindus to be epitomized in the experience of *recognition* (*pratyabhijñā*). Recognition as understood in ordinary life is the realization that an object of a present experience is the same as an object of a past experience, as retained in the memory. It came to be understood that the same process actually occurs in all applications of interpretation to experience. In our memory are stored the semantic conventions regarding the words that we use in interpretation. We apply interpretations to experience when the relevant mnemonic impressions are activated.

The Buddhist logicians claimed that this process of recognition is invalid. They argued that memory of the past has no epistemic relevance to present direct experience. Their most energetic Hindu opponents, the realist schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, argued that our mnemonic resources are grounded in, and elucidate a world of independent, enduring objects possessing intrinsic qualities.

I believe that the model of interpretation as recognition has general validity. Interpretive reference may be more fully characterized in epistemological terms as the application of memory to later experience. In this perspective, the counter of memory should be generalized to include all the raw material of interpretation, from the most basic linguistic and imaginative categories, to the deepest theoretical and symbolic orientations.[65] It should further be understood to comprise any innate or a priori sources of interpretation, whether these be Platonic forms, Kantian categories, God, or other "mythic" realities.[66] Mary Warnock thus includes instinct in the category of memory.[67] Cultural traditions are also repositories of memory.[68]

We may also characterize our own skeptical theories as denying the validity of recognition, like the Buddhist logicians. The reasons for this denial are different. What I have described as the nonepistemic cultural factors of interpretation emphasized in postmodern skepticism—Derridean *différance*, social context for the sociology of knowledge, Foucaultian power, and so on—may be more fully characterized as ostensible determinants of the formation and application of the interpretive memory.[69] Likewise we may characterize more "näive" forms of realism, "objectivism," or direct realism as arguing, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, that recognitions are grounded in identities of a world completely external to interpretations.

The Epistemology of Divine Self-Recognition

In order to address the problems raised by the Buddhists, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta explain their own soteriological realization as a process of recognition, that is to say, "I am Śiva." They elaborate the challenge of the Buddhists as denying this recognition along with the recognitions of all its implied categories. From the Buddhist perspective there can be no Self, no Lord with whom He is identical, no Powers/Consorts (Śaktis) belonging to Him, no universe emanated through Them, and so forth.

The Śaivas do not respond to the challenge of skepticism by attempting, like the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and other kinds of direct realism, to ground their favored interpretations through describing a reality external to them. Their response involves a highly creative development of the thought of the fourth–sixth century linguistic philosopher Bhartṛhari to address their new intellectual and soteriological concerns. Bhartṛhari had interpreted the Vedic revelation as a monistic metaphysical principle called Supreme Speech, which emanates into the universe of separated words and objects. Bhartṛhari's postulation of this superlinguistic principle as the source makes the entire universe of experience inherently linguistic, and thus provides the ground for the reconnection of words and objects in conventional reference.

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta interpret Supreme Speech as Śiva's very self-recognition. Extending Bhartṛhari's approach to the new problematics, *they explain their cosmogonic myth of Śiva emanating the universe through Śakti as His self-recognition.* In this process there is a progressive fragmentation of the Lord's self-recognition from its monistic essential nature to the recognitions of apparently separate items of experience. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' ascription of a primordial, cosmogonic status to the very realization that they aim to communicate makes their response to the Buddhists highly subversive. They are thereby able to argue that *their system's goal constitutes the very facts that the Buddhists say preclude it.*

As we shall see, there are two basic phases of the Śaivas' epistemological argumentation for divine self-recognition. First of all,[70] they make arguments that the recognitive application of interpretation is integral to the nature of all experience, and cannot be coherently denied. Thus the Buddhists must rely on recognition even to talk of their allegedly unrecognizable phenomenal sense data.

Second, the Pratyabhijñā thinkers make idealistic arguments to the effect that *esse est percipi,* which contend that there cannot be any

objects external to recognitive interpretation. From the force of this idealism combined with the arguments for the transcendental character of recognition, they attempt to demonstrate that all experience is a single process of recognition by a cosmic subject. It must accordingly be the self-recognition of God/Śiva.

Philosophy leads us to participate in this recognition through pointing out its necessity and ubiquity. As a conceptually internalized form of tantric praxis analogous to the more concrete forms, it recapitulates—is identical with—the myth. In this way the ostensibly detached intellectual dialogue is transfigured through the resources of the soteriology.

I believe that we may best understand the presumptiveness of the Śaiva theory through its analogies with the Christian conception of God's logos, "Word" or "reason." Of course, the logos in Christianity has been distinctively identified as a member of the Trinity incarnated as Jesus Christ. I will not be concerned with this here, but rather with the Christian philosophical or "natural" theological understanding of logos. There is a significant analogy between the ways in which the Pratyabhijñā thinkers appropriated Bhartṛhari and the Church Fathers utilized various Greek and biblical/Hebraic sources in constructing their respective theistic metaphysics.[71]

The Christian philosophical theology of logos may be characterized as follows: The logos is an expression of God's own subjectivity through which He creates the universe. Our interpretations of the world, and thus the very underpinnings of our rationality, are grounded insofar as they reflect or participate in the language/rationality at the core of reality.

It is of special interest that God's creative logos is frequently conceived as something like His *self-recognition*. This may be understood in that God is existentially prior to His creation, whether this is conceived as ex nihilo or through emanation. Accordingly, His understanding of the rationality by which He constitutes the world must primordially be an understanding of something within Himself, which we may call a kind of self-recognition. In this way, according to the traditional Christian doctrine as well as the Pratyabhijñā, it is God's self-recognition that provides the necessary grounds for all other recognitive interpretations of the world.

In the contemporary period the concept of God's logos has come to be thematized as a deep presupposition of Western thought and to be debated in connection with modern and postmodern dilemmas about the role of interpretation in experience. Heidegger formulated his hermeneutic conception of truth as disclosure (*alētheia*) with full

understanding of its backgrounds in logos theology.[72] A number of physicists in this century, including Albert Einstein, James Jeans, and Wolfgang Pauli, have speculated that the understanding of the world achieved in mathematics and science is a reflection of the mind of God.[73] The logos tradition has been explicitly or implicitly invoked by the transcendental arguments for God or religion as grounding cognitive and ethical judgments, by such diverse thinkers as Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, George Steiner, John Macquarrie, Charles Taylor, Franklin Gamwell, Schubert Ogden, and David Tracy. And in the Orthodox world a closely analogous mode of thinking focusing on God's Sophia rather than logos was developed by thinkers such as Vladimir Solovyev and Sergei Bulgakov.[74] In varieties of postmodern thought and deconstructionism, including that of Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Lacan, and Michel Foucault, this way of thinking has on the contrary been attacked as a device artificially privileging one mode of thought above others for access to reality.[75]

It will not be possible to examine all of these discussions in this book, especially since I am primarily concerned with the interpretation of the complex Pratyabhijñā philosophy. Throughout the exposition I will occasionally observe analogies with Western thought, but my explicit argument for the overall cogency of the Pratyabhijñā will be made in the final chapter. There I will focus the comparison between the Pratyabhijñā and what I consider the strongest contemporary argument for God as grounding our judgments through His logos, the transcendental Thomism of Bernard Lonergan. I will attempt to show that the Pratyabhijñā system elucidates and supports the viewpoint of Lonergan against the grammatology of Jacques Derrida, which I consider the strongest skeptical argument against the theistic metaphysics of logos.

More specifically, the two integral phases of the Pratyabhijñā epistemology will enable us to clarify and further develop corresponding moments in the Christian theory. The arguments for the transcendental character of recognition have their analogies in Lonergan, as well as in a long heritage of understandings of truth as disclosure and of reality as necessarily intelligible. As such, these arguments further elucidate the epistemological implications of the transcendental arguments for interpretive realism previously considered, which are embodied in the Liar's paradox and in the theories of Davidson and Apel. We cannot avoid the premise of the validity of recognition without contradicting ourselves.

I will also endeavor to show that a corresponding idealistic premise is intrinsic to the Christian understanding, which is precisely

what justifies the logical transition from the transcendental character of interpretive recognition to the necessity of a cosmic recognizer.[76] I will take support for this premise from the arguments of skeptics themselves that we cannot describe what is external to interpretation.

It will, however, be necessary to observe a crucial difference between the Śaivas and the Christians in the latter step of the argument. For the Śaivas the divine self-recognition that constitutes all experience is entirely monistic. The Christians, on the other hand, endeavor to limit the logic of *esse est percipi* to maintain the orthodox monotheistic position of the difference between God and the world along with the souls in it. I will briefly attempt to show that, though there is some common ground in a dialecticity present in both traditions, the Śaiva approach is more reasonable.[77]

The Ontology of Divine Self-Recognition

The Śaivas also expound an ontology corresponding to their epistemology of divine self-recognition. The two most basic ontological categories for the Śaivas are relation and action. The category of relation describes abstractly the nature of the objects of transcendental recognition. As all of our experience is recognition, all objects of experience are relationships spanning different situations. Even the hypothesis of disconnected sense data implicitly invokes a number of relationships. I will point out the relevance of this point to the Western discussions of "universals" and "essences."

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta more fully explain Śiva's generation of the universe of relations through His self-recognition as His action (*kriyā*). This conception is partly based on grammar. Just as the Śaivas follow Bhartṛhari in viewing experience as intrinsically linguistic, they follow the grammarian tradition that action is the chief meaning and referent of all language. This view underlines the character of the theory of Śiva's self-recognition as a philosophical rationalization and ritual reenactment of the myth and of Śiva-Śakti. While the Śaiva theory of action invites comparison with recent Western theories of the narrative character of experience, it should more properly be described as a narrative or mythico-ritual narrative ontology, inasmuch as it describes existence itself.

The Śaivas' further elaborate their ontology by using earlier Indian grammatical theories to explain Śiva's action *in terms of syntax*. We shall observe that the main currents of Indian linguistic theory have favored a syntax that tends to denigrate agency in favor of the nexus of action and its result, expressed by the verb and direct object.

This mode of thought may be understood as reflecting upon the pervasiveness and coerciveness of the order of objective ritual behavior (especially for Hindus) as well as what is perhaps the most widespread Indian mytheme—the doctrine of karma. The Śaivas on the other hand endeavor to elaborate a syntax expressive of their tantric mythico-ritual drama of omnipotence, that is, unity of Śiva-Śakti. They explain the generation of phenomena through recognition in terms of a syntax that "absorbs" the result into action and that into the agent. The ever-existent mythical fact explained as this absorption is, again, ritually reenacted by philosophy.

Our dialogical confrontation with the Pratyabhijñā will be facilitated by an understanding of its philosophically explicated narrative syntax. It is in the emphasis on the ubiquitous operation of a monistic agent that the Śaiva rationalization differs from those of the main narratives dominating the Western academy.[78] Corresponding to my earlier analysis of the contemporary dilemmas about interpretation, the "paralogical" postmodern narratives reflect the experience of a world of many agents, fragmented in accounts focused around the material and social *contexts* of behavior and considerations of various kinds of *causal function/instrumentality*. The Pratyabhijñā system finds its closest syntactic allies in the academically marginalized domain of philosophical arguments for the existence of God, including those adverting to the logos. However, as explained, it diverges from monotheism in identifying human agency with the omnipotent agency of God.

Summary of Chapters

The second chapter of this book will survey the Pratyabhijñā system's historical context of medieval, monistic Kashmiri Śaivism, and situate my study vis-à-vis other contemporary scholarship. The third chapter will present the fundamental terms of my analysis of the Pratyabhijñā discourse, formulated on the basis of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta's own explanations of their purposes and methodology. The fuller meanings of the terms of this analysis will become clearer in the course of the exposition of the actual Pratyabhijñā philosophical arguments.

This exposition of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical arguments will be the task of the following four chapters. The fourth chapter will present the challenge of the Buddhist logicians' denial of the validity of recognition. The fifth chapter will explain the main intellectual and religious features of the Śaiva theory of divine self-recognition. The sixth chapter will examine their implementation of this theory in the

area of epistemology, in treatments of the three topics of perceptual cognition, memory, and what I am calling semantic exclusion. The seventh chapter will present the Śaivas' implementation of their theory of recognition in the area of ontology, focusing on their theories of relation, action, and action-syntax.

While chapters 4 through 7 will be mainly exegetical, they will include occasional comparisons with Western thought. In the eighth and final chapter I will tie these comparisons together, and make the final argument for the cogency of the chief theses of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy for contemporary Western academia. As explained, this will involve an analysis, in the light of the Pratyabhijñā, of Bernard Lonergan's development of the theology of logos as an argument for the existence of God; and a defense of the Śaiva and Christian conceptions against Jacques Derrida's effort to deconstruct "logocentrism." Finally I will offer my argument on behalf of the Pratyabhijñā understanding of the identity between God and the soul against the monotheistic understanding of their difference.

Chapter 2

Interpretive Histories and the Scope of This Study

> Victory to the ancient gurus, who have the splendor of the multitude of pearls in the Tāmraparṇī [a river celebrated for its pearls] which is the lineage named after Tryambaka, and who are faultless pilots through the turbulence of the waves of the sea of sacred texts.
>
> —Abhinavagupta, *Tantrāloka* 1.8, 2:27

This chapter will briefly overview the religious historical context of the philosophical theology of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. It will also explain the philological scope of this book and how its approach differs from other studies.

From around the middle of the first millennium C.E. through the early centuries of the present millennium, Kashmir was a great center of Hindu and Buddhist religious, philosophical, and literary activity. The religious culture represented by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta has frequently been designated "Kashmir Śaivism." There are problems with this term. Its referent is actually a group of closely related tantric Śaiva and Śākta traditions, which were perhaps once most centered in Kashmir, but also developed elsewhere in North and South India. Another fact obfuscated by the term is that Kashmir was also an important locus for forms of orthodox, nontantric Śaivism.

A better classification of the relevant traditions often used nowadays is "monistic Kashmiri Śaivism." The names of some of the more important overlapping traditions that developed a monism are Kaula, Krama, Trika, and Spanda. These traditions each comprised complicated esoteric systems of iconographic symbolism and ritual. In

scriptures (*āgama* or tantra), devotional and theological works composed over hundreds of years, these traditions continuously attempted to appropriate for themselves the symbolism and practices of the other monistic Śaiva as well as the orthodox traditions.[1] The texts of the different traditions thus register many levels of mutual influence. As the boundaries between the traditions were diffuse, it seems that religious practitioners frequently adhered to more than one of them.

It is not possible here to attempt to recount the highly complex transformations of these traditions. I will confine myself to describing a general pattern of monistic Śaiva belief and practice useful for appreciating the exposition of the Pratyabhijñā system. The basic cosmogonic myth is uncomplicated: the omnipotent deity Śiva, out of a kind of play, divides Himself from His consort and power Śakti, and in sexual union emanates the universe through Her.[2] As the Goddess, the universe is both real and completely identical with Śiva. The nonrealization of identity with Śiva is the root problem of the falsely delimited individual who undergoes the cycle of suffering in rebirth (*saṃsāra*). Liberation is nothing but the realization of one's true self as Śiva.

Within the plethora of monistic Śaiva spiritual practices, the fundamental pattern may be described as the manifestation or reintegration of the cosmogonic unity of Śiva and Śakti. This may be accomplished by the male and female partners of the esoteric sexual ritual, or by an adept alone through visualization and other kinds of meditation. The adept achieves complete identification with Śiva in the enjoyment of the universe as Śakti—power and consort.

Alexis Sanderson describes the central symbolic and practical theme differentiating these traditions from the more orthodox Hindu traditions as a valuation of *power over purity*.[3] For the orthodox traditions the Ultimate Reality supersedes the desires and actions of the individual self, and external behavior is rigidly controlled by ritual considerations of purity, particularly of caste. The monistic Śaiva alternative is seen in the sexual reintegration of Śiva-Śakti just mentioned, the transgressiveness of which is also evinced in that it is often performed by partners of different castes; myths and iconography of horrific deities; and practices involving forbidden "impure" substances—sexual fluids and corpses in cremation grounds. As is common in *tantric* traditions, below the level of salvation there is also the possibility of attaining limited "magical powers" (*siddhi*) to enjoy wealth, sexual partners, and so on.

Other formulations of characteristic *tantric* patterns that apply to the monistic Śaiva traditions of Kashmir are the pursuit of salvation

(*mukti*) combined with enjoyment (*bhoga*), meditations on iconographic circles (*maṇḍala*), a metaphysics of sacred speech and corresponding mantra practices. I will say more about some particular monistic Śaiva beliefs and practices as it is relevant to the explanation of the Pratyabhijñā.

Certain historical developments in monistic Kashmiri Śaivism were precursory to the creation of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics. As the movements became more popular, they went through a process of "domesticization," in which some of the more radical practices, particularly those connected with the cremation grounds, were toned down and symbolically internalized.[4] The orientation became increasingly gnoselogical.[5] The traditions also started to produce increasingly systematic manuals of doctrine and practice following more orthodox models, for instance, the *Śiva Sūtras* and the *Spanda Kārikās*. The commentaries on these works began to address apologetically the alternative traditions of Hinduism and Buddhism.

A full-scale monistic Śaiva philosophical apologetics developed from the Trika tradition. As indicated in this chapter's epigraph, the Trika tradition traces its lineage to the legendary teacher Tryambaka. Its name also indicates its emphasis on various iconographic-cosmological triads, particularly triads of Goddesses and cosmic levels, associated with the prongs of Śiva's trident.[6] The first work from this tradition devoted to philosophical apologetics was the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, (Cognition of Śiva) by Somānanda (c. 900-950). In this book Somānanda endeavors to defend monistic Śaivism against a number of competing forms of Hinduism and Buddhism.

Utpaladeva, a student of Somānanda, wrote a commentary on the *Śivadṛṣṭi*, the *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti*.[7] Utpaladeva also wrote several other works interpreting and furthering the work of Somānanda with greater philosophical rigor. Although Utpaladeva treats a number of Hindu and Buddhist opponents in his works, his chief opponents are the Buddhist logicians. Somānanda had already begun to address the Hindu-Buddhist debates about recognition in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*.[8] However, it is Utpaladeva's writings that first present the full theory of the Lord's self-recognition discussed in this book. Utpaladeva wrote several works on philosophical theology. The most comprehensive are the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (Verses on the Recognition of the Lord),[9] and two commentaries on this, the short *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*,[10] and the more detailed *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*.[11] Utpaladeva also wrote a trilogy of specialized philosophical studies, the *Siddhitrayī* (Three Proofs)—*Īśvarasiddhi* (Proof of the Lord); *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* (Proof of a Subject Who Is Not Insentient); and the *Sambandhasiddhi* (Proof of Relation).[12]

Abhinavagupta, widely considered to be one of the greatest thinkers in Indian history,[13] had as one of his teachers Utpaladeva's pupil Lakṣmaṇagupta. Abhinava elaborated Utpaladeva's arguments in brilliant and erudite commentaries, one on the IPK, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*,[14] and the other on the missing *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*, the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*.[15] Despite his preeminence in philosophical theology, and the thousands of pages he wrote on it, Abhinavagupta probably placed greater value on his even more voluminous studies in *tantric* symbolism, "systematic theology," and ritual, "practical theology." In his magnum opus, the *Tantrāloka*,[16] and in numerous other works, Abhinava critically structured the Trika in the light of the Pratyabhijñā philosophy; and he synthesized under its rubric an enormous range of symbolism and ritual from diverse *tantric* traditions.[17] Again, Abhinavagupta's long commentaries on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the *Abhinavabhāratī*; and on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, the *Dhvanyālokalocana*, are among the most influential aesthetic writings in Indian history. In these works Abhinavagupta developed Indian studies of literature and literary theory, and linguistic theory—while explaining the character of aesthetic experience as homologous to, and practically approaching, the monistic Śaiva soteriological realization.

Abhinavagupta's pupil, Kṣemarāja (1000-1050), further elaborated the theological insights of his teacher, particularly in a number of commentaries on foundational Śaiva texts such as the *Svacchanda Tantra*, *Śiva Sūtras*, and *Spanda Kārikās*. I believe that it is fair to say that in Abhinavagupta and the other monistic Kashmiri Śaiva thinkers of this period Hindu tantrism reached its peak of theological sophistication. This Śaivism was influential on a number of other Indian religious traditions, for example, Śrīvidyā tantrism, Bengali Vaiṣṇavism, and Southern monistic and dualistic Śaivism. However, the lineages of theological interpretation of the texts, crucial to the perpetuation of traditional Sanskritic culture, were mostly destroyed during the Islamicization of Kashmir.

The main textual focus of this book will be Utpaladeva's IPK and Abhinavagupta's IPV. However, I will also be interpreting and referring frequently to the IPKV, IPVV, and *Siddhitrayī*. These documents are the chief available expressions of what I understand as the Pratyabhijñā system per se.[18] It will generally be necessary to treat the ideas of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta together, though I will point to some possible differences between them when the occasion warrants. As is usual in foundational verse and aphorism texts, Utpala-

deva's IPK is densely written, and is intended to be expounded in subordinate commentaries. However, there is presently available only the shorter of Utpaladeva's commentaries, which is mostly concerned with clarifying the basic meaning of the verses. Abhinavagupta's commentaries have the quality of deep and original thought; but it is most often impossible to distinguish arguments that had direct precedent in Utpaladeva from those that either further or depart from his discussions. It is also in accordance with the intentions of the Indian genre of text and commentary to treat them as presenting one system.

For the elucidation of the works just mentioned, I will also refer to several other related texts—scriptures; pertinent philosophical writings of other traditions; the SD; the TA and other writings of Abhinavagupta; the eighteenth-century commentary on the IPV by Bhāskarakaṇṭha; and later writings expressing some of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics, Virūpākṣanātha's *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā* with the commentary of Vidyācakravartin,[19] and the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra* and the commentary *Mānasollāsa*, wrongly attributed to Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.[20]

During this century, in both India and the West, there has been increasing interest in the monistic Śaiva traditions of Kashmir.[21] The most important progress in scholarship, in my opinion, has been a developing awareness of the historical diversity and complexity of the traditions. The exaggeration of the interpretive scope of limited appropriations has been the main problem. The misconception already explained, that the expression "Kashmir Śaivism" can designate one unanimous tradition, has only gradually been disappearing.[22] The complexly overlapping monistic Śaiva traditions have also been too simplistically reified as distinct schools.[23] Historical simplifications have in particular been made on the basis of Abhinavagupta's theological interpretations and syntheses. The same kinds of problems have occurred in the interpretation of Abhinavagupta alone. Studies of particular features of his thought have overestimated their descriptiveness.

Alexis Sanderson is the scholar who made the most marked breakthrough in contemporary understanding of the historical complexity of the interweaving Kashmiri tantric traditions, and the transformations of them in the theology of Abhinavagupta.[24] Mark Dyczkowski has developed a complementary historical perspective in his important works.[25] My understanding of the history of monistic Śaivism is particularly indebted to these two scholars.

It must be emphasized that I have been talking about progress in an *analytic* understanding of history. The diversity of the tantric traditions does not refute the validity of interpretations of their spiritual

unity, whether by Abhinavagupta in medieval Kashmir, or by Gopinath Kaviraj in twentieth-century Varanasi. These efforts must be assessed through methods of theology—philosophical, symbolic/systematic, or practical.

Despite the increasing interest in monistic Kashmiri Śaivism, there have been relatively few works focusing intensively on the Pratyabhijñā system. The early translations and studies of Pandey and Kaw are important pioneering works (particularly those of Pandey).[26] However, they suffer from the general historical misconceptions just mentioned, and also give insufficient attention to the scholastic debates that the Pratyabhijñā addresses. Their translations are problematic, and opaque to nonspecialists.[27] More careful studies of a variety of topics and sections within the Pratyabhijñā corpus have been done by scholars such as Navjivan Rastogi, David Allport, Harvey Alper, Raffaelle Torella, and Bruno Nagel.[28] These have added significantly to the understanding of the relation of the Pratyabhijñā not only to monistic Kashmiri Śaivism but to other Hindu and Buddhist philosophical traditions.

This book is not only an exercise in the empirical, textual discourse that is philology, but has a philosophical-theoretical agenda. Nevertheless, I believe that I have made important progress in the philological understanding of the Pratyabhijñā texts. One notable feature of the present study is that it attempts to examine the overarching argumentation of the entire Pratyabhijñā *śāstra* comprising the IPK, its commentaries and secondary texts—rather than only particular sections of the corpus. Many concepts can be understood only when placed in their development throughout the works.

Another notable philological aspect of the present study is a direct consequence of my philosophical concern with the Pratyabhijñā as an effort of ostensibly universal communication. I have endeavored to organize the entire descriptive aspect of my study around *expressions by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta of what they are doing in their philosophical apologetics.*[29] Such statements always merit a great deal of attention. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta not only produced a collection of interesting ideas, they were extraordinarily self-conscious and deliberate in pursuing complex agendas throughout their works.

One framework I develop uses the theological concept of "correlation" to characterize the interpretive bridge the Pratyabhijñā thinkers make between Śaiva religious doctrine and practice, on the one hand; and, on the other, the concerns and methods of the Sanskritic philosophical academy—especially debates about recognition. My in-

terpretation attempts to present some of the deeper ramifications of what the Pratyabhijñā is saying regarding both of the correlated areas. By taking a global perspective on the Pratyabhijñā from the point of view of the thinkers' stated agendas, I have been able to put together a number of technical discussions to formulate new interpretations of several important aspects of the system, including its central conception of recognition, its methods, and its theory of action.

Let me add a personal note, that attempting to understand what Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are really claiming in their philosophy has led me, and continues to lead me, to rethink, further study, and discover new things in the Western philosophical and theological traditions. Also a caution in the spirit of the critical remarks above: There is much more to the Pratyabhijñā philosophy than I am able to present. There is certainly much more to the monistic Śaiva traditions than the Pratyabhijñā apologetics. There is an astonishing amount more in the theology of Abhinavagupta alone—in reflections on symbolism, ritual and aesthetics.

Chapter 3

The Task of the Pratyabhijñā System

> Having somehow been caused to attain servitude [*dāsya*] to the Great Lord and desiring the benefit [*upakāra*] of humanity, I am establishing the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] of Him, which is the cause of obtaining all prosperity/has as its reason the apprehension of the establishment of all reality.[1]
>
> —IPK 1.1 benedictory verse, 1:18

In this chapter I will endeavor to construct a "propaedeutics" of what Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta understand themselves to be doing in the texts of the Pratyabhijñā system. I will begin by taking a useful description from contemporary theology: the interpretation of a tradition in a new context of discourse, including that made in this book, may be characterized as an effort of "correlation."[2] My concern will be to show how the Śaivas' discourse ambitiously and distinctively correlates their own soteriological traditions with the Sanskritic traditions of inter-religious philosophical discussion. From the poinṭ of view of our considerations of inter-cultural/religious intelligibility, what is important is the nature of the latter traditions of providing a context with standards for publicly assessable argument. The Śaivas' effort is far from disinterested, but is not at all compromised by this fact.

Recent analyses of the general nature of the discourse of Sanskrit "academic" texts called *śāstras* have shown the extent to which they are strongly tradition oriented—in most cases tradition, or tradition as interpreted in authoritative works, is simply cited as the basis of beliefs and principles of action.[3] However, there are many other types of *śāstras* besides those occupied with philosophy or fundamental religious

reflection in the sense explained in the first chapter. A large number of *śāstras* are "manuals" didactically summarizing the various areas of human knowledge, from religious doctrines and practices to the art of farming.

Our concern is with examples of a still large subclass of philosophical texts. These comprise much of the polemics of the especially influential Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, along with Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Advaita Vedānta, Vyākaraṇa, Buddhist logic, and various other schools. Such works are characterized by the effort to justify the authority of a particular tradition by adducing criteria of experience and rationality that are supposed to be acceptable to others. Indeed, the academic standards that function in such efforts of correlation themselves constitute traditions. This must be the case with all efforts at philosophizing. Again, new questions can be raised about the assumptions of the discursive context of any attempt to achieve more universal intelligibility. This does not undermine my contention that philosophical discourse is the most rigorously dialogical means for dealing with conflicts of views and practices starting from different assumptions. As was argued in the first chapter, the agenda of philosophy must be intrinsically open ended. In David Tracy's words, reason is only "partly history-transcending."[4]

Observations about the conservative orientations of *śāstras* in connection with particular schools, and not interschool, traditions still support a very important point about the Pratyabhijñā system. The correlation that the Śaivas endeavor to make is not a connection between two things understood as equal. The Śaivas wish to play the rules of the academic game that does not accept their authority in order to show that it in actuality depends upon their authority. As was stated in the first chapter, they attempt to situate their effort toward denaturalization fully within their soteriological myth and ritual—through ambitious argumentation that can be understood as transcendental.

In this way, the Pratyabhijñā correlationism illustrates what Alexis Sanderson has called the "overcoding" by which the various Kashmiri Śaiva traditions have appropriated the symbolism and praxis of other traditions.[5] Brian Smith has described this pattern of appropriation in the Vedic and larger South Asian contexts as "encompassment" on the basis of a presumed "hierarchical resemblance."[6] I would say that a kind of overcoding or encompassment is integral to the hermeneutic circularity of all interpretive correlations. Nevertheless, the conservative *śāstric* context may provide a stronger motivation to accommo-

date other traditions' ideas in this manner. The Śaivas' radical apologetic and soteriological project certainly required an ambitious effort of such accommodation.

As would be expected, the Śaivas take up propaedeutic issues particularly in the first chapter of the Pratyabhijñā texts. In accordance with the Indian *śāstric* and philosophical customs, many of these issues are densely summed up in the first verse of Utpaladeva quoted above.[7] They are, however, further developed in a complex manner throughout the Pratyabhijñā texts. Also, many of the matters taken up here are elucidated by discussions in Śaiva literature written both before and after the creation of the Pratyabhijñā system.

Because of the extremely dense and interconnected nature of Abhinavagupta's comments throughout these and other works, along with the points elucidated in related literature, the subjects now being taken up resist a linear explanation. My interpretation of the Śaivas' "self-consciousness" will be structured partially as appears necessitated by the texts and partially by an effort to make things more amenable to the needs of a contemporary monograph. First I will present the thinkers' indications of the religious context of the Pratyabhijñā system. Then I will treat their different levels of purpose in creating it. The bulk of the chapter will be devoted to the explanation of key features of the Pratyabhijñā methodology, as it is designed simultaneously to be universally intelligible "transcendental" argument, and tantric ritual.

Religious Heritage of the Pratyabhijñā

The thinkers provide indications at different places of the connection of the Pratyabhijñā system with the Trika form of the monistic Śaiva tradition. Abhinavagupta thus refers to the ultimate reality in the system as Anuttara. This term, meaning "Unsurpassed," is a an important Trika designation of the unity of the Supreme Lord (Parameśvara/Bhairava) and the Goddess Supreme (Parā). Abhinava again refers to Somānanda as "a pearl in the noble lineage of Tryambaka."[8] Tryambaka was a legendary Śaiva personage whom the Trika attempted to claim as its originator.[9] Likewise in the third chapter of the Pratyabhijñā texts the thinkers explain the modus operandi of the Pratyabhijñā system within the framework of the Trika triad of cosmic levels.[10]

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are also concerned to assert their positions directly within the lineage of the initiator of monistic Śaiva

philosophical apologetics, Somānanda. Utpala explains that the path that he teaches "has been revealed by me as it was explained by the great guru in the text *Śivadṛṣṭi*."[11] Likewise Abhinavagupta refers to the system (*śāstra*) as "a reflection of the wisdom of Lord Somānanda."[12] Abhinavagupta identifies himself as the student of Utpaladeva's own pupil Lakṣmaṇagupta.[13]

Utpaladeva actually states in his introductory verse that his motivating personal situation in composing the text was a religious experience—the attainment of servitude (*dāsya*) to the Great Lord. Servitude (*dāsya*) is a widespread Śaiva term for a state of high spiritual realization. Abhinava interprets this word as indicating Utpaladeva's realization of identity (*tanmayatā*) with the Supreme Lord.[14] He explains this realization in a characteristically tantric manner as comprising the possession of the Lord's Self-enjoyment (*svātmopabhoga*), and the freedom (*svātantrya*) to obtain whatever is desired.[15] According to Abhinava, the gerund construction "having been caused to attain" (*āsādya*) indicates the immediacy of Utpaladeva's effort after he had this realization.[16] Abhinava further states that Utpaladeva's realization indicates his qualification to teach others.[17] The fact that its motivation is directly consequent upon an experience of salvation points to the Pratyabhijñā philosophy's very strong rootedness in the Trika/monistic Śaiva traditions.

The Mission of Universal Redemption and Its Preliminary Objectives

The Śaivas' reflections on the purpose of the Pratyabhijñā system are complex. It is in the course of these reflections that they explain most of the other propaedeutic issues. Abhinavagupta actually finds a hierarchy of three purposes expressed in Utpaladeva's introductory verse.[18] This analysis is not a pedantic indulgence, because it clarifies areas of discussion throughout the Pratyabhijñā texts. For the sake of clarity, I briefly list these purposes before considering them in detail: The highest purpose is the manifestation of identity with the Supreme Lord. The intermediate is the experience of recognition. The lowest is the communication of the knowledge of the means to recognition.[19] We will first move back and forth between the two highest levels of purpose.

The "highest" purpose may be understood as the purpose in the most proper sense. Abhinavagupta finds this purpose expressed in two places in Utpaladeva's introductory verse. It is directly stated in

the clause, "desiring the benefit of humanity."[20] Abhinava explains the benefit that Utpala wishes to bestow as none other than the "servitude" (*dāsya*), the identity with the Great Lord, which he has himself experienced.[21]

Utpaladeva's reference to those whom he wishes to benefit as "humanity" (*jana*) addresses the important *śāstric* issue of eligibility for using the system. Abhinavagupta interprets the term humanity as indicating "those who are afflicted by incessant birth and death" and who "as objects of compassion, should be helped."[22] He explains that Utpaladeva's general reference means that there is no restriction regarding those who are eligible.[23] Abhinava is most explicit on this point in a statement at the end of the book: "Here there is no requirement of caste [*jāti*]. Therefore the benefit of all is expressed."[24] The subcommentator Bhāskarakaṇṭha also explains that Abhinava, contra the Vedāntins, is denying caste restrictions. Those eligible include Śūdras as well as Brahmans.[25]

The Pratyabhijñā is thus intended as a sort of "testimony" promoting the salvation of others. It is interesting that the very possibility of this motivation is called into question. Abhinava deems it necessary to argue that the good of others can really be a purpose. He explains that it is a purpose because it has the definitive characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of a purpose. Even one's own good would not be a purpose if it did not have this characteristic. Abhinava gives a general definition of purpose:

> The purpose [*prayojana*] is that which is aimed at [*abhisaṃhita*] as the chief thing to be accomplished, and thus prompts to actions.[26]

He cites for corroboration the classic Nyāya definition: "Purpose is that object aiming at which a person acts."[27] Abhinava explains that: "There is not a divine curse such that a purpose is only the advantage of oneself and not the advantage of others."[28]

Who did the Śaivas really expect to study and be benefited by the Pratyabhijñā system? The very fact that their ideas were written in the elite language of Sanskrit would seem to delimit the audience to much less than all humanity. It is unlikely that even Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta really believed that everyone would read the books. We shall see that the arguments of the Pratyabhijñā system receive their immediate intellectual problematic from the skeptical views on epistemology and ontology put forth by the school now often referred to as Buddhist logic. Was the system intended to convert Buddhist or

other Hindu intellectuals? The history of Indian philosophy does reveal an extensive process of reading and response of various thinkers to texts of other schools, though we will never know how much any of this resulted in conversions.

It must be observed that the impact of the Pratyabhijñā system along with monistic Śaivism in general was severely attenuated by the Islamicization of Kashmir.[29] We do know that the system was sometimes studied by such distant intellectuals as Mādhavācārya and Bhāskararāya. However, we do not know of any Buddhist philosophical texts before or after the Pratyabhijñā that respond to the monistic Śaiva doctrines. In my opinion we should extend the hermeneutic charity of taking the Śaivas seriously as intending their work to be of benefit to people outside of their tradition.[30] Important to us is that the unlimited potential audience, at least for the "academy," for their soteriologically efficacious discourse creates the need for its more universal intelligibility. We might conjecture that besides convincing those of other traditions, the Pratyabhijñā might have been understood to play the role of increasing the conviction of those already on the path.[31] We know that summaries of ancient debates function in this way for contemporary Buddhist communities. Even this function would depend upon the ostensibly universal rationality of the discourse.

The deeper significance of the Śaiva conception of recognition can be approached only after I have explained the challenge of the Buddhist opponents. However, because it is the intermediate of the three purposes analyzed by Abhinavagupta, it must be briefly taken up. Abhinava's location of recognition in the middle of his hierarchy of purposes is itself worthy of consideration. It clarifies the nature of the Śaivas' concept as bridging their salvation with a method that is simultaneously religious and intellectual. In this explanation of the recognition that Utpaladeva says in the first verse that he is establishing, Abhinava proceeds from the common epistemological to the soteriological modalities:

> Recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] has the nature of the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of that which has appeared[32] with that which is appearing. It is a cognition [*jñāna*] involving synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*, with what was known before] of something which has become present [*abhimukhībhūte*, as may be expressed][33] "This is that very Caitra." [Another sample expression of recognition is] "He is made to be recognized by the king." [As is illustrated in this last example,] recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is understood by ordinary people to be the cognition [*jñāna*] which is enlivened by synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*]

> on the occasion of the becoming present again [*punarabhimukhībhāvāvasare*] of what had been cognized [previously]. [Such a thing may have been known previously] in terms of either its general or particular character, e.g., as [someone] who is the son of someone, [someone or something which] has such a kind of appearance, or [someone or something] which has such a kind of qualities. In the present case also the Lord is known to have perfect Śaktis by means of the well-known Purāṇas, orthodox Śaivism, scriptures, inference, etc. And one's Self is immediately evident. There arises a cognition [*jñāna*] through the synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*] of these, [which may be expressed] "Indeed I am that very Lord."[34]

Abhinava interprets the consequence of the final purpose of salvation from the intermediate one of recognition as further developed by one of two meanings of the compound in Utpaladeva's introductory verse modifying the word recognition (*samastasampatsamavāptihetum*). In this, the apparently more obvious sense, the compound means that recognition *is* the cause for the obtaining of all prosperity.[35] Abhinava explains in a manner reminiscent of the Upaniṣads:

> When there is the attainment of the state of the Supreme Lord, all the prosperity which flows forth from it is attained, like the prosperity of gems got in the obtaining of Rohaṇa.[36] When one has been distracted from the supreme goal which is his own Self, what use is there of anything else which is obtained? And there is nothing other to be desired by the one who has attained the supreme goal which is that [Self].[37]

He cites one of his own verses:

> O God [*deva*], ultimately the goal of all actions and injunctions is identity with you. There will always be delusion for those who desire a goal [which is other than this].[38]

The manner in which benefit accrues from the soteriological recognition is further elaborated throughout the Pratyabhijñā texts. It is sometimes explained in terms of the practical value of recognition.[39] Abhinavagupta finds this practical value corroborated in the famous analogy of Utpaladeva near the end of the text:[40]

> There may be a woman who has become thin [from pining for a man when she learned of his excellent qualities]. Then, because of

> her many requests, he has come and stands in her presence. However, when he is unrecognized, he seems just like all other people, and does not produce happiness. Similarly the Self of everybody, who is the Lord of the universe, when His qualities are not observed is not able to realize His innate Lordship. Therefore, the recognition of Him has been explained.[41]

Abhinava explains that when unrecognized the lover appears just as an ordinary man. He compares the fulfillment obtained from the unrecognized Self to that obtained from a pot! When the woman recognizes her man she experiences "a special fulfillment [*pūrṇatā*] which is like a wonderful bloom."[42] When the Self is recognized there is "liberation while living [*jīvanmukti*] having the nature of fulfillment [*pūrṇatā*]."[43]

The Śaivas also emphasize, as is characteristic of tantrics, that the state accomplished through recognition includes omnipotence. I recall Alexis Sanderson's characterization of these traditions as valuing power over orthodox Hindu purity.[44] Abhinavagupta says of the practical value of the soteriological recognition:

> Here the practical value [*arthakriyā*] is the Lordliness [*vibhūti*] of liberation while living, which is characterized by the higher and lower powers [*siddhi*], and is essentially the wonder [*camatkāra*] that "I am the Great Lord."[45]

Utpala sums up in the very last verse of the book:

> This *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* has been composed by Utpala, the son of Udayākara, so that humanity may have power [*siddhi*] without exertion.[46]

Utpala and Abhinava explain that from what is accomplished in the system, one knows and does whatever he desires.[47] Abhinava explains that it is because the higher and lower powers are attained without exertion that the system has a great result (*mahāphala*).[48]

Abhinava sometimes mentions in his Pratyabhijñā commentaries the use of practices to attain special powers. It seems that he is ambiguous about whether these practices are required in addition to recognition. Additionally, although he is unequivocal that the result of recognition is liberation while living in which one penetrates through illusion, he sometimes speaks of the attainment of the highest perfection only after death.[49] These complexities do not concern us. What is

important is that the Pratyabhijñā system finds its originating motivation in the experience of tantric salvation, and leads to the same salvation via recognition. Even the one who does not at first seem to benefit, will do so ultimately:

> He whose [delusion] is not removed in any way, has delusion due to the Śakti of the Lord.[50] However, even his latent tendencies [*saṃskāra*] will ripen because [this system] has come to his ears. Certainly, at some time in the future, he will realize his essential nature.[51]

The Pratyabhijñā Methodology

We now turn to the system's most immediate purpose—communicating the means (*upāya*) to recognition. In various places in the Pratyabhijñā texts it is asserted that the Pratyabhijñā system itself is a soteriological method or—as Pierre Hadot describes our paradigmatic Greek philosophies—a "spiritual exercise."[52] Abhinava describes the Pratyabhijñā as a specifically Trika method, as "a means for the goal of the Person who is the Witness, who is none other than Anuttara."[53] Utpala proclaims in the third to last verse of the book: "This new, easy path has been revealed by me as it was explained by the great guru in the text *Śivadṛṣṭi*."[54] Abhinava's explanation of the path's novelty is interesting. He states that "new [signifies] contained in all the secret texts, and not well known because of concealment."[55] Abhinava is here giving the common hermeneutic device of grounding innovation in the implicit or potential significance of a tradition a distinctively tantric character of secrecy.[56] The Pratyabhijñā is described in various places specifically as a means working through knowledge (*jñānopāya*).[57]

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' understanding of the manner in which this means works is remarkably complex. They appropriate procedures of philosophical justification from outside their tradition while at the same time "overcoding" or "encompassing" them with their own symbolic and practical resources. In this discussion I will first present theological and metaphysical considerations adduced by them that in the highest perspective controvert the possibility of any methodology regarding the Supreme Lord. Then I will turn to the Śaivas' appropriation of the classic justificatory methods of Nyāya, particularly what is called the "inference for the sake of others." This will elucidate the basic intellectual form of the Pratyabhijñā method along with its area of substantive inquiry. In the final section of this chapter

I will explain the encompassment of the Pratyabhijñā methodology within a set of themes of tantric practice (brought together by Abhinavagupta in a particular classification of spiritual discipline).

Negations of Methodology

The Śaiva formulations of procedure are immediately interrupted by reflections upon what I would describe—with our own academic categories—as a fundamental religious problematic. I would describe this problematic most broadly as the possibility or utility of any finite human behavior, whether linguistic, aesthetic, theological, devotional, ritual, etc., for expressing, affecting, or attaining a religious Ultimate Reality.[58] For the Pratyabhijñā this human-Ultimate "structural" issue has two aspects—coming from its nature as both a theistic and a fully monistic system.

The first brings us to the familiar questions of divine will, grace, and human works. In theistic traditions, salvation is understood to depend upon some sort of favorable relationship between the divine and the human. Now, the former is some kind of "superperson," with superior value, power, and perhaps even reality than the latter (as a prima facie limited individual). It would seem either doubtful or impossible for the finite human to be responsible for "making" a positive relationship with the deity. At the same time that they make a variety of moral or ritual prescriptions, theologies often attempt to address this problem by making formulations negating or delimiting the efficacy of human action for bringing about salvation. Probably every attempt to correct the various analogues of "Pelagianism" is slightly different. Sometimes salvation, and even the orientation of the human that brings about proper actions (e.g., faith), are said to depend entirely on the divine grace (as in conceptions of predestination) and sometimes on some sort of combination of this grace with human response. However, the relation of negative and positive conceptions of the salvific value of human choice or actions is not only "quantitative," but depends upon the "qualitative" metaphysics in which they are conceived.

Abhinavagupta addresses this issue in several of his works. On the one hand, he acknowledges that one may discuss the most favorable conditions or actions of an aspirant for salvation. Indeed, a large portion of his writings consist in elaborate descriptions of ritual procedures. At the same time he states emphatically that in the ultimate perspective salvation is entirely accomplished by the divine will. The favorable conditions do not in any way *cause* the grace of Śiva.[59] Abhinava makes the same argument at various places in the Pratyabhijñā

texts, although not at length. Thus he takes this issue up when interpreting the causative form of the gerund "having been caused to attain" (*āsādya*) in Utpaladeva's introductory verse. Abhinava explains that the Lord does *everything*. His grace is therefore unattainable even by means of hundreds of wishes. It is because of the obfuscation of its real nature that actual causation by the Lord appears as ordinary observed causal relationships, such as the relations between means and goal (*upāyopeyabhāva*), accomplisher and accomplished (*niṣpādyaniṣpādakabhāva*), and that which makes known and that which is made known (*jñāpyajñāpakabhāva*).[60] According to Abhinava, the unconditioned nature of the Lord's grace is indicated by the adverb "somehow" (*kathaṃcit*) modifying "having been caused to attain."[61]

It is to the second aspect of the human–Ultimate structural tension that I have thematized that the Pratyabhijñā thinkers devote most of their reflection. At the same time that the Ultimate Reality is understood in "super-" personal terms as the deity Śiva, rather than as an impersonal principle, it is understood to contain all reality in a pure unity.[62] How does the general problematic express itself in the case of philosophies or theologies attempting to describe, prove, or even evoke the experience of a One? If the Ultimate Reality is nondual, the structure and cognitive presumptiveness of its realization must be fundamentally different from ordinary experience.

Ordinary experience comprises dichotomies between subject and object, as also between different subjects and objects. It includes conceptual/linguistic interpretation. And it takes place as a process in time. On the contrary, the monistic realization must be absolutely simple, conceptless, timeless—perhaps some sort of "intuition." Correspondingly, a system of conceptualization about the experience of a monistic Reality must paradoxically attempt to make epistemological sense about its object while negating its own discursiveness and intentionality. Thus in Neoplatonic dialectic the One is reached after a progressive abstraction through the hypostases of all the features of the sensual experience of matter in flux, equated with nonbeing. The One is more real than Being, more aesthetically valuable than Beauty.[63]

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers were influenced by the previous efforts of the Advaita Vedāntins to understand the nature of the experience of the monistic Brahman/Self, and the role in relation to it of scriptural and *śāstric* discourse. The Advaitins developed one of the important themes of the Upaniṣads into their classic doctrine of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*).[64] According to this doctrine, the Self knows itself in an atemporal awareness that lacks the subject-object dichotomy and conceptualization (*vikalpa*) inherent to the normal operations of

the means of cognition. The Śaivas' divergence is as important as their indebtedness to the Advaitins. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta develop a conception of self-luminosity informed by their distinctive understanding of the Self as the Supreme Lord emanating a real world through His Śakti.

I cannot now fully treat the Pratyabhijñā conception of self-luminosity because this would anticipate many of the system's philosophical arguments that must wait till later.[65] Important for us is that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are mainly concerned with showing that the Self/Lord cannot in any way be an object of cognition. They attempt to accomplish this by repudiating all the ordinary features of experience associated with such an object. Putting the convoluted discussions in a more linear fashion, the thinkers deny that (1) any cognizer (*pramātṛ*) (2) by any means (*pramāṇa*) could have (3) any cognition (*pramā, pramiti*) or proof (*siddhi*)—of which the object (*prameya*) is the Supreme Lord.

Thus, in an analysis which anticipates perhaps all the major arguments of the system, Abhinava argues that non-Śaiva views of the Self could not explain the nature of awareness. He explains that the Self that the non-Śaivas advocate would really be *insentient*. Abhinava thus attempts to demonstrate that the only subject (*pramātṛ*) who could establish or deny anything would have to be identical with the omniscient and omnipotent Lord Himself.[66] He claims that it is logically ridiculous for a being to prove or deny his own self.[67]

The repudiations of cognitive means (*pramāṇa*) and knowledge (*pramiti*)/proof (*siddhi*) pertaining to the Supreme Lord are made for the most part on the basis of His epistemologically foundational status. The very nature of the Lord is illumination (*prakāśa*). He is the source and experient of all phenomena. He is eternal; the idea of the nonexistence of that which constitutes existence is self-contradictory. The operation of episodic cognitive means or knowledge/proof with respect to Him would thus invert the dependencies.[68]

Indicating his awareness of the ancient Indian historical roots of the notion of self-luminosity, Abhinava quotes for support the rhetorical question of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, "Indeed by what can one know the knower?"[69] He also quotes one of his own verses, which appears to express something like a "creature feeling" correlated with the abstract idea of self-luminosity:

> As I have said: "All are ashamed [when they have the experience] 'I have been made an object of cognition [*prameyīkṛtam*].' Therefore, how can the Great Lord be made an object of cognition?"[70]

Despite the negations of the structure of ordinary experience articulated in the Śaiva theory of self-luminosity, Abhinavagupta is sensitive to explain common usage. Thus he acknowledges that there may be the use of a means of cognition regarding the *limited* subject insofar as he is identified with such objective entities as the body, breath, internal psychic organs, and so on.[71] He also admits that discourse about God is inherently objective. However, an effort must be made to minimize the confusion that may result from this. He informs us that this is the reason Utpaladeva in the first of his verses on self-luminosity refers to the Great Lord in the locative absolute. The indication of a preestablished condition to some extent alleviates associations with an object of present, perceptual experience.[72]

Thus we see that the Self is really always aware of Himself as the Supreme Lord in a kind of immediate, "a priori" intuition. Why does the individual not acknowledge this? It would seem necessary that doctrines, spiritual or contemporary-secular, that articulate deeper or esoteric structures of experience must account for their nonacknowledgment in common prima facie awareness through various sorts of delusion. This is also the case with monistic spiritual systems such as the Pratyabhijñā that hold conceptions of self-luminosity.

We are not concerned presently with the technicalities of the Śaiva doctrine of illusion. Important for our purposes is that on the grounds of the doctrines of self-luminosity and delusion Abhinavagupta, like the Advaita Vedāntins, gives a negative formulation of the modus operandi of the system. The system is said only to *remove the false conception that one is not aware of His identity*. The following explanation by Abhinavagupta brings together this point with the other negation of methodology; it is the Lord who both creates and removes His self-concealment:

> Nothing new is accomplished. Nor is what is really not shining [*aprakāśamāna*] illuminated [*prakāśyate*]. [Rather] the supposition [*abhimanana*] that what is shining is not shining is removed. For liberation, which is the attainment of the state of the Supreme Lord, is nothing but the removal of that [false supposition]. The cycle of suffering in rebirth [*saṃsāra*] is nothing but the nonremoval of that. Both of these [conditions of liberation and rebirth] are in essence only supposition. And both are manifested by the Blessed One.[73]

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' denials of the efficacy of human thought and action, like other such qualifications in the world's religions, do not prevent them from engaging in elaborate positive discussions of methodology. I believe that we may take another term

from Western theology in describing the negative formulations as "dialectically" complicating their more positive descriptions. What is important for us is that in delimiting their new philosophical procedures from the viewpoint of Ultimate Reality, the thinkers are from the start carefully preserving their intratraditional integrity. Though the Śaiva soteriological realization will be entered into the game of methodologically detached interreligious debate, it is already the winner.[74]

Positive Formulations of Method: The Pursuit of Universal Intelligibility Following the Nyāya Protocol

In considering the relation of the Pratyabhijñā method to Indian standards of philosophical argument, we must rely on explanations of Abhinavagupta. Utpaladeva does not seem directly to treat this issue in his available writings. Certainly the classic philosophical standards are in many ways implied in his speculation, and Abhinava's formulations are profoundly elucidative of Utpala's thought. Nevertheless we may see here some of Abhinava's genuine innovations.

As explained in chapter 1, the standards of argument that were most widely accepted by the diverse Indian philosophical schools were those developed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. Gautama summarized these standards as sixteen categories pertaining to philosophical discussion at *Nyāya Sutra* 1.1, and these were elaborated with ever greater sophistication in later commentaries.[75]

Though in the truest perspective the Pratyabhijñā system does not do anything, when it comes to positive discussions of philosophical methodology, Abhinavagupta asserts that it adheres to the standards of Nyāya: "There is the correctness only of the method of the Naiyāyikas in the condition of Māyā."[76] He explains the very power of the system to convince others on the basis of its addressing the Nyāya categories:

> The ultimate purpose in that [*śāstra*] is nothing but [explanation in terms of] the sixteen categories, such as the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*], etc. . . . When the sixteen categories are articulated [*nirūpyamāṇeṣu*], another is made to understand completely that which is to be understood.[77]

For understanding the Pratyabhijñā as a correlational enterprise, these classical argumentative standards may be taken as the norms of a critical academic community. They are the "traditions" of denaturalizing sectarian views for the sake of more universal intelligibility.

To give the reader at least an idea of the sixteen categories, I briefly enumerate them, largely following the glosses of Matilal.[78] The first two categories, the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the objects to be cognized (*prameya*), may be broadly taken as identifying fields of investigation roughly corresponding to epistemology and ontology (integral to each other in the Indian context). Then come the formal preliminaries of a well-rounded philosophical debate, namely, doubt (*saṃśaya*), purpose (*prayojana*), observational data (*dṛṣṭānta*), doctrinal positions and argumentative premises (*siddhānta*), the schema for argument (*avayava*-the limbs), supportive reasoning (*tarka*), and decision (*nirṇaya*). Next are the three forms of philosophical debate.[79] Then pseudo-evidence, quibbling, sophistical rejoinders, and situations for courting defeat.[80]

The sixteen Nyāya categories are somewhat overlapping in their significance; and they refer to items of different orders—subject matters and proper and improper methods. Their significance may be taken as a variety of concerns that must be addressed, more than as items that necessarily have to be considered separately.[81] The Pratyabhijñā corpus, like the majority of Indian philosophical works, does not even mention most of the categories, and they must be understood as only implicitly operative within its discourse.

Some of the categories, namely, the basic doctrinal position and purpose, have actually already been discussed, and the meaning of others may be apparent to the reader. It would not be useful to attempt to explain the pertinence of every one of them for the Śaivas. I will be concerned with two main categories in examining the Pratyabhijñā discourse. In the present chapter I will focus on the way in which the system is structured by the "schema for argument" (*avayava*) because this category is said directly to account for its achievement of universal intelligibility. This schema may indeed be taken as the chief positive formulation of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical method that, as we shall see, is also clearly "overcoded" by the Śaiva soteriology. The next chapter will consider the role of doubt as defining the intellectual problematics to respond to which the schema and other categories are brought into play.

Philosophical Rationalization with the Nyāya Schema for Argument: Inference for the Sake of Others

The Nyāya category most emphasized by Abhinavagupta is the schema for argument (*avayava*). This schema presents the steps of what is called the "inference for the sake of others" (*parārthānumāna*). There developed

in Indian philosophy a distinction between two types of inference, that for the sake of oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and that for the sake of others. The latter is given a rigorously explicit formulation in order to make logical justification from experiential and conceptual evidence assessable by any critical person. Abhinava explains:

> What is the purpose with respect to the other? This [work] is for the comprehension of the other. And there is that from the inference for the sake of others.[82]

The conceptualization of the Pratyabhijñā arguments according to this schema further underlines the nature of the Śaiva attempt as the demonstration of truth on the basis of ostensibly universal criteria of experience and rationality.[83]

I will, again briefly, review the classic Nyāya inference for the sake of others. This inference has five steps and four or five terms.[84] The following outline uses the common example of the inference of fire from smoke. The numbered items are the steps; the other expressions given are the terms:[85]

1. Thesis (*pratijñā*): There is fire on the hill. The hill is the subject (*pakṣa*) of the inference. The fire is that which is to be established (*sādhya*) pertaining to it.
2. Reason (*hetu*): Because there is smoke. The smoke itself, like the inferential step that invokes it, is also designated with the word "reason" (*hetu*). It is a property found in the subject, and known to be concomitant with that which is to be established. As such it is the justification for the inference.
3. General principle with exemplification (*udāharaṇa*): Where there is smoke there is fire, like in the kitchen and unlike on the lake. This step explains the concomitance underlying the reason. The kitchen is the positive example illustrating the concomitance (*sapakṣa*). The lake is the negative example (*vipakṣa*), showing that the property does not have concomitance with a class wider than that which is to be established. (This term is usually not cited by the Śaivas.)
4. Application (*upanaya*): The hill, because it has smoke on it, has fire on it. This step explicitly asserts that the subject falls within the concomitance shown by the previous step.
5. Conclusion (*nigamana*): Therefore there is fire on the hill. This repeats the thesis as established.

Now, Abhinava goes so far in what might be called his enthusiasm for philosophical rationalization as to contend that the Pratyabhijñā corpus itself is structured as an inference for the sake of others.[86] He attempts to ground this in the classic Nyāya traditions of argument:

> It has been explained by the founder of Nyāya, Akṣapāda, that every academic text [*śāstra*] apart from scripture really consists of the inference for the sake of others, and [thus] brings about the complete comprehension of the other.[87]

Abhinava even indicates correspondences of inferential steps with parts of the Pratyabhijñā text. He explains that Utpaladeva's introductory verse states the thesis. The third to last of the concluding verses, announcing "This new easy path has been revealed by me,"[88] expresses the inferential conclusion. The middle of the book expresses the "reason (*hetu*), etc.," that is, steps 2 through 4.[89]

Though the correspondences with particular parts of the text must not be taken too strictly, Abhinava's characterization is quite illuminating. Though the introductory and concluding verses do not have the style of a formal thesis and conclusion, this may be taken as their implicit meaning.[90] The proposition that the Pratyabhijñā inference demonstrates is of course that of the soteriological recognition—that one is identical with the Lord.[91] The subject (*pakṣa*) of the thesis is the person, and what is to be established (*sādhya*) is that he or she is the Lord.

I observe that the reason, general principle, and application are stated by Abhinavagupta to occur in the middle of the text. This is largely constituted by the technical discussions of problems of epistemology and ontology important to the Indian philosophical academy. Here we may also reflect upon the three levels of purpose analyzed by Abhinava. These discussions provide the justificatory section of the system as means, the first level of its purpose. They thus logically ground the closely interrelated middle and final purposes of the system, recognition and salvation.

We must now endeavor to get a programmatic understanding of how this justification works abstracted from the technical details of the theories that actually articulate it. What is the reason in the Pratyabhijñā inference that the individual is identical with Śiva? In approaching this question, it will be useful first to delineate the area of substantive inquiry through which the reason is propounded. It will be recalled that Abhinava finds two different meanings for the

compound modifying the word "recognition" in Utpaladeva's introductory verse, that is, *samastasampatsamavāptihetum*. The first meaning already discussed is that recognition is "the cause for the obtaining of all prosperity." According to Abhinava, when the compound is understood in the second sense as a "possessive" (*bahuvrīhi*) compound, it expresses the means (*upāya*) to recognition.[92]

In this construal the compound indicates that recognition *has or involves* what its constituents describe. All these constituents are also given different meanings. The final word that I previously translated "cause," *hetu*, is actually also the word for "reason" as both inferential step and term. It is not certain that Abhinava has the inferential significance directly in mind in this construal. However, whether the word is taken as cause, reason in general, or the step or term of the inference, the basic point about the Pratyabhijñā inquiry is the same.

The word *samavāpti* in this gloss means "attaining" in the sense of a philosophical "apprehension." The word *sampat*, rather than "prosperity," is understood as "establishment" in a sense that is both cognitive and metaphysical. "All" (*samasta*) is taken to refer to all the objects of experience. Abhinavagupta explains:

> "All" [refers to everything] which is existent and nonexistent, and internal and external, such as blue, pleasure, etc. There is the accomplishing [*sampat*], accomplishment [*sampatti*][93] or establishment [*siddhi*] of all this, that is, the awareness [*prakāśa*] of it as such. [Through this system, there is regarding this *sampat*] a complete [*samyak*] apprehension [*avāpti*], that is, a development of judgment [*vimarśarūḍhi*].[94] This [apprehension of the establishment of all things] is the reason [*hetu*] for that recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]. There is thus taught here the attainment of the Ultimate Subject by means of the study of the cognition [*pramā*] of the blue, pleasure, etc., which are clearly appearing [in common experience].[95]

Shortly later Abhinava explains further:

> The object [such as blue, pleasure, etc.], which has been explained [in the interpretation of the compound just given] to be indicated by [the words in the compound] *samastasampat*, is at first the cause/reason [*hetu*] for virtue, sin, etc., which are [in turn] root causes of the cycle of suffering in rebirth [*saṃsāra*]. . . . By *karaṇavyutpatti*[96] it is ex-plained as the means [*upāya*] for the path beyond the world. Thus at the end of the book . . . when he indicates that Lordship is characterized by the doing of that which is extremely difficult, he explains that the means [*upāya*] is the chief subject of discussion [in this system].[97]

These statements are highly significant. Abhinava says that recognition is attained through the study of the underlying establishment of all the features of internal and external experience.[98] I believe that Abhinava here interprets common areas of epistemological and ontological study in a way that may be understood as specifying a kind of *transcendental* inquiry. The Śaivas do not merely attempt to justify their soteriology in a manner parallel to other items of experience. Rather, they argue that their God is *necessary* to the establishment of all such items. In the language of David Tracy, the identity of Śiva with the individual will be discovered as a grounding "limit of" beyond the "limits to" the various areas of our experience determined through philosophical study.[99]

Abhinavagupta's second comment illustrates the ambitiousness with which he and Utpaladeva pursue their transcendental inquiry. Claiming to be enacting the Lord's omnipotence and employing the transgressive, "transfigurative" approach regarding the normally binding characteristic of tantrism, they will make the examination of ordinary experience a means for achieving the soteriological realization.[100] The Śaivas' soteriological and transcendental-philosophical method attempts completely to "turn the tables" in the game of public academic discourse.

Even if Abhinava is taking the word *hetu* to refer to the inferential components, it does not designate the step or term of the Pratyabhijñā inference per se, but rather the sphere in which these are propounded. We are now better equipped to appreciate these components. The reason step itself is supposed to establish the connection between the inferential subject and what is to be established, that is, respectively the person and Śiva. It does this by demonstrating a quality, the reason *term*, in the subject, which is known to be invariably concomitant with that which is to be established.

Now the most distinctive fact known about Śiva is expressed in the cosmogonic myth. That is, Śiva emanates the universe through His power and consort Śakti, whose identity with Himself is described as sexual union. The reason step in the Pratyabhijñā inference is precisely that the individual is the actor in the cosmogonic myth of emanation.

The Śaivas articulate this reason, that the individual is—transcendentally/necessarily—the emanator of the universe, through their actual philosophical theories that we will take up later. They also describe it with a variety of ad hoc figurative expressions. The most important expression of the reason step in programmatic discussions of Pratyabhijñā methodology is simply that the individual possesses

Śakti.[101] In this formulation, Śakti Herself is the reason as the step's component term. As Utpaladeva states in the second verse of the *śāstra:*

> This recognition of Him, who though experienced is not noticed due to the force of delusion, is made to be experienced through the revealing of [His] Śakti [*śaktyāviṣkaraṇa*].[102]

As we shall see, this *revealing of Śakti* that is performed by the inference's reason step, is also rich with significance in the context of tantric praxis.

For the purposes of different sorts of philosophical and theological explanation, Śakti is often analyzed into special modalities that designate Śiva's emanatory power as operative in the respective spheres of explanation. These modalities are themselves also called Śaktis. In his summary formulations, Abhinava usually mentions the Śaktis of Cognition (*jñāna* or *dṛk*) and Action (*kriyā*).[103] These provide the broad subjects of the two main philosophical sections of the book, the *Jñānādhikāra* and *Kriyādhikāra*—which we shall see correspond roughly to our areas of epistemology and ontology.[104]

We shall also observe that in actual practice these two Śaktis are further subdivided, and additional Śaktis are invoked. The differentiations among Śaktis as well as between Śaktis and Śiva are merely heuristic. Abhinava compares such discrimination to the analysis of the powers of fire for burning and cooking.[105] Elsewhere, Abhinava explains that by the term Śaktis there are indicated the qualities (*dharma*) of the Lord.[106] These are precisely the qualities that are claimed by the *śāstra* to belong to the student.

It is through the transcendental inquiry that transfigures all the features of internal and external experience that the individual's possession of Śakti is demonstrated or "revealed." While we cannot fully understand this process until we get into the philosophical discussions of recognition in interpretation, it may be summarized abstractly: the demonstration that the individual possesses the emanatory Śakti operative in a particular sphere is made by a *reduction of all its features to modalities of his or her subjectivity.* This is brought out in a concise formulation by Utpaladeva regarding the philosophically encompassing powers of Cognition and Action:

> There is the establishment [*pratiṣṭhā*] of insentient entities as grounded in living beings [*jīvadāśrayā*]. The life of living beings is maintained to be the [Śaktis of] Cognition and Action.[107]

Abhinavagupta explains that by living beings Utpaladeva means subjects (*pramātṛ*). These include all apparently limited subjects, from a

worm to the gods Brahma and Sadāśiva. The system demonstrates that the very existence of objects is the subject's exercise of cognition and action over them.[108]

This gives us a programmatic understanding of the reason of the Pratyabhijñā inference. The third step of the inference states the concomitance of Śiva with His character as emanator, that is, Śakti, and so on, and gives examples demonstrating this concomitance. The fourth explicitly asserts that the individual falls within this concomitance. The conclusion reiterates the thesis that the individual is actually the Lord. The entire inference will be further clarified by the presentation of some informal summaries of it by Abhinavagupta.

In our first summary, the reason is formulated directly in terms of the Cognition and Action modalities of Śakti. Two supporting examples are mentioned, the Lord Śiva Himself as known in sacred literature; and the king, who like the Lord Śiva, knows and acts over all his subjects. Abhinava explains:

> The subject [*pramātṛ*], because he is endowed with the Cognition and Action Śaktis, is to be understood [*vyavahartavya*] as the Lord, like the Lord who is well known in the Purāṇas, scriptures, etc. Even if He is not well known [from such texts], Lordship is established to have the nature of the possession of the Cognition and Action Śaktis over all objects. For [Lordship] is invariably associated with nothing but these [two Śaktis]. Thus the logical concomitance is understood in the case of one such as a king, who is regarded as Lord. Like the king, one is the Lord over so much as one is the cognizer and doer. It is contradictory to the nature of one who is not the Lord to be a cognizer and a doer. And the Self is cognizer and doer with regard to everything. Thus recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is established.[109]

This may be put formally as follows: (1) The subject is the Lord. (2) Because he/she has the Cognition and Action Powers. (3) Whoever has Cognition and Action Powers is Lord. Like the Lord known in the Purāṇas and scriptures, and like the king. (4) The subject, since he/she has them, is the Lord. (5) The subject is the Lord.

The following example is similar to that just given but describes the relationship of individual and universe in terms of dependence: "He who is depended on somewhere is the Lord, like a king over his domain. So does the universe [depend on] you."[110] Formally: (1) You are the Lord. (2) Because the universe depends on you. (3) He/she who is depended on somewhere is the Lord. Like the king over his domain. (4) You, on whom the universe depends, are the Lord. (5) Therefore, you are the Lord.

Several expressions by Abhinavagupta do not even mention the Lord as the inferential predicate but establish that the individual has divine status in other ways. Thus the following demonstrates that one is the pervader of the universe because he/she contains it:

> That in which something appears is the pervader [*vyāpakah*] of so much, like a casket regarding jewels. The universe, beginning with the earth and ending with Sadāśiva, as has been explained in the *śāstras*, [appears] in you who have the nature of consciousness.[111]

We analyze: (1) You are the pervader of the universe. (2) Because in you there is the manifestation of the universe. (3) That in which something manifests is the pervader of so much. Like a casket regarding jewels. (4) You, in whom the universe manifests, are the pervader of the universe. (5) Therefore, you are the pervader of the universe, beginning with the earth and ending with Sadāśiva.

Other expressions of the inference assert that the individual is full (*pūrṇa*) of the universe, like a treasure chest is of jewels; and pervades the prior and latter parts of the universe, like the earth in relation to sprouts.[112] I hope these examples have given a sufficient general view of the Pratyabhijñā methodological program as structured by the Nyāya inference for the sake of others. By submitting their soteriological vision to this academic regimen, the Śaivas are in a sense suspending their assumptions of its validity, in order to demonstrate its cogency on extratraditional grounds.

In closing this section, I wish further to emphasize that the positive conceptualization of the Pratyabhijñā modus operandi as inferentially evoking recognition is not contradictory to the negative formulations considered as addressing the problems of omnipotence/grace and self-luminosity. As I have stated, these conceptions are "dialectically" interrelated. Thus the revealing of Śakti is itself framed within the higher, negative framework of self-luminosity. Abhinava explains that it is due to the Lord's Māyā Śakti that one is not aware of his omnipotent capacity of emanating all objects of experience.[113] The system removes one's ignorance about the inferential reasons that establish recognition of identity with the Lord.[114]

The transcendental study of problems of epistemology and ontology in the Śaiva philosophical theology can be understood as a deep clarification of the nature of the person as Śiva. This is brought into focus in Abhinavagupta's comparison of the operation of the system with the questioning by which a person is cured of spirit possession:

> This is what has been said: One who is possessed by a demon [*bhauta*], although his Self is appearing [*bhāsamāne*], believes due to delusion "I have been carried off." The delusion is removed [by questioning]: "Who indeed are you?" If [he answers] "One who has such clothing and such a face," then [one replies]: "Look, you have them." The one who explains this again and again does not accomplish anything new. Similarly there is removed the delusion of bound humanity, who, though the Self is appearing [*bhāsamāne*], believe due to delusion, "I am not the Lord."[115]

The Pratyabhijñā Method in the Larger Context of Tantric Praxis: The **Śākta Upāya**

This section will endeavor to place what has been explained so far as well as some additional methodological statements in the Pratyabhijñā texts into the context of a set of broader patterns of tantric praxis. This will further elucidate the nature of the Pratyabhijñā method as ambitiously correlating and encompassing academic traditions of philosophical demonstration with the full agenda of the Śaiva soteriology. I will delimit this undertaking by considering the Pratyabhijñā method (*upāya*) vis-à-vis the typology of spiritual means propounded by Abhinavagupta in his *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra*.[116] Abhinavagupta consolidated earlier efforts of systematization by organizing a plethora of yogic and tantric spiritual techniques into a grand fourfold typology. His four "means types" (*upāya*) distinguish by characteristic emphases large and overlapping "families" of methods and methodological principles. This typology became paradigmatic for monistic Śaivas after Abhinavagupta and was read back into the earlier traditions.

I will first briefly summarize this typology. As has been explained, the highest theological rubric in Abhinavagupta's synthesis of diverse forms of theology is the Trika tradition. Abhinava's first three types are framed as operating on the levels of this tradition's characteristic cosmic triads. In ascending order, these are the "individual means" (*āṇava upāya*), the means of Śakti (*śākta upāya*) and the means of Śambhu, that is, Śiva (*śāmbhava upāya*)—named after the triad of man (*nara, aṇu*), Śakti and Śiva (a.k.a. Śambhu).[117] These types are similarly correlated with the homologous triads of the states/Goddesses "Nonsupreme" or Lower (*Aparā*), "Supreme-Nonsupreme" or Intermediate (*Parāparā*), and Supreme (*Parā*);[118] the conditions of diversity (*bheda*), unity-and-diversity (*bhedābheda*), and unity (*abheda*); and the Will (*icchā*) Śakti, Cognition (*jñāna*) Śakti, and Action (*kriyā*) Śakti. As should be

evident from some of the terms just given, the means are increasingly "internal" and "unitive." The individual means tends toward more concrete ritual or meditative practices, and the means of Śambhu is more intuitive. These three may be understood as the means proper.

At the top of the hierarchy, Abhinava posits what he calls the "nonmeans" (*anupāya*). This designates the direct absorption into Ultimate Reality of the spiritually advanced involving no practice or very slight practice.[119] In my understanding, the "nonmeans" has much of the same import as the negations of methodology in terms of divine will and self-luminosity. The final transition beyond the means system is nothing but the awareness of the fact that the Supreme Lord is always realized. And it is the Lord who, paradoxically, brings about this awareness.[120]

Some contemporary scholars have assumed that the Pratyabhijñā system teaches the "nonmeans" (*anupāya*).[121] As we have already seen, however, the system operates through an elaborate communicative *practice* of philosophical argument. The evidence is strong rather that Abhinavagupta and his successors either understand the Pratyabhijñā system as falling within the *śākta upāya* or at least associate it mainly with its characteristic practical themes.[122] In fact it seems that in some ways Abhinava uses the Pratyabhijñā ideas to structure the broader means-type. We will now examine some of the main practical themes that Abhinava synthesizes in the *śākta upāya*, and their connections with methodological formulations in the Pratyabhijñā system.

We first turn to the practice of the revealing of Śakti itself, which we have seen constitutes the reason step of the Pratyabhijñā inference. The approach to Śiva through Śakti is an ancient and pervasive tradition.[123] As Śiva's self-identical, sexually united consort, operating as His energy emanating the universe—She provides the way for the approach to Him via ordinary experience. There being much overlap between Abhinavagupta's types, he ascribes a general role to the revealing of Śakti in all the forms of practice.[124] Nevertheless, its special importance in the *śākta upāya* is indicated by the *upāya*'s very name, which expresses operation at the intermediate level of Śakti in the Trika triads. As Navjivan Rastogi has explained:

> The element of Śakti permeates all these three in varying measures and is characterized variously as gross, subtle, ultimate, etc., as the case may be. But it is the superabundance of Śakti because of which this Upāya is called Śākta.[125]

A particularly influential version of the practice of the revealing of Śaktis (to shift to the plural) in the traditions of monistic Kashmiri Śaivism was developed out of a procedure from the Krama tantric tradition of meditating upon Lordship over circles (*cakra*) of them. It is notable that Abhinavagupta elaborates a Trika interpretation of this procedure in the chapters of the *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra* presenting the *śākta upāya*.[126] In various works, Abhinavagupta's pupil Kṣemarāja makes connections between the Krama mastery of the circles of Śaktis, the revealing of Śaktis, and recognition.[127]

I will confine myself here to citing a few other passages, without making the effort to separate out earlier strands of Trika, Krama, and so forth. First I will give two statements from the *Vijñānabhairava* that vividly illustrate the background to the *śākta upāya* and the Pratyabhijñā inferential method. Here is the first:

> There is always nondifference between Śakti and the possessor of Śakti [i.e., Śiva]. Since She is thus the possessor of His qualities, She is the Supreme [*parā*] Śakti of the Supreme Self [*parātman*]. [Similarly] the burning power [*śakti*] of fire is not considered to be different from fire. There is this [the analysis of power and possessor of power] only as a beginning in entering into the state of knowledge. If one who has entered into the condition of Śakti would meditate on their nondifference, he would come to have the nature of Śiva. Śiva's consort [*śaivī*] is explained here to be the door. Dear, just as different places, etc., are cognized by means of the light of a lamp and the rays of the sun, so is Śiva [cognized] by means of Śakti.[128]

Another passage is even more interesting. The post-Abhinavagupta commentator Śivopādhyāya explicitly identifies this passage as describing the contemplation of Pratyabhijñā and classifies it within the *śākta upāya*.[129] As with some discussions in the Pratyabhijñā texts, this passage does not explicitly mention Śakti, but refers to the realization of the possession of the definitive world-emanating qualities of God. These are the fundamental modalities of Cognition and Action that organize the Pratyabhijñā texts:

> One can become Śiva from the firm conviction: "The Supreme Lord is all-cognizer [*sarvajña*], all-doer [*sarvakartṛ*], and pervasive. I, who have the qualities [*dharma*] of Śiva, am none but He. Just as the waves belong to the water, the flames belong to a fire, and

> light belongs to the sun, these waves[130] of the universe belong to Bhairava, who is none but me."[131]

There is seen here a remarkable similarity to the later Pratyabhijñā inference. One understands oneself as Śiva because of having his distinctive qualities (*dharma*) of emanation. This expression contains exactly what constitutes the fourth, application, step of the inference, that is, "I, who have the qualities [*dharma*] of Śiva, am none but He." The contemplation described here may be seen as having the very "rationality" that is explicated in Abhinavagupta's use of the schema of inference for the sake of others. The "correlational" interpretation really elucidates the presumption of the original practice.

Abhinava describes the revealing of Śakti in the *śākta upāya* in terms of the same modalities of Cognition and Action:

> There is the condition of conceptual constructions in the *śākta* [means]. In that [state], [the Śaktis of] acting and cognizing are evident. However, according to the previous reasoning, there is a contraction of them. To the one occupied with destroying all of this contraction, there is revealed blazing Śakti, which brings about the desired internal illumination.[132]

Perhaps more distinctive than the revealing of Śakti per se, is Abhinavagupta's consolidation in the *śākta upāya* of developing understandings of the religious function of intellectual activity. The *śākta upāya* is the means based upon cognition (*jñānopāya*).[133] This can be understood on the basis of its operation on the middle level of the Trika cosmic triad, which is in one version the Cognition (*jñāna*) Śakti.[134] Abhinavagupta describes the modus operandi of the *śākta upāya* in a gnoseological manner as the "purification of conceptualization" (*vikalpasaṃskāra*). As he explains:

> One attains the realization[135] through the repeated practice of successive intellectual decisions, which are aspects of conceptualization [*vikalpa*]. They call this the means of cognition [*jñānopāya*].[136]

The classification of the Pratyabhijñā as a means of cognition has already been mentioned. Abhinava describes the Pratyabhijñā as a "means of cognition [*jñānopāya*] by which the Lord gradually comes to be recognized [*pratyabhijnāyate*]."[137] Likewise in the IPV he refers to the system as a "path of cognizing" (*saṃvedanapatha*).[138]

The quintessential "tool" of the purification of conceptualization, and thereby of the *śākta upāya,* is good or true reasoning (*sattarka*). Reasoning was increasingly seen as a spiritual means in scriptures before Abhinavagupta. Of greatest importance for Abhinavagupta were the assessments of reasoning in his most revered Trika scripture, the *Mālinīvijaya Tantra.* This scripture itself tantricizes Indian academic traditions in explaining the soteriological role of reasoning as the discrimination that encourages the movement from that which is to be abandoned (*heya*) to that which is to be pursued (*upadeya*).[139] At the same time it bestows upon it great soteriological efficacy. It states:[140]

> Although it is a limb of yoga and similar [in this respect to the other limbs of yoga], reasoning [*tarka*] is the highest limb of yoga. It is the elucidation of that which is to be abandoned, etc.[141] Therefore, effort in that [reasoning] is praised. By means of that [reasoning], the mind impelled on a path which, although it should be abandoned [*heya*] has become firm due to desire for it, must be led to a harmless state.[142]

Abhinava uses the notion of good reasoning as the supreme limb of yoga[143] as a point around which to elaborate upon its nature as the gnostic internalization of more concrete forms of practice. He explains all other concrete methods as oriented toward the achievement of good reasoning, and contends that they only derive their efficacy as informed by good reasoning. In this manner Abhinava "reduces" to modalities of good reasoning such diverse religious practices as sacrifice, oblation, recitation, vows, and even bathing.[144]

Abhinavagupta's explanations of the categories of that which is to be avoided and that which is to be pursued enable us to understand the direction of the *śākta upāya* purification. Abhinavagupta formulates a transgressive, tantric criticism of orthodox Hindu notions of purity (*śuddhi*) and impurity (*aśuddhi*). Again grounding himself in the authority of the *Mālinīvijaya,* he states:

> One should not be troubled with the discrimination of that which is to be eaten and that which is not to be eaten, purity and impurity, etc., which does not describe reality and is essentially mere mental fabrication. This has been explained in the *Śrī Pūrva* [a.k.a. *Mālinīvijaya Tantra*], etc. For purity is not a form of the real thing, as is blueness.[145]

Of special importance to us is that he redefines purity and impurity *in terms of whether or not there is apprehended the absorption of the*

objective universe into the emanatory subject, which we have seen is the significance of the revealing of Śakti:

> The impurity called supreme is the idea which distinguishes from Śiva these [things] which really have Him as their nature. Purity is the destruction of this idea.[146]

Thus Abhinava explains the pure and impure forms of conceptual construction (*vikalpa*):

> The multitude of things appear clearly in that jewel [the Self/ Lord], who is pure, and has omnipotent freedom [*svatantra*].[147] That [conceptual construction] is said to be benighted [and is impure] which comprehends differentiation between [those things] and the Self. However [there is also conceptual construction] having the nature of Pure Wisdom, which comprehends the Self as containing all objects [as is expressed]: "I am all this." This conceptual construction has the nature of Pure Wisdom and is clearly manifest; it destroys the māyic conceptual construction which causes differentiation.[148]

Good reasoning is an axe that cuts down the binding tree of differentiation of the subject and object.[149] The description of the desirable form of emanation-knowing conceptual construction in terms of Pure Wisdom (*śuddhavidyā* or *sadvidyā*) in the passage just quoted is important. Pure Wisdom is a principle found in a number of Śaiva cosmological schemes. It is the fifth principle of emanation from the Supreme Lord in the thirty-six-fold scheme of *tattvas,* and intermediate in the Trika cosmic triads. Sometimes in discussions of the *śākta upāya,* such as the above statement, Pure Wisdom is framed as the goal. However, an important principle of Abhinavagupta's theology is that spiritual means and goal are ultimately identical.[150] Abhinava thus fully identifies good reasoning with Pure Wisdom: "Good reasoning is nothing but Pure Wisdom."[151] Pure Wisdom is the insight that informs the purification of conceptualization.

Just such an "operative insight" may be understood as animating the Pratyabhijñā arguments, transforming the academic inquiries into a method of salvation. This view is supported by some less prominent but important methodological explanations in the Pratyabhijñā texts, which we have not yet considered. I will first mention the less, and then the more conclusive of these. Abhinavagupta explains the operation of the system in terms of the discrimination of that which is

to be avoided from that which is to be pursued. Because of the ubiquity of projects for such discrimination in Indian scholarly literature, this fact would not have much persuasive force in isolation from the rest of the evidence.[152] Nevertheless it is of note that Abhinava explains salvation itself with these categories:

> In this *śāstra* there is taught the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] of the essential nature of the subject. One cognizes that which is to be abandoned and that which is to be pursued, that is, his essential nature. He becomes one with his own Self, which has the essential nature of Śiva, and is the supreme thing to be pursued; and becomes liberated while living.[153]

Abhinava also frames Utpaladeva's elaborate discussion in the *Āgamādhikāra* of the sorts of subjects existing on different cosmological levels, their characteristic defilements and states of consciousness in terms of these categories.[154] The principle of discrimination is again that of the absorption or nonabsorption of the object into the emanatory subject. The condition of the subject that should be abandoned is that in which the objects delimited by Māyā are viewed as separate; from this mistake result all the afflictions such as egoism and hatred, and bondage to karma. The type of cognizer that one should try to become is the one who has attained the state of recognition and views objects as his own limbs.[155]

What makes the connection of good reasoning with the Pratyabhijñā clear is the extensive discussion of Pure Wisdom by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta in the texts' *Āgamādhikāra*.[156] Utpaladeva introduces the discussion with a concise linguistic definition: "The apposition[157] of the notions of I and this is Pure Wisdom [*sadvidyā*]."[158] According to Abhinava the next verse explains why the wisdom (*vidyā*) thus described is pure (*śuddha*).[159] Utpala states:

> For things which have fallen to the level of objects of cognition and are understood in the condition of "this" are essentially consciousness [*bodha*]. [Through Pure Wisdom] they are seen as they really are.[160]

Such knowledge is pure *because it reflects the actual state of affairs of objects as the emanation of monistic Consciousness.*

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta directly apply the conception of Pure Wisdom to the explanation of the spiritual illumination derived

from the Pratyabhijñā system.[161] Abhinava represents Pure Wisdom as a Śakti, working to counterbalance the effects of the Māyā Śakti:[162]

> When there is the development of error regarding both the object of cognition and the cognizer, then there is the Māyā Śakti. There is that [Māyā Śakti] in subjects who are bound creatures [*paśu*]. [There also occurs the situation] when, in the subjects [*pramātṛ*] who are not bound creatures, such as yogis, sages, etc., the latent tendency [*saṃskāra*] for error regarding both the cognizer and the object of cognition has not disappeared. Then the manifestation of the reality of things is the operation of the Wisdom Power.[163]

He leaves no doubt that it operates directly through the philosophical discussions:

> When there is born the condition of the bound creature . . . then the Śakti of the Supreme Lord illuminates His Lordship, as has been explained by means of the previously stated arguments. She due to whom some, having accepted these arguments and having their hearts encouraged, become successful—is the Wisdom Power.[164]

Some of the associations made here between key features of the *śākta upāya* and the Pratyabhijñā may be brought together by considering one of the last of Utpaladeva's verses in the IPK. In the verse before the one in question, Utpaladeva refers to a meditation that seems to typify what became the more "apophatic" *śāmbhava upāya:* "From concentration, through the abandonment of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*], there is gradually the condition of the Lord."[165] Then Utpaladeva presents an alternative not requiring the abandonment of conceptualization.[166] In commenting on *Vijñānabhairava,* 109–10 (discussed above), Śivopādhyāya quotes this verse as illustrating the contemplation of Pratyabhijñā, and further classifies it within the *śākta upāya*. The verse resonates with the themes we have considered of the purification of conceptualization, Good Reasoning/Pure Wisdom, the knowledge of Śakti, and again contains the "rationale" constituting the Pratyabhijñā inference:

> Even when there is the arising of conceptual constructions [*vikalpa*], the nature of the Great Lord belongs to him who recognizes [*parijānataḥ*] that he possesses the essential nature of the universe [as may be expressed] "All this is my glory."[167]

I will now conclude the examination of constellations of features of the Pratyabhijñā method with the practical themes synthesized by Abhinavagupta in the *śākta upāya.* This inquiry has further reinforced the nature of the Pratyabhijñā discourse as an ambitious attempt to play the game of "denaturalized" Sanskritic interreligious debate while at the same time encompassing the game within the *full* monistic Śaiva soteriological agenda, or mythico-ritual drama. The arguments of the text purify one's delusive conceptualization through embodying the action of the Lord's Pure Wisdom. By this Wisdom He eliminates His self-imposed ignorance of His emanation of all the features of experience through Śakti. The student is thereby led inferentially to recognize His real identity, and re-enjoy His omnipotence. The Pratyabhijñā philosophical "correlationism" in the context here provided may be seen as a culmination of the development of themes of a distinctively intellectual, "domesticizing," sort of internalization—of radical practices for reaching God through His immanence.

Chapter 4

The Challenge of the Buddhist Opponents

> We praise Śiva, who manifests the differentiated universe as the prima facie argument, and then leads it back to unity as the established conclusion.
>
> —IPV 1.2 benedictory verse, 1:81

Doubt as a Requirement for Philosophical Discourse

We now turn to consider the exposition of the challenge of the opponents in the Pratyabhijñā system. This exposition is necessary to the system's simultaneously philosophical and soteriological method, and provides the immediate intellectual context in which the Śaiva theory of recognition is articulated. I characterized philosophy in the introduction as argumentation that endeavors to formulate or arrive at views that are justified by genuinely universal criteria. The reflexivity about the underlying premises for views that is basic to this project would seem to require an awareness of alternative possibilities. A comparative-dialogical encounter with "otherness" is thus integral to the ideal-typical nature of philosophy as pursuing more universal intelligibility.

Otherness can take many different forms. There are others inside and outside a given "academy," with its distinctive feature of intertheoretic competition—expressing themselves in both philosophical and nonphilosophical ways. There are philosophical and nonphilosophical expressions from widely different periods and cultures. Many others may be uninterested in communicating or unable

to do so. Otherness, in the sense intended here, can also be conceived by the thinker himself or herself. One may endeavor to argue in a manner that would anticipate objections, by individuals, by a particular alternative "school," or by any critical inquirer.

From an appreciation for its comparative-dialogical and reflexive character, Indian traditions incorporate *doubt* (*saṃśaya*) as an essential feature of philosophical discourse. Doubt is listed as the third of the classic Nyāya categories pertaining to philosophical discussion. As was explained in the last chapter, Indian philosophies are usually developed with a conservative, apologetic stance for the views of particular schools. Philosophy is understood to proceed by considering doubt or indecision about the evidence for a particular view. By employing the schema of inference for others, along with other standard methods of debate, it then endeavors to reach a justified decision (*nirṇaya*).[1]

Most Indian philosophical texts are structured as a series of statements, questions and answers expressing the views of opponents (*pūrvapakṣa*—the "prima facie") in confrontation with the position being established (*siddhānta*—the "established conclusion").[2] In the IPK and its commentaries the whole second chapter is devoted to an initial presentation of the views of opponents. The discussions are developed further as the proponents argue their response in the remainder of the book. Abhinava himself is explicit about the intelligibility accomplished through this attempt to answer doubt:

> The nature of Ultimate Reality here [in this system] is explained through the consideration of the views of opponents as doubts and the refutation of them; it is thus very clearly manifested.[3]

The controversial, apologetic character of Indian philosophies does not mean that they are mere invective; there is an enormous amount of influence between schools in progressively developing understandings of various issues. And I believe the fact that many of the discussions may be interpreted (though with difficulty) as bearing directly on our own discussions may be taken as evincing the success of both the Indian and Western thinkers in approaching some truly universal considerations for holding views.

The Śaivas' effort of correlation attempts to achieve universal intelligibility while simultaneously reencompassing the arena of denaturalized discourse within their soteriological tradition. This is evident in Abhinava's benedictory verse to the chapter presenting the

views of the opponents, which I have taken to introduce this chapter. In this statement the otherness of philosophical opposition is situated within the traditional Śaiva myth. Here Abhinava is including the process of philosophical argument within the traditional soteriology's understandings of the Lord's acts of producing both delusion and revelation for humanity. Thus, shortly after his benediction in the introduction, Abhinavagupta quotes for support a statement from a devotional work, the *Stavacintāmaṇi* of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, which more generally describes these acts:

> Homage to God [*deva*] who, creating the delusion of the deluded who are within worldly existence, destroys it; and concealing the transoppositional bliss of cognition, uncovers it.[4]

We know that Śiva ultimately does everything. Nevertheless, corresponding to the mythical identification, the elimination of philosophical opposition is also encompassed within tantric practice. In his expositions of the *śākta upāya,* Abhinava identifies doubt with the propensity toward seeing duality, which is eliminated by good reasoning (*sattarka*).[5] The reader will also recall Abhinava's development of the assertion in the *Mālinīvijaya Tantra* about the operation of reasoning in discriminating between that which is to be avoided and that which is to be pursued. Abhinava polemically includes within the latter category the paths to salvation taught by rival traditions. Among those whom Abhinava mentions are Buddhists, Jains, Vaiṣṇavas, Vaidikas, and Sāṃkhyas.[6]

Blinded by *Māyā,* these rival schools lack good reasoning and do not understand the purification of conceptualization (*vikalpasaṃskāra*).[7] However, through purifying their reasoning, those who follow other schools can be saved:

> Even one who [because of *karma*] has developed within those [wrong systems] can come to be discriminating about his rising judgements [*parāmarśā*]. Due to the excellence of Pure Wisdom, he is purified by the descent of Śakti [*śaktipāta,* a way of describing mystical grace], and ascends the good path, from which the obstacles have been removed.[8]

The Pratyabhijñā philosophical arguments endeavor to purify other schools' conceptualizations to reflect the tantric metaphysics. In one of his final comments in the IPV, Abhinava asserts that the Pratyabhijñā *śāstra* makes the views of various other systems help

bring about the recognition of the Self, like the sun unites the essences (*rasa*) of earth and water for the nourishment of grains.[9]

Buddhist Logic Skepticism

Various rival systems are dealt with in the Pratyabhijñā texts. However, the chief opponents, and the focus in the works' chapter on the "prima facie," are the followers of the school founded by Dignāga and most influentially interpreted by Dharmakīrti.[10] This school is sometimes described as a hybrid of the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika, and is now often called "Buddhist logic." This school attempted to defend the Buddhist soteriology in the framework of the Nyāya-inspired game of philosophizing about means of cognition (*pramāṇa* theory). The arguments between Buddhist logic and the Hindu realist schools of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā were the arena for the advancement of a great deal of sophisticated epistemological and ontological theory.[11]

There are not presently known any texts expressing criticisms of the Śaivas by the Buddhist logic school. It is quite possible that there were either formal or informal debates. At the time of the composition of the classic monistic Śaiva *śāstras*, Kashmir was a great center of both Hindu and Buddhist learning.[12] The monistic Śaiva writers would probably have interacted with intellectuals of various persuasions. Abhinavagupta in particular informs us that he studied with teachers of a number of philosophical traditions. However, we are in the realm of conjecture. Regardless of whether there were actual debates, what is important is that the Buddhist logicians were seen as a great intellectual threat by the large community of Hindu philosophers. By answering the epistemological and ontological challenges posed by them, the Śaivas were giving their soteriology a strong intellectual foundation.[13]

The Buddhist logicians present a challenge that presumes to be much more than the positing of an alternative set of total-interpretations, starting from alternative assumptions. The Buddhist logic may be understood as an exercise in skepticism, in the sense explained in the introduction. It must be granted that this skepticism, classifiable as a form of "phenomenalism," is in some ways more modest than those of the Buddhist Mādhyamikas, the Pyrrhonists, and many varieties of contemporary linguistic and historical relativism. Nevertheless, as with the more radical skepticisms, the Buddhist logicians deny the validity of the recognitive application of any interpretation in experience—the grounding in some given of anything persisting, substantial, or para-

digmatic. The analogy of the Śaivas' opponents with contemporary forms of skepticism will enable us to understand more clearly how the Śaivas' answer may speak to our dilemmas.[14]

This section will present the views of the Buddhist logicians only inasmuch as this illuminates the intellectual setting within which the Śaiva theory of recognition is formulated. For the sake of manageability, the presentation will largely be based on the Śaivas' own interpretation of the Buddhists' challenge; however, I will refer to some other sources to clarify what is being discussed. I will first summarize the Buddhists' analysis of the manner in which interpretation functions in the construction of experience. Much of this analysis came to be accepted by the members of a number of other schools—Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Jainism, the Śaivas, and so on. This will enable us to appreciate the significance of the Buddhists' "phenomenalistic" denial of recognition. Finally I will take up the Śaivas' interpretation of the critical force of this skepticism against their own tradition. This takes the form of an attempted refutation of the soteriological recognition that the Śaivas wish to impart, by way of a refutation of all the recognitions of the categories that are understood to be comprehended within this soteriological recognition.

Utpaladeva compactly summarizes the epistemology of Buddhist logic in the first verse of the second chapter of the IPK:

> There is one cognition [*jñāna*], which is the manifestation [*ābhāsa*] of that which is self-characterized [*svalakṣaṇa*]. However, other is that called conceptual construction [*vikalpa*], which comprises words [*sābhilāpa*] and [occurs] diversely.[15]

Following Abhinava, the word manifestation (*ābhāsa*) indicates introverted illumining or awareness (*prakāśanam antarmukham*).[16] This is a kind of self-awareness (often designated *svasaṃvedana*) that for the Buddhist logicians is integral to every cognition, validating it, so that one knows that one knows.[17] The Buddhists understand this awareness to be transient with each experience, rather than a characteristic or activity of an enduring subject. The Buddhists also take the idealistic position that this awareness is only artificially distinguishable from its ostensible object.

The term "self-characterized" (*svalakṣaṇa*) refers to what may be analyzed as its objective counterpart—it designates the ontological given in direct perception. Abhinava explains that the second word of the compound expression *svalakṣaṇa*, "characteristic" (*lakṣaṇa*—more

accurately: "defining characteristic"), indicates place, time, and form (*ākāra*). The first element, *sva*, means "self." The place, time, and form of the *svalakṣaṇa* belong only to itself.[18] Abhinava later explains that distinctions of place and time are referred to by the Buddhists only as concessions to gross understanding. All difference is of constitutive form (*ākāra*).[19] The forms constituting the *svalakṣaṇas* are the absolutely simple elements in physical sensations, visions of colors and shapes, emotions, and even the inner-sensorial aspect of thoughts.

The *svalakṣaṇa* is not known in any sort of qualificative *seeing as*. The perceptual appearances of *svalakṣaṇas* are so unique that they cannot even be distinguished from each other![20] The term *svalakṣaṇa* is sometimes translated as "unique particular" or "point instant." Though not literal, these expressions convey some of the idea. I will sometimes use the former for the sake of convenience and style.

From the direct perception of the unique particulars, the Buddhists have distinguished *vikalpa*. This and related words such as *kalpanā* may be understood as articulating conceptions of the interpretive feature of experience. Two other frequent glosses for these terms are "imagination" and "conceptual construction."[21] All of these glosses appear suitable for our purposes.

Abhinava explains that according to the Buddhists the (ostensible) objects of conceptual construction are characterized by universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).[22] The Buddhists' concept of the universal is much broader than those of the Hindu realists, as well as of most Western philosophers. Thus according to Dignāga conceptual construction includes the categories of name (*nama*), genus (*jāti*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*), and substance (*dravya*).[23] Matilal has pointed to the applicability to understanding the concept of *vikalpa* of P. F. Strawson's reconstruction of Hume's and Kant's theories of the operation of imagination in perception.[24] Following Strawson's theory of imagination, we may say that the syntheses of *vikalpa* include all "kind-identity," as well as "individual-identity."[25] These include the features of what may be called "internal, psychological" as well as "external" experience.

Utpaladeva's expression "comprises words" (*sābhilāpa*) indicates the Buddhists' partial adherence to Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. One of Bhartṛhari's well-known positions is that all experience is in some way linguistic.[26] The Buddhists hold that language is not involved in the direct perception of the unique particulars. However, they accept the view that imaginative construction is linguistic in nature.[27] Words express the universals that ostensibly synthesize unique particulars.

Now, for the Buddhists, the application of linguistic interpretation to experience depends on the memory of the acquired referential convention (*saṃketa*). The construction is applied to experience when the latter activates the relevant mnemonic impressions (*saṃskāra*).[28] Thus, in the manner explained in the introduction, the applications of *vikalpa* to experience are understood as instances of a very general sort of *recognition*.

Abhinava explains the recognitive application of linguistic interpretation to experience as having the subject-predicate structure that is typified "This is that."[29] He supports the Buddhist view with a verse from Bhartṛhari:

> The form of the word through its application is made one with the object [as is expressed] "This is that." That word is understood to be linguistic qualification [*abhijalpa*].[30]

The Buddhist logician Dharmottara thus describes the way in which an infant (who seems to remember some language as well as basic facts from previous lives) rudimentarily interprets experience through recognitive judgment (*pratyavamarśa*):

> An infant does not stop crying and does not put its mouth on the breast as long as it does not recognize [*pratyavamṛśati*] the breast being perceived as what has already been perceived. [Such a recognition is expressed] "This is that."[31]

Utpaladeva states in his summary verse that conceptual construction occurs diversely. Abhinava explains the diversity of *vikalpa* as due to the diversity of words[32] and the universals they express.[33] The recognitive structure of linguistic ascription (*abhilāpasaṃsarga*) may be illustrated with examples from some of Dignāga's categories mentioned above. In the case of a name, it could be expressed "This is Ḍittha." A quality: "This is blue color." A species/genus: "This is a cow."[34] Action could be recognized "This falls"—and so on.

Abhinava also explains the diversity of *types of experiences* as depending on the variety of words. What is ordinarily called recognition is only one of several possible expressions of a deeper "This is that" recognitive structure. Thus after he quotes the verse of Bhartṛhari just considered, Abhinava gives examples:

> When there is the synthesis "that," there is memory. When there is the intermixing [*anuvedhe*] "This is that," there is recognition

> [*pratyabhijñā*]. When there is the consideration [*anurodhe*] "This is like that" there is comparison. When there is the association [*anuyoga*] "This is only that" there is discrimination.[35]

Now, the Buddhist logicians acknowledge the provisional value of conceptual construction for ordinary behavior. However, as I have stated, they make the skeptical argument that the recognitive application of interpretation to experience is ultimately *invalid*. This is the significance of Utpaladeva's description of conceptual construction as "other." Abhinavagupta finds in this compact expression the assertion that the application of the remembered words expressing universals is not grounded in immediate experience. Paradoxically using the expression "blue," to refer to an uninterpreted datum, Abhinava explains:

> That [linguistic interpretation] is not here. For linguistic interpretation is not a quality of blue. And it is not cognized by the eyes. It is something of the past which is the object of memory. And when the mnemonic impression is not awakened, there is no memory. The awakening of that [impression] arises from the cognition of the real thing. Thus there is not the memory of the linguistic interpretation at the time of the cognition of the real thing. Therefore, interpreted cognition is "other." For all interpretation directly or indirectly results from the root, uninterpreted [cognition]. "Other" means having another nature. The object of that [interpreted cognition] is that characterized by a universal [*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*]. A conventional linguistic reference is known from the behavior of one's elders or from instruction. It is not possible to make that [reference], which is accomplished through extensive conceptual construction, to the unique particular [*svalakṣaṇa*], which is extremely self-confined.[36]

All that we really know is the flux of unique particulars. This doctrine has often been classified as a species of phenomenalism. I believe that this characterization is valid. The degree of the Buddhist logicians' skepticism is necessary limited by its acceptance of the framework of discussing the nature of valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Thus, at the same time that they deny recognition, they must (paradoxically or contradictorily) attempt to characterize uninterpreted data of perception positively. Here again there is an analogy with the varieties of Western phenomenalism, the skeptical force of which resulted largely from an effort to carry scientific empiricism to an extreme.[37] Of course the ultimate motivation of the Indian theory is very different from the Western. The Buddhist logic view constitutes a philosophical rationalization of the central Buddhist soteriological

doctrine of impermanence. In fact Buddhist meditation cultivates this ostensibly more correct way of cognizing, which Stephan Beyer has described as "cinematographic."[38]

The Buddhist logicians' challenges had a great impact on the development of Indian philosophy. In polemics spanning centuries the Buddhists attempted to deconstruct many of the commonsensical and religiously significant conceptions held by the Hindu schools—external objects, ordinary and ritual action, an enduring Self, God, Bhartṛhari's metaphysical interpretation of revelation as Supreme Speech, and so forth. The application of any of the Hindu concepts to experience was held to be ungrounded. The Buddhist critiques were advanced through a variety of epistemological, ontological, and logical considerations, while the question of the validity of recognition was often seen to epitomize the discussions.[39]

The Hindu realist opponents of the Buddhists held the direct realist or "objectivist" position that there is a fully independent world corresponding exactly to our recognitive interpretations. It is notable that they generally accepted the occurrence of the originally uninterpreted experience identified by the Buddhists, and then attempted to show that the application of conceptual/linguistic interpretation is somehow grounded in it.[40] Thus the Mīmāṃsā thinker Kumārila tried to show that recognition, or synthesis utilizing memory, further elucidates universals or attributes already given through sense contact. He compared this process to the way in which the items in a dark room become clearer as one becomes accustomed to the light.[41]

Vācaspatimiśra modified the classic Nyāya understanding of perception in contending that

> there is direct perception of what is within the range of the cognition which is born of the senses, and not just what is in contact with the senses.[42]

He thus argued:

> Let it be [conceded] that the range of the senses regarding an object do not include its state at a previous time. Nevertheless that [previous state] is comprehended in perception [*jñāna*] produced by the senses, with the assistance of memory or mnemonic impressions.[43]

Corresponding to the broad defense of recognition, the Naiyāyikas elaborated upon the ontology of the quality-qualified/substance-attribute structure (united by inherence—*samavāya*) in the entities that

they claimed it establishes.[44] Our limited objective of interpreting the Śaivas unfortunately does not make it possible to survey the full range of the different thinkers' understandings of interpretation in experience, its precise relation to recognition, ontology, and so forth. I only wish to observe that these debates provided the intellectual concerns that the Pratyabhijñā thinkers believed they needed to address.[45]

Skepticism about the Śaiva Soteriological Recognition

Now it is possible to appreciate why the Śaivas formulate the soteriological realization that they wish to convey as a kind of recognition (the intermediate in Abhinava's scheme of three purposes). They deliberately set it up as having the recognitive structure of interpretation that has been problematized by the Buddhists.

One other point is relevant to the examination of how the Buddhists are understood to deny this recognition. In Indian philosophy inference itself, as an interpretation, was understood to operate through a kind of recognitive judgment (*liṅgaparāmarśa, pratisaṃdhāna. anusaṃdhāna*). Inference is the application of the knowledge—or memory—of a concomitance to a case presently at hand. One has a memory that when there is smoke there is fire. The inference identifies as falling within this concomitance a present case of smoke on a hill. The recognitive structure is exhibited most fully in the fourth, "application" (*upanaya*), step. Thus "The hill, because it has smoke on it, has fire on it."[46] For the Pratyabhijñā inference, one has a memory from scriptures and other sources of the Lord Śiva as emanating the universe, possessing Śakti, and so on. One applies this memory to the direct experience of one's own self, as is expressed "I, who have the Cognition and Action Śaktis (or other designations of emanatory power), am Śiva."[47]

The coalescence of the Śaiva recognition with the formal structure of inference is important. For it clearly focuses the validity of the recognition in question as a matter of philosophical discussion. The Śaivas' soteriological recognition is not taken in the prima facie chapter as merely a general example of what has been denied. The Śaivas elaborate strong Buddhist objections—on the basis of the denial of recognition—against what constitute every one of *the components of the Pratyabhijñā inference.*

Utpala and Abhinava first formulate Buddhist arguments against the very existence of the inferential subject (*pakṣa*)—the Self. They then present arguments against key features of the reason (*hetu*)—one's possession of Śakti(s) or Lordship. Śakti is analyzed under the two

main headings of Cognition and Action, which (as I have been saying) are efficacious in the broad fields that may be characterized as epistemology and metaphysics/ontology. Finally, the Buddhists refute the very possibility of *relation* (*sambandha*)—which Cognition and Action must somehow have with the Self/Lord in order to be considered His Śaktis.[48]

Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's interpretations of Buddhist criticisms against the Śaiva topics were developed from strategies typical of the earlier attacks against the realists, Vedāntins, and others. Simplifying, the chief strategies employed in treating the various topics may be characterized as follows:

1. The Buddhists present a description of the elementary phenomenal data underlying the various Śaiva categories. (I have been saying that such an effort is either inherently paradoxical or contradictory.)

2a. They refute the existence of an establishing means of cognition (*sādhaka pramāṇa*) for each construction primarily by denying perception in the unique particulars of grounds for the qualifications from memory.

2b. They further deny inference as establishing means. This is done largely on the basis of the view that inference is made regarding facts instances of which have already been known through perception.

3. The Buddhists also adduce repudiating means (*bādhaka pramāṇa*) against the various topics. These consist of reductio ad absurdum arguments, mainly claiming the logical impossibility of synthesizing into a unity a plurality of unique particulars at different moments.[49]

We begin with the inferential subject, the Self. The reality that the Buddhists paradoxically describe as underlying the idea of personal identity is the very series of experiences (*saṃtāna*), comprising various cognitions and particularly experiences of the body. Personal identity arises through the (recognitive) application of the mnemonic impressions (*vāsanā*) of these series to these series. Thus one forms such conceptions as "I am thin," "I am happy," "I conceptually construct," "I remember." Since recognition is invalid, these ideas are *nothing but* mental constructions.[50]

The Buddhists first deny perception as establishing means for the existence of the Self. Abhinava explains:

> It is not correct that there is a Self which has the essential nature of consciousness and is enduring. For there is no awareness of an enduring self-awareness.[51]

The Buddhists then argue for the inadequacy of inference as an establishing means. While considering the ostensible nature of the inferred Self they adduce the repudiating means, that is, they contend that the Self is logically impossible. The attempt to infer the existence of the Self that the Śaivas record follows the lines of typical Naiyāyika arguments. The attempt is to infer a Self as a substratum (*guṇin*) of various psychological attributes (*guṇa*).[52] I will mention only the salient features of the arguments.

The discussion focuses on *memory*. Both sides agree that memory has access to the past *through impressions* (*saṃskāra*) made by an original experience.[53] We may understand the Buddhist conception of an impression as a kind of "pattern" conveyed from moment to moment in the flux of experience. The proponent of the Self, on the other hand, argues that the impressions productive of memory must reside in a substratum (*āśraya*) because they constitute a kind of quality. This substratum is the Self.[54]

The Naiyāyika inference could be described as an inference of material cause from effect.[55] The Buddhists severely criticize the conception involved. They contend that if the Self were something that endured apart from the changing qualities that we actually know in immediate experience, it would have no value in explanation. As Abhinava explains the argument (while glossing some words in a verse):

> If it is accepted that qualities [*dharma*] are different "from that," i.e., the Self, then there is no modification[56] in the essential nature of the Self. Therefore that Self does not operate in memory. For it does not lose its nature previous [to an experience which will be remembered], of being non-rememberer and without mnemonic impressions [*asaṃskṛta*]. Therefore, there is the accomplishment of memory from the mnemonic impression alone.[57]

On the other hand, the impressions may be considered intrinsic properties (*viśeṣa*) of the Self. Because they change, such properties would actually turn out to be modifications. The Buddhists thus argue that this suggestion would entail that the Self is *changing* rather than enduring.[58] One would then be left with the Buddhist doctrine that memory occurs through nothing but impressions transmitted in the phenomenal succession.[59]

According to Abhinava, this reductio ad absurdum, that if the Self were of any explanatory value it would not be eternal, constitutes the repudiating means of cognition (*bādhaka pramāṇa*) regarding it.[60] The Self is both a useless hypothesis for the understanding of experience and impossible. The ideas are nicely summed up in an old Buddhist maxim quoted by Abhinavagupta:

> What is the result of rain and heat on the ether and the skin? If that [Self] is like skin, it is not eternal. If it is like the ether, it is as much as nonexistent.[61]

The Buddhist logicians then turn to what constitute the reasons in the Pratyabhijñā inference. These are the definitive characteristics of Lordship—the Śaktis. The Buddhists examine the two chief Śaktis—Cognition and Action. They first take up the Cognition Śakti.[62] I have already explained the character of Buddhist logic as a phenomenalistic position in the context of Indian epistemological (*pramāṇa*) theory; the Buddhist logicians accordingly do not wish to repudiate the existence of cognition altogether. For them, the reality of cognition is the flux of experience.

In considering cognition in the present context, the Buddhists only wish to exclude any conception of cognition that could be meaningfully considered a Śakti of the Self/Lord. They do not elaborate arguments denying experience and inference as means establishing such a cognition, as with the other Śaiva categories. Their attack rather consists only in the repudiating reductio ad absurdum (*prasaṅga*) of such a notion of cognition.[63]

This section is complex and obscure, but I believe that the main thrust of the arguments remains the impossibility of uniting a plurality of unique, episodic awarenesses in a reified "cognition" or "knowledge" existing at different points of time. Thus the problem of qualification that affected the value of an alleged Self for memory is invoked. If cognition as a Śakti were eternal, it could be associated neither with the transient objects of cognition nor with another eternal entity, the Self. Another problem is mentioned for the notion of a single enduring cognition. Because it could not be delimited, all objects would be comprehended at the same time, and in a confused manner.

Much attention is given to showing the unsuitability of an understanding of cognition taken from the Sāṃkhya school, which would seem to be viewed from the perspective of the Buddhist criticism as the most likely option available to the Śaivas. This conception attempts

to bridge the Self and objects by describing cognitions as the modifications of an insentient faculty of cognition (*buddhi*). The insentient faculty is explained to take on the nature of cognition when it receives the reflections of both the self-luminous Self (*puruṣa*) and the object. The Buddhists argue that cognition cannot be insentient; its validation must be integral to it.[64] Furthermore, the problem brought up against the Self would affect the faculty of cognition. If eternal, it would not be associated with its objects. It must therefore be transitory. The Buddhists succeed in this way in turning the Sāṃkhya theory back into their own view of a phenomenal flux of experience.[65]

The Buddhist discussion of action again follows the complete pattern of refuting recognition outlined above. There is the denial of perception and inference as establishing means, and the putting forth of a reductio ad absurdum as repudiating means.[66] Conceptually constructed action is refuted by the Buddhists as having the features of a *unity apprehended in an enduring substratum-object*, which also occurs in a *temporal sequence*. The Buddhists give the minimalist description of what really lies behind such constructions as "the origination of an object such as a body, etc., at various places."[67] For example, underlying the construction "Devadatta goes" are the observations of Devadatta inside the house and then outside of the house; behind "The milk is transformed" are the experiences of a sweet liquid and a sour, firmer substance.[68]

We first turn to the Buddhists' treatment of perception as an ostensible means for establishing the existence of action. Here the two features identified in action are denied separately. Perception is thus denied as a means of establishing the unity of action in a persisting entity:

> No substratum is perceived which is different from those moments. For only moments in a phenomenal succession [*prabandhavṛtti*] appear.[69]

The recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) of such continuity makes out only *similarity* rather than a real identity.[70]

The Buddhists next take up the question of the perception of the other feature of action—sequence. One might expect that this would be acceptable to those who hold that everything is impermanent. However, the determination of sequence in terms of before and after depends upon the recognition of extrinsic qualifications in the flux of experience. The perception of the unique particulars themselves does not establish it:

> The priority and posteriority of moments is due to synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] through conceptual cognition [*vikalpabuddhi*]. However, nothing is before or after in its essential nature. For there is only the [i.e., isolated and evanescent] entity [*vastu*]. Thus sequence, the coming before and after in action, which is brought about through conceptual construction [*vikalpa*]—does not touch the momentary entity. For the moments do not enter into relation with each other.[71]

The Buddhists also briefly take up and deny inference as a means of establishing action. They mention particularly the attempt to infer the existence of action from its effect. For example one may infer an action (of movement) from the effect of arriving at the village. However, inference depends upon concomitances between things that have already been directly perceived. There has never been a perception of action from which to infer it in other circumstances. The effect of arriving at a village is nothing but the final moment in the perceptual series.[72]

Besides denying the positive means of establishment, the Buddhists formulate a repudiating means alleging that action is logically contradictory. The two features of action, the denials of the perception of which have just been considered, are inconsistent with each other. Abhinava explains the argument:

> Sequence has as its concomitant diversity, because it is absent in that which is undifferentiated. Unity is contradictory to diversity. Therefore, how can [action] be sequential and unitary? . . . How can the substratum affected by such moments of action, which have different places, times and forms, be unitary? Therefore the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], "This is Devadatta; he has arrived at the village," cannot establish a real unity.[73]

The Buddhists then turn to consider a more abstract but nonetheless essential issue for the success of the Pratyabhijñā inference of the person's Lordship. Cognition and action (along with the other features of experience), in order to be comprehended as Śaktis, would have to have a *relation* to the Self or Lord. The Buddhists accordingly proceed to criticize the general notion of relation (*sambandha*).[74] The Buddhists are here attacking the very possibility of the concomitances of subject and predicate with the linking quality in the Pratyabhijñā inference. Without relation, the recognitive application, "I who have Lordly qualities am the Lord," would be impossible.

More generally, relation may actually be understood as epitomizing what Buddhist logic is trying to deny. Like universals, rela-

tions may be taken as a description of the ontological counterpart of recognition. They are ostensible connections, conditions seeming to endure, between the particulars experienced in different circumstances. On the basis of their fundamental doctrine of impermanence, Buddhists have generally taken a "deconstructive" approach to relations as enduring conditions.[75]

At the same time, ordinary life depends upon the understanding of connections or regularities between circumstances. This is also of importance to Buddhism as a soteriological path. There must be a way of describing what inhibits and what furthers the way to salvation. The Buddhists attempted to comprehend such connections with a theory that may perhaps be described as an attempt to characterize a relation that is not a relation. This is the special Buddhist understanding of the causal relation, the well-known conception of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). With respect to our explanatory rubrics, this constitutes the Buddhist attempt to describe the phenomenal data underlying erroneous constructions of relation.

This doctrine describes causality as a mere regularity of succession. Utpaladeva explains in a characteristic manner: "It is only cognized that when there is such and such [*tatra tatra*], such and such becomes."[76] Abhinava elaborates:

> The fixed priority and posteriority of one entity with another entity is understood in ordinary life by means of conceptual construction. Thus is what is explained as the relation of cause and effect.[77]

In this way, one might see a lump of clay followed by a pot; there is no "substantial" connection between them. Even relations that we might not expect are reduced to this characterization of causality. Thus the reality behind the container-contained relation of bowl and jujube fruit is held to be nothing but the perception of them separately and then contiguously.[78]

Again this minimalist redescription of phenomenal data precludes means for validating the recognition of more substantial relations. "There is no relation other than the relation of cause and effect [as described by the Buddhists]."[79] Abhinava explains:

> Thus only momentary entities are experienced. Nothing additional appears through direct perception. Nor [is anything additional demonstrated] through inference, which should be explained like [the denial of the inference of] action.[80]

Bhāskarakaṇṭha clarifies that the idea in the last assertion is again that there is inference only regarding what has already been perceived.[81]

The Buddhists further apply their denial of establishing means to what was at issue in the Pratyabhijñā inference. It is not only that there can be no enduring relationships; not even the Buddhists' own minimalist causal relation is observed between the Self and cognition and action. Taking into consideration some of the Buddhists' previous refutations, the argument is rather overdetermined:

> There is no cause-effect relation of the Self with cognition and action, because they are not effects of the Self, because cognition is an effect of its own collection [of causes], and because action does not exist. Thus there is no relation [of the Self] with cognition and action by which it could be cognizer and actor.[82]

The Buddhists again adduce considerations refuting all more "substantial" relations as contradictory.[83] This is approached from two angles. First, relation, as a unity, would lose its own nature by becoming associated with dual relata.

> Relation is the attaining [*prāpti*] of each other of two things which each partake in the attaining. [At the same time relation] remains unitary. . . . How can that be? That of which the entirety rests in one location cannot rest in another. For there would then be the unacceptable consequence that it would be differentiated from its own nature.[84]

Abhinava compares the logical problem here to what would be involved in a jar existing in two houses.[85]

Second, ideas of dependence (*pāratantrya*) or expectation (*apekṣā*) between particulars are held to involve contradictions. The Buddhists claim that it is impossible for particulars that are already established to depend upon or expect anything else. And there could never be such relations between particulars that do not exist.[86] The two parts of this logical critique may be taken as pointing out the impossibility of one being many and the impossibility of many being one. For the Buddhists, the conceptions of the Self as cognizer and agent are *nothing but* imagination.[87]

Such, in brief, is the Śaiva interpretation of the challenge of the Buddhists to their doctrine. The Buddhists do not merely pose the threat of any set of alternative assumptions. They make the skeptical claim that all recognitive applications of interpretation to experience are ungrounded. They argue in detail that the recognitions of the chief

components of the vision that the Śaivas wish to impart are both invalid and logically impossible.

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' articulation of this criticism against the realization that they wish to impart is essential to their communicative agenda. Sanskritic denaturalized discourse requires the reflexivity granted by such a "foil" in the demonstration of views. Perhaps the extreme, skeptical character of the Buddhist challenge is itself necessitated by the Śaivas' even greater "optimism" about the use of transcendental argument to convey the tantric salvation. The following three chapters of the book concern various aspects of the Śaivas' answer.

Chapter 5

A Summary of the Śaiva Theory of Recognition

> The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of awareness, makes His own Self into an object of cognition, even though it is not an object of cognition, because the Cognizer is unitary. . . . As He recognitively apprehends [*parāmṛśati*] His Self, so, because everything is contained within Him, He appears as blue, etc.
>
> —IPV 1.5.15, 1:267–68

How do the Śaivas answer the challenge of skepticism? Before the Navya-Nyāya,[1] the Hindu realists remained locked in the problematic defined by the Buddhists—that is, they attempted to justify the interpretation of an uninterpreted datum. Their final recourse often was just to deny the value of the skeptics' questioning the validity of constructions we all accept in daily life—in effect stipulating that there cannot be such doubts.

Chapter 3 has shown, however, that the Pratyabhijñā theory of recognition is articulated within an ambitious correlational agenda—of radical encompassment. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers attempt with their theory of recognition both to make their tantric tradition philosophically intelligible to others and, ultimately, to convey to them the soteriological realization. They follow the approach of Śiva described in Abhinava's verse quoted in the epigraph of the fourth chapter. That is, they turn everything back into Him. As is evinced in the epigraph of the present chapter, the central myth of Śiva emanating the universe through Śakti is explained as a *process of self-recognition*. Such recognition, thereby given a primordial status, is recovered through transcendental inquiry as *constituting the very facts of epistemology and*

ontology that the Buddhists say preclude it.[2] The primordial status of this recognition in turn makes the philosophical inquiry that realizes it into tantric ritual.

The Pratyabhijñā thinkers' theory of recognition is a brilliant synthesis of the understandings developed in the debates between the Hindu realists and the Buddhists, their own traditional symbolic and ritual resources, and the linguistic idealism of Bhartṛhari. As is the case with many aspects of their thought, this theory is so complex and multivalent that it resists a linear presentation. Nevertheless, I must endeavor to impose an appropriate order in presenting and interpreting some of their statements.

I will first comment on the vocabulary in which the Śaiva theory of recognition is expressed. Then I will give some basic explanation of two related complexes of ideas contributing to the Śaiva theory not yet treated: The most important of these is Bhartṛhari's interpretation of Indian traditions of sacred language, the Śaivas' use of which I am comparing with the Christian philosophical theology of logos. The other of these complexes is tantric understandings of memory as the repository of sacred language in the form of mantras. Next I will take up in a broad structural manner the ways in which the model of the Lord's self-recognition is related to ordinary experience, from the two directions of *emanation* and *return*.[3] Thus I will first discuss how the Śaivas also appropriate Bhartṛhari's scheme of levels of the concretization of speech in explaining the emanation of the Lord's self-recognition. I will then examine how the theory of recognition elucidates features of the system's simultaneously philosophical and soteriological modus operandi of return presented in chapter 3—for example, transcendental philosophical investigation, the revealing of Śakti, the inference for the sake of others, and the structuring of the system in terms of the gnoseologically internalized *śākta* means-type. Finally I will explain the strategies the Śaivas use to respond to the Buddhist reductio ad absurdum arguments against recognition, and the relation of these strategies to their own positive theory of recognition. This summary of central features of the Śaiva theory of recognition will enable us to proceed in the next two chapters to considering the ways in which it is implemented in epistemology and ontology. It is in considering such implementations that the question of justification becomes important.

Basic Vocabulary of the Śaiva Theory of Recognition

First, comments on vocabulary. The Śaiva theory of recognition is elaborated with three sets of terms. The first is the word *pratyabhijñā*

itself along with cognates such as *abhijñā,* which are usually unproblematically translated as just "recognition." The second set comprises various derivatives from the root *mṛś,* such as *vimarśa, parāmarśa, pratyavamarśa, āmarśa,* and so on. Alper has designated this class the "*mṛś* terms." There has been much discussion about the internal relations of this set.[4] Whether or not there are some differences in connotation between these terms themselves, previous scholars have not appreciated their significance in the context of the debates about imagination (*vikalpa*) and recognition treated in the previous chapter. The words derived from *mṛś* convey notions of linguistic interpretation, judgment, reflection, apprehension, and so forth, *all of which have a recognitive structure.*

The third set of terms is derived from attaching various initial prefixes to the second prefix *sam* and the root *dhā,* for example, *anusaṃdhāna, pratisaṃdhāna,* and *abhisaṃdhi.* Again these *develop the significance of recognition* through notions of synthesis or association, particularly the synthesis between different moments of experience (as analyzed by the Buddhists)—under the rubric of language.[5] All these terms have extensive backgrounds in linguistic and epistemological speculations before the Pratyabhijñā school.[6]

In the Pratyabhijñā texts, these terms are variously defined by one another, used interchangeably, and placed in close functional relationships. They are also employed disjunctively. The task here of summarizing the complex Pratyabhijñā theory of recognition before considering its implementations is already difficult; it is not possible to engage in a tortuous philological examination of usages in the abstract. The following presentation will be made on the basis of the synonymies and homologies between the classes of terms.[7] I will make my translations according to the contexts of use, leaving the important Sanskrit terms in brackets. I will often direct the attention of the reader to the overarching problematic in my glosses of the *mṛś* and *anusaṃdhāna* terms, for example, as, "recognitive ascertainment." On a few occasions it seems best to translate these terms simply as "recognition."

The Linguistic Monism of Bhartṛhari

We may now take up two important sources of ideas incorporated into the Śaiva theory of recognition that have not yet been focused upon. The first of these is the linguistic monism of Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari's system represents a philosophical development of ancient Indian understandings of sacred language—important from the Veda through the Tantras.[8] It is articulated in the context of grammatical

and linguistic speculations of the Pāṇinian school. Bhartṛhari metaphysically interpreted the sacred language of revelation as the monistic Word Absolute (*śabdabrahman*). Another term for the highest level of language in Bhartṛhari's thought, which the Śaivas often use, is Supreme Speech (*parāvāk*).[9]

For Bhartṛhari, the Word Absolute is much more subtle than what is ordinarily understood as language—words in sentences referring to separate objects. It is the essential source from which the semantic dichotomy is idealistically emanated. In the first verse of the *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari extols this principle as the Ultimate Reality generating the very sounds of speech along with the entire world of objects:

> Brahman, the Word-Principle, which is without beginning or end, is the cause of phonemes, and manifests itself as objects. From it there is the creation of the universe.[10]

On the basis of his exalted understanding of language Bhartṛhari maintains that, through its proper use and the understanding of it in the discipline of grammar, one can achieve liberation.[11]

This monism posits an intrinsically linguistic character of experience, on the basis of which one is able to make conventional references of words to objects. As Bhartṛhari explains, the linguistic plenum thus grounds knowledge and communication:

> If there were to end the eternal condition of cognition having the nature of speech, awareness could not be aware.[12] For it is this [condition that cognition has the nature of speech] which makes possible recognitive judgment [*pratyavamarśinī*]. This [condition] secures [*upabandhinī*] all the branches of learning, the crafts and the arts. Due to it, everything created is classified.[13]

The ordinary interpretation of experience gains access to the higher level of language through flashes of intuition (*pratibhā*), and communication is successful through its manifestation (*sphoṭa*). It should be clear that Bhartṛhari's basic position is diametrically opposed to that of the Buddhists.[14]

Tantric scriptures and other writings predating the Pratyabhijñā system already reflect an appropriation of the system of Bhartṛhari. The originator of monistic Śaiva philosophical apologetics, Somānanda, on the other hand, devotes substantial space in the *Śivadṛṣṭi* to defending Śaivism against Bhartṛhari's school. He is not concerned with repudiating it, but only limiting its scope as a description of the ultimate nature of things and a soteriological path. Somānanda "encompasses"

or "imperializes" Bhartṛhari by identifying Supreme Speech with Śiva's creative Śakti.[15]

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta elaborate greatly on the positive aspect of the interpretation of Bhartṛhari in Somānanda as well as the earlier tantric traditions. They identify Supreme Speech with the Lord's self-recognition (*ahampratyavamarśa*).[16] As observed in the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, and as will be further analyzed below, the Pratyabhijñā thinkers explain their cosmogonic myth of Śiva emanating the universe through Śakti as this process of His self-recognition.

As Śiva's cosmogony itself is a process of recognition, the Śaivas maintain that a kind of recognition is integral to the nature of all experience. Abhinava explains that "having the nature of synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] is invariably concomitant with consciousness."[17] He describes recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) as "the root of any of the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*], i.e., perception, inference and scripture,"[18] or simply says that it "is any of the means."[19] This is expressed in the later text following the Pratyabhijñā school, the commentary *Mānasollāsa* on the *Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra:* "Recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is the means of establishing [*sādhana*] all the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*]."[20]

The Christian philosophical theology of logos also was developed through the identification of earlier Greek and Hebraic understandings of the metaphysical grounds of the intelligibility of the world as integral features of God's nature.[21] It is of great interest that the logos has frequently been identified, from the Church Fathers to the nineteenth–twentieth-century absolute idealists, as a modality of God's self-knowledge or self-recognition. God's understanding of the rationality by which He creates the world—whether ex nihilo, through emanation, or through a combination of such notions[22]—must primordially be an understanding of something within Himself. St. Anselm of Canterbury puts it concisely:

> Hence, that Spirit, supreme as he is eternal, is thus eternally mindful of himself, and conceives of himself after the likeness of a rational mind; nay, not after the likeness of anything; but in the first place that Spirit, and the rational mind after its likeness. But, if he conceives of himself eternally, he expresses himself eternally. If he expresses himself eternally, his Word is eternally with him.[23]

God creates the world from this very self-expression:

> Hence, when the supreme Spirit expresses himself, he expresses all created beings. For, both before they were created, and now that they have been created, and after they are decayed or changed

> in any way, they are ever in him not what they are in themselves, but what this Spirit himself is.[24]

Such an understanding of the Word is elaborated in Thomas Aquinas's classic discussions of God's knowledge within himself of all things other than himself, and this knowledge as the cause of those things.[25] The Russian "Sophiologist" Sergei Bulgakov describes Wisdom in the same way:

> The first and most fundamental question which we must ask is this: is the content of the life of the world, or rather are the divine principles on which it is based, something new for God himself, which was unknown to him prior to creation and which was lacking in him, apart from his relationship to creation? It is enough to raise this question to be able to see the obvious answer. For as soon as we admit that the principle of creation is something *new* to God himself, we must recognize a certain incompleteness in God without creation. This inevitably forces us to the further conclusion, that the creation of the world, is in some sense, a sort of self-revelation for God himself.[26]

Thomas Aquinas clearly explains how our knowledge, or recognition, is ultimately grounded in this divine knowledge:

> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.[27]

> Truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.[28]

Traditional Religious Understandings of Memory

Before analyzing in more detail the Śaiva understanding of how divine self-recognition is related to ordinary experience through emanation and philosophical inquiry, one other area of constitutive influence in their theory must briefly be considered. Another pan-Indian and especially tantric theme closely related to that of sacred speech is the religious valuation of *memory*.[29] Most obviously, memory operates in the perpetuation of sacred language along with other culture. Abhinava refers to this operation in stating that the succession of memory (*smaraṇaparamparā*) regarding Ultimate Reality (*brahman*) known from the scriptures and other sources is a spiritual means.[30]

More profoundly, memory is the means of access to the essential level of language. The adept gains such access through the memory of the exemplars of this level of language in the form of mantras. This gives him salvific-"cosmogonic" as well as lower, derivative powers. Abhinavagupta explains:

> The followers of scripture maintain that memory, which is enlivened by mantra, etc., is like a wish-fulfilling gem which is capable of bestowing all powers [*siddhi*]. Thus [it has been said]: "Memory itself, taking on the nature of contemplation [*dhyāna*], etc., is the wish-fulfilling gem which manifests your Lordship."[31]

When conceived as the repository of sacred language, memory is accorded a metaphysically primordial nature. In the course of a discussion of mantra in the *Tantrāloka,* Abhinava quotes the authority of scripture in positing memory as the very origin and synthesizer of all experienced diversity:

> In the *Triśirobhairavatantra,* before the extraction of the mantras, it is explained: "Memory is the remembering which is there from the beginning in all things, and actually has the nature of mantra. It effects the apprehension of the essential nature of the object of cognition." Memory generates the essential nature of, and colors all things in multiple forms which abide everywhere. It is the attainment of one's own nature and ultimately has the nature of consciousness. It resides within the manifestation [of everything]. Therefore one should know that it is called Supreme Being [*sattā parā*].[32]

The same notion is expressed by Abhinava in a benedictory verse to a chapter on memory in the IPV, using the Upaniṣadic metaphor of the cosmic thread:

> We praise Śiva, who strings together in series on the string of memory, the heap of jewels that are the objects of words [*padārtha*], which are heaped up in the jewel room which is His heart.[33]

These exalted valuations of memory do not usurp but support the transcendental nature of recognition. The Buddhists attempted to refute recognition by denying the groundedness of the application of the mnemonic resources of interpretation to present experience. The conception of memory as primordial in effect says that all experience is the reexperience of what is remembered—this *is recognition*.[34] This way in which a formulation of recognition as transcendental may be related to an understanding of memory as transcendental is important to keep in mind. It enables us to understand how a transcendental recognition would not depend upon the contingencies of creation and activation ordinarily experienced in memory.

The Christian philosophical theology of logos and other formulations of the transcendental nature of recognition, synthesis, disclosure, and so on, are spared this problem in various ways—deliberately or just by nature. Plato's understanding of the soul's *anamnesis* of Ideas known before birth is well known.[35] Much of Christian theology, deeply influenced by Neoplatonism, used this notion[36] to describe the soul's "recollection" in itself of the Ideas in God's logos/mind as well as God Himself. In Christian mystical prayer there is also commonly a process of recollection of the soul, and of God in the depth of the soul.[37]

It must be emphasized that the higher form of memory discussed here is something much deeper than the ordinary contingent memories of life. We shall see that in expounding their theory of ordinary memory in response to the Buddhists, the Śaivas actually reduce it to a deeper sort of recognition.[38]

The Structure of Self-Recognitive Emanation

Next on our agenda is considering, in a broad structural manner, how the Pratyabhijñā thinkers relate their conception of the Lord's self-recognition to ordinary experience—by explaining the processes of emanation and return. I say that we are considering this area of their thought in a broad structural manner because we are interpreting its presumption "intratraditionally" as the interpretation of myth and philosophical/ritual practice. The final aspect of the Pratyabhijñā correlation, the ostensibly universal explanation of ordinary experience,

is made in the epistemological and ontological arguments to be taken up in the next two chapters.

We first turn to the Śaivas' interpretation of the myth of emanation as a movement from the Lord's self-recognition into recognitions transcendentally constituting ordinary experience. In explaining emanation in terms of self-recognition, the Śaivas incorporate Bhartṛhari's own account of the fragmentation of the unitary Word Absolute. Bhartṛhari described this process in a series of either three or four stages, depending upon whether one understands him like the Śaivas to have actually posited Supreme Speech (*parāvāk*) as the highest stage identical to the Word Absolute.

The Śaivas identify three of Bhartṛhari's stages (they skip a lower one) with the main cosmic levels of the Trika. We considered the Trika levels in the third chapter, as locating the spheres of operation of Abhinavagupta's spiritual means-types (*upāya*). To remind the reader, I list some of the homologous items corresponding to each of the stages in the descending order of emanation:

1. Śiva. The Śakti as well as the cosmic level designated Supreme (*parā*). The Śakti of Will (*icchā*). The condition of nondiversity (*abheda*). The means of Śambhu, that is, Śiva (*śāmbhava upāya*).
2. Śakti. The Śakti as well as the cosmic level designated Supreme-Nonsupreme or Intermediate (*parāparā*). The Śakti of Cognition (*jñāna*). The condition of simultaneous diversity and nondiversity (*bhedābheda*). The means of Śakti (*śākta upāya*).
3. The individual person (*nara/aṇu*). The Śakti as well as the cosmic level designated Nonsupreme or Lower (*aparā*). The Śakti of Action (*kriyā*). The condition of diversity (*bheda*). The "individual means" (*āṇava upāya*).

Because of its intrinsic difficulties, and since our task is already complicated enough, I will not present Bhartṛhari's scheme of speech stages independently. We will consider it only as it is appropriated by the Śaivas.[39] In their synthesis, the Śaivas describe emanation as a move from a unitary state of self-recognition to the concrete structure of reference involved in the applications of interpretation in multiplistic experience. For the sake of simplicity, this process will be described in terms suggesting present perceptual experience. However the same process occurs in all types of outer and inner experience and reflection.[40]

I will now present a long passage in which Abhinavagupta describes the process of emanation. This will be followed by some general remarks about each of the descending stages. I will further discuss various points made in this passage in relating the paradigm of recognition to the Pratyabhijñā modus operandi of return. For greater clarity, I will divide the continuous discussion according to the Trika levels:

> Recognition [*pratyavamarśa*] has the nature of verbalization [*śabdana*] as an inner talking [*antarabhilāpa*]. That verbalization does not at all depend upon the establishment of reference by convention [*saṃketa*]. It has the nature of unbroken wonder, and is like an inward nodding of the head. It is the life of language sounds of the realm of Māyā, such as [the phoneme] "a," etc., which have their reference fixed through convention. It is called Supreme because it is the inner foundation of recognitive judgements [*pratyavamarśa*] such as "This is blue" and "I am Caitra," and because it is perfect. It is called Speech because it speaks the universe by means of recognitive judgement [*pratyavamarśa*]. For this reason, "as its own essence," i.e., in the form of Consciousness, and as resting [*viśrānti*] in itself—it is the "arisen," i.e., always unset, eternal "I." Therefore it is said to be the chief "freedom of action" of the Supreme Self, and "Lordship," i.e., the nature of one who lords, and non-dependence on others.[41]
>
> Then there is the Supreme-Nonsupreme [*parāpara*] in the condition of Seeing [*paśyantī*], at the level of Śrī Sadāśiva. Here there arises the recognitive judgement [*pratyavamarśa*] having the form "this," which [because it begins to fragment the Self] involves ignorance. Nevertheless there is still the [proper understanding that the judgement "this"] rests [*viśrānti*] on the condition of "I."
>
> There is the Lower state when there is rest on the condition of "this." This state belongs to Viṣṇu, Viriñca, Indra, etc., who rule over the womb of Māyā.[42]

In the first section Abhinavagupta identifies Supreme Speech, which is the transcendent ground of concrete reference, with the Lord's self-recognition at the Trika level of Supreme. This takes the form of a completely unfragmented "I."[43] The next section concerns the second level of speech according to the Śaiva exegesis of Bhartṛhari, called "Seeing" (*paśyantī*). Abhinava identifies this level with the Supreme-Nonsupreme level of the Trika triad. Here there is the awareness of the object as dependent upon the subject. It has the expression "I am this."[44]

In the third section, Abhinava identifies Bhartṛhari's lowest level, called "Gross" (*vaikharī*), with the lowest member of the Trika.[45] This level comprises ordinary interpreted experience, from the recognitions of external objects (such as "This is that pot") to those constituting the components of the physical and psychic person. At this level self-recognition is fragmented in various ways. In order to emphasize that the interpreted object is apparently separated from the subject, this level of experience is typified with the expression "this." The Śaivas also follow Bhartṛhari in characterizing this level by the apparent separation of language from its objects. From this point of view, it may be more fully expressed with the phrase used to typify the recognitive structure of linguistic ascription: "This is that." It is also characteristic of this level of experience that recognized objects are distinguished from each other.[46]

The Philosophical and Soteriological Return

We may now turn to relating what has been said so far to the frameworks of the Pratyabhijñā system's modus operandi of return. This will greatly deepen our understanding of the system as both soteriology and philosophy. We may begin with the central positive formulation of the modus operandi as the transcendental epistemological and ontological—and *śākta upāya*—revealing of Śakti. The Śakti that the subject is discovered to possess is the reason in the inference that establishes his self-recognition as the Lord. Now, in the passage above equating Supreme Speech with the Lord's self-recognition at the Supreme level, these principles are also equated with freedom of action and Lordship. The latter are other terms for Śakti.

Thus Śakti, the mythological description of Śiva's sexually united consort, power, and mode of emanation, *is self-recognition*.[47] Utpaladeva explains this clearly:

> The ascertainment [*adhyavasā*] "This is a jar" is the Supreme Lord's Śakti, who transcends name and form; it appears as the Self and not as "this."[48]

Abhinava elaborates:

> The ascertainment [*adhyavasā*] judges [*parāmṛśantī*][49] word and object, characterized [in the verse] by name and form, as one, in the manner of "This is that." [That ascertainment] is the Supreme Lord's Śakti, who has the nature of recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*].

> It appears only "as the Self," that is, non-separately from "I." However, it never appears as "this," that is, as separate [from the Self].[50]

Some repetition may help in developing the next point. The transcendental inquiries to be taken up in the following chapters are concerned to show the nature of experience as Śakti. They will take the form of showing that the recognition of interpretation is fundamental to ordinary experience—and that such recognitions are forms of the Lord's self-recognition. Śakti, again, is the reason in the inference that structures the Pratyabhijñā system. We are lead to the startling realization that *self-recognition, the thesis-goal of the Śaivas' inferential-ritual methodology is identical with the reason that justifies it*. That is, one is inferentially led to the recognition that one is the Lord, because everything is one's self-recognition. Utpala explicitly places the interpretation of the two chief Śaktis of Cognition and Action in terms of recognition, in the position of inferential reason:

> He [the subject] is the Great Lord since it is necessarily the case that he is recognitively judging [*vimarśattvena niyatena*], and since that very recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] is the pure Cognition and Action of God [*deva*].[51]

The inferential-ritual process may be further elucidated in terms of the other characteristic theme of the Pratyabhijñā system along with the *śākta upāya* in general—the purification of conceptualization (*vikalpasaṃskāra*). The lower and intermediate stages of the emanation of self-recognition further define the reverse course that this purification has to take. I will comment on some other ideas found in the passages recently considered. First, it is notable that in the passage on emanation Abhinavagupta explains the awareness at the middle level as belonging to Sadāśiva. Sadāśiva in a more elaborated account of cosmic levels is supposed to possess Pure Wisdom (*śuddhavidyā*)—the operative insight in the *śākta upāya* and the Pratyabhijñā system.[52] Abhinava describes the structure of awareness at this level in the manner I explained Pure Wisdom in chapter 3—as the emanation-knowing awareness *of the object resting on the subject*, that is, "I am this."

At the lower level recognition takes the form of gross conceptual constructions. Here there is a loss of the emanation-knowing structure of Pure Wisdom in experience; objects are differentiated from the subject, from language, from each other, and occur in differentiated

circumstances. Again, experience at this level is typified "This"/="This is that." For example, "This is that pot." Because such constructions are unifications of what appears as differentiated, Abhinavagupta describes them as instances of reflected recognition (*chāyāmayī pratyabhijñā*).[53] He also describes them, *in the manner of what must be cognitively refined* in the *śākta upāya*, as impure (*aśuddha*).[54]

Now I direct the reader to the two passages above where Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta state that the recognitions of ordinary experience are Śakti. Both passages also assert that the recognition that is Śakti appears as the Self rather than a separate "this." *These passages are expressing the insight of the middle level of Pure Wisdom about the reality informing the lower level of fragmented experience. That is, they are endeavoring to bring about the purification of conceptualization.* This endeavor is thematized by Abhinavagupta. In the same section where he talks about the impurity of ordinary conceptually constructed experience, he states:

> Thus the [lower] condition of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] should be understood in the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of the pot, etc., [expressed] "This is that pot." However, in these levels of synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*], the Wisdom Power [*vidyāśakti,* a.k.a., *śuddhavidyā,* Pure Wisdom] flashes strongly, like lightning. Thus the gurus admit them to be first means to the Supreme State.[55]

Using the body as an example of a differentiated object, Abhinava states:

> If, cognizing the all-around perfection [*sarvataḥ pūrṇatvam*], i.e., the lack of separation, of the body, etc., one could perform the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] "I am this," he would be at the level of Sadāśiva.[56]

Abhinava later makes the rhetorically marvelous statement:

> The means [*upāya*] to be depended upon to know the nonduality which is Ultimate Reality is nothing but cognizing the nondiversity in the diversity of the manifestation of a pot.[57]

We may now understand the operation of the Pratyabhijñā system—an inference working through revealing Śakti in transcendental inquiry, and a purification of conceptualization—as a rediscovery and reintegration of the self-recognition fragmented in ordinary linguistic ascription. Because the Pratyabhijñā theory of recognition so fully

encodes the Śaiva cosmogonic myth, the inquiries that disclose it become a tantric ritual that bestows salvation.[58]

These considerations lead us further back to the Śaivas' overarching theological negations of methodology that we considered in chapter 3. I there explained the negations on the bases of the conceptions of grace and self-luminosity. I also expressed the view that Abhinava articulates the same insight in his conception of the *anupāya* or "nonmeans" of spiritual realization in his *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra*. In his discussion of the nonmeans, Abhinava propounds a conception more fundamental than but homologous to that of the identity of inferential reason and conclusion in the Pratyabhijñā. This is the *denial of the ultimate validity of any relation between a distinct spiritual means* (upāya) *and goal* (upeya)*:*

> The relation of means [*upāya*] and goal [*upeya*] is an illusion of grossness of cognition. It is the Action Śakti which is the cause of both bondage and liberation.[59]

> What use is there with reasonings regarding the self-luminous principle of consciousness [*saṃvittattva*]? . . . All means [*upāya*], external and internal, depend upon it. How could they be means [*upāya*] regarding it? . . . [Objects of different kinds of experience, such as] blue, yellow and pleasure are only awareness [*prakāśa*], that is, Śiva. Since there is [really only] this supreme nonduality which has the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], what relation of means [*upāya*] and goal [*upeya*] could there be which is other than it? For that [relation of means and goal] is only awareness [*prakāśa*].[60]

It is again the Lord's omnipotence and self-luminous unity that preclude all relationships of distinct means and the goal. This general conception of practical theology is exemplified in the relation of steps in the Pratyabhijñā inference. In negative modus-operandi language, the Pratyabhijñā system only removes the obstacles that obscure the ever-existent fact that everything is one's self-recognition as Śiva.

This practical theological understanding may be yet further situated intellectually by some abstract considerations about the relation of Śiva's emanation to the return to Him. The rediscovery of self-recognition through the Pratyabhijñā system is cast by the thinkers in a manner that may be described as *teleological*. I recall the section treated in chapter 3 where Abhinava describes the scope of the Pratyabhijñā system as the comprehension (*avāpti*) of all the features of internal and external experience.[61] Abhinava here describes this

comprehension as a "growth of recognitive judgment" (*vimarśarūḍhi*).[62] He then cites a verse from Utpaladeva's *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* that makes the point clearly. This is perhaps the most frequently cited verse throughout Abhinava's commentaries. Utpaladeva says:

> The accomplishment of the purpose [*kṛtārthatā*] of the separated recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] "this"—is the recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] of rest [*viśrānti*] in its own essential nature [expressed] "I am He."[63]

The early-twentieth-century Sanskrit commentator Harabhatta Shastri elaborates:

> The insentient object of recognitive judgement [*vimṛśya*] is separated [from the Self, as is expressed] "this." The accomplishment of its purpose [*kṛtārthatā*], is characterized by rest [*viśrānti*] in its essential nature, which is consciousness. Because of the identity [of that separated judgment "this"] with the illumination of consciousness [*caitanyaprakāśa*], [the accomplishment of its purpose] has the nature of the self-recognition [*ahampratyavamarsātmā*] of the living being [expressed][64] "I who appear as the marvelous diversity of various things am He." On this basis, the insentient thing, by rest [*viśrānti*] in I-hood [*ahambhāva*], by unification with the subject [*pramātṛ*] who has the essential nature of the recognizer [*vimṛśtṛ*]—attains noninsentience [*ajaḍatva*]. Noninsentients really have the unitary essential nature of the Supreme Subject [*parapramātṛ*]. Thus only the nondual, noninsentient Subject appears as perfectly complete [*pāripūrṇyena*] everywhere. This is the purport.[65]

Shastri's passage is notable for elucidating that Utpaladeva's expression of the soteriological recognition ("I am He") comprehends the structure we know as the application (*upanaya*) step of the Pratyabhijñā inference ("I myself who appear as the marvelous diversity of various things am He"). The philosophical arguments, as has been explained, are the means for the fruition/return of phenomena in the Lord's self-recognition.

Now the progress of phenomena *toward self-recognition* is nothing but a clarification of their ultimate nature *as self-recognition. Cosmogony and teleology are the same.* Abhinavagupta clearly reflects upon such a conception. He compares the recognition constituting ordinary experience to a point of rest in a paradoxical journey between the identical origin and goal of Śiva's self-recognition:

> That which is called recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] is the absolutely final and true [*pāryantikam eva pāramārthikam*] place of rest [*viśrāntisthānam*]; and it only has the form "I." In traveling to a village, the intermediate point of rest [*madhyaviśrāntipadam*] at the root of a tree, is explained to be created as expectant of that [final point of rest]. . . . Thus also blue, etc., existing in the intermediate recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] as "This is blue," are established to consist of the Self. For they rest upon the root recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] "I."[66]

This idea of ordinary experience as a midpoint between an identical origin and goal should not be confused with the midpoint of the Trika cosmic triad, the location of Pure Wisdom. As has been explained at length, the Pure Wisdom that animates the Pratyabhijñā system is located at a stage of the homologous emanation and return. It is located at the midpoint between origin/goal and ordinary experience—as it were, a midpoint to the midpoint.

The Śaivas' identification of the origin of the cosmos, the spiritual means, and the soteriological goal attained by such means, should be seen as exemplifying in an intensified form a generic accordance between people's basic interpretations of the world and their behavior. All presuppositions about truth, fact and value can be understood as describing noncontingent "given" conditions about the world, whether or not they are traced all the way back to the cosmogony. Human activities, including of course the goals of such activities, get their very sense from these conditions.

I am not attempting here to address the question of which comes first, interpretations or actions—myths or rituals—but only affirming how the former identifies the world within which the latter operate. This is the basic insight articulated by Clifford Geertz in terms of worldview and ethos.[67] This is also the notion emphasized—perhaps too strongly for a universal prima facie description, but it applies here—by Mircea Eliade's characterizations of ritual, that is, the telos of ritual, as the reenactment of the cosmogony.[68] Inasmuch as what I have called assumptions about noncontingent states of affairs or *foundations* are unavoidable—even a cultural relativist engages in intellectual practices the nature and purpose of which are defined in terms of the nonrelativist world of values (usually democratic), plurality and nonepistemic causes he or she takes to be the case.

This basic accordance between belief and practice may be elaborated or intensified in a variety of ways. The very process of systematic theological or philosophical reflection will make it more explicit.

Justificatory foundations and justified practices and goals are tied together by discourse itself. The accordance will be even more pronounced in transcendental or metaphysical arguments that attempt to elucidate what necessarily underlies, or in a certain way is recapitulated, in all experience, beliefs, and actions.

The more a system of beliefs reduces the number of foundations, and thus strengthens their explanatory power, there will also be a strengthening of these foundations' accordance with human practices. The Śaiva conception of deity, uniting a fully monistic ontology with theistic omnipotence, is unusually encompassing.[69] Classic monotheism, especially in its metaphysical formulations, often approaches a monistic world-explanation.[70] Jesus is both cosmogonic Alpha and the eschatalogical Omega of all human activity.

The philosophical theology of logos exhibits this heightened accordance with the variety of "epistemic practices." All human acts of knowing are understood to come, in Platonic terms, from *anamnesis*/participation in the light of the Ideas contained in the divine mind; or in Aristotelian terms, from a movement from potentiality toward the actuality of the divine intellect.[71] In salvation, the human recapitulation of the divine act is most complete. As Augustine puts it, the human image of the trinity in Memory, Intelligence, and Will comes closest in likeness to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost when redirected toward God through grace.[72] The Śaivas do not merely "simulate and participate." For them, spiritual practice along with all other human experience and behavior are disclosed as *nothing but* the divine act of cosmogonic self-recognition.[73]

These general and specific observations about the accordance between belief and practice are all relevant to the hermeneutic circularity of the practice of philosophical inquiry. As I emphasized in chapter 1, however much a philosopher's views may change, he or she must always begin and end in a set of assumptions that are his or her own. And, despite great areas of consensus or overlap between different schools of thought, the methodology of specific instances of philosophical practice will be inseparable from these positions.

This basic accordance/circularity will be even more pronounced in cases of the conservative intellectual practice of apologetics for one or another tradition. Even granting the soundness of the positions defended, the fairness and cogency of the reasoning, and the new discoveries to which it leads, the philosopher knows in advance the conclusions he or she is attempting to reach. Unless the apologetics is abandoned, the philosopher will strive to maintain a basic continuity

between the original positions and the new discoveries adduced. The Śaiva effort to make a spiritual practice out of transcendental argument, homologizing the relation of inferential reason and conclusion to the unifications inherent in their tantric myth and ritual, represents a particularly radical effort to transfigure the whole enterprise of philosophical discourse.

From the point of view of our own critical reflection, the identity of reason and conclusion found in the Pratyabhijñā inference may seem already to admit a vitiating circularity. It would thus be a blatant example of the "closure" of metaphysics. However, the circularity is not vitiating. The soteriology is not presumed from the *extratraditional* perspective, but is supposed to be demonstrated through publicly assessable arguments. Indeed, these arguments, attempting to find mediation for the Śaiva positions against the radically divergent views of Buddhist skepticism, required an enormous amount of hard "methodologically detached" and creative thinking. In effect the transcendental inquiries that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta developed provide "reasons for the reason" that is Śakti/self-recognition.[74] Such a cognitive advance is what distinguishes *hermeneutic* from vitiating circularity.[75]

It is only within the intratraditional perspective that the Pratyabhijñā does not do anything. The new Śaiva philosophy, with all its technical procedure of justification, is a path of return in a circular journey that never really departs.

Reconciling Unity and Multiplicity

One other issue must be considered. There were two phases of the Buddhists' attacks against the Śaivas. The first was the denial of recognition as the establishing means (*sādhaka pramāṇa*) for the Śaiva soteriology. We have so far in this chapter considered how the Śaivas attempt to subvert this criticism with their theory of recognition. Second, the Buddhists attempted to adduce repudiating means (*bādhaka pramāṇa*) against recognition. These consisted of reductio ad absurdum arguments, alleging the impossibility of unifying a multiplicity.

The thinkers deal with this phase of the Buddhist arguments in a manner that is more occasional and less systematic than the other. Many of their more substantial comments regarding it are made in the section on action, which, as we shall see, deals with the ontological issues of the nature and structure of what exists. It should be obvious that the logical possibility of the coexistence of unity and multiplicity

is important to a consideration of the structure of things. At the beginning of the section on action, Abhinava discusses the challenge of the Buddhists' reductios. Reflecting summarily about all the philosophical arguments with the Buddhists, he states: "In all of the prima facie view, this is the crux: How can a multiplicity be unitary?"[76]

I will present some of the Śaivas' approaches to dealing with this problem in my own order. The fundamental strategy by which one avoids contradiction is distinguishing the applications of contradictory attributes. While it is impossible that something is both *a* and not-*a* in the same aspect, it is possible that it is both in different aspects. The Śaivas do resort to this strategy of claiming that there is a differentiation of the spheres (*viṣayabheda*) of unity and multiplicity.[77] In the second chapter on action, Abhinavagupta situates an assertion of Utpaladeva to this effect by formulating the following objection of an opponent:

> There may be this doubt: Unity and multiplicity are mutually contradictory. How can they exist in a single thing? Thus there is a way of destroying the soundness [of a unity of multiplicity] with a repudiating means of cognition [*bādhaka pramāṇa*].[78]

Utpaladeva's verse answers:

> The internal reality [*tattvam*] in that is unitary. That very [internal reality], upon obtaining the status of the objects of the senses, reaches the condition of the multiplicity of places, times and essential natures.[79]

In the respect in which everything is internal and ultimately identical with Śiva, it is one; in the respect that it is emanated, it is many.[80]

The Śaivas attempt to extend this understanding of a differentiation of spheres to cover cases such as universals, substances, wholes, and so on, which apparently have external unity as well as multiplicity. For example, one recognizes a group of external particulars with the single word "cows," or recognizes the body of Caitra as unitary amidst changes of place, time, and form.[81] Such categories are the objects of the mental constructions (*kalpanā*) fragmented from the Lord's self-recognition in the manner explained in the body of this chapter. For the Śaivas these syntheses of external multiplicity, as engaged in by the subject, ultimately derive their unity from their internal source.[82]

What seems to me to complicate this explanation is that the Śaivas do not want to say that the ostensibly external unities-of-multiplicity

are illusory. The Śaiva tantrism is concerned not with a denial but with a transfiguration of experience as Śakti.[83] For the Śaivas, whatever is experienced is real; the only exceptions to this reality are things that appear, and are then sublated by later experience, such as perceptual illusions. Abhinava explains the case of the recognition of action in a unitary and multiple substratum:

> The body of Caitra appears as multiple, that is, as differentiated with respect to various places, times and forms. However, it does not at all lose its unity, as is expressed "This indeed is he." That very [body of Caitra] is an object[84] having a nature which is both single and multiple. It is the same with action. Because there is a manifestation of it, it is real. Although [illusions such as there being] two moons, etc., also appear, they are unreal. For at a later time their soundness, that is, the continuation of the operation of cognitive means [*pramāṇa*] regarding them, is destroyed [*unmūlana*]. This [later realization that there was an illusion could be expressed] in a form such as "There are not two moons." However, the recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] having the form "Caitra goes" persists and is not experienced to be sublated [*unmūlyamāna*] by anything.[85]

I understand the difficulty as follows: It may be granted that experienced unity and multiplicity have different spheres. However, how can it be claimed that everything is one at the same time that multiplicity is real?[86] Would not the problem of unity and multiplicity persist on a cosmic scale? If external unity-and-multiplicity is in some sense real, would not the logical problem remain there? On the other hand, perhaps there is a "synergistic" relation between the understanding of unity as the essence of multiplicity and the differentiation of spheres—together these ideas may account for what needs to be accounted for. Perhaps the differentiation of spheres avoids the contradiction as a provisional notion, which is comprehended in the understanding of everything as unitary. It is hard to come to a clear decision about these matters—perhaps because of the difficulty of conceiving of any sort of absolute unity!

Sometimes Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta make assertions to the effect that it is the special *nature* of the Lord that enables Him to unite multiplicity. Thus they claim that only pure Consciousness (*svaccha/nirmala cit*), as they understand it, could unite the diversity of action.[87] In the following passage, Abhinavagupta suggests that the Lord's *power* avoids the difficulty:

> Recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] is will [*icchā*], which has the nature of the desire to act. Everything which is to be created exists as undifferentiated within that [will]. . . . This universe is nothing but [the Lord's] own Self, is real [*satyarūpa*], ultimately has the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], and is nothing but the unity of unbroken awareness [*prakāśa*]. The Great Lord manifests it in a condition of differentiation; [and this condition of differentiation] itself is ultimately nothing but awareness [*prakāśa*]. Thus His Lordship is explained to be agential freedom [*svātantrya*]. [This agential freedom] has the character of the accomplishment of that which is very difficult.[88]

This solution really is a deus ex machina! It would be circular to argue that the special *nature* of the Lord allows Him to resolve unity and multiplicity—unless there were other reasons to believe that there is such a Lord.

Another frequent strategy by which the Śaivas deal with the alleged contradictoriness of unity and diversity is *analogy*. Various instances of the apparent coexistence of unity and multiplicity in ordinary experience are adduced to support the possibility on a more cosmic scale. In the first passage quoted above where Abhinava epitomizes all the reductio arguments, he continues:

> To this it has been replied: He, who has the essential nature of consciousness is like a mirror. [In this way] there is the possibility of a diversity of appearances without contradicting His unity. What is the contradiction? Therefore, the Essential Nature of things,[89] though unitary through the force of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], accommodates within Himself contrary divisions of His essential nature.[90]

Besides reflection, other analogies used to lessen the paradox of the one and the many are a painting on a wall; the unitary vista from the top of a mountain; the movements of a dancer; and the relationships between waves, rivers, and the ocean.[91]

Like the assertions of the Lord's special nature, these uses of analogy are not sufficient to answer the Buddhists' logical objections. The Buddhists have challenged the possibility of a unity of multiplicity not only at the cosmic level, but as comprising all the features of ordinary experience. It begs the question to have recourse to ordinary experience when that is included in what is in dispute. However, granting a realist view, the analogies do support the Śaivas' theology.

The possibility of a monistic Lord emanating the universe would be strengthened by instances of unity-and-diversity familiar to everyone.

The fact that the Śaivas do not focus on the Buddhist reductios in the same consistent, systematic manner as they focus on the recognitive interpretation of experience per se suggests that they had difficulty with them. I have expressed the opinion that their recourse to a differentiation of the spheres of unity and multiplicity is not definitely unsatisfactory, although it is opaque. The arguments considered do not appear able to remove all of the logical doubts suggested by the Buddhists.

However, I believe that all three classes of argument have a secondary status in relation to the chief Śaiva theory of the transcendental recognition of the Supreme Lord. If it is compelling to believe that all experience is constituted from a primordial and personal unity as understood by the Śaivas—then their suggestions would be helpful in working out some of the likely consequences. The weight the Śaivas give to working out their theory of recognition in relation to considering the reductios suggests that they may have understood the situation in the same way.[92] Perhaps difficult logical puzzles or paradoxes are inevitable in any grand account of the world, and other factors can dictate which ones it is best to live with.

As I have already stated, I believe that the success of the Śaiva demonstration of a universal rational foundation for their soteriology depends upon the validity of their implementations of their paradigm of recognition in the areas of epistemology and ontology, to be considered in the next two chapters. The next chapter will examine the Śaivas' treatments of three important epistemological topics—cognition, memory, and conceptual exclusion. The success of the Pratyabhijñā system in the arena of epistemology depends upon the reduction of these experiential processes and their ostensible objects to modalities of the Lord's self-recognition.

Chapter 6

Epistemological Applications of the Theory of Recognition

> The affairs [*sthiti*] of humanity are born of the recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of experiences [*jñāna*] which are different from one another and do not [by themselves] apprehend one another. These [affairs] would be destroyed if there were not the Great Lord, who contains within [Himself] the infinite forms of the universe, is unitary, has the nature of consciousness, and possesses the Cognition, Memory and Semantic Exclusion [*apohana*] Śaktis.
>
> —IPK 1.3.6-7, 1:136–39

We now turn to the Śaivas' attempt to demonstrate the theory of recognition explained in the previous chapters in the arena of epistemology. This chapter will not attempt to survey the enormous range of epistemological issues treated by the Pratyabhijñā thinkers.[1] It is concerned rather with the implementations of a simultaneously argumentative and ritual agenda. I remind the reader of some of the homologous schemes in terms of which we have come to understand this agenda. The Śaivas endeavor inferentially to elicit the recognition of identity with the Supreme Lord by showing through transcendental inquiry that all the items of experience are one's Śakti—who is Herself one's self-recognition. This is a purification of conceptualization, which reintegrates the Lord's self-recognition fragmented in ordinary linguistic ascription. It is a removal of the obstacles that obscure the ever-existent fact that everything is one's self-recognition as Śiva.

As explained in chapter 3, the two chief Śaktis that are invoked in summaries of the Pratyabhijñā inference—operative in the areas of

epistemology and ontology—are those of Cognition and Action. In the two main philosophical sections of the Pratyabhijñā texts, the Book on Cognition and the Book on Action, a number of subsidiary topics are treated; the reality underlying these topics is often given designations as various subsidiary Śaktis.

The passage of Utpaladeva quoted above divides the modalities of the Lord's self-recognition operative within the area of epistemology into three chief Śaktis. These are Cognition per se, Memory, and Semantic Exclusion (*apohana*) (which will be explained below).[2] This chapter will consider the basic arguments by which the Śaivas attempt to explain each of these topics in terms of modalities of the Lord's self-recognition designated as separate Śaktis. Like the Śaivas, I will devote most attention to the Cognition Śakti.[3]

Cognition as Śakti

I will begin the discussion of the first topic with some general remarks. The main word being translated as cognition is *jñāna*.[4] This word is a derivative of the root *jñā*, and is related both to the word "knowledge" and to the word "cognition." In treating the subject of cognition, the Śaivas are mostly concerned with *perception* (referred to as *pratyakṣa*, "direct perception," and *anubhava*, "direct experience").[5] For the sake of convenience, I will use the terms *cognition* and *perception* somewhat interchangeably.

Another point is that cognition is understood in Sanskrit epistemological discussions to occur *in an episodic manner—it is not a disposition*.[6] Though cognition is episodic, information gained through it can be retrieved through memory. A further characteristic of Indian understandings of cognition is that each episode must yield new information. Thus, although memory may be completely valid in its recovery of the information from an original cognition, it is not classified as a separate means of cognition (*pramāṇa*).[7]

The following definition of the Cognition Śakti by Abhinavagupta describes the Lord's emanation of the characteristic features of cognition:

> Thus it is established: The multitude of objects are merged within His essential nature. He, comprehending a particular object as having a differentiated form, manifests it as having emerged from His essential nature. That which has the essential nature of Consciousness, but is differentiated from the object which has emerged, is explained to be cognition, which is always new. Because [that

> cognition] is directed outwards, it is affected by [the object's] reflection.[8]

The Lord creates the episode as a paradoxically *self-identical* manifestation of a *separate* object.[9] As will be explained, this is accomplished through His self-recognition.

The arguments by which the Cognition Śakti is demonstrated may roughly be divided by two terminological focuses. First, there are arguments centering around the term *prakāśa*. This is the same word as "self-luminosity" without the reflexive prefix *sva;* it may accordingly be translated as "light, illumination" or "awareness." Generally I will use the latter gloss, and I will gloss cognate verbs as "appears." Second, there are arguments centering around the term *vimarśa* and cognates derived from *mṛś*, which have been discussed in the previous chapter.[10] Despite much attention to these two categories of terms in studies of the Pratyabhijñā theory of cognition, I believe that they have not been properly understood. Even where there is acknowledgment of their ultimate identity, they are discussed almost like two separate epistemological "juices" that are being mixed.[11] There has not been a careful examination of the precise logic of their relation in the context of the overarching problematics of the system.

I would characterize the relation of the arguments about perception centering around the different terms as follows: The arguments utilizing the term *prakāśa* are largely concerned with a reduction of perceived entities to the fact of awareness itself. *Vimarśa* and related terms do not describe a factor in experience *supplementing prakāśa*. Rather they clarify that the awareness to which objects have been idealistically reduced *is necessarily recognition*. The force of the arguments together is that the perception of objects is an expression of the Lord's self-recognition.[12]

I believe that each of these phases of argumentation elucidate corresponding moments in the classic Christian philosophical theology of logos. While a more thorough demonstration of this claim will be made in the last chapter using the example of Bernard Lonergan, a few comparative remarks will be offered here to facilitate an initial appreciation of the Śaiva ideas.

The Idealistic Prakāśa Theory

The arguments centering around the term *prakāśa* seem to be most directly inspired by the idealistic Buddhist school of Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda.[13] The opponents in these discussions are those who

believe in the existence of objects external to awareness, particularly the Naiyāyikas in the Hindu tradition and the Sautrāntikas in the Buddhist. The formulations of the Buddhist logicians, whose ambiguity about whether objects are external to awareness has given them the epithet Yogācāra-Sautrāntikas, are temporarily left aside.

The Śaiva discussion of *prakāśa* develops some of the meanings of their own doctrine of self-luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*). As stated in chapter 3, the backgrounds to the Śaiva understanding of this concept include both the Advaita Vedāntin understanding of self-luminosity and the Buddhist logicians' understanding of the component of self-consciousness (*svasaṃvedana*) integral to each experience.[14] Our present concern is not the Śaivas' utilization of this idea to explain the simplicity of monistic experience. Important now is the Śaivas positing in this concept, like the other two schools, a self-aware subjectivity that epistemically grounds every cognition, so that one "knows that one knows."[15]

The thrust of the *prakāśa* arguments is that this component of subjective awareness integral to every cognition *constitutes the objects of these cognitions.* Utpala states:

> If the object did not have the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], it would be without illumination [*aprakāśa*], as it was before [its appearance]. Awareness [*prakāśa*] cannot be different [than the object]. Awareness [*prakāśatā*] is the essential nature of the object.[16]

The argument is based on the analytical fact that we can only be aware of that of which we are aware. For this reason, it is held to be impossible for there to be an object outside of awareness. An object is nothing but the awareness of it.[17]

The Śaivas further take up an attempt to infer the existence of external objects. This follows the epistemology of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism, which may be classified as "representationalist." According to these thinkers, awareness is in itself without any differentiation.[18] On the other hand our experience does present a diversity of appearances—for example of different colors such as blue and yellow. External objects are inferred as the *causes* of this diversity. Utpala states the basic Sautrāntika inference:

> The cause of each of the various manifestations is unknown. This necessitates the inference of the external [object]. For awareness, which is undifferentiated, cannot cause the marvelously diverse manifestations.[19]

These external objects cause such manifestations as their *reflections* (*pratibimba*).[20]

The Śaivas respond on the basis of the understanding held by the majority of Indian philosophical schools that the inference of a relationship between a cause and an effect depends upon the observation of their invariable succession in a series of direct perceptions.[21] As Utpala explains, the Sautrāntika inference simply lacks the necessary experiential foundation:

> Inference is definitely not accepted regarding something which has not appeared previously. . . . There has never in any way been the manifestation of an object external to manifestation. Therefore there is also not the establishment of it by inference.[22]

Abhinavagupta makes an additional reductio ad absurdum argument based on the understanding that inference itself is a kind of awareness. This reductio shows the necessity of the Śaiva alternative. Abhinava explains:

> Inference, as a conceptual construction [*vikalpa*], is [a kind of] awareness [*prakāśa*]. If the object such as blue, etc., is not comprehended even by this [kind of awareness which is inference], then it cannot be inferred. If [the object] is comprehended [by awareness], then it has the essential nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], according to the principle "The object would lack illumination [*aprakāśa*], as it did before."[23] It is not external. Therefore, any means of cognition [*pramāṇa*] which is adduced to prove that there is an external object, on the contrary, only proves its non-externality. Thus it is contradictory.[24]

According to the Śaivas, the representationalist inference is not only unfounded and illogical, but also epistemologically useless. Ordinary behavior can be accounted for without the hypothesis of external objects. Abhinavagupta states:

> You attempt to establish external objects with a problematic conjecture [*kaṣṭakalpanā*, i.e., the inference]. Nothing can be accomplished through those [conjectured external objects]. For worldly behavior is established solely through those manifestations [*ābhāsa*], which you have admitted. There is no worldly behavior with something which is always an object of inference.[25]

The *prakāśa* arguments elucidate an analogous idealistic conception in the Christian philosophical theology of logos. This idealism

directly follows from the explanation of the origin of all things from God's internal or "subjective" process of self-recognition as discussed in the previous chapter. As Augustine affirms, "It is true of all his creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, that he does not know them because they are, but that they are because he knows them."[26] To repeat part of a quotation already made from Anselm:

> Hence, when the supreme Spirit expresses himself, he expresses all created beings. For, both before they were created, and now that they have been created, and after they are decayed or changed in any way, they are ever in him not what they are in themselves, but what this Spirit himself is.[27]

Again, for Thomas, God knows all things within Himself:

> Whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.[28]

Knowledge in general is just a formal cause that must be followed by an act of will to bring things about; however in God the connection is more direct because His knowledge and will are one:

> Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the *knowledge of approbation.*[29]

The reduction of phenomena to their foundation in divine subjectivity is a persisting feature in a variety of metaphysical understandings of the Christian logos, whether the explanation is made in terms of Platonic Ideas, the Aristotelian divine act of intellect,[30] or Hegelian logic.[31]

I believe that Bishop George Berkeley's notorious formulation that *esse est percipi* only thematized and emphasized this conception. Granting the inevitable differences, many of Berkeley's demonstrations of this thesis are quite analogous to the Śaiva *prakāśa* arguments. Basing himself on the notion that all we directly experience are "percepts" or "ideas" (in the broad sense including percepts), he contended that it is impossible to posit the existence of such ideas apart from a subject. Here is a representative explanation:

> That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow.—And to me it is no less evident that the various SENSATIONS, or *ideas imprinted on the sense,* however blended or combined together (that is, whatever *objects* they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them—I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by anyone that shall attend to *what is meant by the term exist when applied to sensible things.* The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odor, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all I can understand by these and like expressions.—For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi,* nor is it possible that they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.[32]

As the Śaivas refuted the Sautrāntika representationalism, Berkeley contended that Locke's position that separate substances cause ideas is unfounded.[33] Berkeley also held that the very conception of an object external to awareness is a "manifest repugnancy." He explains:

> When we do our utmost to conceive of the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other proofs against the existence of *material substance.*[34]

As the Śaivas contended that valid worldly behavior can be accounted for solely in terms of experiences—so did Berkeley understand his immaterialist hypothesis as supporting common sense and behaviors, along with science, on the basis of ideas alone.

However, Berkeley, as much as the most realist Aristotelians, affirmed the existence of phenomena outside of the subjectivity of the limited individual. He avoided solipsism, and guaranteed the regularity of experience by positing the continuous existence of the ideas constituting the world in the divine subjectivity:

> The question between the materialists and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to holy scriptures, will be of another opinion.
>
> . . . Every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by any finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we live, move, and have our being."[35]

Here we must consider an important point that is connected with the *prakāśa* arguments, but discussed in other sections of the Pratyabhijñā texts. This point also marks a divergence of the Śaivas from most of Christian orthodoxy, and puts them in line with the more monistic expressions of Western idealism, for instance, of Eckhart, Fichte, Hegel, and others. The Śaivas contend that there is in the ultimate perspective only one subject. In the introductory chapter, while discussing the presence of the Cognition and Action Śaktis in all beings, Utpaladeva and Abhinava explain that the cognition of others is supposed or trusted (*ūhyate*) from their observed action.[36] However, this understanding of the cognition of others is only provisional. Abhinava reduces the presumed awareness of others to one subject in the same way that objects have been reduced:

> Cognition does not appear as [an object other than oneself expressed] "this." For "thisness" [as externality to awareness] is non-cognition. Something which has appeared with one nature could not have appeared with another. Therefore, only cognition appears. And that which appears has only the nature of "I." Even the cognition of others is nothing but one's own Self. Otherness is entirely due to accidental attributes [*upādhi*] such as the body, etc. And that [an accidental attribute such as the body] has been determined not to be other [than awareness]. Thus everything falls under the category of the subject. The subject is really unitary. And He alone exists. Thus it has been said: "There is only the awareness of one's Self as oneself and others."[37] Therefore, beginning with "Bhagavan Sadāśiva cognizes" and ending with "The worm cognizes"—there is only one subject. Consequently, all cognitions [by apparently different subjects really] belong to that [one] subject.[38]

The Śaiva arguments are so strongly idealistic that a repugnant solipsism is replaced by a conception of a universal awareness. Individual

selves are only the apparent delimitations of this awareness. Once the principle of *esse est percipi* is accepted, it appears more economical to argue in this manner than to attempt to justify the existence of other selves.[39] I will offer some final remarks on this divergence between the Pratyabhijñā and mainstream Christianity at the end of chapter 8.

Returning to the discussion of perception per se—according to Abhinavagupta, the refutation of external objects as causes of the diversity of perception establishes the Śaiva doctrine of the Lordship of awareness.[40] The idea that objects are nothing but a single awareness entails that they are emanated by it. The capacity of emanation was explained in the third chapter to be the basic significance of Śakti, the definitive characteristic of Lordship.

Utpala presents the Śaiva explanation, supporting the theory with a widely accepted analogy:

> Indeed God [*deva*], whose nature is only consciousness, can, from the force of His will and without material, cause the mass of objects which are contained within Him to appear [*prakāśayet*] as external. [In this creation He is] like a yogin.[41]

Abhinava explains Utpala's analogy as follows: The creations of a yogin are held to be real, not merely fantasy, dream or the like.[42] The yogin produces them without material and other external causes such as are observed in a potter's production of a pot. Again, Abhinava explains that it is because consciousness creates objects through mere will, that Utpaladeva uses the expression "God."[43]

The Integrality of Vimarśa

Thus the *prakāśa* arguments, as demonstrating that the subject has the character of emanation that is called Śakti, in themselves already point toward the inferential conclusion of the identity of the perceiver with the Lord. However, the Śaiva position has not been fully distinguished from that of the Vijñānavāda/Yogācāra. The arguments of the Yogācāra-Sautrāntika Buddhists against recognition considered in the fourth chapter have not been answered.[44] They are answered with the arguments centering around *vimarśa* and other terms derived from the root *mṛś*—which show that awareness is necessarily a process of recognition.

Now, corresponding to the identification of Supreme Speech with the Lord's self-recognition (as explained in the last chapter), the Śaivas develop these arguments out of earlier discussions of Bhartṛhari. Thus Abhinava supports the Śaiva thesis with excerpts from the *Vākyapadīya:*

> It has also been said by the honorable Bhartṛhari: "There is no cognition in the world which is without the accompaniment of speech. Every cognition is experienced as if permeated by speech. If there were to end the eternal condition of cognition having the nature of speech, awareness could not be aware. It is this [condition that cognition has the nature of speech] which makes possible recognitive judgment [*pratyavamarśinī*]." And also: "It [speech] is the consciousness of all beings subject to transmigratory existence, and it exists both internally and externally. If there were an end to that [speech], [one] would be observed to be unconscious, like wood or a wall."[45]

Śiva's Supreme Speech/self-recognition and Bhartṛhari's Word Absolute are monistic principles of interpretation from which the universe is said to be created. According to both the Śaiva and Grammarian philosophies, the primordial unity of the source necessarily pervades and interrelates both poles of ordinary interpretations and the states of affairs to which they are recognized to apply. By their heredity, interpretation must be the way to reality and reality must be what is interpreted. The Western logos as a grounding order of reality and rationality issues the same transcendental entailment, whether in Greek, Judeo-Christian or post-Enlightenment, secularized expressions. The arguments against relativism propounded in chapter 1 using the insight embodied in Epimenides' paradox and the theories of Davidson and Apel should all be seen as reflecting on this larger Western tradition of logos. Those arguments all demonstrate that we cannot make sense of interpretations that do not refer to a noncontingent reality.

The Church Fathers contended that all knowledge is achieved through the presence in humans of Christ in the form of *logos spermatikos*. As Justin Martyr explains:

> We have been taught that Christ was First-begotten of God [the Father] and we have indicated above that He is the Word of whom all mankind partakes. Those who lived by reason are Christians, even though they are considered atheists.[46]

St. Augustine's influential interpretation conceives the divine Word, which contains the Platonic Ideas, as providing an inner illumination by which all humans attain knowledge.[47] Augustine argues in more directly linguistic terms that humans, as images of God, have within them by participation a very subtle form of word correlated

with all epistemic acts. This is the essential language expressed through the media of concrete languages such as Greek, Latin, Hebrew, or bodily gestures.[48]

Thomas Aquinas explains that we have in us a preexisting potential knowledge of the order found in various objects of experience:

> For certain seeds of knowledge pre-exist in us, namely, the first concepts of understanding, which by the light of the agent intellect are immediately known through the species abstracted from sensible things. These are either complex, as axioms, or simple, as the notions of being, of the one, and so on, which the understanding grasps immediately. In these general principles, however, all the consequences are included as in certain seminal principles. When, therefore, the mind is led from these general notions to actual knowledge of the particular things, which it knew previously in general and, as it were, potentially, then one is said to acquire knowledge.[49]

In the contemporary intellectual scene, there are some strong analogies between the Śaiva arguments for the necessity of recognition and Martin Heidegger's conception of truth as disclosure.[50] While Heidegger affirms the relationship of his conception to Platonic *anamnesis* and Christian logos theology, he claims its more authentic source as the Presocratic conception of truth as *alētheia*, "unveiling." The linguistic disclosure of beings is the most basic cognitive, and behaviorally orientative, experience:

> All working and achieving, all action and calculation, keep within an open region within which beings, with regard to what they are and how they are, can properly take their stand and become capable of being said. This can occur only if beings present themselves along with the presentative statement so that the latter subordinates itself to the directive that it speaks of beings *such-as* they are. . . .
>
> A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the presentative correspondence. . . . But if the correctness (truth) of statements becomes possible only through this openness of comportment, then what first makes correctness possible must with more original right be taken as the essence of truth.[51]

In other words, all seeing is seeing as.[52]

Although Heidegger was trained in, and deeply influenced by theology, he repudiates the Greek and Christian metaphysics of logos as "ontotheology." The implications of his thought for establishing this metaphysics are thus profoundly ambivalent. Is what is disclosed only historically and linguistically contingent beings or a universal Being identical with or emanated from God? The former direction of understanding leads into (self-contradictory) historicist relativism and Derridean deconstructionism, and the latter back into transcendental theology, for example, of Karl Rahner, John Macquarrie, and David Tracy. David Tracy's synthesis of hermeneutics with Lonergan's metaphysics reintegrates disclosure theory into the Christian logos theology. Tracy describes the experience of truth with our very term, as recognition.[53] As I have indicated, the Pratyabhijñā will be comparatively engaged with Derrida and Lonergan in the last chapter.

To return to the Sanskrit texts, one of the *vimarśa* arguments that Abhinavagupta developed out of Bhartṛhari is that cognition must be intrinsically linguistic to account for the possibility of the *learning* of conventional language.[54] Abhinava explains that initially a small boy will have a series of cognitions lacking gross conceptual construction (*nirvikalpaka*). For example, he hears language as a series of incomprehensible sounds, and he sees the ground with and without a pot. It is due to the fact that objects are generated from the higher form of speech, that the connection is possible:

> According to this system, the object actually consists entirely of speech, because it consists of recognitive judgment [*vimarśa*]. . . . Thus things can be verbalized [*śabadanam*] by the entire collection of words. Then a fixed association with a word is created.[55]

Abhinava compares the linguistic interpretation intrinsic to experience to pointing with the finger. On its basis the boy comes to learn the reference of expressions such as "This is a pot" and "Fetch it."[56]

Another of Bhartṛhari's arguments concerns the necessary retrievability of the information gained from cognitions in memory. He gives as examples very simple perceptions such as the sensations of earth and grass while walking quickly, along with states of unconsciousness such as sleep and stupor. It is only if there is linguistic interpretation even in such experiences that one is able to remember them.[57] Abhinavagupta only briefly mentions this idea in the IPV. He states that one could not recall that one was in a state of stupor if there were not such an inner judgment (*parāmarśa*).[58]

The chief argument made by Utpaladeva for the linguistic-recognitive nature of cognition recalls Bhartṛhari's discussion of walking rapidly through the grass. Utpaladeva's argument draws attention to the need for a kind of recognitive ordering in the perception accompanying *rapid behavior:*

> There is recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] even at the moment of direct perception. Otherwise, without recognitive synthesis [*pratisaṃdhāna*], how would running, etc., be possible?[59]

Abhinava states that in the case of running there must be a continuous recognition of the destinations that one successively aims for and attains. The same is the case with other rapid behaviors such as speaking and reading, in which one moves the tongue between the places of articulation.[60] In these behaviors there is not time for the activation of gross linguistic reference. Abhinava explains:

> In these cases, there is not experienced the gross conceptual construction which occurs later. Therefore, rapidity must be due to subtle recognitive judgement [*pratyavamarśa*], consisting of the interpretive application [*bhāvanā*] of contracted speech.[61]

There is a further area of the Śaiva theory of cognition that is a direct outcome of their understanding of the transcendental character of recognition. This mode of thinking is elaborated in a complex manner in a variety of terminologies throughout the texts, and I can only give an idea of it here. The Śaivas invert the Buddhist understandings of the relations of the experiences of universals and particulars. The Buddhists hold that the primary awareness is of unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), and that the synthetic linguistic constructions invalidly applied to them take the form of universals (*sāmānya*) or relations (*sambandha*). The Śaivas, on the other hand, make the recognition of linguistic syntheses primary, and hold that particulars are constructed at a secondary level through the synthesis of these syntheses. I will quote a passage from Abhinavagupta's discussion of means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). This explains the construction of particulars through the synthesis of universals with location and time—which, as will be seen in the next chapter, are themselves understood as conceptual syntheses:

> There is the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*] through the power of recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. Recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]

> is animated by the word [*śabda*]. And the word [*śabda*] is employed regarding only a single manifestation which is untouched by other manifestations, such as place, time, etc. [Examples of expressions for such isolated manifestations are] "pot" and "red." Therefore, the means of cognition [*pramāṇa*] operates regarding a manifestation which is as a universal; for with it there is no mixture of place and time, which would make it into a unique particular [*svalakṣaṇa*]. . . . However, the unique particular [*svalakṣaṇa*] is another, different sort of unitary manifestation. It has the nature of the manifestation of location in the same substratum, of the manifestations of those [i.e., place, time, etc.].[62]

In this mode of explanation the Śaivas attempt to achieve a double victory. The perceptions of both sorts of entities are shown to depend intimately on synthesis.[63]

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta further develop the force of this mode of explanation against the Buddhists in a variety of ways. Thus, they deny the Buddhist position of the primary status of the unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) by contending that they are apprehended by the synthesis of the universal categories according to taste, purpose, and education.[64] For example, a pot will appear as very different things according to its conceived uses as a container for water, a source of profit or a hard object. One who for some reason is broken-hearted will only see that "It is"![65] The Śaivas also subvert the Buddhist criterion of the reality of unique particulars, i.e., causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*)—the capacity to do things. A classic example is that only the phenomenal, particular rather than the conceptual fire can burn. For the Śaivas, causal efficacy is just one more concept synthesized into the particular. They further emphasize its secondary character by specifying that it can only be included in the synthesis of an entity when there is also included its apparent externality.[66]

Such are the basic arguments on cognition centering around the term *vimarśa,* and some of those closely connected with them.[67] Now, as I have already suggested, the idealistic *prakāśa* arguments make the recognition integral to the experience of an object *constitutive of it.* The following passage from Abhinava's summary of the Pratyabhijñā system in the first chapter clearly places *vimarśa* in the algebra of *esse est percipi:*

> Here, as the multiplicity of things are recognitively apprehended [*vimṛśyate*], so they exist [*asti*]. This is so because Being [*astitva*] depends upon awareness [*prakāśa*]. That is, there is the manifesta-

tion of Being as depending on the recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] regarding what is brought about through this awareness [*prakāśa*]. For if a thing were not recognitively ascertained [*avimṛṣṭa*], then what could be the answer to the question of why it is not blue, not yellow, not existent, not nonexistent?[68] Therefore, something exists as much and in whatever way it is recognitively apprehended [*vimṛśyate*] and uncontradicted.[69]

It is this idealism that gives the Śaiva theory greater force against skeptics than merely establishing interpretive realism. Because the awareness to which everything has been reduced is unitary, recognition must be self-recognition.[70] Because this self-recognition emanates everything, it has the metaphysical and soteriological character described in the previous chapter. The way in which the epistemological argumentation demonstrates the reality of Śiva-Śakti is brought out in a fuller excerpt from the passage quoted in the epigraph of that chapter:

The Śakti of being Creator,[71] which has the nature of Lordship, contains all the Śaktis. That [Śakti of being Creator] has the nature of recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. Therefore it is proper that only it is predominant. . . .[72] The Supreme Lord, who has the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*], makes His own Self into an object of cognition, even though it is not an object of cognition, because the cognizer is unitary. This is deduced [*sambhāvyate*] by means of a firm inference for the proposition [*sambhāvanā*], which includes the demonstration of the impossibility of another cause.[73] "Therefore"[74] means that this is so by reason of [His] creator-hood [*kartṛtvāt*], characterized as the Śakti which is recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. As He recognitively apprehends [*parāmṛśati*] His Self, so, because everything is contained within Him, He appears as [objects such as] blue, etc.[75]

The Pratyabhijñā does not need like Christian orthodoxy to metaphysically distinguish limited recognizers from the cosmic one. The thinkers' epistemological argumentation constantly leads one to recognize that one is the Supreme Lord on the basis of seeing that all things are nothing but one's own self-recognition. This is illustrated by a casual remark of Abhinavagupta on a verse of Utpaladeva in the discussion of cognition. Though very brief, I will mention it here because it parallels a more explicit statement by Abhinavagupta in the section on memory. This verse follows a verse in which Utpaladeva identifies consciousness (*citi*) with self-recognition (*pratyavamarśa*) and Supreme Speech (*parāvāk*).[76] According to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva

in the verse in question supports his position on the basis of the principle scriptures.[77] It will be recalled that in explanations of the soteriological recognition treated in the third chapter, Abhinava places the knowledge of the Lord from the scriptures in the position of memory. Utpaladeva's verse actually predicates of consciousness some traditional theological qualifications:

> She is Creative Trembling [*sphurattā*] and Great Being [*mahāsattā*], and is unqualified by time and place. As the Essence [*sāratayā*], this is She [*saiṣa*] who is said to be the heart of the Supreme.[78]

Abhinavagupta comments: " 'This is She' [*saiṣa*] indicates the recognition [*pratyabhijñāna*] of Śakti."[79] Means and goal are of course identical.

Recognition and Coherence

It is important to understand that the treatment of cognition so far has focused on the ultimate grounds of successful recognitions of interpretation. It does not address the important problem of how to arbitrate between the diverse recognitions that people make. I direct the reader to a quotation of Abhinavagupta above which states that "something exists as much and in whatever way it is recognitively apprehended [*vimṛśyate*] and uncontradicted [*abādhita*]."[80] Utpala and Abhinava similarly define a means of cognition [*pramāṇa*] as having the characteristic of bringing about a recognitive judgment (*vimarśa*) that is uncontradicted (*abādhita*).[81] A classic example of contradiction is when what was thought to be silver on closer examination turns out to be mother of pearl. According to the Śaivas, the discovery of contradictions such as this itself depends upon the recognitive act of the Self/Śiva uniting prior and later experiences.[82]

With regard to the generation of particulars through the synthesis of synthetic experiences, Abhinavagupta explains that the limiting factor of such synthesis is also a contradictoriness that obtains between particular manifestations. Again, this contradictoriness is emanated by Śiva's "Fixed Regularity" (*niyati*) Śakti:

> [There may be the question:] "But what is the limit of the mixing of manifestations?" To this it is replied: Only those manifestations of which there is noncontradiction [*avirodha*] become mixed." For the manifestation of form does not become mixed with the manifestation of air because of contradiction. And that contradiction is brought about by the Fixed Regularity Śakti.[83]

According to the Śaiva epistemology, the Lord creates the rightness and wrongness in the combinations of what is recognized.

The notion that contradiction (*bādha, virodha*) between interpretations is an indication of error—or conversely that noncontradiction is characteristic of what is yet unfalsified—is common in Indian philosophy, and should not be difficult for us to accept. What I wish to observe is the significance of this conception in the light of the *prakāśa* arguments that there are no objects external to awareness. It is not possible to assess the correspondence of recognized interpretations with any external, uninterpreted datum. Noncontradiction thus becomes in effect a criterion of *coherence*. It is an ongoing assessment of internal as well as external coherence that arbitrates between the diverse recognitions pertaining to perception, along with the claims of scriptures, inferences, and so forth.[84]

David Tracy, in developing the hermeneutic disclosure theory for theology, has likewise specified additional criteria to evaluate claims of disclosure/recognition. According to him, such claims should be assessed as to coherence as well as practical, ethical consequences.[85] I agree that the criterion of practice thematizes an important area of common concern. The Śaivas themselves appeal to utility (*upayoga*) in addition to persistence/coherence (*sthairya*) in at least one discussion, to defend the reality of action, relation, and other categories involving a unification-of-multiplicity.[86] However, I believe that practice is actually also assessed in terms of the criterion of coherence. We should include in evaluations of coherence our best understandings of practical utility and ethics.

Tracy proposes the triad of recognition, coherence, and practice for the mediation of claims in interreligious dialogue. He particularly associates the search for coherence with fundamental theology; for him the transcendental inquiry into ultimate of reality is a search for "ultimate coherence."[87] The Śaivas do not similarly explain the whole Pratyabhijñā discourse as a search for the most noncontradictory/coherent interpretation. However, I suggest that this would be a useful way of describing their along with other projects of philosophical dialogue—as characterized in chapter 1—in the light of the understanding of all cognition as recognition.

The Memory Śakti

The Śaivas again explain the ordinary, as opposed to the transcendental, memory as a modality of recognition designated as the Memory

Śakti. The person is demonstrated to remember because of possessing the Memory Sakti of the Lord.[88] By elucidating this, the Pratyabhijñā enables the student to participate in the Lord's self-recognition.

To proceed, I recall the Buddhists' refutation of the Nyāya understanding of the self as a substratum for mnemonic impressions (*saṃskāra, vāsanā*). The Buddhists argued that memory is accomplished through impressions alone, in a phenomenal series without a substratum. The Śaivas in turn demonstrate the self-recognitive nature of memory through pointing out features of it which cannot be accounted for by impressions alone. First, they acknowledge that impressions could account for the *similarity* (sādṛśya) *of memory with the original experience of an object.*[89] Abhinava explains:

> By the impression [*saṃskāra*] which was produced by the previous experience this much is accomplished: That cognition [which is memory] is not produced by the object [of the original experience]. Nevertheless [memory] has that as its object.[90]

Abhinava analogizes the function of impressions in memory to the way elasticity enables a branch that has been bent to return to its previous position.[91]

However, there is more in memory to be explained than its mere similarity to an original experience of an object. If memory were only a sort of copy of the original experience of an object, it would still have the expression typified "this." "This" is an ascription having the significance of something that is present to perception.[92] The memory of the object however has the typical expression "that." That is, it is *qualified as previously experienced.* Now, according to the Śaivas, such a qualification requires that there is some sort of awareness in memory of the previous experience itself as well as its object.[93]

In the inquiry regarding this awareness, special considerations for the continuity of the self are brought in, which address the Buddhist challenge to the subject in the Pratyabhijñā inference. These considerations depend upon premises rather foreign to Western understanding. As explained above, Indian philosophy looks at cognition as occurring in an episodic manner. The Śaivas contend that because the self-luminosity that the Buddhist philosophers understand to validate each episode is integral to and temporary like the episode itself—it is impossible for one episode, memory, to know the episode that was the previous experience. Utpala explains:

> The cognition which is memory is produced from the impression [*saṃskṛti*] of a previous experience. However, since it is contained within itself [*ātmaniṣṭha*], it does not make known the first experience. A cognition is only self-luminous. It is not the cognitive object of another [cognition], just as the cognition of taste [is not the object] of the cognition of color.[94]

Thus the qualification of the object as previously experienced would be impossible on the Buddhist account.

The Śaivas avoid the problem of objectivizing one cognition to another through the idea of the continuing self. It is the continuous self that enables the memory both to comprehend an original object, and to distinguish it as previously perceived. Utpaladeva explains:

> There could be no manifestation of an object which is being remembered, if it were different from the memory itself. Therefore, there is a unity of experiences in different times. This is that Cognizer. The former experience does not appear separately in memory like an object. For there is the manifestation of it as resting in the Self [in the manner expressed]: "I previously experienced."[95]

The qualification in memory of an object as previously experienced is a judgment regarding the experience of the continuing self.

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta point out another necessary feature of memory that the Buddhists cannot explain without a recognitive connection of experiential episodes. This is the *comprehension of the similarity between the episodes of the original experience and the memory itself:*

> How is there the ascertainment . . . of similarity? The perceptual cognition [which is past] does not cause one to ascertain similarity. Nor does the cognition which is memory. Since [the original perception and memory] do not know each other, there is no possibility for the ascertainment of the similarity between the two. And [according to the Buddhists] there does not exist another [i.e., a Self] which knows both of them.[96]

This point furthers the Śaivas' development of a distinctive understanding of self-luminosity in the context of memory. The Buddhist cannot account for a sort of recognition within memory that validates its authenticity.[97]

The Śaivas emphasize again that the validating self-consciousness that the Buddhists admit cannot be episodic with experiences. An enduring subject is the epistemic ground of both direct experience and memory. Abhinavagupta explains:

> Therefore, this [memory] is possible in this manner: The self-consciousness [*svasaṃvedana*] of memory is the same as the self-consciousness [*svasaṃvedana*] of perceptual experience. Nothing other than self-consciousness is able to bring about that [memory]. Neither direct-perception nor inference can. Thus is established the principle which is the subject [*pramātṛtattva*], which is the uninterrupted self-consciousness, continuing through all that time [between the original experience and the memory]. It is not possible for the one who remembers to be different from the one who [originally] experiences.[98]

Inasmuch as the recognitions integral to the temporal and validating aspects of memory pertain to the experience of the subject, they are expressions of self-recognition. The Śaivas thus reduce memory to a modality of such self-recognition designated as the Memory Śakti. This is brought out in the following definition of Abhinavagupta:

> At some previous time there was an extroverted awareness [*saṃvedana*] of a manifestation. [However,] the essential nature of consciousness [*cit*] of that [awareness] is introverted; that remains within His Self at another time. He recognitively ascertains [*parāmṛśati*] His [previous] extroversion towards a particular object [*viṣaya*]. Such is the Memory Śakti.[99]

Memory is a recognition by the Self/Lord of His previous "extroverted awareness" (*saṃvedanam bahirmukham*), that is, awareness of an object.[100]

As explained above, the Śaivas maintain that all perception is nothing but the expression of the Lord's self-recognition. The Śaiva understanding of memory as the Lord's self-recognition articulates the same notion of a freedom from all extrinsic causality by objects. The following passage of Abhinavagupta more fully explains the process of memory, including the role in it of impressions, in a manner that brings out its total subjectivity:

> At the time of the previous experience, an object is made separate [from the Lord as highest subject] through association with place,

> time, and a subject who is other [than the highest subject]. It is not dissolved in I-hood.[101] It is then as if covered by darkness.[102] Remaining as such [as the object originally experienced separately from the highest subject, along with its concomitants], it is what is called an impression [*saṃskāra*]. Then He removes its cover of darkness. When that [darkness] is removed, then that [object] appears, like before, as separated. It may be objected that it would then appear, like before, as "this." It is not so. For there is the awareness [*prakāśa*] of it without loss of the connection with the separated body, etc. of the manifestation of that [original] time. The recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] of the time of the memory, which is a manifestation of this [present] time, also does not disappear. Thus the recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] "that" is explained to have the essential nature of the recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] of both the prior and the later, which are contrary. In this manner, that Supreme Lord remembers.[103]

The Pratyabhijñā agenda of course is to demonstrate this sort of deus ex machina in every sphere of explanation.

Such are the main lines of the Śaiva demonstration of the self-recognitive nature of memory. However, I must briefly take up one other issue raised in the course of the discussion which is critical to the success of the Śaivas' argumentative agenda. The Buddhist claims that he does not need to give an adequate explanation of the synthetic features of memory because memory, as a sort of conceptualization, is an illusion.[104] This objection in a sense moves the disagreement with the Buddhists to a more radical level than the discussion of cognition. Because the Buddhist logicians, as phenomenalists, accept that there is such a thing as valid cognition, the *vimarśa* arguments[105] only have to show that, contrary to their understanding, this cognition must be intrinsically recognitive.

Here, however, the Śaivas need to establish that *memory is valid* in order for their demonstration of its nature as the self-recognition/Śakti of the Supreme Lord to be allowed to come into play. The Śaivas respond to the Buddhist criticism by making the validity of memory hinge upon the necessary validity of something else—ordinary experience and behavior (*vyavahāra*). Memory functions in the synthesis of personal identity. It is also essential to forming the desire for repeating pleasure that motivates actions such as approaching, leaving, and taking.[106] According to Abhinavagupta, the undesirable consequence of the Buddhist view with regard to worldly affairs necessitates the alternative:

> Thus [on the Buddhist view] worldly affairs would be destroyed. However, they are not destroyed by the mere curse dear to you: "Let them be destroyed." Since they appear [*prakāśante*], they are established. And an effort must be made to understand them.[107]

The Buddhist theory is said to contradict the aggregate of what we know. Worldly experience does not disappear just because it is "cursed" to do so.

The Śaivas also attack the internal coherence of the Buddhist account. Thus they claim that the Buddhist theory of impressions itself would not even be sensible if memory were illusory. Abhinava explains:

> Since there is not [according to the Buddhists' account, in memory any genuine] awareness [*aprakāśana*] of that [original object], nothing can be accomplished by [memory] being born from the impression. For, it [the impression] is resorted to in order to understand the similarity [between memory and the original experience]. However, there is no similarity between an experience which has the nature of the awareness [*prakāśana*] of an object, and an illusion called memory which does not touch the object in any way.[108]

We see here another example of the contradictoriness inherent to skepticism. Skepticism precludes giving an account of anything.

I will finish this section by presenting a passage from Abhinavagupta that points out the soteriological possibility of experiencing the Lord's self-recognition disclosed by the discussion of memory. This explanation is made in Abhinavagupta's commentary on IPK 1.4.3, which was quoted above. Utpaladeva there states the necessity of a unity of experiences in different times, and identifies the unity with the subject in the expression: "This is that Cognizer" (*veditaiṣa saḥ*).[109] Abhinava's comment parallels his assertion in the cognition chapter regarding the expression "This is She" as indicating the recognition of Śakti. It actually comes first in the Śaiva order of presentation, and is probably alluded to in the statement in the cognition section. Abhinava states:

> The unity, that is, the recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of "I experienced the pot" or "that pot" is undifferentiated from the synthesizer [*anusaṃdhātṛ*]. In order to show this, the unity is pointed out with the apposition: "This is that Cognizer." With "This . . . is that" is made the clear manifestation [*sphuṭāvabhāsana*] of the subject-principle [*pramātṛtattva*], which is as if covered.[110] By this

> expression, which is filled with wonder [*vismaya*], recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is indicated. As the author has said: "The self-luminous subject-principle had been muddied over by those who obfuscate, talking of this and that. This has been revealed, upon putting those fools in their place by means of clear arguments."[111]

The disclosure is filled with a mystical-aesthetic wonder.

The Semantic Exclusion Śakti

We may now turn to consider the last of our three general epistemological topics—*apohana,* which I have translated as "semantic exclusion." This subject is again explained in terms of a modality of the Lord's self-recognition designated as the Semantic Exclusion Śakti.

I must begin by explaining the idea of semantic exclusion. The Buddhist logicians originally developed this conception. These thinkers had radically divorced the unique particulars from linguistic or imaginative construction. However, they were still faced with the problem of explaining some sort of "coordination" (*sārūpya*) between language and the particulars as the basis for successful reference in communication and behaviors on the basis of language.[112] They developed the theory of semantic exclusion in the attempt to explain a "similarity between things absolutely dissimilar."[113] According to this theory, an expression such as "cow" does not positively designate or describe anything in the primitive sense data. Its only referentiality is the negation of what does not fit into the category of cow. The only similarity of the sense datum with the category is that it is *not a non-cow.*[114]

The Hindu realists rejected the theory of exclusion as a satisfactory account of semantics. Nevertheless it was generally accepted that the rejection of the inapplicable is an important feature of more positively referential construction. Now, as the Śaivas have already argued for the generation of all experience from the Lord's self-recognition, their problem is not explaining the relationship between raw sense data and construction. However, in the explanation of conceptual construction at the gross level of emanation, they accept, like the realists, that exclusion is an aspect of more positive reference.[115]

Abhinavagupta explains the intrinsic character of conceptual construction of the rejection of the inapplicable using the example of the interpreted cognition of a pot:

> When a pot is seen, it is also possible that there could be, in the place of the pot, a non-pot, such as a cloth, etc. [Such a non-pot

would like the pot also] naturally have a location believed to be suitable; it would produce cognition [of itself as object], and would be brought to its location by its own causes.[116] Since the manifestations of both the pot and the non-pot are possible, there is an opportunity for a superimposition [in which one wrongly takes a pot to be a non-pot]. Since there is the [possibility of the] superimposition of a non-pot, there is the operation of exclusion, which is characterized by negation. Thus the determinate ascertainment [*niścaya*] "pot" has the nature of conceptual construction which is animated by that [exclusion].[117]

The basic point in the Śaivas' theory of exclusion is that it depends upon a comparative synthesis, or recognition, of what does and does not fit into categories.[118] The Śaivas contend that the Buddhists cannot account for this, because of their understanding of perceptions and concepts as series of entirely discrete events. Abhinava explains through a rhetorical inquiry:

There may be this doubt: The pot is seen as having a very particular form. How can a conceptual construction [*vikalpa*], as pertaining to the cognition of the pot, effect the negation of the non-pot? For not even the name of non-pot has been apprehended by anyone. How can the mental impression of the non-pot be awakened when the pot is seen? [This reasoning is accepted by the Śaivas:] True. [However,] the Buddhist is to be censured in this way, and not us.[119]

Since the Buddhists cannot even account for exclusion, it would naturally be impossible for them to posit it as the sole basis of reference.

Utpaladeva explains exclusion utilizing the term "semantic intuition" (*pratibhā*), which for Bhartṛhari along with the Śaivas describes the revelatory unity of reference grounding all interpretation of experience:

The determinate ascertainment [*niścaya*] of "that" results from the exclusion of the "not-that" by the cognizer who experiences the intuition [*pratibhā*] of both the "that" and the "not-that." This [determinate ascertainment] is explained to be conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] [as is expressed]: "This is a 'pot.' "[120]

The subject's recognition of reference comprehends similarity as well as difference.[121]

I point out the paradoxical character of the Śaivas' explanation. Exemplifying the logic discussed at the end of the last chapter, they

have in effect *explained difference as similarity.*[122] Now, the theory of the Exclusion Śakti is an effort to accept and transfigure an issue in semantics and epistemology. However, we have also seen that for the Pratyabhijñā, illusion is not seeing the monistic reality of Śiva. Because exclusion is understood by the Śaivas along with other Indian philosophers to be intrinsic to gross conceptual construction, it is assimilated to the explanation of the fragmentation of the Lord's self-recognition. In addressing this problematic it is impossible for the Śaivas to avoid bringing in again the concept of illusion. The following passage by Abhinavagupta suggests the identification of the operation of the Exclusion Śakti in discriminating all subjects and objects from other subjects and objects with delusion:

> That [object] which is manifested is differentiated from consciousness. Consciousness [is differentiated] from that. One consciousness [is differentiated] from another consciousness. One object of consciousness [is differentiated] from another object of consciousness. This differentiation is not really possible. Thus it is explained to be the mere manifestation of the differentiation. As such, that [differentiation] is not ultimately real. For this [manifestation] is the ultimate reality of everything which is created. Due to the differentiating all around [*paritaśchedanāt*], there is said to be all-around differentiation [*pariccheda*]. The capacity for the manifestation of that [differentiation] is the Semantic Exclusion Śakti.[123]

The mixture of positive epistemology with some degree of illusionism is puzzling. I refer to the discussion of the Śaivas' approaches to the logical problem of the relation of unity and diversity at the end of the last chapter.

Such are the basic outlines of the Pratyabhijñā treatment of semantic exclusion. The reduction of the topic to a form of recognition designated as the Exclusion Śakti again supports the inference for recognizing the identity of the person with the Supreme Lord. Abhinava explains:

> This investigation of the differentiation of manifestations was made in connection with [the discussion of] the capacity for internal manifestation. From this [investigation of differentiation] the purpose in this *śāstra*, the chief thing aimed at [*abhisaṃhita*], i.e., the recognition of the Lord in oneself, is established without effort, according to the principle that when one thing is demonstrated its correlative is demonstrated.[124]

The Epistemological Triad as the Foundation of Ordinary Life

I have completed my survey of the Śaivas' efforts to demonstrate their theory of recognition in the arena of epistemology. The discussion of memory brought out an important Śaiva position—that the ordinary experience of the world must be basically valid, even if it should be "transfigured." The Śaiva arguments are transcendental in that they attempt to show what must be the case in order to account for this experience—as analyzed into the topics covered by the triad of Śaktis. The true identity of the individual as the Supreme Lord is the grounding "limit of" beyond the "limits to" found in the study of the topics. Abhinava sums up the triad:

> There are all worldly behaviors by means of this triad of Śaktis. By this triad of Śaktis of the Blessed One there is the manifestation of [limited individuals such as] Caitra, Maitra, etc., who are the perceivers, rememberers, and [semantically exclusive] conceptualizers [*vikalpayitṛ*]. For it is [actually] He who cognizes, remembers and conceptualizes in this and that form. As it has been said by the preceptor: "Although the establishment of objects is concealed by the individual soul as delimited by the vital breaths and psychophysical complex [*puryaṣṭaka*]—nevertheless that [establishment] is [actually] accomplished in the Supreme Self."[125] . . . If this is not accepted, nothing can appear. Thus is the undesirable consequence. However, [this world] does appear. Therefore, this [the Śaiva understanding of the Lord with His Śaktis] must necessarily be accepted. Thus there is the avoidance of the undesirable consequence.[126]

In the conclusion to the book I will make my final case for the enduring plausibility of these epistemological arguments, along with the ontological arguments presented in the next chapter.

Chapter 7

Features of the Ontology of Recognition

Being is the condition of one who becomes, that is, the agency of the act of becoming.[1]

—IPKV 1.5.14., 19

Being is the agency of the act of becoming, that is, the freedom characteristic of an agent regarding all actions.[2]

—IPV 1.5.14, 1:258–59

We now turn to the Śaivas' theorization about a group of issues falling under the rubric of the Action Śakti. I am classifying this area as an ontology corresponding to their epistemology of recognition. As the Śaivas' speculation in this domain is vast and complex, this chapter will only be able to point out some of what I consider its most interesting features. I will first introduce what I am describing as ontology, and explain why the Śaiva approach can be described as a narrative ontology. Then I will discuss the Pratyabhijñā understanding of the abstract structure of action as emanating from unity to unity-in-multiplicity. From this point of view the category of action is placed in a reciprocally comprehending relationship with the more static category of relation. Next I will turn to an aspect of the Śaiva ontology more familiar to Western conceptions of narrative. I will show how the Śaivas explain action with the rationalized categories of Sanskrit syntactic theory in order to express the distinctive tantric mythico-ritual drama of omnipotence. The philosophical apologetics for this drama is thereby encompassed by it.

Mythico-Ritual Narrative Ontology

First, an introduction to the subject. I am using the classification ontology in the generic sense of reasoning about what is existence or Being, and what are the nature and structure of what exists.[3] The word which I have been translating as action, *kriyā*, is derived from the root *kṛ*, and is a cognate of the English word create. *Kriyā* actually means "creation" as well as "action." The placement of such reasoning under the rubric of the Action Śakti refers primarily to the understanding that it is the Lord's action-production that constitutes what exists. For the Śaivas, this is the mythic action of the emanation of the universe as Śiva-Śakti.

Kriyā furthermore has the important meaning for the Pratyabhijñā system, as it does generally for Sanskritic theological and philosophical discourse, of *ritual action*. Scriptures comprise injunctions about the sacrificial *kriyās* that are to be done. Readers will be familiar with a closely related derivative from *kṛ*, *karman*. This is a major Asian, mythically and social-ritually defined, conception or symbol of action as action-and-its-results in rebirth.[4]

The interconnectedness of the mythical and ritual meanings of *kriyā* may be understood in terms of the general accordance between worldview and action that was discussed in chapter 5. As explained there, for the Śaivas this accordance takes the radical form of the identity of spiritual means and goal. The practitioner of various kinds of tantric ritual, including the internalized form which is the Pratyabhijñā philosophical inquiry, becomes Śiva in the Śiva-Śakti myth.

The Śaivas' understanding of action is also grounded in semantic theory. According to the mainstream of thinking that they inherited from Bhartṛhari's Grammarian school (Vyākaraṇa), the chief unit of meaning is the sentence, and the chief meaning and referent of that is action (*kriyā*). Language is said to express being (*sattā*) as an action to be accomplished.[5] The Grammarians' view extrapolates to all discourse the priestly interpretation of the Vedas as expressing injunctions for ritual behavior.[6] This semantic conception reinforces the classification of the Śaiva discussions of action as ontology. As all states of affairs are intrinsically linguistic, what there is depends on to what one may refer.

I believe that the Śaiva and related semantic concepts of action have some analogy to contemporary Western theories of the intrinsically narrative character of experience.[7] However the Śaiva and other Indian theories neither relativize narrative like Lyotard nor "revisionistically" metaphorize it like Ricoeur.[8] The mythical story that is para-

digmatic for human ritual action is not understood to be a mere quality of experience generated by imagination, but is affirmed unhesitatingly of existence itself. Everything is the action of Śiva-Śakti.

The Pratyabhijñā narrative ontology gives yet another twist to all of the interpretation made so far in this book. Our Western category of ontology may be understood as in a certain way comprehending epistemology. That is, knowledge of various sorts must be assigned some sort of existence.[9] Similarly, cognition is explained by the Śaivas to be a sort of action. Thus Abhinavagupta cites for support a statement of Somānanda: "At the time of the cognition of a pot, there is the action 'He knows the pot.' "[10]

Now, the Pratyabhijñā system devotes much more space to the topics falling under the rubric of the Cognition Śakti than to those of the Action Śakti. Also, the two Śaktis are often said to be identical. However, it is of great interest that in several places Abhinavagupta asserts the primacy of the Action Śakti over the Cognition Śakti. Furthermore, he identifies the two respectively with *prakāśa* and *vimarśa!* The following passage expresses the greater importance of Action as *vimarśa* over Cognition as *prakāśa*, at the same time as stressing the ultimate identity of the categories:

> The nature of this [Self] as the Great Lord consists in His recognitively judging [*vimṛśad*], His having uninterrupted recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*], His not being dependent on anything else, and His being a mass of pure bliss. That recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] having the nature "I," is the pure and ultimately unitary Cognition and Action [Śaktis] of God [*deva*], who is involved in play, etc.[11] Cognition has the nature of awareness [*prakāśa*]. Action is recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*], which has the nature of the freedom characteristic of an agent [*svātantrya*].[12] Furthermore, recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] has awareness [*prakāśa*] within it. Thus Cognition and Action are, on the Supreme level, nothing but recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. . . . However, cognition is in every way nothing but recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. For it has been said that without that there would be insentience. And that very [recognitive judgement] is Action.[13]

The bulk of this work has shown that recognition as understood by the Śaivas fully embodies or actualizes the tantric myth and ritual at the same time that it is ostensibly universally intelligible. As a transcendental and "essential" process this recognition (in *vimarśa*, etc.) is constitutive of awareness per se (*prakāśa*). The interpretation of recog-

nition in terms of the Action Śakti further articulates the encompassment of discourse by the Śaiva myth and ritual qua narrative.

Nevertheless, another point must be made in this regard. Although the Śaiva epistemology is framed as an expression of the narrative, the philosophical explanation of action is in key ways parasitic upon the epistemology. The explanation of action relies on the idealistic premises of the emanation of a monistic Consciousness.[14] Thus in talking about action at the ordinary level of experience the Śaivas *conflate the performance of action with the observation of it.* This dependence upon the epistemology will become distinct in our consideration of the Śaivas' development of earlier syntactic conceptions to interpret their mythico-ritual narrative.

Action as Emanating from Unity to Unity-in-Multiplicity

Before moving to this syntax, I must explain a particular aspect of action as understood by the Śaivas, coming from its placement in the structure of emanation. I recall that in the chapter on the prima facie the important features of action identified by the Buddhists for refutation were: a *unity apprehended in an enduring substratum-object, occurring in a temporal sequence.* It would seem that these are features of a universal commonsensical understanding of action. For the Śaivas, however, action, in its highest nature as the Lord's self-recognition, has no temporal sequence. Thus Utpaladeva states:

> It is possible for ordinary action to have sequence, due to the Time Śakti.[15] However, it is not [possible for there to be sequence in] the eternal [action] of the Lord, just as [it is not possible for there to be sequence in] the Lord [Himself].[16]

It is due to admixture with time that the eternal action is emanated into action with its commonsensical features. In fuller accounts, the monistic action is held to be differentiated due to differences of time, place, and constitutive form.[17]

Abhinavagupta explains the descent of action from unity to unity-in-multiplicity:

> Therefore, the Essential Nature of things, though unitary through the force of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], accommodates within Himself contrary divisions of His essential nature. Due to their contrariety, they [the divisions] appear in the form of sequence, and thereby make that [Essential Nature] into the unitary substratum of action.[18]

The following passage describes the recognition of action at the empirical level:

> From the force of that awareness [*prakāśa*] which is firm recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] there is the apprehension "This in its essential nature is the same hand." [In this experience, there is first of all] no difference of the body [i.e., the hand]. However [paradoxically], there also appears a diversity of forms which, because of their contrariety, cannot exist in the same essential form [i.e., the hand at one particular time]. This [diversity of the unitary] is explained to be action.[19]

Relation

In its emanatory structure the Śaiva conception of action overlaps with another of their fundamental ontological conceptions, relation. It will be recalled that relation was repudiated by the Buddhists in basically the same manner as action—as an unsubstantiated and illogical unification of multiplicity. Relation is unity-in-multiplicity per se. Utpaladeva defines relation:

> Entities, which are restricted to themselves and appear separately, obtain unity as reciprocal connection in the unitary subject. This is the basis of the conception of relation [*sambandha*].[20]

The diversity comprehended by relation is again made on the basis of differences in the times, places, and constitutive forms of the *relata*.[21] As in the case of action (and as was explained at the end of the fifth chapter), the unity and multiplicity of relation are understood to reside in different spheres. Abhinava explains: "Multiplicity is external. However, unity through the reciprocal connection of forms is internal. Such is the nature of relation [*sambandha*]."[22] In its static character, relation may be understood *as the most abstract ontological category for the referent of the transcendental recognition.*[23]

In the following passage Abhinavagupta places relation in the position of the fundamental ontological category generated by the Action Śakti:[24]

> This is the manner in which consciousness descends [to the level of ordinary experience]: Every movement/manifestation [*visphāra*] here results solely from the Action Śakti. In this the root is nothing but relation [*sambandha*]. . . . However, sometimes this relation [*sambandha*] is entangled by other designations. . . . If this entanglement by other designations is ended, it is correct only to speak of

> relation [*sambandha*]. . . . Thus the diverse affairs of the world are completely dependent upon relation [*sambandha*].[25]

The Śaivas reduce a number of other categories to relation on the basis of its metaphysical necessity and primitiveness. Thus it is relation which connects words with their objects.[26] Although, as we have seen, the Lord's Action Śakti is said to generate relation—action is itself included as an example of relation. Action is a unity of an individual, such as the person Devadatta, across places, times, and forms.[27] From a linguistic viewpoint, action is the relation between all the inflected nouns in the sentence.[28] A universal is a unity belonging to a diversity of things which are similar.[29] A whole is a unity of different parts occupying different places.[30]

The great differentiator, time, is itself explained as a relation. Time is *the relation of difference between manifestations of something in the course of action.* Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta further point out that the (relational) changes of regular duration such as those of the sun and the moon and seasons are used to measure the changes of irregular duration such as going or reading.[31] As has already been seen, the Śaivas define the capacity of the Lord for the generation of temporal sequence as His Time Śakti.[32]

Locations and directions are relations between material objects existing at the same time. For example, they are before, behind, near, or far from each other.[33] Other categories stated by Abhinavagupta to be relations are grammatical cases, measurements of number, size, and weight, and the Hindu realists' categories of inherence and conjunction.[34]

Mythico-Ritual Syntax

Having observed the structure of the homologous frameworks of action and relation as emanating unity-in-multiplicity, we may now turn to more straightforwardly narrative aspects of the Śaiva ontology. What I wish to show is that the Pratyabhijñā system carries forward in its ostensibly universal discourse the *syntax* characteristic of the monistic Śaiva mythico-ritual narrative. This syntax is deliberately articulated in the terms of scholastic grammatical theory about the structure of Sanskrit sentences.

It is first necessary to explain some elementary ideas from Sanskritic theory on syntax.[35] As has been said, *kriyā* designates the action expressed by the verb. The word roughly corresponding to our notion

of grammatical case is *kāraka*. While the six *kārakas* are historically related to the Indo-European cases, their conception is more subtle, and bridges in a particular way the areas of semantics and syntax. They describe various logical relationships of the referents of declined nouns to the main action expressed by a verb: the action's agent (*kartṛ*), chief instrument (*karaṇa*), object it effects or affects (*karman*), location (*adhikaraṇa*), where it comes from spatially, causally, and so on (*apādāna*), and for whom or what one performs it (*sampradāna*). The same *kāraka* may actually be expressed in more than one case declension. The genitive is not even considered a *kāraka*, as it usually articulates relationships between nouns, rather than between nouns and a verb.

The word *kāraka* is a derivative from the same root as the word action (*kṛ*), having the causal significance of "actor, maker, factor." The *kārakas* are understood as functioning to accomplish the action expressed by the verb. From this point of view, the action is said to be "that which is to be established" (*sādhya*) and the *kārakas* are "establishers" (*sādhana*). Take the typical example: "He cooks rice in the pot with fire." The pot contains the rice and water, and the fire heats them. The rice, that is, the direct object expressed in the accusative, is explained to be the locus of the result (*phala*) of the action of cooking. This result is a transformation of the nature of the rice. In contemporary scholarship on Sanskrit, the *kārakas* are sometimes described as "syntactico-semantic categories." To give them the significance of what accomplishes the action, I would rather use the gloss "syntactico-semantic factors."

In accordance with its general emphases on language and action, Sanskritic speculation about many philosophical topics often has recourse to arguments about the interrelations between the various *kārakas* and the overarching *kriyā*. Even traditions such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta, and Buddhism, which do not accept the notion that semantics is primarily the expression of action, are influenced by the view and also engage in these discussions.

To help thematize one of the trajectories within these discussions, I point out an analogous area of Western theory, propounded by Kenneth Burke in his *Grammar of Motives*.[36] Developing his categories from a model of drama, Burke identifies five intrinsic factors or "motives" necessary to all accounts of action: act itself, agent, scene, agency (i.e., instrument),[37] and purpose.[38] The last four of these roughly overlap with the Sanskrit *kartṛ*, *adhikaraṇa*, *karaṇa*, and *sampradāna*, and an interesting parallel may also be observed between the causal

significance of motive and that of *kāraka*.[39] However, I am not concerned here with a detailed comparison of the schemes.

Rather I am interested in Burke's insight that different philosophical and literary expressions tend, explicitly or implicitly, to emphasize reductionistically or "feature" particular motives at the expense of the others. For example, Burke observes that Hegelian idealism features the agent. Materialism, from the Greek atomists through modern science, and I would add humanistic and social scientific contextualism, feature the scene.[40] Burke interprets scientific and technological thought, pragmatism, and utilitarianism as featuring the instrument/agency, in an analysis that may be assimilated to other studies of contemporary "instrumental" rationality.[41] Outside of the classification of philosophies, Burke's grammar has notably been used in sociological theories to typologize different sorts of explanatory accounts and justifications of action.[42]

It is not necessary to attempt to use Burke to classify different South Asian philosophies. I believe that an important dimension of the Sanskritic debates about action syntax is precisely an effort of the different schools *to articulate their own, literally grammatical, grammars of motives.* Here I wish to show how the Śaivas develop such a grammar in order further to interpret the Lord's transcendental self-recognition. They distinguish themselves from other Indian philosophical systems by their explanation of the role of the *agent* in relation to the syntactic nexus of *action and its objects and results*.[43]

The Orthodox Hindu and Buddhist Denigration of the Agent in the Syntactic Nexus of Action and Result

Now the mainstream of orthodox Indian philosophical systems, Hindu as well as Buddhist, has in various ways denigrated the role of the agent within the syntactic nexus. First, the agent is devalued in the same manner as all of the other *kārakas*. As I have said, action is the chief meaning and referent of language. All of the *kārakas* are accessories helping to accomplish that action that is to be accomplished (*sādhya*).

In his study of *karman*, Edwin Gerow places the point just mentioned in a more complicated pattern of considerations that syntactically subordinate the agent.[44] Thus, on the one hand, the word *karman* means action. On the other, it designates the *kāraka* indicating the direct object, which is (usually) expressed in the accusative case. As stated previously, the direct object is understood to receive the result

(*phala*) of the verbal process (*vyāpāra*), for instance, the rice that is cooked.

Gerow points out a strong tendency in Indian linguistic and philosophical speculation toward the identification of the verbal process with the result. The reasoning for this identification is complex. However, it may be stated briefly that the case of intransitive verbs, which to us would seem exceptional, became paradigmatic. In "He sits" the sitting is a unity of both process and result. The meaning of the word *karman* as both action and direct object articulates the identity.

Furthermore, explains Gerow, the unitary nexus of process and result came to be understood as the dominant feature of syntax. This is observed in a proclivity in Sanskrit toward passive constructions—a proclivity that in itself emphasizes the agent's accessory status. Now, in passive syntax, the verb agrees with the *karman*, for example, "The rice is cooked by him." In Gerow's view, the culmination of these patterns of thinking is the late grammarian Nāgeśa's treatment of what would seem to us the oddest case as most paradigmatic, that is, passive intransitive syntax. Thus "It is sat (by him)." The process-result is featured strongly.

According to Gerow, this grammatical understanding is *the same* as the religious conception of *karman* as a chain of process and result extending across lives. The agent is seen as a kind of adjunct bound within the nexus. Gerow is careful to distinguish his views from earlier arguments that Sanskrit causes an alleged "passive character" of the Indian mind.[45] Nevertheless he still contends that it is primarily a fact about the Sanskrit language that was reflected in the various forms of the doctrine of *karman*, and was increasingly realized in the linguistic and philosophical speculation.

I believe that the range of ideas about *karman* in Indian history is far too vast to be explained this way. I also view Sanskrit and other languages in themselves as semantically more indeterminate.[46] My interest is rather in how the second-order, scholastic speculation reflects *divergent* religious-cultural understandings within the South Asian cultural area. In any event, Gerow has pointed out an important homology about which Western scholars previously had very little awareness.

A number of philosophical and theological systems do think in precisely the way he identifies, using grammar to support their views. There is a tendency to look at the agent as a slave to the syntax. I believe that this pattern of thinking articulates not only the agent's bondage to *karman* in rebirth for Hindus and Buddhists but also its

subordination to the order of objective ritual behavior—pertaining to caste, sacrifice, life cycle, and so on—in orthodox Hindu society.

Support is accorded to this mode of explanation by Alexis Sanderson's "Purity and Power among the Brahmans of Kashmir"—the characterization of monistic Śaivism of which was discussed in chapter 2. Sanderson examines conceptions of agency with a social historical rather than grammatical focus, and he is especially concerned with associated symbolism of purity and impurity. Nevertheless, his analysis of the extreme but divergent approaches to denigrating agency of the orthodox traditions of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta is based upon the very texts discussing the syntax of action.

The case of the orthodox ritualistic system of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is particularly interesting. The Mīmāṃsakas actually stress the importance of the agent in carrying out ritual injunctions. However, the agent is "depersonalized" in various ways. As with most Indian traditions, he is subject to *karman* as action and result in rebirth. More specifically, he must follow the injunctions to perform rituals. Salvation comes from performing rituals that *completely transcend all worldly purpose.* Sanderson explains:

> This contradiction, that of the "solipsistic conformist," was his self-representation as ritual agent. The notion of autonomous agency individualised the person, but his determination by a world of revealed duties, his wish to conform to the Brahmanical ideal, depersonalised this individual, purging him of all independent motivations.[47]

As Sanderson observes, Advaita Vedānta accepts the necessity of social-ritual action described by Mīmāṃsā, but contends that it is ultimately illusory and escapes from it in a liberation equated with nonagency.[48] I will take Śaṅkara as the representative of Advaita because his name is so well known in the West.[49] Śaṅkara is thoroughly grounded in the ritualistic school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. He rigidly defends the orthodox Hindu patterns of behavior. However, I would say that he is equally terrified of them. For him an agent is inexorably subordinated to the syntax of acting and enjoying results. Śaṅkara thus systematically rejects the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā process of exegesis and ritual action as the way to ultimate salvation. He divorces the saving knowledge of the real Self/Brahman from agency and action. The following passages from the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* are typical:

> We maintain [as opposed to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā] that the knowledge of the Self does not pertain to something which is to be done.

> [This knowledge] is not for the purpose of avoiding or pursuing [anything]. Our excellence is [maintaining that] when there is the realization of the Self as Brahman there is the abandonment of everything which has to be done, and the completion of what has to be done.[50]

> This is what one who knows Brahman realizes: "I am Brahman, which is completely different from that [limited self] known previously as agent and enjoyer; and is neither agent nor enjoyer in any of the three times [i.e., past, present, and future]. Thus previously I was neither agent nor enjoyer. Nor am I now. Nor will I be at a future time." Only thus is liberation possible. For otherwise, if there were no destruction of the *karmas* which have been proceeding for beginningless time, there would be no liberation.[51]

This gnosis of nonagency is the individuality of the renunciant as interpreted by Louis Dumont.[52]

The valuation of subordination to action in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and the attempt to escape from the same in Advaita Vedānta indicate the diversity of ways of proceeding from the same or similar assumptions. Sanderson also observes that there are moderate devaluations of agency in the "middle ground," for instance, by Vaiṣṇavas.[53] Of course, the mainstream Buddhist positions completely deny the existence of a self/agent. I have said enough to provide a foil to the Śaiva conceptions.

The Śaiva Grammar of Omnipotence

As explained in chapter 2, Sanderson characterizes the monistic Śaivism of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta as pursuing the value of "power" as opposed to the orthodox Hindu "purity." The omnipotence of identity with Śiva-Śakti or participation in Śiva's self-recognition stands in continuity with other limited magical powers (*siddhis*) that are pursued. And, as Sanderson points out, the tantric praxes transgress the ritual proscriptions concerning purity, for example, regarding caste, diet, sexuality, and death. I also observe that for the monistic Śaiva traditions *karman* as bonding process and result extending across lives is not an inexorable consequence of action. It is described as one of three illusory taints (*malas*), the taint of *karman* (*kārma mala*).[54] This taint is understood as only an incomplete realization of one's omnipotent, cosmogonic Action Śakti. Freedom from *karman* is the realization of that Śakti.[55]

The Śaivas develop their theory of recognition into a syntax of power or omnipotence that directly reverses the direction of thinking

observed by Gerow. In this they take up several earlier understandings of the special (albeit often delimited) role of the *kartṛ* or agent, particularly from the Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika traditions, and radicalize them. The alternatives provided by these considerations were not given sufficient attention by Gerow.

I will summarize the most important of these to the Śaivas. As I have explained, all of the *kārakas* are understood to function in accomplishing the overall action or process (*vyāpāra*) expressed by the verb. They do this through their own *subordinate processes.* The pan *holds* the rice, the fire *heats* it, and so on. More complicated sets of subordinate processes could easily be envisioned. Where are all the subordinate processes synthesized into the larger one? This is understood to be accomplished by the agent, who is the locus of the overall process (*vyāpārāśraya*).

Furthermore, according to grammar it is the agent who is the instigator (*prayojaka*) of all of the subordinate processes comprising the larger one. He arranges the equipment, lights and controls the fire, and so forth.[56] Sometimes further subjective factors in this instigation are identified. The Naiyāyikas in particular stress that the agent has the intention or desire (*icchā*) and makes the effort (*yatna*) that brings about the action. The followers of Pāṇini state that the direct object (*karma*), as receiving the result of the process, is that which is most desired (*īpsitatama*) by the agent.

I will make one more point. While the agent controls the processes of the other *kārakas,* no other *kāraka* has a similar influence on him. The other *kārakas* are "determined by another" (*paratantra*), but he is "self-determined" or "free" (*svatantra*) with regard to their operations.

The Śaivas formulate of the agent an absolutely fundamental place in syntax by interpreting all of the special characteristics just mentioned in terms of their idealistic theory of the Lord's self-recognition. These characteristics are asserted to belong to the Lord as cre-ator through recognition. Thus the agent's role as substratum of the overall process is interpreted in terms of the synthetic function of recognition. The agent's instigating intention (*icchā*) and freedom (*svātantrya*) are the Lord's will to emanate. The reader will recall the explanation that for the Śaivas action, in its highest nature as the Lord's self-recognition, has no temporal sequence. It is precisely the agent who is the higher nature of action.[57] These identifications are exemplified in the following explanation by Abhinavagupta, which uses the analogy of ordinary agency to elucidate that of the Lord:

> Here [according to this system], action is really nothing but the Supreme Lord's [agential] intention [*icchā*]. [This agential intention] consists of uninterrupted self-recognition [*svātmāparamarśa*] which has the nature of unobstructed [agential] freedom [*svātantrya*], and is not dependent on another. . . . For [limited individuals such as] Caitra or Maitra, etc., the inner intention [*icchā*] [expressed] "I cook" is the action. Thus, even though there is the relation [*sambandha*] of [the one who is cooking] with numerous movements such as putting something on the fire, etc., the [intention] "I cook" is uninterrupted. It is nothing but the intention [*icchā*] "I cook" which appears as such movements. However there is really no sequence in this [intention]. Thus is that recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] of the Lord, which has the nature of intention [*icchā*, which may be expressed] "I Lord," "I appear," "I manifest in cosmogonic vibration [*sphurāmi*]," "I create through agitation [*ghūrṇe*]"[58] and "I recognize [*pratyavamṛśāmi*]." The essential nature [of such recognitive judgement] is nothing but "I," and it has no sequence."[59]

Thus there is a reductionism in a direction opposite to that which Gerow observed. In a sentence such as "Devadatta cooks rice in the pan with wood," the factors such as the pan, wood and rice appear (*prakāśante*) as merged in the action. The action in turn rests (*āśritām*) in the agent.[60] According to the Śaivas, even action that seems to be situated primarily in the object is actually located in the agent through His unifying recognitive synthesis.[61]

The Śaiva Syntax of Causation

The Śaivas elaborate this syntax in a number of different spheres of philosophical explanation. We may first look at their theorization about the important Indian philosophical topic of the cause-effect relation.[62] To begin, the term most frequently used for cause in discussions of causality is *kāraṇa*. This word is situated in syntax in the position of the *kāraka* called *karaṇa*, which corresponds to our instrumental case.[63] Whereas all the *kārakas* have a kind of causal role in the accomplishment of an action, this case indicates that the cause proper is conceived as the most efficient means (*sādhakatama*). Sometimes the cause is also declined in the *apādāna* or ablative, indicating that from which the action comes. The effect is the result (*phala*) that is understood to occur in the direct object (*karman*).

The Śaivas subsume the cause-effect relation within their idealistic agential syntax. Through His recognitive synthesis, the omnipotent agent

Śiva/the Self, is the substratum of the overarching verbal process that contains the subordinate operations of all the other *kārakas*, and it is He who instigates these operations. He moves and, as underlying substance, connects through time what is ordinarily considered the cause with the effect in the object. As such it is He who is the real or essential cause. Utpaladeva puts this densely:

> That [Action] Śakti is the existence [*sattā*] of both [cause and effect, which are at different moments each] existent [*sat*] and nonexistent [*asat*]. That [Action Śakti] does not belong to what is insentient. Therefore the essential nature of the cause-effect [*kāryakāraṇa*] relation is the agent-direct object [*kartṛkarma*] relation.[64]

In the following passage of his commentary, Abhinavagupta more fully explains the Lord's instigation and synthesis of the different moments through His Action Śakti, using the example of germination:

> The insentient seed, [regardless of whether or not] the sprout [is conceived to be either implicitly] existent or nonexistent [within it],[65] does not have the capacity to make [the sprout] have existence as an object of experience. There is no power of the sprout such that the sprout is born from the seed because [before it is born as the sprout] it does not exist. [Again,] since the seed is other than the sprout, how can it have the power such that the sprout is born? Since all this is so, it is concluded that the effect [*kārya*] is nothing but the direct object [*karma*] being manifested through the Action Śakti. This [fact] is evinced in the gerundive suffix [used to derive the word for effect, *kārya*, from the verb for action, *kṛ*].[66] [The effect] is caused to be produced by Him.[67] [He is the] agent by reason of exercising the capacity for this [production of the effect]. Therefore the cause [*kāraṇa*] rests in the agent [*kartṛ*], who is consciousness.[68]

Because of the dependence of the Śaivas' conception of agency on their monistic idealism, the apparently unconscious process of a sprout arising from a seed is really not different from the manifestly conscious process of a potter making a pot. The Lord manifests from Himself the seed, along with the additional necessities such as earth and water—and then the sprout.[69] Also, it is ultimately the Lord Himself, and not the potter qua limited individual, who makes the pot. The Lord manifests the potter, the tools and materials, and their activities. Abhinava places the process in the monistic idealistic perspective with the analogy of the reflection in a mirror of a potter making a pot.[70]

The Śaivas elaborate some of the same basic syntactic considerations to produce an interesting refutation of the Buddhist logicians' understanding of causation as "dependent origination." It will be recalled that this theory was interpreted in the fourth chapter as a minimal phenomenalist reconstruction of the raw data behind the causal relationship. According to it, causality is a mere regularity of succession between evanescent entities, without any continuous or substantial "connection" between them. Such causality may be described in the manner "When there is this, then there is this."[71] Now, this expression in Sanskrit uses the grammatical construction that in English is called the "locative absolute."

The Śaivas interpret the regular priority and posteriority expressed with the locative construction as a sort of expectation (*apekṣā*) between the moments. They contend that such an expectation could not exist between discrete entities that in themselves lack recognitive synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*).[72] Here is another terse statement by Utpaladeva:

> The cause-effect relation [is formulated by the Buddhists as dependent origination expressed] "When there is this, then there is this." This [relation] cannot belong to insentient things, which are devoid of expectation [*apekṣā*]. For the referents of the seventh case cannot be supposed to be those [insentient things] which are situated only in themselves and are devoid of recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*], whether they are existent [*sat*] or nonexistent [*asat*].[73]

In his commentary Abhinava again invokes the Śaiva interpretations of the syntactic principles regarding the agent as free and as substratum uniting the constituent processes of the *kārakas* in the overarching process. It is He who unites what is expressed in the locative with what is expressed in the main clause:

> The meaning of the seventh [locative] or other declension is classified as the relation between the *kriyā* and *kāraka.* It is this [relation between the *kriyā* and *kāraka* which is the only] regular succession[74] between things. There is no other dry[75] [form of regular succession]. That [regular succession] is possible if the pair of things [which are related] rest on [Him] who is free [*svatantra*] and has the nature of consciousness, and not otherwise. . . . [The Buddhists have advocated dependent origination as a regular succession of cause and effect having such typical expressions using the locative as] "When there is the seed, there is the sprout" and "When there is fire, there is smoke." All this [regular succession]

> is possible only when there is rest [of the things occurring in succession] on the subject [*pramātṛ*] who is free [*svatantra*] and has the nature of consciousness. And not otherwise.[76]

For the Śaivas there is no unrelated component of the sentence. All syntax is related through the agent.

We see that in the discussions of causality the agent's ability, as substratum and instigator, to unite the processes of cause and effect is crucial. It will be useful for us briefly to consider the Pratyabhijñā thinkers' evaluations of the Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta expressions of *satkāryavāda*, the view that the effect preexists in the cause. According to the Sāṃkhya, the effect is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of a *continuous* underlying material cause (*pradhāna, prakṛti*). The Śaivas applaud the Sāṃkhya assertion of the continuity between cause and effect. Abhinavagupta describes the Sāṃkhyas as "having long-ranging insight" and "resorting to recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)."[77] However, they disagree with the Sāṃkhya understanding of the underlying material cause as insentient matter.[78] Here is an excerpt from Abhinavagupta's argument that the different moments of the action of transformation can only be synthesized and instigated by a conscious agent:

> Action is explained to be a differentiation between forms belonging to a unitary essential nature, which is unitary due to the force of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]. Since [action] is accompanied by temporal sequence, these mutually differentiated forms do not appear simultaneously. Action is explained to be nothing but this priority and posteriority of forms. Such is action. "So," i.e., in this way,[79] [it is established that], because the material cause [*pradhāna*] is characterized by a particular action, it has agency. It does not have a mere dry causality. . . .[80] The [material cause, *pradhāna*, in its ultimate nature as source of the universe, viewed by the Pratyabhijñā as the agent Śiva] constantly enters into the action of transformation . . . in a sequence of diverse forms such as *mahat*, etc.[81] Therefore it is One who transforms [*pariṇamat*]. . . . The material cause [in its ultimate nature as source of the universe, viewed by the Pratyabhijñā as the agent Śiva] abandons one form, establishes another distinct from it, and becomes intent [*prahvatā*] upon a third.[82]

The Pratyabhijñā syntax articulates a distinctive *satkāryavāda* of emanating Consciousness.[83]

Advaita Vedānta also advocates the *satkāryavāda*, and maintains that the underlying material cause is the Self/Consciousness rather

than insentient matter. However, it claims that the effect that is the universe is an illusion (Māyā), a false supposition or "projection" (*vivarta*) on this Self. The Śaivas adduce many of the well-known (nonsyntactic) arguments against the Advaita Vedāntin understanding of Māyā—the impossibility of denying a world that all experience, the difficulty of specifying the subject of cosmic illusion, the illogicality of the Advaita view of the ontological inexplicability (*anirvacacanīyatva*) of illusion.[84] On the basis of such considerations, the Śaivas claim that the unity of the multiplistic universe can only be explained with their narrative syntax of cre-ation by the conscious agent Śiva.[85] To again quote an excerpt from Abhinavagupta:

> Therefore, even if it is admitted [with Advaita Vedānta] that the real Consciousness is a unity, there will not be possible [by their view] creation/action [*kriyā*], which involves entrance into diverse forms. [This creation] has agency [*kartṛtva*] as it definitive characteristic. However, all this is possible if there is [in accordance with our view, agential] freedom [*svātantrya*], which has the essential nature of recognitive judgment [*parāmarśa*]. For recognitive judgement is intention [*icchā*], which has the nature of the desire to create/act [*cikīrṣā*]. Everything to be created exists within that [intention] in nondifferentiation. . . . Thus the Great Lord causes the universe, which has the nature of awareness, to appear in diversity. This universe is real [but at the same time] is essentially nothing but His own Self, has the ultimate nature of awareness, and is a unity of unbroken awareness. Lordship [*aiśvarya*] is explained to be freedom [*svātantrya*] having the character of doing this which is extremely difficult. . . . Because the subject of discussion here is the cause-effect [*kāryakāraṇa*] relation, both the *kartṛ* and the *karman* are mentioned. However, the other *kārakas* also really follow within [*anupraveśīni*] the unitary agency [*kartṛtva*]. Otherwise, how could that [creation/action] be undifferentiated, when there is a differentiated multitude of *kārakas*, such as the *karaṇa*, etc.?[86]

The divergence from Śaṇkara's grammar of the agent's bondage to action within the realm of illusion could not be greater.

I will now summarize the significance of the discussion of causality in the larger context of the Śaiva ontology. I have explained that the Śaivas understand ontology in terms of a mythico-ritual narrative, describing an action that is ultimately untouched by time and a self-identical expression of agency. Causality pertains to what is involved in the bringing about of a result. This finally is a question of what

constitutes its existence. The answer is that the existence of anything is the eternal agency of its cre-ation. Abhinava explains:

> Therefore [the expression] "The pot exists" has this meaning: The Great Lord, who is awareness [*prakāśa*], desires to exist as the pot and assumes that existence through His [agential] freedom [*svātantrya*].[87]

The statements quoted at the beginning of this chapter directly equate Being with this agency. Thus we may say that the Śaivas develop corresponding to their epistemology of recognition an "eternalizing agential mythico-ritual narrative ontology"—or perhaps a better summary would be simply "agential ontology"!

The Śaiva Epistemic Syntax

I believe that I have sufficiently explained the basic emanatory and syntactic features of the Śaiva ontology. However, our picture will be more complete if I develop to the same level a theme from the beginning of this chapter. It was explained that epistemology is in a sense comprehended within ontology. Processes of knowing must be accorded some sort of existence. The Śaivas thus talk about cognition as action. Like other Indian philosophical schools, they also make frequent use of syntax to explain the structure of processes of human knowing. Because the Śaiva ontology is itself dependent on the idealistic epistemology, these discussions do not cover entirely new territory. Nevertheless, the thoroughness of the narrative encompassment of epistemology is significant.

To begin with the common Indian epistemological triad (*tripuṭī*) of subject, means, and object of cognition: The subject of cognition (*pramātṛ*) is, of course, the agent (*kartṛ*). The word for means of cognition, *pramāṇa*, is derived in the same way, and has the same syntactic function as the *kāraka* usually used to express the cause, that is, *karaṇa*. The *pramāṇa* is the most efficient means (*sādhakatama*) for the accomplishment of the action of cognizing. The object of cognition is the direct object (*karman*) of the action of cognizing. And another relevant category outside of the triad, cognition itself (*pramā, pramiti*), is the result (*phala*) of the process (*vyāpāra*) of cognizing the object of cognition.

The Śaivas' basic strategy is to reduce all the other categories in essential nature to the process (*vyāpara*) of self-recognition internal to the subject/agent. The Śaivas claim that the other factors in the syntax

of cognition only appear to function independently through a sort of contraction (*saṃkoca*) of this self-recognition.[88]

Now, the relation between means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and cognition (*pramā, pramiti*) is a particular form of the relation between cause and effect, which we already considered. The underlying process is perhaps even clearer here where the focus is explicitly on knowledge. In the following passage Abhinavagupta places both means and cognition within the synthetic nexus of the agent's self-recognition:

> Recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*] has been established previously to be, in its essential nature, inwardly directed [as self-recognition]. Only when that [recognitive judgement] is contracted in the condition of [having apparently separate] objects, it is cognition as a result [*phala*]. [We may take the following as an illustration:] There is the awareness "I who am brave am victorious." One may analyze into a cause-effect relation the two conditions of bravery and victory, which are actually situated in a single [agent]. [This would be expressed] "Since I am brave, therefore I am victorious." Similarly [there is the analysis] that, since there is the perceptual awareness of blue, therefore there is the judgement "This is blue." Even though they really have a unitary nature, [through this artificial analysis, they are understood in] a cause-effect [*hetu-phala*] relation.[89]

What are normally regarded as cognitive means and effect are equally reduced to subjective conditions.[90]

In this vein, there are a large number of examples where the Śaivas reinterpret expressions of cognitive states in forms that uncover the syntactic role of the agent. Thus Abhinava glosses the sentence "The blue appears to me [*mama nīlam bhāti*]" as "The blue is cognized by me [*mayā nīlam jñāyate*]."[91] Likewise Utpaladeva explains regarding the memory of an earlier experience:

> [An earlier experience] may be remembered as different [from the subject, as expressed in the form] "That cognition of mine was thus." [The memory having this expression] is nothing but a grammatical analysis [*vyākaraṇa*][92] of the memory [expressed] "It was seen by me."[93]

In another interesting example Abhinava refutes the apparent perception of a wife as an independent "other." He controverts the idea that the direct object (*karman*) is the locus of cognition as result (*phala*) of cognizing:

> One may claim that cognition rests on the lotus face of one such as a wife [i.e., as an object of cognition], and is not produced within the Self. For there is the past passive participle affix as referring to the direct object [*karman*].[94] [We respond] that the one [claiming this] does not understand his own speech. For the direct object [*karman*] is what is to be obtained by means of the action [*kriyā*] of the agent [*kartṛ*]. Thus the action [*kriyā*] of cognizing is established in the agent [*kartṛ*].[95]

This is the opposite of the direction of thinking observed by Gerow.

Sometimes the thinkers parse the underlying syntax of experiences with expressions which do not even mention a direct object.[96] Thus Abhinava states:

> Thus even [apparently separate objects such as] blue, etc., existing in the middle[97] recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] as "This is blue," are established to be constituted by the Self, because they rest upon the root recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*] "I." Even "I cognize this to be blue" really amounts to "I am aware [*prakāśe*]."[98]

Abhinava states that some believe that the expression that does not mention the object is the most proper one.[99]

Some Practical Implications

I must emphasize that this narrative-ontological syntax that we have considered is ritually axiomatic as well as doctrinal/mythical. Abhinava thus directly applies this syntax in a philosophical theological interpretation of the concrete, nonphilosophical tantric ritual. In his *Tantrāloka* and *Tantrasāra* he uses this syntactic theory in explaining the inner significance of preliminary ceremonies of the ritual—*nyāsa*, the divinizing projection of mantric syllables onto the body and other parts of the ritual; and purifications[100] with the sacrificial vase. Abhinava identifies various components of the ritual, such as the location, ritual implements, object of sacrifice (for instance, flowers), and oblations, with the grammatical cases of *adhikaraṇa, apādāna, karaṇa, karman,* and so forth. He explains the overarching ritual process as the aspirant's identification with Śiva as agent of all the cases. It is this identification that is facilitated by *nyāsa* and purifications with the vase. The experience of this identification is cultivated in the rites of worship (*arcā, pūjā*) with the intent of carrying it over into the rest of one's life. To quote Abhinava:

> All things are without separation from Śiva, who has supernatural power [*siddhi*], or is perfectly complete [*pūrṇa*]. Here, through [the *kriyā* that is] worship, the *kārakās* [are realized to be without separation from Śiva]. In the case of worship, the entire collection of *kārakās* is revealed to be undifferentiated from Śiva. This also obtains in [ordinary worldly actions such as] walking, etc. A horse which has been freed from carrying loads and roaming in an enclosed area, does not betray its training even when it has entered into battle.[101] Similarly, one who has identified the *kārakās* with Śiva through training in the *kriyā* of worship—eliminates the duality of *kārakās* [and the aspirant's true Self as Śiva] even [when engaged in ordinary worldly actions such as] walking or standing. So, to the one occupied with this training of unity, this universe appears immediately [*akramāt*, "without temporal succession"] and powerfully, like a woman dancing in a frenzy of the perfectly complete state of Śiva. . . .[102]
>
> Thus, since the *kriyā* of worship bestows this identification [of everything with Śiva], its ultimate nature is the unity of all the *kārakās* with Him. By the ceremonies of purification of the place, there is [realized] the identity [with Śiva] of the seat of the sacrificer. By means of the divinizing-meditative-projection [*nyāsa*], the sacrificer, object of sacrifice [i.e, the direct object or *karman*], place of that [sacrifice—the locative], *karaṇa* [instrument], *ādāna* [ablative] and *sampradā* [dative] attain identity with the state of Śiva.[103]

The Pratyabhijñā discourse participates fully in the ritual aspect of the agential syntax; the agential ontology gives us one more homologous framework for understanding the system's distinctive philosophical and spiritual modus operandi. The nature of Being as an eternal agent gives the ontological expression to the "limit of" arrived at in philosophical analysis. The inference working through the revealing of Śakti has been explained as a clarification of the Lord's ever-existent self-recognition. The same is a clarification of His agency. Utpaladeva asserts in the third to the last verse of the book:

> This new, easy path has been revealed by me as it was explained by the great guru in the text *Śivadṛṣṭi*. Therefore, that one succeeds [*siddhyati*] who places his feet on this [the path of the Pratyabhijñā *śāstra*], and, contemplating that the status of the Agent [*kartṛ*] of the world belongs to himself, submerges himself incessantly in the state of Śiva.[104]

The fifth chapter has already shown how in its ambitiously transcendental character the Pratyabhijñā argumentation endeavors to

encompass the arena of denaturalized discourse within the Śaiva soteriology. It becomes a scholastic ritual identical with its goal. The present chapter further elucidates this effort of encompassment. The Pratyabhijñā system is an expression in philosophically rationalized form of the soteriology qua mythico-ritual *narrative.*[105]

Chapter 8

Conclusion

> What answer can be given to the question "Who are you?" by one possessed by a demon, who, not having recognized Himself, desires to study something else?
>
> —IPV 4.1 concluding verse 3, 2:317

In the endeavor to understand the foreign and complex Pratyabhijñā system, this book has been concerned with different aspects of the problem of interpretation. The problem presented itself from the outset in its contemporary radicalization as the difficulty of cross-cultural understanding. The first chapter argued against cultural relativism and in support of realism in cross-cultural interpretation by adducing the insight embodied in the Liar paradox's along with the theories of Davidson and Apel. On this basis, I contended that paradoxically foundationalist and open-ended philosophical dialogue is the best approach to arbitrating conflicting accounts of the world. I formulated this conception of philosophical methodology both as a program for the contemporary discipline of comparative philosophy and as a model for understanding expressions of philosophical apologetics in other cultures, such as the Pratyabhijñā.

This conception of philosophy was confirmed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta's understanding of the Pratyabhijñā discourse. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers endeavored to make their spiritual tradition available to all humanity by rationalizing it in terms of the inferential methods and the epistemological and ontological concerns of the medieval Sanskritic academy. At the same time—illustrating what I described as the hermeneutic boundedness of the specifics of philosophical methodology with substantive orientation—they attempted to "encompass" or

"overcode" their project of universally intelligible discourse by making it into a complete actualization of tantric myth and ritual spiritual exercise. Indeed the Pratyabhijñā articulates in a philosophically rationalized form the very syntax of Śaiva myth and ritual.

As a project of universally intelligible discourse, the Pratyabhijñā system demands to be taken seriously by a response in kind. Granting a competent philological exegesis, the most "neutral" and "critical" approach we can take to a system such as this is to consider its plausibility and make a decision about it. In respect of the Śaivas' intentions, I believe we may understand the process as a contemporary translation and elaboration of their discourse corresponding to the Nyāya categories structuring dialogue—the prima facie position expressing doubt (*pūrvapakṣa*) and the ostensible refutation of it articulated in the doctrinal conclusion (*siddhānta*). To the extent that the conclusions of the Pratyabhijñā are accepted, they may be integrated into a further-expanding philosophical theory. To the extent that they are rejected, the Pratyabhijñā may be reductionistically interpreted in terms of contesting viewpoints.

The analogies that I have suggested between Indian and Western ideas are by no means intended as simple equations, but rather as similarities-in-differences. Nor are the suggestions made on the premise that foreign ideas are of significance to us only as offering solutions to our own conundrums. My purpose is to facilitate the consideration of plausibility that I have argued is necessary.

I have emphasized the analogies of the Buddhist logic *pūrvapakṣa* with our class of interpretive skepticism and, most relevantly, the varieties of postmodern interpretive skepticism/relativism discussed in chapter 1. As affirming the necessity of an ultimate cosmic agent, the *siddhānta* has commonalities with the various Western arguments for the existence of God, granting of course the disagreement on whether or not God and the individual are identical.[1] However, we have already been pursuing a more pointed analogy between the Pratyabhijñā and the Christian philosophical theology of logos. I maintain that the Pratyabhijñā enables us better to understand the presumptiveness of this philosophical theology against skepticism, by elucidating in it moments corresponding to the *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* arguments, divine self-recognition and its associated narrative syntax.

This chapter will more fully develop this analogical approach to plausibility through considering the strongest contemporary arguments that have been made for and against the affirmation of God as grounding our judgments through His logos. I believe these to be found in the grammatology of Jacques Derrida and the transcendental Thomism

of Bernard Lonergan. My contention is that the Pratyabhijñā system elucidates and supports the viewpoint of the latter against the former. This discussion will also involve an effort to defend the idealistic premise that I maintain is an essential moment of both the Pratyabhijñā and the Christian logos theories.

The confrontation with otherness/doubt and the attempt to answer it is a never-ending process. More is at issue in assessing the Pratyabhijñā system than whether or not the Christian philosophical theology of logos is reasonable. Indeed, outside of the immediate problematics of interpretation and skepticism, Christian theology itself may be seen as a strong *pūrvapakṣa* to Śaivism. In the final section of this chapter I will offer suggestions on how one may critically decide about one important divergence between the Pratyabhijñā and Christian logos theology, which I have already mentioned: the Śaiva system's stress on the ultimate identity rather than difference between God on the one hand and world and people on the other.

Jacques Derrida's Effort to Deconstruct Logocentrism

Derrida's most frequent targets of deconstruction are not explicit advocates of the philosophical theology of logos.[2] Rather he elucidates this conception, which he calls "logocentrism," as one of the deepest historical presuppositions of even secular Western thought; and he correlates it in an ad hoc fashion with such other themes as phonocentrism, phallocentrism (combined with our theme as "phallogocentrism"), masturbation, and so on.

In making allegations of such deep propensities, Derrida endeavors to criticize any absolutized claim about the nature of reality, especially as articulated in conceptions such as truth as correspondence, or the reference of the linguistic signifier to an objective signified or presence.[3] For this reason Derrida may heuristically be characterized along with other kinds of skepticism as denying the validity or groundedness of recognition. For him, along with other proponents of cultural relativism, Buddhist logic, Mādhyamika, and Humean phenomenalism, conceptual/linguistic memory has no applicability to a separate intelligible reality.[4]

What are Derrida's most important skeptical arguments?[5] Crucial to *Of Grammatology* is a reworking of the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. While Derrida views Saussure as perpetuating logocentrism and phonocentrism, he uses some of his ideas on speech and writing to subvert Saussure himself along with Rousseau, Lévi-Strauss, and others.

Most important for Derrida is Saussure's conception of the linguistic sign. According to this view, the linguistic signs of both speech and writing are arbitrary, and given their significance only by their relations to each other. The relationships between signs are based on their *differences* from each other. Saussure states the idea clearly:

> No particular configuration of sound is more aptly suited to express a given message than any other such configuration. So it is clearly the case—indeed, it must be the case—that no linguistic item can ever be based, ultimately, upon anything other than its non-coincidence with the rest. Here the terms arbitrary and differential designate two correlative properties.[6]

Derrida's move is to radicalize this conception of the systematicity of language to exclude the possibility of there ever being any referential connection to, or recognition of, reality or presence.[7]

At this point we may observe a significant analogy between Derrida and the Buddhists beyond their skepticism per se. Both conceive semantics in terms of the negation between words/concepts to eliminate the need to posit an isomorphism between language and reality. The most important distinction between Derrida and the Buddhists in this regard is that the latter do not advert to such difference as a primary means of criticism, but only to support their skepticism in epistemology.

Another key feature of Derrida's skepticism is his argument that all language has the character erroneously attributed merely to writing of being a system of *signs of signs*.[8] Since they are not symbols of initial presences, linguistic signs can only refer to other linguistic signs. A useful statement of this idea is found in the following passage from a section discussing Peirce and Lambert:

> There is thus no phenomenality reducing the sign or the representation so that the thing signified may be allowed to glow finally in the luminosity of its presence. The so-called "thing itself" is always already a *representamen* shielded from the simplicity of the intuitive evidence. The *representamen* functions only by giving rise to an *interpretant* that itself becomes a sign and so on to infinity. The self-identity of the signified conceals itself unceasingly and is always on the move.[9]

The referential, or we may say recognitive, connection of language with presence is endlessly *deferred*.[10] Derrida coins the term "*différance*"

to capture these two conceptions of language as constituted through difference and deferral.[11]

While Derrida is cognizant of the great range of Western understandings of logos, from the Greeks through Hegel and Heidegger, he treats the theistic interpretation as most important.[12] As I have said, Derrida views this theistic conception as underlying even modern, nontheistic understandings of reference. According to him, the idea of a holistic unity of language and reality in the mind of God is a vain attempt to efface the original nonorigin or uncenteredness of language. It is a dream of language as accessing presence in a "transcendental signified."[13] It seems that Derrida would accuse the Pratyabhijñā system of logocentrism in this exact sense.

The Pratyabhijñā, Bernard Lonergan, and the Defense of Logos as a Way of Affirming the Reality of God

I believe that the most focused and cogent development of the Christian understanding of logos as a way of affirming the reality of God—or what we may call a "logos argument"—is that made by Bernard Lonergan. This argument is presented by Lonergan in chapter 19 of his magnum opus, *Insight,* as one of his culminating syntheses of themes propounded throughout the work.[14] Lonergan's project in this regard is to develop the conceptions of logos of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine to formulate a transcendental argument that invokes God as necessary to account for the processes of human cognition evinced in the progress of science and other academic research.[15] Like the examples from ancient and medieval Christian logos theories discussed in chapters 5 and 6, Lonergan's argument may be elucidated by the analogous intellectual moments of the Pratyabhijñā epistemology.

Before considering Lonergan's proof, I will appropriate one of his rhetorical strategies for my own argument. Lonergan designates the findings of the transcendental inquiries throughout his work "positions" and calls views that deny these findings "counter-positions." He claims that the insights articulated in positions can be further and further developed. The counter-positions may be expressed along with various enduring insights. However, insofar as they deny what is necessary to their very expression, they are self-contradictory and invite reversal.[16]

These ideas usefully thematize what appears essential to the presumptiveness of any transcendental argument. The subversion of opposition is evinced in the Śaivas' response to the Buddhists' denial

of the validity of recognition with their theory of Śiva's primordial self-recognition, and in the arguments for interpretive realism and against relativism that were adduced in chapter 1. With Lonergan's terms I may express my hope: that the Pratyabhijñā system will enable us further to develop the positions articulated in Western understanding of logos to demonstrate the conception of the self-recognition of God against the counter-position of the skeptical denial of recognition—whether expressed by relativists, Buddhists, Humean phenomenalists, or any others.

Though Lonergan's argument is difficult and complex, it admits of simple expression:

> The existence of God, then, is known as the conclusion to an argument and, while such arguments are many, all of them, I believe, are included in the following general form. If the real is completely intelligible, God exists. But the real is completely intelligible. Therefore, God exists.[17]

Now, I suggest that this proof's minor and major premises respectively develop considerations analogous to and complementing the Śaiva arguments centering around the terms *vimarśa* and *prakāśa*.

The Intelligibility of Reality and the Self-Contradictoriness of Skepticism

Lonergan's minor premise that the real is completely intelligible may thus be related to the Pratyabhijñā *vimarśa* arguments for the transcendental character of recognition, along with the correlated epistemological and ontological arguments for the necessity and primitiveness of universal categories and relations. Whereas the Śaivas demonstrate their views through examining the most elementary features of the human construction of experience, Lonergan focuses on the critical process of academic research.[18] Lonergan defines reality as being, that is, what is affirmed to be, as the objective of the human eros of an "an unrestricted desire to know."[19] The complete intelligibility of reality is a necessary truth or position. Whenever a state of affairs is affirmed, it is affirmed to be and placed within the generic sphere of intelligibility. The denial of this fact is a counter-position inviting self-reversal:

> Might there not be an unknowable? If the question is invalid, it is to be ignored. If the question is valid, the answer may be "Yes" or "No." But the answer, "Yes," would be incoherent, for then one

> would be knowing that the unknowable is; and the answer, "No," would leave everything knowable within the range of being.[20]

In this way Lonergan demonstrates his minor premise.

As explained in chapter 6, the Śaiva *vimarśa* and correlative arguments, along with their precursors in Bhartṛhari and their Western analogues, articulate the transcendental entailment of the creation of the world from a metaphysical principle of interpretation. The primordial unity of the source pervades and interrelates both poles of ordinary interpretations and the states of affairs to which they are recognized to apply. Interpretation must be the way to reality and reality must be what is interpreted; the denial of either results in internal contradiction. The antirelativist arguments given in chapter 1 assert the impossibility of a theory of interpretations that does not refer to a noncontingent reality. Lonergan's contention that reality is nothing but intelligible being, and that to deny this demonstrates it, is only a particularly clear and direct expression of a basic insight of the Western understanding of logos.[21] In the perspective of the Pratyabhijñā, reality is only what we know through the recognitive application of interpretations.

These considerations may be brought against the skeptic and antagonist of logocentrism, Jacques Derrida. I note that Derrida in many ways does address the problem of the self-referential contradiction for deconstructionism. More than claiming that the contradiction is not a problem, he frequently asserts that deconstructionism itself must be deconstructed. He claims that the *différance*, arche-writing, and so on, he invokes do not exist, and thus cannot be viewed as objects of a science.[22] He attempts to belie rational systematicity by deconstructing in an ad hoc fashion, largely commenting on the works of others, and multiplying his terminologies.

I do not believe that all of this is satisfactory, although I am sympathetic with many of Derrida's views and objectives, and the way in which his work may function as an agent of intellectual modesty. Despite his rhetorical devices, Derrida in both his supporting considerations and conclusions implicitly is recognizing as presences, or positing as intelligible being, a number of complex states of affairs. The Śaivas' contention against the Buddhists that difference itself is a recognitively synthesized universal category applies also to Derrida's ironically negated difference. Even if Derrida does not mind contradicting himself, this contradiction means that he is *wrong* in an old-fashioned, hard-headed rationalist sense.[23] Just as there can be no satisfactory phenomenalist account of "atomic" sensual objects in the

manner of either the Buddhist logicians or Hume, there can be no satisfactory grammatological non-science of nonexistent *différance*, nor any other satisfactory form of relativism. All kinds of interpretive skepticism are counter-positions.[24] Thought is essentially essentialist.

The Idealistic Move: From Intelligibility to Intelligence

We may now turn to Lonergan's major premise. How does the full intelligibility—or intrinsic recognizability—of reality or being entail the existence of God? Does the failure of skeptical positions, such as those of the Buddhists, Derrida, and other relativists, due to self-contradiction demonstrate the necessity of a Supreme Agent of the cosmos? The close association Derrida makes between the conception of the signification of presence or linguistic nonarbitrariness on the one hand, and the ontotheological logos on the other—would appear to grant that if deconstruction does not succeed, the existence of God as presumed by logos theology must follow. Of course many of self-content modern scientific and agnostic perspectives, as well as of theological viewpoints, would acknowledge the truth in Lonergan's minor premise, but not grant that thereby God must exist.

Lonergan's major premise, which culminates much of the laborious study of cognitive processes in *Insight*, is a theistic formulation of the ultimate grounds of intelligibility, of how we know that we know.[25] This is the intellectual moment explained in chapter 6 to correspond to the *prakāśa* arguments within Christian logos metaphysics. The transcendental grounds of our interpretations of the world are affirmed to have their existence *within God's subjective experience, or self-recognition, rather than in features of external material objects, through a logic to the effect that* esse est percipi. The same reasoning is evident in Lonergan's demonstration of his major premise.

I must acknowledge that throughout his works, Lonergan actually opposes a doctrine he calls idealism, which would reduce cognition merely to contingent human interpretations. Against this he argues rigorously for objective scientific, philosophical, and theological inquiry. For Lonergan, the historic diversity of cognitive methods are animated by a drive to know *that which is*. Nevertheless, Lonergan perhaps even more vehemently repudiates the näive realist or objectivist conception of knowing as "taking a look." For him insight emerges within the laborious processes of critical inquiry itself and not as the contemplation of an uninterpreted datum.

Furthermore, these processes by which human subjects learn of a reality transcending their own subjectivity, are grounded in a higher

subjectivity. While a particular inquirer may be satisfied by reaching a "virtually unconditioned judgment" about a topic, each such judgment depends upon the "formally unconditioned judgment" of God. Lonergan explains intelligibility per se as the "idea of being." This final interpretation—or we may say fully sufficient rationality—grounding all other interpretations is neither an actual human accomplishment nor a Platonic Idea existing in a realm of pure abstraction. It is the content of an act of an unlimited intellect:

> An idea is the content of an act of understanding. As a sense datum is the content of an act of sensing, as an image is the content of an act of imagining, as a percept is the content of an act of perceiving, as a concept is the content of an act of conceiving, defining, supposing, considering, as a judgment is the content of an act of judging, so an idea is the content of an act of understanding.
>
> Being is the objective of the unrestricted desire to know. Therefore, the idea of being is the content of an act of understanding that leaves nothing to be understood, no further questions to be asked.[26]

According to Lonergan this unlimited act of intellect grasping the idea of being must necessarily exist:

> Particular inquiries solve some questions but not all. Only an unrestricted act of understanding can meet the issue. . . . Correlative to an unrestricted desire to understand, there may be posited either an indefinite process of development or an unrestricted act of understanding. But the content of developing understanding never is the idea of being, for as long as understanding is developing, there are further questions to be answered. Only the content of the unrestricted act of understanding can be the idea of being, for it is only on the supposition of an unrestricted act that everything about everything is understood. It follows that the idea of being is absolutely transcendent. For it is the content of an act of unrestricted understanding.[27]

In order to flesh out further the analogy between Lonergan's argument and that of the Pratyabhijñā, we must further examine his understanding of the interrelation of subjectivity and objectivity at this level. According to Lonergan, the idea of being has both "primary" and "secondary" components, which he also calls primary and secondary intelligibles. These are respectively being or reality in itself and all the contingent components of reality. Now Lonergan holds that *the primary component of the idea of being is none other than the*

unlimited act of the intellect Himself. For by understanding Himself, this unlimited act of intellect understands all contingent things as coming from Himself:

> If an act of understanding is unrestricted, it understands understanding; it understands not only restricted acts but also the unrestricted act; understanding the unrestricted act it must understand its content, otherwise the understanding of the unrestricted act would be restricted; but the content of the unrestricted act is the idea of being, and so if the unrestricted act understands itself, it thereby also understands everything else. . . .
>
> The primary intelligible is by identity the unrestricted act of understanding. It is intelligible in the profounder sense, for it is an intelligible that is identical with intelligence in act. It is a unique intelligible, for it is identical with the unique act of unrestricted understanding. On the other hand, the secondary intelligibles are what are also grasped inasmuch as the unrestricted act understands itself. They are intelligible in the ordinary sense, for they are understood; but they are not intelligible in the profounder sense, for the unrestricted act is one understanding of many intelligibles, and only the unique, primary intelligible is identical with the unrestricted act.[28]

Now, according to Lonergan, this idea of being in its primary component, or unlimited act of intellect has the attributes of God. Therefore Lonergan considers his proof to have been accomplished.[29]

I believe that Lonergan has posited—through arguments paralleling the Śaivas' arguments about *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*—as the necessary grounds of human cognition what is in effect a conception of divine self-recognition. We even see an analogy between Lonergan's theory and the Śaiva conception of Pure Wisdom, in that he contends that all limited recognized things are understood by God as contained within and derived from His self-recognition.

Again, for Lonergan as a Thomist, since humans are potentially what God is in act, what we really are is in God.[30] So for him as well as the Śaivas, our recognitions are grounded insofar as they in some way participate in the self-recognition of the deity. I believe that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta would heartily agree with Lonergan's statement that "God is the unrestricted act of understanding, the eternal rapture glimpsed in every Archimidean cry of Eureka."[31]

However, there is a crucial difference between Lonergan and the Śaivas here as well. For the latter philosophy enables us to utilize this

glimpse, present in every experience, as a path toward full participation in the self-recognition of God. I recall a passage by Abhinavagupta that I quoted in chapter 5:

> Thus the [lower] condition of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] should be understood in the recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of the pot, etc., [expressed] "This is that pot." However, in these levels of recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*], the Wisdom Power [*vidyāśakti*, a.k.a., *śuddhavidyā*, Pure Wisdom] flashes strongly, like lightning. Thus the gurus admit them to be first means to the Supreme State.[32]

At the end of the chapter I will offer my suggestions about how to assess the Pratyabhijñā in its divergence from Christian logos theology about whether or not God and the person are identical. At this point we must further consider their common idealistic premise.[33]

The Tenableness of Idealism at the End of the Twentieth Century

If I am right that there is an idealistic supposition, that *esse est percipi*, essential to the Pratyabhijñā as well as the Western philosophical theology of logos, it may seem that I have discredited them. Within the recent past of philosophy, only isolated voices such as John Findlay and Nicholas Rescher have openly defended idealism. The last advocates of idealism who had a dominant influence in the Western academy were the nineteenth–twentieth century Neo-Hegelians or Absolute Idealists, such as Green, Bradley, Royce, and Gentile. As all argumentation for a theistic superagent has been intellectually marginalized, Neo-Hegelian idealism has virtually disappeared.

Idealistic systems were driven into academic disrepute earlier in this century by attacks from a diverse group of philosophers reforming the discipline in conformity with modern patterns of rationality. It is notable that two of the sharpest critics, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, had at one time been idealists. Philosophy for them was a linguistic or quasi-mathematical tool assigned the role of defending and analyzing the empirical data of both common sense and science.[34] An early formulation of Moore typified much of the criticism of idealism, and also plays into our reflections on narrative syntax: the anti-idealists wished to separate the *acts* of any subject's awareness from its *objects*.[35] They thus held that it is a logical fallacy to conclude on the basis of the tautology that we only know what we know that it is

impossible for things to exist that we do not know. Moore, in particular, is famous for arguing the complete undeniability of the common belief in external objects.

The "metanarrative" of human progress in scientific and technological thinking advocated by such philosophies may be broadly characterized in a comparative narrative-syntax framework by an emphasis on two factors. First is the *object* or what Burke interpreted as the material "scene." Second is the *instrument,* which includes the causes identified by science as well as technological artifacts exploiting them.[36] The same emphases typify efforts to understand and control the political, social, and economic spheres.

Such "objectivist" and "instrumentalist" thinking endeavors to neutralize interpretive subjectivity in the recognition of an independent, predictable reality. The role of the agent in the modern story of rational progress has been correctly to observe and manipulate this reality.

In the developing postmodern consciousness discussed in chapter 1, through appreciation of the increasing pluralism, we may say that there has been a greater sensitivity to the role of various forms of individual or cultural "agency"/subjectivity in interpretively structuring experience. Moreover, I claim that a doctrine of idealism, of an "illusionistic" variety, is very widely accepted in our postmodern situation, although its proponents would not accept the appellation of what modern thinking superseded. That is, systems of thought that are skeptical in the sense of reducing reality to interpretations are in effect asserting that *esse est percipi.* This is true of some of the central theses of thinkers such as Whorf, Barnes and Bloor, the Kuhn of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* Feyerabend, Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, and countless others. I am not alone in labeling much of skeptical postmodern thought idealist. Others including Richard Rorty and Juliet Sychrava have already pointed out how in the reduction of reality to textuality, in their "sentimentalism," and in other ways these philosophies continue the themes of nineteenth-century idealism and romanticism.[37]

Of course the postmodern vision of paralogical narratives does not reduce reality to an expression of divine subjectivity/agency. Such thought repudiates the intersubjectivity, universality, or objectivity of reality guaranteed by divine authorship. Postmodern skepticism rather reduces reality to the production of a *fragmented human subjectivity.* Paradoxically, this fragmented subjectivity is delimited by postmodernists in terms exhibiting the *modern* syntax of: What can be

objectively contextualized, whether the locus be personal-psychological, cultural-linguistic, subcultural, textual, etc.; and what can be causally/functionally described, for example in terms of the sexual drive, the politics and economics of power, or the grammar or structural/"poststructural" characteristics of language. In this respect the skeptical aspect of postmodernism represents a kind of nihilistic development out of modern thought. However, as has been shown repeatedly, the skeptical view is incoherent and must be rejected.

Summing up, I suggest that the philosophical plausibility of the conception of the Lord's self-recognition we have been considering depends on two conditions: First, that we accept various contemporary analyses of the interpretive agency, imaginative character, linguisticality, and so on, integral to all experiences of the world as supporting the idealism of the *prakāśa* arguments. We never cognize a reality outside of our interpretations. Second, that we accept the *vimarśa*-type arguments that reality must be recognizable or intelligible. The skeptical form of idealism, whether propounded by Dharmakīrti, Nāgārjuna, Bradley, Feyerabend, or Derrida, is self-refuting. Granting these points, it should still be reasonable to invoke God's self-recognition as the source of whatever presence we achieve in the recognitions by which we live our lives. Even if this way of thinking is not entirely persuasive as a proof of the existence of God, I hope it may at least be seen as a way of making the idea of God coherent with our daily lives.[38]

Divergences and Convergences: Monotheism and Panentheism

Having thus argued for a mode of thought in which the Pratyabhijñā converges with Christianity, I must stress that there are still substantial divergences. These are found in numerous areas—in religious myths including conceptions of theodicy and salvation, in ritual and ethical practices. We can only consider what I view as one of the most important divergences related to the argument that I have made. The Śaivas aim to lead us to complete participation in Śiva's self-recognition. Monotheistic orthodoxy on the contrary stresses the ultimate difference between God on the one hand, and the soul and the world on the other. I will close with a few suggestions about how I believe this divergence should be assessed.

First of all, despite what I have just said, it must be granted that there is a dialecticity in both traditions. There is, paradoxically, a dualistic moment in the Śaiva notion that the multiplistic experience

of the world and the individuals in it are *real*, as the emanation of Śiva.[39] Much of the Śaiva devotional literature in fact has a dualistic, supplicatory quality.[40] Likewise a moment of identity between God and the world is found in much of Christian theology, particularly when it makes use of features of Neoplatonic emanationism; this is seen also in the Thomist conception of the act of the divine intellect. The understanding of identity in difference found in both traditions permits a degree of rapprochement.

Second, in the philosophy of logos/recognition that I have expounded, the moment of identity is supported precisely by the premise of idealism, the reduction of human experience and its objects to contents of the divine mind. We see the power of this monistic logic in Lonergan's dialectically qualified formulations of the subject-object unity in the divine mind:

> The secondary intelligibles are conditioned. For they are what is to be understood, if the primary intelligible is understood.
>
> It follows that they are distinct from the primary intelligible, for they are conditioned and it is unconditioned.
>
> Still, though the secondary intelligibles are distinct from the primary, they need not be distinct realities. For knowing does not consist in taking a look at something else and so, though the secondary intelligibles are known, they need not be something else to be looked at. Moreover, the primary being is without any lack of defect or imperfection; but it would be imperfect if further realities were needed for the unrestricted act of understanding to be restricted.[41]

If one grants some validity to the *prakāśa* arguments, the Thomist conception of the subject-object unity in the divine mind, and other such conceptions—one can establish difference only by limiting the degree of identification in the logic of *esse est percipi*. In this context, both traditions are faced with the paradox of unity and multiplicity raised by the Buddhist reductios introduced in chapter 4. Perhaps the matter can be resolved by such conceptions as the Aristotelian theory of the relation of act and potency. Anyway, though the Śaivas also need to explain difference as intrinsic to the existence of the world, this problem does not have for them the theological urgency that it does for Christianity.

Conversely, if by the idealistic premise it is God who is the source and inner reality of the recognitions that make up our lives, then it is easy to say that we are nothing but God and His self-recognition is

our self-recognition. The Pratyabhijñā apologetic objective of leading us to the Śaiva soteriological realization would follow naturally.

Third, I observe in favor of the Pratyabhijñā that a number of thinkers in the contemporary period have argued that the traditional Western understanding of God places too much emphasis on God's transcendence of the world. It has been argued that this emphasis denies various modern valuations of this world—including the scientific and historical, the ethical or socially progressive, and the sexual. A number of thinkers have attempted to sacralize these values by developing a new conception of the deity stressing His immanence in the world as complementing His transcendence. Following the initiative of the process philosopher Charles Hartshorne, we may use Karl Christian von Friedrich Krause's term "panentheism" to classify these doctrines.[42] These include: Hegelianism; theological Heideggerian thought, for instance, of John Macquarrie;[43] the process thought of Whitehead, Hartshorne,[44] Ogden, and others; the religious theories of evolution of Teilhard de Chardin and Sri Aurobindo Ghose; the phenomenological dialectic of the sacred as within and transcending history of Mircea Eliade; and the dialectic of manifestation and proclamation of Paul Ricoeur and David Tracy.

One of the ideas most emphasized by Abhinavagupta and much of Hindu tantrism is that God/Śiva-Śakti is both transcendent (*viśvottīrṇa*) and immanent (*viśvamaya*). Therefore I think that these systems may be placed within the class of panentheism. I also believe that a panentheistic approach to the problems of tradition and modernity has inspired many contemporary retrievals of Hindu tantrism, by both Indian scholars such as Gopinath Kaviraj and Western scholars such as Sir John Woodroffe. I also recommend the Pratyabhijñā as a valuable intellectual and spiritual resource for the development of contemporary panentheism.

Recognition and Retrieval

Abhinavagupta's explanation of the soteriological recognition describes a kind of hermeneutic retrieval, in the sense of a very deep personal appropriation. It will be recalled from chapter 3 that he places the knowledge of God from scriptures in the counter of what is in memory and re-experienced. In our contemporary dialogical retrieval of the significance of the Śaiva understanding of recognition, the tradition-bearing aspect of memory may be taken to include analogous expressions of spirituality—such as the Christian logos theology, panentheism,

and so forth—as well as similar conceptions that may be found in other religions.

To facilitate this retrieval I have endeavored to elucidate the orientations in the Western academy supporting and denying the claims of the Pratyabhijñā. If the reader accepts at least some of my interpretation of its cogency, there will still be reasons for further arguments about a variety of philosophical and theological points, regarding the nature of God, theodicy, ethics, ritual, and so on.

The considerations adduced here as well as countless possible others regarding the acceptance of Śiva's self-recognition as one's own are extremely difficult to assess, and will be assessed in different ways by different people. Wrestling with this difficulty is both the most rational approach we can take and the one most respectful of the intentions of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta.

Notes

Introduction

1. My understanding of transcendental/metaphysical argument is indebted to that of David Tracy, and, somewhat less directly, to two of his sources, Emerich Coreth and Bernard Lonergan. This understanding unites the Kantian conception of the transcendental-as-the-necessary with older Greek and Christian understandings of metaphysics as inquiry into ultimate reality. See David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology* (Minneapolis: Winston-Seabury Press, 1975); Emerich Coreth, *Metaphysics,* trans. Joseph Donceel, with a critique by Bernard J. F. Lonergan (New York: Seabury, 1973); and Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding,* revised edition (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978).

2. This causal view is a basic expression of modern "instrumental rationality." See Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," trans. William Lovitt, in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,* ed. with an introduction by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1977), 283–317. For such thinking, the world is viewed as intellectually controllable and practically exploitable "standing reserve."

3. The two sets of basic considerations problematizing interpretation that I have characterized here have been pithily summarized by David Tracy with the terms *plurality* and *ambiguity.* The latter specifically refers to what I am calling "nonepistemic causes" identified by the hermeneutics of suspicion. See David Tracy, *Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).

4. I note that relativism has been analyzed into a variety of types and degrees of strength. Among the ostensible types of relativism are those of perception, concepts, truth, reason, and ethics. I believe that the distinctions between these types are ultimately artificial and may lead to confusion. Thus conceptual relativism will refer to perception, will have implications about truth and falsity, will define reasons, and will be correlated with an axiology or ethics

about which concepts should and should not be acknowledged. A relativism of perception will likewise apply to concepts about perception, the truth of perception, what it is reasonable to regard as perception, and so on. My focus on relativism/skepticism as an approach to interpretation is intended to include all of these types. I also believe that the distinction between strong and weak kinds of relativism is not useful. Sometimes gradations of strength are made only on the basis of the quantity of topics of reality, truth, reason, norms, and so forth, that are considered relative. Sometimes weak relativism amounts to nothing more than acknowledgment of the plurality of interpretations and of the difficulty of arbitrating between them. I do not believe that relativism with regard to a particular topic admits of degrees. Either a subject on which there is disagreement is relative or it is not. Examples of efforts to articulate relativist positions of different strengths are found in Michael Krausz, ed. with introduction, *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).

Another problem in discussing relativism is that many thinkers who are frequently identified as relativists do not call themselves such, or are not considered so by some of their interpreters. This is more than a disagreement about names. It is often pointed out that one or another of such thinkers has in his/her works some clearly nonskeptical intellectual or ethical agendas. In my view such evidence does not necessarily affect the classification of such intellectuals as relativists. I shall argue that some realistic understanding of reference is transcendental to interpretation. Therefore the presence of nonrelativist/nonskeptical features in such philosophies is actually unavoidable. My classification of relativists/skeptics will therefore include all thinkers who elaborate arguments that fundamentally undermine the validity of the reference of interpretation, regardless of the inevitable presence of strong nonrelativist elements in their thought or even claims they may make that they are not relativists.

I am focusing on postmodern relativist skepticism in order to maximize the relevance of the exposition to contemporary cultural theory. For a broader historical perspective on Western skepticism, see Myles Burnyeat, ed., *The Skeptical Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and the writings of Richard H. Popkin, e.g., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1967), s.v. "Skepticism," *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), and *The High Road to Pyrrhonism*, ed. Richard A. Watson and James E. Force (San Diego: Austin Hill, 1980).

5. Postmodern skeptical/relativist theories have usually been propounded in defense of the modern liberal-democratic values of tolerance and free speech. However, it is sometimes the case that such theories are themselves used "conservatively" to isolate one or another tradition from the challenge of alternative viewpoints. Thus Jürgen Habermas has made the following remark regarding those who defend plurality against unity: "To be sure, this protest against unity made in the name of a suppressed plurality expresses itself in two opposed versions. In the radical contextualism of a Lyotard or a Rorty, the old intention behind the critique of metaphysics lives on: to rescue the moments that had been sacrificed to idealism—the nonidentical and nonintegrated, the deviant and the heterogeneous, the contradictory and the conflictual, the transitory and the accidental. In other *contexts*, on the other hand, the apologetics of the accidental and the abandonment of the principled

lose their subversive traits. In these contexts, all that is retained is the functional significance of shielding the powers of tradition, which are no longer rationally defensible, against unseemly critical claims; the point is to provide cultural protection for the flanks of a process of societal modernization that is spinning out of control." Jürgen Habermas, "The Unity of Reason in the Diversity of Its Voices," in his *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays,* trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 115–16. An example of an attempt to support a more or less fundamentalist form of Christianity through cultural relativism is George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1984). It will be argued below that even the liberal relativism involves an unacknowledged closure to the challenge of alternative viewpoints.

6. See Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf,* ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

8. Saussure and Derrida will be taken up in chapter 8.

9. See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,* trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). For another recent effort to reduce rationality to myth, see Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, "Myth, Inference, and the Relativism of Reason: An Argument from the History of Judaism," in *Myth and Philosophy,* ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 247–85.

10. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

11. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1996).

12. See Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," in *Rationality and Relativism,* ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984). For an overview of the "social constructionist" approach in the field of social psychology, see Kenneth J. Gergen, "Social Constructionist Inquiry: Context and Implications," in *The Social Construction of the Person,* ed. Kenneth J. Gergen and Keith E. Davis (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1985), 3–18.

13. See Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,* ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).

14. One might further explicate this point with the aid of the attack on foundationalism by the Popperian critical rationalist school. According to Hans Albert, any attempt to adduce philosophical foundations will fall into the "Münchausen trilemma" of infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. See Hans Albert, *Treatise on Critical Reason,* trans. Mary Varney Rorty (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 18–19. The applicability of Albert's model to the present discussion was suggested to me by the general discussion of it in Karl-Otto Apel, "The Problem of Philosophical Foundations in

Light of a Transcendental Pragmatics of Language," in *After Philosophy: End or Transformation?* ed. Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 250–90. The problem of infinite regress is illustrated by the famous account of "turtles all the way down," in Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 28–29. The problem of circularity has been observed to affect the justification of the principles of inference. Thus an argument for the groundedness of deduction, or material implication, will make use of that very principle; an argument for induction will advert to what works. See Lewis Carroll, "What the Tortoise Said to Achilles," in *The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll* (London: Nonesuch, 1989), 1104–8 (on deduction); and Barnes and Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," 40–43. On dogmatism, again see Barnes and Bloor's claim that faith is the only final recourse for the rationalist, ibid., 46–47.

15. Edward Farley, "Truth and the Wisdom of Enduring," in *Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion*, ed. Daniel Guerrière (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65–66. On the self-contradictoriness of the strong program of the sociology of knowledge, see Martin Hollis, "The Social Destruction of Reality," in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 80–81. Cf. the similar arguments of Dan Sperber, "Apparently Irrational Beliefs," ibid., 153; and Ben-Ami Sharfstein, "The Contextual Fallacy," in *Interpreting across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, ed. Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94. I do not agree with Ernest Gellner (himself a rationalist) that this argument is "facile and superficial" because we are able to visualize a relativist world. "Relativism and Universals," in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 183. All levels of an account must be taken together in assessments of consistency. Cf. the debates about the coherence of moral relativism in Jack W. Meiland and Michael Krausz, eds., *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); and Michael Krausz, ed., *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation*.

16. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984): 183–98. Davidson endeavors to refute the very idea of a conceptual scheme as an interpretation of a separate realm of objects or experience. Davidson understands this dualism of scheme and content as of a piece with that between subjective and objective. "The Myth of the Subjective," in *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation*, ed. Michael Krausz, 163, 166. For him the idea of a separate scheme includes the possibility of alternatives, and thereby opens the way for relativism. See Michael Krausz, "Introduction," ibid., 5; and Gordon C. F. Bearn, "The Horizon of Reason," ibid., 210. Davidson's attempt to get beyond these problems that have occupied Western thought for hundreds of years, through the demonstration of a sort of "unmediated touch" with objects (Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 198) has some affinity with the epistemological theory of transcendental recognition that will be presented in the course of this book. See the brief comment at chapter 6, note 70.

17. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 185. The idea of a language has shifted, but I believe that the semantic issues he brings up remain the same.

18. Ibid., 190.

19. Ibid., 187. Davidson here explains this position more technically in terms of the abandonment of the philosophical distinction between the analytic and the synthetic.

20. Donald Davidson, "Thought and Talk," in *Mind and Language*, ed. Samuel Guttenplan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 20.

21. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 191–94.

22. Tarski gives a simplified explanation of his theory in "The Semantic Conception of Truth, and the Foundations of Semantics," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4 (1944): 341–75. Tarski's theory is intended to apply specifically to languages with an exactly specified (likely formalized) structure. Ibid., 347. Davidson attempts to generalize his theory to cover natural languages. See the discussion of what is involved in this strategy in Bjørn T. Ramberg, "Convention T," chap. in *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 49–63.

23. See Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth," 344. Tarski gives an actual definition of truth, intended materially to cover all T equivalences, in terms of *satisfaction*, ibid., 353.

24. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 194.

25. Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth," 349–51. This condition is central to what has to be dealt with by Davidson in generalizing the theory to explain natural languages. In the case of a single language, formulations in terms of convention T are made through a "conceptual or ideological expansion of the object language." Ramberg, *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language*, 51.

26. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 194.

27. Ibid., 194–95.

28. Ibid., 185.

29. Ibid., 196–97. Some scholars have argued that Davidson has not completely eliminated the possibility of relativism. Thus both Ian Hacking and Gordon C. F. Bearn have accepted Davidson's argument that there is some basic level of common beliefs (or truths) that makes all languages at least partially translatable. However, beyond this level they advocate relativisms of styles of reasoning or understandings of what constitutes a good reason. See Ian Hacking, "Language, Truth and Reason," in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 61–62; and Bearn, "The Horizon of Reason," 205–9, 214. Though it is not possible to go into details, I believe that the attempt to separate truth from reason is invalid. As explained above, reason is parasitic upon the truth of its assumptions. And truth cannot be relative. Cf. Terry Godlove, "In What Sense Are Religions Conceptual Frameworks?" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 52 (1984): 289–304. Godlove's (nonrelativist) argument for relegating differences between religions to the interpretations of "an autonomous world of shared objects and subject-matters"

(ibid., 301) also does not do justice to the extent to which religious differences are differences over matters of fact. For a more sophisticated attempt to account for linguistic/conceptual differences in Davidsonian terms, see Ramberg, "What Is Incommensurability?" a chapter in *Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language,* 114–37.

30. Karl-Otto Apel, "The Transcendental Conception of Language-Communication and the Idea of First Philosophy: Towards a Critical Reconstruction of the History of Philosophy in the Light of Language Philosophy," in *Karl-Otto Apel: Selected Essays, volume 1: Towards a Transcendental Semiotics,* ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1994), 102.

31. Ibid., 102–3.

32. Ibid., 103. Furthermore it is this language game that, as the ideal of intelligibility, makes possible the introduction of rules not yet found in any existing language game. Ibid.

33. Apel, "Problem of Philosophical Foundations," 280.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 282. Apel takes head-on arguments for the circularity of justifying deduction: "The insight that certain evidence cannot be deductively grounded without presupposing itself (for example, the paradigmatic evidence of a minimal logic in the framework of an as yet unclarified transcendental language game) is no longer a proof of the impossibility in principle of philosophical foundations but rather a reflexive, transcendental-pragmatic insight into the uncriticizable foundation of argumentation itself. If, on the one hand, a presupposition cannot be challenged in argumentation without performative self-contradiction, and if, on the other hand, it cannot be deductively grounded without formal-logical *petitio principii,* then it belongs to those transcendental-pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation that one must always (already) have accepted, if the language game of argumentation is to be meaningful. One can, therefore, also call this a transcendental-pragmatic argument for foundations on the basis of critical arguments concerning the meaningfulness of certain practices." Ibid., 277.

It may be interesting to compare with the considerations adduced here Umberto Eco's effort to moderate his deconstructive theoretical approach, by showing that there must be criteriological controls—or limits—in interpretation. These limits are found in assessments of coherence by the community of inquirers. Eco makes the rudiments of a transcendental argument in stating that we cannot prove the limits *but only show that their denial is self-contradictory.* He further explains that the assessments of coherence are formulated in a portion of ordinary language functioning as a metalanguage. Umberto Eco, "*Intentio Lectoris:* The State of the Art," in *The Limits of Interpretation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 60–61.

36. W. Newton-Smith mentions the distortion resulting from relativism in "Relativism and the Possibility of Interpretation," in *Rationality and Relativism,* ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 112. It is not even possible to separate causality from the issues of whether beliefs are true or false, for certainly truth

itself would be an important cause of beliefs. See the discussion in Steven Lukes, "Relativism in Its Place," in *Rationality and Relativism,* ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, 292–98. As Charles Taylor has observed, in attempting to explain foreign beliefs, we would not accept that actual giants created the universe or that dances could really cause rain. Charles Taylor, "Comparison, History, Truth," in *Myth and Philosophy,* ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, 44–46.

37. Proposals for what Martin Hollis has called a "rational bridgehead" of common experience and rationality upon which to base cross-cultural interpretation are discussed throughout Hollis and Lukes, eds., *Rationality and Relativism.* Robin Horton explains his account of universal rationality in a typical fashion: "Central to this 'common core' of rationality is the use of theory in the explanation, prediction and control of events. Central too is the use of analogical, deductive and inductive inference in the development and application of theory." Robin Horton, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited," ibid., 256. Horton's famous scheme of primary and secondary theory may be understood as oriented around the development of scientific and technological rationality.

38. Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 196.

39. Cf. Aristotle on wisdom as the science of first principles in *Metaphysics,* trans. W. D. Ross, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle,* ed. with introduction, Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1.2, 691–93.

40. Recent landmarks in the development of comparative philosophy include the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, the University of Chicago conferences on the comparative philosophy of religions, and the SUNY series, Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religions.

41. Jean-Pierre Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982).

42. The experience of cross-cultural differences was also crucial to the development of the recent discipline of the "philosophy of religion." See David Tracy's study of the role of dialogue and comparative studies for the classic Western founders of this discipline—Hume, Kant, and Hegel. David Tracy, "On the Origins of Philosophy of Religion: The Need for a New Narrative of Its Founding," in *Myth and Philosophy,* ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, 11–36.

43. Robin Horton, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited."

44. Paul J. Griffiths, "Denaturalizing Discourse: Ābhidharmikas, Propositionalists, and the Comparative Philosophy of Religion," in *Myth and Philosophy,* ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, 66.

45. Ibid., 63.

46. Theology has seen its own debates parallel to and often associated with those between relativists and universalists/rationalists in the larger arena of cultural studies. On the one side have been the "anticorrelationists"—

traditionalists and fundamentalists, for example, Balthasar, Barth, and Lindbeck. On the other have been the "correlationist" theologians such as Tillich, Rahner, Lonergan, and Tracy. See David Tracy, "The Uneasy Alliance Reconceived: Catholic Theological Method, Modernity, and Post-Modernity," *Theological Studies* 50 (1989): 555–59. Tracy argues that even the intratextual nature of the Christian (or Jewish or Muslim) understanding of God requires that theology be universal in its intent. Ibid., 559, and *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1975), 51–52.

47. For Tracy, it is the need to follow criteria of appropriateness to the Christian tradition that distinguishes the fundamental Christian theology from the philosophy of religion. Tracy, *Blessed Rage,* 72. Of course much Western philosophy of religion also follows these criteria.

48. Tracy, *Analogical Imagination,* 89n47. Cf. the analysis of how Kūkai attempted in his Shingon theories to give an archaic (a term I do not like) worldview a philosophical underpinning in Thomas P. Kasulis, "Kūkai (774–835): Philosophizing in the Archaic," in *Myth and Philosophy,* ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, 141.

49. Tracy, *Analogical Imagination,* 57. See the analysis of the differences between the three types of theology in terms of five rubrics, ibid., 54–58.

50. Ibid., 57. Also see the discussion focusing on fundamental theology, ibid., 62–64.

51. See David Tracy, *Blessed Rage,* 64–87; and "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 557–59, 567–68. He talks of judgments of "relative adequacy," by which he means not relativism but the "partly history-transcending character of reason" (basing himself on Lonergan), ibid., 567.

52. See Paul Griffiths, *An Apology for Apologetics* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1991), 77–84.

53. One may get an appreciation for the substantive orientations of different types of recent philosophy from Paul Ricoeur, *Main Trends in Philosophy,* Main Trends in the Social and Human Sciences (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978).

54. Cf. the following remarks of Apel made against Popperian critical rationalism: "The Kantian claim of the definitive completeness of the 'system of pure reason' can no longer be sustained; our task is rather that of progressively opening up transcendental horizons, which grow wider with the expansion of the human knowledge that we are questioning as to conditions of possibility. It in no way follows from this, however, that the principle of fallibilism, and the principle of virtually universal criticism derived from it, could show the absurdity of the postulate of transcendental-philosophical foundations or function as its replacement." Apel, "Problem of Philosophical Foundations," 273. While I agree with the logic of this viewpoint, I do not believe that it should be used programmatically to prevent any position from being considered in philosophical discussion.

55. For a valuable critical reconstruction of the many ways in which Weber differentiated rationality, see Donald N. Levine, "Rationality and Freedom: Weber and Beyond," *Sociological Inquiry* 51(1981): 5–25. Levine charts the in-

tersection of three typological rubrics—subjective and objective; conceptual, instrumental, substantive, and formal; and according to spheres such as religion, economy, and law. See the charts on pages 13–14 (ibid.), and the summary on page 23.

56. Ibid., 14.

57. The phrase is from Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965,* vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91–195. The idea is applied to religious studies in Guilford Dudley III, *Religion on Trial: Mircea Eliade and His Critics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977).

58. I do not believe that the understanding of dialogue that has been advocated here should be seen as much different from the Platonic-Socratic model. It has become increasingly apparent that the "arch-foundationalist" Plato was intimately aware of the issues complicating the progress of dialogue. Contra the usual textbook summaries, Plato does not give a neat account of everything on the basis of his ahistorical criteria, the Ideas. Rather, he uses irony—in the mouth of Socrates or through other literary devices—partially to negate almost everything he asserts. Readers are led into the dialogical process by means of the aporias in the texts. Plato was just as sensitive to the tragic power of "nonepistemic causes" of belief and action—which prevented Meno from being initiated into the mysteries of recollection, and led to the death of the one who descended back into the cave. A couple of useful works providing a different understanding of Plato are Paul Friedländer, *Plato: 1 An Introduction,* trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Kenneth Seeskin, *Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method,* SUNY Series in Philosophy, ed. Robert Cummings Neville (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

59. Various qualifications should be made with this classification. A term other than theology seems best to include the nontheistic systems. Francis X. Clooney explains how in most of the arguments of the Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara reason is subordinated to the process of exegesis of scripture. See Francis X. Clooney, "Vedānta, Commentary, and the Theological Component of Cross-Cultural Study," in *Myth and Philosophy,* ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, 296. I suggest that it is precisely because of this that Śaṅkara is a philosopher only on exceptional occasions. He would better be described as a systematic and practical theologian, or "Brahmalogian." I note that even systems that wished to deny the validity of rational discourse itself were provided with an arena within philosophically rationalized discourse for attempting to repudiate the views of others. The most radical skepticisms were perhaps articulated by the Mādhyamikas and the Advaita Vedānta school of Śrīharṣa. In the case of the Mādhyamikas, the "fundamentals" of Buddhist soteriology justified would have to be understood in a paradoxical sense.

60. More will be said about the Nyāya categories in the third chapter.

61. As Pierre Hadot has shown, most of our own paradigmatic Greek philosophies were conceived as systems of "spiritual exercises," in that they aimed at the conversion (*epistrophe* and *metanoia*) of the student to a redemptive

understanding of self and universe. See Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, 3rd ed. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1993). For other examples, see David B. Burrell, *Exercises in Religious Understanding* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974); and Hossein Ziai, "Beyond Philosophy: Suhrawardī's Illuminationist Path to Wisdom," in *Myth and Philosophy*, ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy, 215–43.

62. The continuity between philosophy as myth and as recapitulatory ritual may be understood as illustrating a fundamental monistic tantric principle that the spiritual means (*upāya*) is identical with the goal (*upeya*). This will be discussed later.

63. I do not wish to engage in debates about the appropriateness of calling Buddhists "skeptics." The classification here is made on the basis of their characteristic approaches to interpretation. The Buddhists certainly had a "positive attitude" with respect to their own soteriological and charitable agendas. See chapter 4, note 14. Cf. this chapter, note 4 on relativism.

64. Of course Hume's skepticism was the consequence of a radical thinking-through of the implications of the empirical method, rather than a soteriological quest.

65. The phenomenon of recognition is considered in many accounts of interpretation without being thematized. The following passage of Mary Warnock on interpretive imagination is typical: "So imagination is necessary, I have suggested, to enable us to recognize things in the world as familiar, to take for granted features of the world which we need to take for granted and rely on, if we are to go about our ordinary business; but it is also necessary if we are to see the world as significant of something unfamiliar, if we are ever to treat the objects of perception as symbolizing or suggesting things other than themselves." Mary Warnock, *Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 10. (This book is a useful summary of and argument for common insights about the imagination as developed through Hume, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others.) Also see the study of the theories of imagination of Hume and Kant of P. F. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," in *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (London: Metheun, 1974), 45–65. This concerns the recognition of various sorts of object and kind identities.

On the role of memory in imagination, see Mary Warnock, *Memory* (London: Faber & Faber, 1987). See Warnock's discussions of recognition in animal learning, ibid., 6–7, 12–13; and her discussion of the relation of the learning of language to the ability to recognize things and types of things, ibid., 11. Marcel Proust's philosophical novel remains the classic contemporary reflection on the roles of memory and recognition in the construction of personal identity. See Roger Shattuck, *Proust's Binoculars: A Study of Memory, Time, and Recognition in À la recherche du temps perdu* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Warnock, *Memory*, 56–57.

66. The theme of the memory or recollection of higher, sacred realities is extremely widespread. For some useful sample studies, see Mircea Eliade, "Mythologies of Memory and Forgetting," *History of Religions* 2 (Winter 1963): 329–44; Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Aspects mythiques de la mémoire en Grèce,"

Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique (1959): 1–29; Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, "Recollection, Indian and Platonic," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 64 (1944): supplement 3, 1–29; Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1984); Lawrence A. Babb, *Redemptive Encounters: Three Modern Styles in the Hindu Tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). For the northern Indian tantrics, memory is the heart of mantra.

67. Warnock, *Memory,* 6. She sees memory per se as a continuum from the unconscious form in the simplest animals to the conscious. Ibid., 14. If we wish to continue to speculate in this vein, we could include here the deep structures of Noam Chomsky and others.

68. Thus see the discussions in Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

69. Thus see Barnes and Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," 37–39, on the meanings of words that cultures teach children as divergent "possible judgements of sameness." One of the most direct skeptical attacks on recognition per se in the contemporary West is that of Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition,* trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

70. For ease of explanation, I am actually reversing the order of the Śaiva arguments.

71. The Greek roots include the Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle, Stoicism, and Neoplatonism. The biblical/Hebraic include the Wisdom traditions as evinced in the Wisdom of Solomon and Sirach, Philo of Alexandria, and the Gospel of John. (Though my discussions focus on Christianity, I do not deny that related conceptions are found throughout the history of Jewish thought.)

72. See Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis, in *Basic Writings,* 120–22. (This passage is quoted in chapter 5, note 28.) Of course Heidegger is profoundly ambivalent whether the contents of *alētheia* and the call of Being are somehow transcendental or entirely historically contingent. These two possibilities have trajectories into transcendental theology on the one hand and deconstructionism on the other.

73. See the popular collection of speculative writings of prominent physicists in Ken Wilber, ed. *Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World's Great Physicists,* New Science Library (Boulder, Colo.: Shambhala, 1984). For a more up-to-date survey of the field, mixing considerations of what may be called a logos argument for God with the cosmogonic and teleological arguments, see Paul Davies, *The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

74. For representative writings of the philosophical and theological retrieval of Hebraic and Eastern Orthodox Wisdom traditions, known as "Sophiology," see Vladimir Solovyev, *Lectures on Godmanhood,* trans. with introduction, Peter Peter Zouboff (London: Dennis Dobson, 1948); and Sergei Bulgakov, *The Wisdom of God: A Brief Summary of Sophiology,* with a preface by Frank Gavin (New York: Paisley Press, 1937).

75. Levinas's effort is different from those of the other thinkers mentioned in that he attempts to defend a kind of ethical religiosity by completely removing God from the sphere of philosophical/metaphysical justification.

76. I am classifying the Śaiva and Western theories as idealistic because of their reduction of all objects of experience to expressions of kinds of divine "subjectivity." The classification is not meant to imply that the objects of experience are considered to be illusory, like perhaps in the idealism of Vijñānavāda, Advaita Vedānta, Bradley, and—as I shall argue—important theses of contemporary postmodern skeptics. For the Śaivas, objects are real as contents of recognitive awareness rather than as external. I believe that most Christian idealism is also broadly realistic about worldly experience. To emphasize the world-affirming approach of the Śaivas, K. C. Pandey describes their position with the expression "realistic idealism." I have seen Neohegelianism as well as the thought of C. S. Peirce described in similar ways. Nevertheless, I do not wish to deny that there are illusionistic moments in the Śaiva and Christian theories, as perhaps in any grand account of the world. The limited degree of illusionism in the Śaiva doctrine will be discussed in later chapters.

77. The thesis of God's self-recognition/logos pertains to the ultimate grounds of successful recognitions of interpretation. It does not directly address the important problem of how to arbitrate between conflicting recognitions. Chapter 6 will briefly address this problem and claim, on the basis of suggestions in the Pratyabhijñā and theories of David Tracy, that such arbitration should be understood in terms of evaluations of coherence.

78. In chapter 7, I will refer to the initiative of Kenneth Burke for the typologizing of intellectual strategies on the basis of a correlated narrative syntax.

2. *Interpretive Histories and the Scope of This Study*

1. As we shall see, the same process is evinced in the Śaivas' appropriation of common standards of philosophical methodology. The next chapter will refer to Alexis Sanderson and Brian Smith's respective descriptions of this sort of appropriation as "overcoding" and "encompassment."

2. The appellation of the Goddess, Śakti, literally means "power" or "capability." In some versions of these traditions the highest deity is understood to be Śakti rather than Śiva. Also, the theologies often describe many different forms of Śiva and Śakti at different cosmic levels. In the plethora of different schemes, two of the most prominent forms of the God and Goddess are the horrific deities Bhairava and Kālī. Sometimes the highest form of Śiva, including Śakti as identical with Himself, is called the Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*) or the Supreme Śiva (*paramaśiva*). Sometimes the emanatory reality of Śakti is described as Śiva's creative vibration or pulsation (*spanda, sphurattā*).

3. Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and Power among the Brahmans of Kashmir," in *The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, ed. Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 190–216.

4. Sanderson has done the important work on this process. Ibid.

5. Sanderson explained this to me in our personal conversation.

6. In accordance with the synthetic tendency I have explained, other monistic Śaiva traditions were also comprehended within the Trika, particularly the Krama.

7. *The Śivadṛṣṭi of Srisomānandanātha with the Vritti by Utpaladeva*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 54 (Pune: Aryabhushan Press, 1934). Henceforth these texts will be abbreviated respectively as SD and SDV.

8. See SD 4.118–24, 182–83. The Hindu-Buddhist discussions of recognition had also already been taken up by the orthodox dualistic Śaiva Siddhānta thinker Sadyojyoti. See *The Nareshvarapariksha of Sadyojyotih with Commentary by Rāmakaṇṭha*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 55 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steem Press, 1926).

9. Henceforth IPK. I will refer to this text in the edition used for the commentary on it by Abhinavagupta, mentioned in n 14.

10. Utpaladeva, *Siddhitrayī and the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 34 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1921). The *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* will henceforth be referred to as IPKV. In referring to it I will include, before the page numbers of this edition, the book, chapter, and verse enumeration found in Abhinavagupta's commentary on the IPK (n 14).

11. So far there has been general academic access only to fragments of this extremely important text, though some of it can be inferred from Abhinavagupta's commentary on it mentioned below. It seems, however, that a complete (or almost complete) manuscript exists that is being kept hidden by one or more individuals.

12. The edition used is the same as that containing the IPKV. The three proofs will be respectively abbreviated IS, APS, and SS.

13. All of the Kashmiri theologians were also considered holy men by their traditions. However, the belief is especially strong in the case of Abhinavagupta. He himself asserts that he was conceived in a tantric ritual—something that is supposed to give great spiritual power to the child. In his works Abhinava speaks in a casual factual manner about his spiritual realization and his identity with Bhairava.

14. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine Recognition: Sanskrit text with Bhāskarī*, 2 vols., ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer and K. C. Pandey (Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986). Abhinavagupta's text will henceforth be referred to as IPV and the eighteenth-century commentary on it, *Bhāskarī*, by Bhāskarakaṇṭha—will be referred to as BIPV. I note that I will refer to the verses of the IPK in this edition.

15. *The Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī by Abhinavagupta*, 3 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (Reprint, Delhi: Akay Book Corporation, 1987). Henceforth IPVV.

16. *The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Jayaratha*, 8 vols., ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri and Mukunda Rama Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, republication, ed. R. C. Dwivedi and Navjivan Rastogi (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987). Abhinavagupta's work will henceforth be referred to as TA, and Jayaratha's commentary, *Tantrālokaviveka*, will be referred to as TAV.

17. For an interpretation of the history of the use of the Pratyabhijñā in tantric exegesis, see Mark Dyczkowski, "The Doctrine of Vibration and Recognition," chap. in *The Stanzas on Vibration: The Spanda Kārikā with Four Commentaries*, SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 33–48. Cf. the discussion of the role of fundamental theology in systematic and practical theologies in Tracy, *The Analogical Imagination*, 183n26.

18. Kṣemarāja's well-known *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* is not so much a development of the Pratyabhijñā apologetics as a basic manual of spiritual doctrine and practice in the light of this apologetics. Kṣemarāja, *Pratyabhijnāhṛdayam: The Secret of Self-Recognition*, ed., trans., and introduced by Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980).

19. *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā with the Vivṛti of Vidyācakravartin*, in *Tantrasaṃgraha (Part 1)*, ed. Gopinath Kaviraj, *Yogatantra-granthamālā*, ed. Badarinath Sukla, vol. 3 (Varanasi: Sansar Press, 1970), 1–22. Henceforth VPP and VPPV.

20. *Shankaracharya's Dakshinamurtistotram: With the "Tattvasudha" of Svayamprakasha and "Manasollasa" of Suresvaracharya, with the Commentary of Ramatirtha and Pancikarana of Shankaracharya with Suresvaracharya's Vartika*, ed. Vidwan N. S. Venkatanathacharya (Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1972). Henceforth DMS and DMSM. Cf. the remarks on these texts in Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 3, *Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 550–51.

21. Some of the more notable points in the development of interest have been: The Western discoveries of the Kashmiri traditions by George Buhler and M. A. Stein. The publication of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies. The revival of spiritual interpretation of the traditions in the synthetic mystical theology of the scholar and holy man Gopinath Kaviraj. The scholarship and religious teachings of the holy man Lakshman Joo. The pioneering studies of Abhinavagupta by K. C. Pandey and his student Navjivan Rastogi. The translations and studies of the Italian scholar Raniero Gnoli. The translations and studies of the French scholars Lilian Silburn and André Padoux. The translations of Jaideva Singh. The advocation of Kashmir Śaivism by the popular guru Swami Muktananda. The Sanskrit editions, and Sanskrit and Hindi scholarship on the scriptures by Brajvallabh Dvivedi. The analytic historical studies of Śaiva symbolism and practice by Alexis Sanderson and Mark Dyczkowski. The SUNY Series on the Shaiva traditions of Kashmir. The SUNY Series in Tantric Studies. Recent work by scholars such as Constantina Bailly, Enrico Garzilli, Bruno Nagel, and Raffaele Torella.

22. The classic expression of the view is J. C. Chatterjee, *Kashmir Shaivism*, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 2 (Srinagar, 1914; reprint, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

23. A brief discussion of these problems may be found in Paul Eduardo Muller-Ortega, *The Triadic Heart of Śiva: Kaula Tantricism of Abhinavagupta in the Non-Dual Shaivism of Kashmir*, SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 16–18.

24. In addition to Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and Power," see "Maṇḍala and Āgamic Identity in the Trika of Kashmir," in *Mantras et diagrammes rituels dans l'Hindouisme*, ed. André Padoux (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986), 169–214; "Śaivism and the Tantric Traditions," in *The World's Religions*, ed. Stewart Sutherland et al. (London: Routledge, 1988), 660–704; "The Visualization of the Deities of the Trika," in *L'Image divine: Culte et méditation dans l'Hindouisme*, ed. André Padoux (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1990), 31–88; and "The Doctrine of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra," in *Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honor of André Padoux*, ed. Teun Goudriaan, SUNY Series in Tantric Studies, ed. Paul Eduardo Muller-Ortega (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 281–312.

25. Besides Mark Dyczkowski, *The Stanzas on Vibration*, see *The Doctrine of Vibration: An Analysis of the Doctrines and Practices of Kashmir Shaivism*, SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987) and *The Canon of the Śaivāgama and the Kubjikā Tantras of the Western Kaula Tradition*, SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

26. I have already cited K. C. Pandey's edition, with K. A. Subramania Iyer, of the IPV, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, Doctrine of Divine Recognition*. Volume 3 of the latter is a translation of the text by Pandey. Pandey's classic monograph is *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study*, 2nd ed., The Chowkhambha Sanskrit Studies, vol. 1 (Varanasi: Chowkhambha, 1963). R. K. Kaw's works include the edition, translation, and study, *Pratyabhijñā Kārikā of Utpaladeva: Basic Text on "Pratyabhijñā Philosophy" (The Doctrine of Recognition)*, Sharada Peetha Indological Research Series, no. 12 (Srinagar: Sharada Peetha Research Centre, 1975); *The Doctrine of Recognition (Pratyabhijñā Philosophy)*, Vishveshvaranand Indological Series, no. 40 (Hoshiarpur, India: Vishveshvaranand Institute, 1967); and *Recognition (Pratyabhijñā) of Man's Supreme Inheritance: Voice of Somānanda and Utpaladeva*, Sharada Peetha Research Series, no. 15 (Srinagar: Sharada Peetha Research Centre, 1977).

27. Despite the problems, Pandey's judgments are often valuable. I must acknowledge that sometimes I have found it useful to consult his translations.

28. See Navjivan Rastogi, "Recognition in the Pratyabhijñā School: A Study in Epistemology," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 58–59 (1977–78): 841–61; Navjivan Rastogi, "Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 14 (1986): 1–33; David Allport, "Utpaladeva's Doctrine of Recognition" (D.Phil. thesis, Wolfson College, Oxford University, 1982); Harvey Paul Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power: A Translation of the Jñānaśaktyāhnika of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* with Commentary and Introduction" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1976); "Śiva and the Ubiquity of Consciousness: The Spaciousness of an Artful Yogi," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979): 345–407; " '*Svabhāvam Avabhāsasya Vimarśaṃ*':

'Judgment' as a Transcendental Category in Utpaladeva's Śaiva Theology: The Evidence of the *Pratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*" (unpublished); Raffaele Torella, "The Pratyabhijñā and the Logical-Epistemological School of Buddhism," in *Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honor of André Padoux*, 327–45; Bruno M. J. Nagel, "Unity and Contradiction: Some Arguments in Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta for the Evidence of the Self as Śiva," *Philosophy East and West* 45 (1995): 501–25.

29. I begin to interpret Utpaladeva's and Abhinavagupta's frameworks in the next chapter.

3. The Task of the Pratyabhijñā System

1. The two interpretations of the final clause given by Abhinavagupta will be discussed at different points below. The version given first appears to be more literal.

2. I have already referred to the treatment of the debates between correlational and anticorrelational theology (in some ways related to those between relativism and antirelativism) in Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance."

3. On the extent to which *śāstric* discourse tends to create ancient, ahistorical authority for principles of action, see the articles by Sheldon Pollock, "The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 105.3 (1985): 499–519; "The Idea of Śāstra in Traditional India," in *Shastric Traditions in Indian Arts*, ed. Anna Libera Dallapiccola (Stuttgart, Germany: Steiner, 1989), 17–26; and "Playing by the Rules: Śāstra and Sanskrit Literature," in *Shastric Traditions in Indian Arts*, 301–26. I cannot fully consider these studies here. While greatly elucidative, Pollock's interpretation does not sufficiently address the necessary role of tradition in generating principles of action in all cultures, as is emphasized in hermeneutic theory, or address the problem of criteria for differentiating such principles as valid or invalid. For an analysis of the ways in which doctrines themselves are legitimated on the basis of earlier textual authorities, see Paul J. Griffiths, *On Being a Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood*, SUNY Series, Toward a Comparative Philosophy of Religion, ed. Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).

4. Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance," 567.

5. See the articles of Sanderson cited in the previous chapter.

6. See Brian K. Smith, *Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual and Religion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 46–49, 186–89.

7. Another tradition is that the first verse expresses benediction. Abhinava finds this meaning implied in Utpaladeva's verse. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:17–23.

8. IPV 1.1 introductory verses 2–4, 1:7–8.

9. Cf. the account of the sources at Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 18, 229n74. Also see the articles by Alexis Sanderson on the relation of the Pratyabhijñā system and the Trika tradition.

10. IPK and IPV 3.1.5, 2:226–28. Abhinava here also finds support for Utpaladeva's understanding of the illuminative operation of the system in the Trika text *Ṣaḍardhasāra*. IPV 3.1.7, 2:231.

11. IPK 4.1.16, 2:309. Abhinava in fact finds Utpala's communication of his guru-succession (*guruparvakrama*) as one of the meanings of the word "somehow" in the introductory verse, and connects it to this explicit assertion. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42.

12. IPV introductory verses 2–4, 1:7–8.

13. IPV introductory verses 2–4, 1:7–8; IPV 1.1 concluding lines, 1:79; IPV 4.1.16, 2:309–10.

14. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:17.

15. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:28–29.

16. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:28, and BIPV, 1:28.

17. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:28–29.

18. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:40. Abhinava also discusses in various places the relative interpretive objectives of the various levels of commentaries by Utpaladeva and himself on the Pratyabhijñā. Thus see IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:39 and IPVV 1.1, 1:15–17. This is not our main concern here. I note that Abhinava states that he wrote the shorter of his two commentaries, the IPV, which is our main focus chiefly "so that the dull-witted can discern recognition [*pratyabhijñā*]"! IPV 1.1 introductory verse 5, 1:15.

19. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:41–42.

20. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33. Abhinava finds corroboration for interpreting Utpala's expression of his purpose with the participle "desiring" (*icchan*) in the Śaiva metaphysics of emanation, according to which the Lord's Power of Desire/Intention (*icchā śakti*), swells into His Power of Action (*kriyā śakti*). IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33.

21. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:38–39. See also IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33 and on this BIPV, 33.

22. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

23. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:29–30.

24. IPV 4.1.18, 2:316.

25. BIPV on IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:30.

26. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

27. *Nyāya Sūtra* 1.1.24, quoted at IPV 1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32. My translation is influenced by those of Ganganatha Jha, *The Nyāya Sūtras of*

Gautama: With the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 1:339; and Pandey, IPV 3:5. Abhinava understands this definition as supporting the Nyāya view that the good of others is the motive for the Lord's creation and other acts. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

28. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32. Abhinava also observes that the others are ultimately identical with Utpaladeva's own self. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:32.

29. It was particularly the educational culture necessary for the perpetuation and development of interreligious polemics which was damaged. The Pratyabhijñā philosophy, however, did have a very wide-ranging indirect impact. Abhinavagupta utilized the theoretical vocabulary of the Pratyabhijñā system to structure Śaiva symbolism and ritual. This interpretation was passed on in monistic Śaiva cultus and had an influence on other traditions, of Śaivism, tantrism, Vaiṣṇavism, and so on, across South Asia. Abhinava and others also "cross-fertilized" the Pratyabhijñā and other Śaiva theology with ideas from Indian aesthetics. This occurred particularly in the area of the philosophy of language. The Pratyabhijñā thus represents an important, although usually unacknowledged, background to later Indian poetic theory.

30. On hermeneutic charity, see Griffiths, *Apology for Apologetics*, 20–21.

31. We will consider in the next chapter on the Buddhist prima facie Abhinava's statements regarding the nature of doubt as the chief obstacle to spiritual advancement.

32. This verb is from the root *bhā*. It is an example of a group of words that it is difficult to translate uniformly, which includes verbs, nouns, and adjectives from the root *bhā*, the root *bhās*, and the prefix *pra* plus the root *kāś*. These words have senses of "shines/light," "appears/appearance," "manifestation," and "awareness." I will generally translate intransitive verbs as "appears," "appeared," and so on. I must stress that when I do so I intend *no connotations of illusoriness*. For the Śaivas, these appearances are real. Transitive verbs will usually be translated as "manifests," and so forth. Nominal expressions will be translated as "manifestation," "illumination/luminosity," or "awareness," depending on the context. I will discuss the technical meaning of the expression *svaprakāśa*, "self-luminous" (from the reflexive prefix *sva*, plus the prefix *pra* and root *kāś*), and the abstraction *svaprakāśatva*, "self-luminosity," in this chapter. In the context of this technical discussion I will sometimes translate cognate verbs as "illumines/shines." In the sixth chapter I will explain more deeply the meaning of the isolated term *prakāśa*, "light, awareness."

33. In this passage the bracketed expressions frequently make use of the components of the word recognition, that is, the prefixes *prati* and *abhi*, and the root *jñā*.

34. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:36–38. The significance of the Lord being known to have Śaktis will be discussed below in the consideration of the Śaivas' use of the Nyāya inference for the sake of others.

35. See IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:41–42. Abhinava is here interpreting the word as a genitive (i.e., *tatpuruṣa*) compound.

36. Rohaṇa is a mountain.

37. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:33–34.

38. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42.

39. See IPV 1.1.2, 1:58–59. The term that I have translated for a limited context as "practical value" is *arthakriyā*. This is a technical concept in Buddhist and thereby in Hindu philosophy. The Buddhists understood it as a criterion for reality. It may be more exactly translated as "purposeful action" or "causal efficacy." Though the deeper technical ramifications were doubtless in Abhinava's mind, I believe that the gloss as "practical value" is sufficient and appropriate for the present discussion.

40. IPV 4.1.17, 2:312–13.

41. IPK 4.1.17, 2:313. I have had to translate this loosely to make the sense clear.

42. IPV 4.1.17, 2:314.

43. IPV 4.1.17, 2:314–15.

44. In chapter 7 we will examine the Śaivas' development of a philosophical theory of syntax that articulates their valuation of power.

45. IPV 4.1.17, 2:313. The Śaivas frequently say that the deeper forms of experience are accompanied by mystical-aesthetic wonder (*camatkāra*). For a brief discussion of this wonder see Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience of Abhinavagupta* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1968), xlv–xlvii. Gnoli compares the Śaiva concept with the Platonic understanding of the wonder involved in the appreciation of Beauty.

46. IPK 4.1.18, 2:315.

47. IPK and IPV 4.1.15, 2:308.

48. IPV 4.1.18, 2:316. On the realization of omnipotence via what is laid out in the system, also see IPK and IPV 3.2.11–12, 2:256–59.

49. On practices to attain qualities or powers vis-à-vis *jīvanmukti*, see IPV 2.3.17, 2:146–47; IPV 4.1.16, 2:310–11; IPV 4.1.17, 2:314–15. On the role of death in the transition to the highest perfection, see IPV 2.3.17, 2:146–47 and IPV 3.2.11–12.13, 2:257.

50. That is, it is the Lord Himself who causes the delusion.

51. IPV 2.3.17, 2:148.

52. Pierre Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, was cited in chapter 1.

53. IPV 1.1 introductory verse 3, 1:8. As explained above, Anuttara, "Unsurpassed," is a Trika name for the Ultimate.

54. IPK 4.1.16, 2:309.

55. IPV 4.1.16, 2:309.

56. Abhinavagupta glosses the word *nava*, "new," as *abhinava*, "very/ever-new," which he explains in terms of the path's previous *secrecy*. Abhinavagupta ultimately seems to ground the innovation in the creation of monistic Śaiva polemics—in the metaphysics of Śiva as the transcendent God generating the temporal flux of immanent experience. Also of interest is that Abhinavagupta seems here to be making word play with the meaning of his own name. "Secret" is one of the meanings of the word *gupta*. There are a number of other such discussions throughout his writings. Perhaps these hint that Abhinavagupta was given his name because of so well embodying the truth of the Śaiva metaphysics.

57. See IPVV, 1.1, 1:16. Cf. IPV and BIPV 1.1.4, 1:78; and SDV, 3.16, 105.

58. Mircea Eliade conceptualized this issue in terms of history and the transcendence of history, as the "dialectic of the Sacred."

59. See the discussion of sections from the *Tantrāloka, Tantrasāra,* and *Mālinīvijayavārttika* in Debabrata Sen Sharma, *The Philosophy of Sādhanā: With Special Reference to Trika Philosophy of Kāśmīra* (Karnal, Haryana: Natraj Publishing House, 1983), 88ff. In Śaivism more generally, Śiva is said to perform five cosmic acts: the creation of the universe, the preservation of it, the destruction of it, the creation of human delusion (which is the cause of suffering in rebirth), and the bestowal of salvific grace.

60. I will consider the Śaivas' reduction of all causation to the Lord's agency in the seventh chapter. I will shortly take up an aspect of the Śaiva theory of illusion.

61. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:24–28. As mentioned above, Abhinava also includes Utpaladeva's relationship with the lineage as part of the meaning of the adverb. Abhinava makes it clear that the traditional teacher (*guru*) is himself nothing but the Lord; and the propitiation of His feet is itself an act of the Lord. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:26–28. Cf. the first line of the *Śivadṛṣṭi:* "May Śiva, who has expanded [in emanating the universe] through His innate Śakti, and who has been entered by my form [i.e., Somānanda has realized identity with Him]—pay obeisance to Himself by Himself in order to remove [the obstacle which is] Himself." SD 1.1, 2. The manner in which the theistic problematic is affected by the ultimate identity of human and divine will be taken up next.

62. One may question how a pure unity can also be a personal God. Central to the Śaivas' understanding of Śiva is His nature as a conscious agent, who has enjoyment. I cannot do justice here to the question of the coherence of a monistic theism. In any event it would seem that this possibility stands or falls with the coherence of the Śaivas effort to explain *all* diversity, and not just that usually understood to constitute "personality," as an emanating pure unity.

63. For a useful discussion of this process, one may see Michael Sells, "The Metaphor and Dialectic of Emanation in Plotinus, John the Scot, Meister Eckhart and Ibn Arabi" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1982). What is being described here holds to a degree for the qualified monistic "moment" in many

theistic systems—in the Neoplatonist-inspired Christian, Jewish, and Muslim theologies, as well as in Indian Viśiṣṭādvaita and Bhedābhedavāda.

64. Besides the issue connected with the structure of a monistic experience that has here been thematized, the Advaitin as well as the Śaiva theories also address quandaries concerning the validation of cognitions—"knowing that one knows." In this latter respect the Advaitin view was influenced by the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the "self-established-ness" (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) of the means of cognition (*pramāṇas*), as well as the Buddhist logicians' notion of the "validating self-awareness" (*svasaṃvedana*) inherent to all experiences. This is discussed further in the consideration of the Śaiva "*prakāśa* arguments" in chapter 6.

65. The two chief sections where Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta focus on the issue of self-luminosity are IPK and IPV 1.1.1, 1:47–56 and 2.3.15–16, 2:134–39. Abhinavagupta points out the connection between these discussions. IPV 2.3.15–16, 134. Utpala gives his main positive statement about the system's modus operandi (which will be discussed below) in the two following sections, at IPK 1.1.2–4, 1:57–70 and IPK 2.3.17, 2:141.

66. IPV 1.1.1, 1:49–51. Abhinavagupta's discussion of self-luminosity itself is thus structured to lead to the soteriological recognition. It follows the pattern that I will exposit as common to all the arguments.

67. IPV 1.1.1, 1:55–56.

68. See IPV 1.1.1, 1:49–51; IPV 1.1.4, 1:71; IPK 2.3.15–16, 2:134–35; IPV 2.3.15–16, 2:135–39.

69. IPV 1.1.4, 1:72. This is *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.5.15, in *Upaniṣatsaṅgraha*, ed. Jagadīśa Śāstrī (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), 121.

70. IPV 2.3.15–16, 2:139.

71. IPV 2.3.15–16, 2:138–39.

72. Abhinava's explanation is interesting: "We will explain that [Consciousness] by being conceptually constructed [*vikalpyatvena*], as expressed 'Consciousness [*saṃvid*],' assumes the condition of an object of cognition [*prameyatā*]. As such, it is something which is created and, therefore, not the ultimate Consciousness. Even when it is said 'The Great Lord is the agent and cognizer' the same thing happens. Therefore, one should attempt in any way practicable to avoid the stain of degrading [the Lord] by bringing [Him] down to the condition of an object of cognition. Thus the description is made with a syntactic termination indicating the past [i.e., the locative in an absolute construction]. For, on the occasion of instruction, it is not possible entirely to avoid objectifying Him." IPV 1.1.1, 1:54. Abhinavagupta's interpretation would equally apply to Utpala's later explanation of self-luminosity, where the Lord is mentioned in the same syntax. IPK 2.3.15–16, 2:134–35.

73. IPV 2.3.17, 2:143–44. On illusion in the context of self-luminosity, also see IPK and IPV 1.1.2, 1:57–59; IPK and IPV 2.3.17, 2:141–43. Cf. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:38. There will be some discussion on noncontradiction/coherence as a means for generally distinguishing cognition from error/illusion in chapter 6.

I note that what I have described as the "negative" formulation of the system's modus operandi in terms of self-luminosity is intrinsic to the significance of recognition. This is brought out in some of Abhinava's speculative etymology of the word *pratyabhijñā* in his commentary on Utpala's benedictory verse. He explains that *pratyabhijñā* is the luminosity (*prakāśa*) that is directly evident to the self (*pratīpam ātmābhimukhyena*) because of the Self's nature as uninterrupted luminosity (*avicchinnaprakāśa*). IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1.36. This evinces recognition's transcendental status, which will be treated in later chapters.

74. I will offer some further comments on the significance of the Śaivas' negative qualifications of their method in chapter 5.

75. The list is given at *Nyāyadarśanam: With Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, with intro. by Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985), 28. The paradigmatic role of the Nyāya standards is demonstrated in the studies of Matilal. See particularly "The Nature of Philosophical Argument," chap. in *Perception*, 69–93.

76. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:43. Abhinava also states here that he is explaining the view of Utpaladeva.

77. IPV 2.3.17, 2:140. He specifically cites the support of "the book [where it is said] 'the obtainment of that which is good and denial of that which is not good,' etc." Ibid. This citation is also made at IPVV 2.3.17, 3:182. Pt. Hemendra Nath Chakravarty expressed the view in personal conversation that the text is the *Nyāyabhāṣya*.

78. See Matilal, *Perception*, 71–93.

79. These are called *vāda*, *jalpa*, and *vitaṇḍā*. I will not go into these here because of the disagreements surrounding them. The Pratyabhijñā would be classified as the well-rounded form of argument, *vāda*.

80. Matilal, *Perception*, 73–74.

81. Within the Naiyāyikas' own soteriological project, the categories are oriented toward the comprehension of particular objects of knowledge (*prameya*). Knowledge of and the elimination of error regarding relevant objects of knowledge, particularly as pertaining to what is and is not the true self, leads to detachment and liberation from suffering in rebirth. The list of *prameyas* relevant to liberation is given at *Nyāyadarśanam* 1.1.9, 180.

82. IPV 2.3.17, 2:140.

83. I note that Abhinava mentions scripture (*āgama*), along with self-experience (*svasaṃvedana*) and philosophical proof (*upapatti*), as a way in which the Pratyabhijñā system demonstrates the identity of Self and Lord. IPV 4.1 introduction, 2:280. It is particularly in the texts' sections "Āgamādhikāra" and the "Tattvasaṃgrahādhikāra" that the thinkers appeal to revealed tradition to map out details of Śaiva cosmology. Abhinava frames the appeal to scripture as a way of supplementing what can be understood on the basis of direct

perception and inference. IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:212–13. The main body of the work is clearly meant to convince through the principles of philosophical debate. As Abhinavagupta says, *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* "is brought to the heart by means of hundreds of arguments." IPV 4.1.18, 2:316.

84. I note that there were debates between the Indian schools about the precise number of steps and the structure of inference for the sake of others. Abhinava dismisses the Buddhist disputation of the number of parts as mere obstinacy. IPV 2.3.17, 2:140.

85. This account largely follows the interpretations by Karl H. Potter, ed., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. 2: *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), 180–81, and *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), 60–61; and by Matilal, *Perception*, 78.

86. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42–43; IPV 2.3.17, 2:139–40; IPVV 2.3.17, 3:182.

87. IPV 2.3.17, 2:140. Abhinava here cites the precedence for this view of the author (a.k.a. Guatama) of the core text of the Nyāya tradition. However we do not know of such a strong understanding of the construction of a text itself as an inference before Abhinava. Matilal suggested in personal communication that this idea may actually be Abhinava's innovation.

88. This excerpt of IPK 4.1.16, 2:309, was discussed above. Here is the verse in full: "This new, easy path has been revealed by me as it was explained by the great guru in the text *Śivadṛṣṭi*. Therefore, that one succeeds [*siddhyati*] who places his feet on this [the path of the Pratyabhijñā *śāstra*], and, contemplating that the status of the Agent [*kartṛ*] of the world belongs to himself, submerges himself incessantly in the state of Śiva." (The significance of agency as the ontological interpretation of the central epistemological conception of self-recognition will be discussed in chapter 7.)

89. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:42–43.

90. The final verses of the IPK do parallel and conclude the matters raised in the first verse in a general way.

91. IPV 2.3.17, 2:142–43.

92. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:34.

93. I am just trying to give a slightly different gloss to *sampat* and *sampatti*.

94. See the fuller explanations of the significance of *vimarśa* in chapters 5 and 6.

95. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:34–35.

96. This is a grammatical term. Abhinava is referring to the interpretation of the compound as a *bahuvrīhi*.

97. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:40–41

98. Abhinava explains that the inquiry into the cosmological principles (*tattva*) on the basis of scripture also has "the intention of bringing to the heart the state of the subject. [This state of the subject] is experienced through subjecting to investigation the universe, and also transcends the universe." IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:213.

99. For Tracy's use of limit language to describe transcendental inquiry, see *Blessed Rage*, 91–118. Tracy believes that the nature of religious claims requires that the inquiry of fundamental theology have a transcendental character:

> Yet the dimension of meaning in question for theology (the religious) is not simply a meaning coordinate with other meanings like the scientific, the aesthetic, or the ethical. Rather the religious dimension precisely as such can be phenomenologically described as an ultimate or grounding dimension or horizon to all meaningful human activities. The reflective discipline needed to decide upon the cognitive claims of religion and theism will itself have to be able to account not merely for some particular dimension of experience but for *all experience* as such. Indeed, precisely this latter insight is required to show why the theologian cannot resolve the religious and theistic cognitive claims of theology by any ordinary criteria of verification or falsification. . . . One clear way of articulating the nature of the reflective discipline capable of such inquiry is to describe it as "transcendental" in its modern formulation or "metaphysical" in its more traditional expression. As transcendental, such reflection attempts the explicit mediation of the basic presuppositions (or "beliefs") that are the conditions of the possibility of our existing or understanding at all. Metaphysical reflection means essentially the same thing: the philosophical validation of the concepts "religion" and "God" as necessarily affirmed or necessarily denied by all our basic beliefs and understanding. (Tracy, *Blessed Rage*, 55–56)

Also see Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 559, 568. Tracy discusses the enduring importance of transcendental/metaphysical inquiry in philosophy in *Blessed Rage*, 67–68.

100. Cf. IPV 1.7.14, 1:390–393.

101. There is an alternative programmatic formulation of the notion articulated in the inferential reason, as the insight embodied in the principle called Pure Wisdom (*śuddha vidyā*). This principle will be discussed later in the chapter.

102. IPK 1.1.2, 1:57. The same idea is expressed at IPK 2.3.17, 2:141. Utpaladeva makes these two statements, his most explicit comments on the Pratyabhijñā philosophical modus operandi, directly after each of his verses about self-luminosity. Utpaladeva never explicitly mentions the inference for the sake of others in his available writings. However, these statements along with his arguments fit precisely into Abhinava's explanation of the inference. See the discussion of Abhinavagupta's explanations of the Pratyabhijñā philosophical

methodology above. I recall Abhinava's explanation of the soteriological recognition of identity with Śiva at IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:36–38, which was quoted above. He refers to the inferential reason in stating that the Lord is known to possess Śaktis.

103. See IPV 1.1.2, 2:59.

104. The Śaktis of Cognition and Action are also central categories of prephilosophical tantras.

105. See TA 1.67–74, 2:107–15.

106. IPVV 2.3.17, 3:182; IPV 2.3.17, 2:146. At IPVV 1.5.21, 2:269, Abhinava explains that in different contexts the same fact may be variously referred to by the terms quality (*dharma*), Śakti, attribute (*guṇa*), and operation (*vyāpāra*).

107. IPK 1.1.3, 61.

108. See IPV 1.1.3, 1:62–67; IPV 1.1.4, 1:76–77; IPV 1.6.11, 1:141–43.

109. IPV 1.1.3, 1:67–68.

110. IPV 2.3.17, 2:144–45.

111. IPV 2.3.17, 2:145–46.

112. See the series of expressions at IPV 2.3.17, 2:144–46 and IPVV, 2.3.17, 3:181–82.

113. See IPV 2.3.17, 2:142–43.

114. IPV 2.3.17, 2:147–48. Cf. the analogy of the woman recognizing her lover. She recognizes him through seeing/recognizing his qualities, which at first she did not notice. IPV 4.1.17, 2:314–15. Also cf. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:17. In the actual philosophical discussions there are various descriptions of the recognition of the inferential reason, Śakti Herself.

115. IPV 2.3.17, 2:144. Abhinava reiterates this analogy in an ironic question in the last of the concluding verses of the IPV: "What answer can be given to the question 'Who are you?' by one possessed by a demon, who, not having recognized Himself, desires to study something else?" IPV 4.1 concluding verse 3, 2:317. This is quoted in *Mahārthmañjarī of Maheśvarānanda with the Auto-Commentary Parimala,* ed. Vrajavallabha Dviveda (Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya Press, 1972), 20.

116. *The Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta,* ed. Mukunda Ram Sastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 17 (reprint, Delhi: Bani Prakashan, 1982).

117. Though the practices that Abhinavagupta describes have very ancient roots, the sources of their triadic classification are very difficult to discern. A similarly designated triad of mystical submersions (*samāveśa*) is described at *Śrī Mālinīvijayottara Tantram,* ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri (Delhi: Butala & Company, 1984), 2.21–23, 9. At TA 1.167–70, 2:203, Abhinava grounds the three means proper in these submersions. Dyczkowski contends that Abhinava learned the triad of means orally from one of his teachers, Śambhunātha.

Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 171. For a valuable discussion of tantric classifications of yoga that are a background for Abhinavagupta, see Navjivan Rastogi, "The Yogic Disciplines in the Monistic Śaiva Tantric Traditions of Kashmir: Threefold, Fourfold, and Six-Limbed," in *Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism*, 247–80.

118. TA and TAV 2.45, 2:347.

119. E.g., understanding a glance from the teacher.

120. See TA 1.145, 2:184; and TA 2.10–11, 16–17, 2:319–23. This significance of the *anupāya* will be further discussed in chapter 5.

121. See for example, Kaw, *Doctrine*, 264 and Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 179. Dyczkowski apparently bases his classification on Abhinavagupta's citations of the authority of Somānanda on the nonmeans, and on the lack of need for practice after Śiva is realized. However, none of the relevant statements by Somānanda or Abhinavagupta state that the Pratyabhijñā system works through the nonmeans. See SD 75b–76, 209; TA and TAV 2.48, 2:349–50; IPV1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:31–32; IPV 4.1.16, 2:311.

122. The *śākta upāya* classification was first suggested to me by Pt. Hemendra Nath Chakravarty. This well supported my own analysis of practical themes that seemed to contradict the nonmeans classification. Pt. Chakravarty and I then spent a considerable amount of time researching the *śākta upāya* classification of the system together. Prof. Navjivan Rastogi later informed me that he also made the *śākta upāya* classification. He provided me with a copy of the unpublished second volume of his dissertation, "The Philosophy of Krama Monism of Kashmir: An Analytical Study" (Ph.D. thesis, Lucknow University, 1967), which elucidates many connections between the Pratyabhijñā and the *śākta upāya*. My understanding of the Pratyabhijñā system in terms of the *śākta upāya* is therefore indebted to Pt. Chakravarty and Professor Rastogi—though I have also researched it on my own. Alexis Sanderson also later supported the *śākta upāya* interpretation in our personal conversation. The following key points of my interpretation are my own: The way the revealing of Śakti and Pure Wisdom (to be considered below) in the Pratyabhijñā system as well as the *śākta upāya* articulate the same knowledge of emanation; their function within an inference in the Pratyabhijñā system; and the connections between this inference and the *śākta upāya*.

123. Alexis Sanderson suggested in personal conversation that this practice reflects the assimilation of Śāktism within Śaivism.

124. In personal conversation Sanderson did not wish to make a special connection of the *śākta upāya* with the practice of the revealing of Śakti because this practice is so general.

125. Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 388.

126. TA 4, 3:617–923 and TS 4, 21–33. Rastogi's dissertation strongly emphasizes the importance of Krama Śāktism in the *śākta upāya* as interpreted by Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja. On the general importance of Krama in monistic Kashmiri Śaivism, see the articles by Alexis Sanderson.

127. In this, Kṣemarāja utilizes philosophical concepts for structuring more general theological understandings. See *The Spandakārikās of Vasugupta with the Nirṇaya by Ksemarāja*, ed. and trans. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 42 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1925), 1.1, 3–8 and 3.19, 74. (Kṣemarāja's commentary will henceforth be abbreviated SN.) For elucidation of the connections between the Krama and Spanda traditions, see Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama." Sanderson also follows Kṣemarāja in connecting the *Spanda Kārikā* with the Kālī cults. Sanderson, "Śaivism," 694–95. Mark Dyczkowski interprets the conception of "creative vibration" (*spanda*) as close in meaning to Śakti. For example, Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 190. Likewise he observes that Kṣemarāja views Spanda practice as falling predominantly within the *śākta upāya*. Ibid., 260n181. Cf. Bhāskarakaṇṭha's explanation of the process of becoming the Lord of the cycle in BIPV 1.8, 1:399–400. (The last passage was pointed out by Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 417–18.)

128. *The Vijñāna-Bhairava with Commentary Partly by Kṣhemarāja and Partly by Shivopādhyāya*, ed. Mukunda Rama Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 8 (Bombay: Tatva-vivechaka Press, 1918), 18–21, 13–15. This translation is influenced by that of *Vijñānabhairava or Divine Consciousness: A Treasury of 112 Types of Yoga*, ed. and trans. Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 18–21, 16–17. The passage is cited by Jayaratha at TAV 1.74, 2:115.

129. This may have been pointed out to me by Professor Rastogi.

130. For this word, *bhaṅgyaḥ*, I follow Singh, trans., *Vijñānabhairava*, 99.

131. *Vijñāna-Bhairava* 109–10, 95–96. On this practice also see *Śivasūtras: The Yoga of Supreme Identity; Text of the Sūtras and the Commentary Vimarśini of Kṣemarāja*, ed. and trans. Jaideva Singh (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), 3.30, 196–97; TA 1.69–74, 2:109–15; TA 1.202–6, 2:227–31; SN 1.5, 19.

132. TA 1.217–18, 2:240.

133. Alexis Sanderson explained in personal conversation that an increasing valuation of knowledge is evident even in the composition of the Śaiva scriptures. It might be conjectured that this evinces an assimilation to more orthodox (*śāstric*) soteriological models as part of the broader pattern of domesticization. This trajectory may be understood as having a sort of culmination in the "correlational" agenda of the Pratyabhijñā system.

134. In this scheme, the more concrete individual means is designated by the corresponding power as the means of action (*kriyā upāya*) and the more subjective means of Śambhu is designated the means of desire (*icchā upāya*). See Sanderson, "Maṇḍala," 173n9.

135. The word is *parāmarśa*. I will explain in the fifth chapter that this term (along with its cognates) should be interpreted in terms of the Śaiva theory of recognition. I will there suggest "recognitive judgment" as a more appropriate gloss.

136. TA 1.148, 2:186. I am not clear exactly what Abhinavagupta means by the expression "the repeated practice of successive intellectual decisions, which

are aspects of conceptualization" [*bhūyo bhūyo vikalpāṃśaniścayakramacarcanāt*]. Jayaratha describes a process whereby there is an exclusion of wrong ideas of what it not the self, in line with what I have explained below. TAV 1.148, 2:186–87. Also see on this section of the text Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 416. Though, always evincing "sacred-intellectualization," Abhinava applies this schema to a wider range of practice, it is most distinctive in the *śākta upāya*. Sanderson explains the relation of the wider and specifically *śākta upāya* senses of the purification of conceptualization at "Maṇḍala," 173n9. For more on the purification of conceptualization see Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 431.

137. IPVV, 1.1, 1:16.

138. IPV 1.1.4, 1:78. Bhāskarakaṇṭha glosses this term as "way of cognition" (*jñānamārga*). BIPV 1.1.4, 1: 78. Cf. SDV 3.16, 105.

139. The role of reasoning and scholarly works (*śāstras*) in bringing about such a discrimination is discussed in *Nyāyadarśanam* 1.1, 1.

140. These verses are quoted at TA 4.15–16, 3:630–31.

141. Jayaratha's commentary on the section of the *Tantrāloka* that quotes these verses clarifies that the word "etc." (*adi*) after the word expressing "that which is to be avoided" (*heya*)—indicates "that which is favorable and is to be pursued" (*upadeya*). TAV 4.15–16, 3:630–31.

142. *Śrī Mālinīvijayottara Tantram*, 17.18–19, 114.

143. On tantric schemes of the limbs of yoga, see Rastogi, "The Yogic Disciplines."

144. See TS 4, 23–27, 31; TA 4.86–96, 3:708–19; TA 4.114b–18a, 3:733–37. Abhinavagupta sometimes identifies as instruments of the purification of conceptualization besides good reasoning—good/true scripture (*sadāgama*) and good/true teacher (*sadguru*). TS 4, 21. However, as with the limbs of yoga, he understands good reasoning as the essential factor in the operation, as well as the goal, of these two factors. See TS 4, 23; TA 4.33–47, 3:654–67; TA 4.76b–79, 3:698–700.

145. TS 4, 31.

146. TA 4.118–19, 3:737. Cf. TA 4.218–20, 3:858–59.

147. This term *svatantra*, "free," will be explained in the seventh chapter. It refers to the freedom characteristic of the syntactic agent, which the Śaivas take as omnipotence.

148. TA 4.111–14, 3:731–33.

149. TA 4.13, 3:628 and TAV 4.13.1, 3:628–29.

150. There will be some discussion of this point in chapter 5.

151. TA 4.34, 3:655. Likewise see TS 4, 25–26. Cf. TS 4, 23–24. Abhinavagupta frequently utilizes the terms interchangeably—see TA 4.44b–45a, 3:665; TA 4.109–18, 3:729–37.

152. I have already mentioned that Abhinava quotes a passage of an actual Nyāya text (the *Nyāyabhāṣya*?) speaking of this discrimination. This is in the section where he explains the method of the system in terms of the Nyāya categories and inference for the sake of others. IPV 2.3.17, 2:140.

153. IPV 3.2 introduction, 2:244.

154. IPV 3.2 introduction, 2:244. Utpaladeva himself refers to certain states of consciousness as to be abandoned (*heya*) at IPK 3.2.18, 2:269.

155. IPV 3.2.2–3, 2:246–47.

156. See IPK and IPV 3.1.3–7, 2:221–32. In personal conversation Alexis Sanderson in fact suggested that this category may have been utilized by Abhinava for interpreting good reasoning in the *śākta upāya* because of its significance in the Pratyabhijñā.

157. This technical grammatical term, *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, literally means "the condition of residing in the same substratum."

158. IPK 3.1.3, 2:221.

159. IPV 3.1.4, 2:225.

160. IPK 3.1.4, 2:225. This translation is influenced by that of Pandey, 3:193.

161. IPK and IPV 3.1.7, 2:230–32.

162. One of the themes of Abhinavagupta's commentary on this section is the explanation of various cosmological principles (*tattvas*) as modalities of the universal Śakti. Thus he even interprets Sadāśiva and Īśvara as Śaktis. IPV 3.1.3, 2:222. The identification of Pure Wisdom as a Śakti may be further understood as bearing upon the problem discussed earlier in the chapter of the relation of divine perfection/omnipotence to human works; the principle comes to have some of the same meaning as grace.

163. IPV 3.1.7, 2:230. Cf. DMSM 7.15–16, 142–143.

164. IPV 3.1.7, 2:230–231. This is also stated at IPK 3.2.2, 2:246 and IPV 3.2.2–3, 2:246–247. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta also connect Pure Wisdom with the Intermediate, Supreme-Lower (*parāpara*) cosmic level characteristic of the *śākta upāya*. IPK and IPV 3.1.5, 2:227–28. On an apparent apophatic leap beyond the identification inherent to Pure Wisdom, see IPV 4.1.14, 2:306–7. I note that Jayaratha connects reasoning/good reasoning with the bringing about of recognition at TAV 4.13.1, 3:628–29. Space does not permit our pursuing a number of further connections of the Pratyabhijñā with good reasoning.

165. IPV 4.1.11, 2:300. The *śāmbhava upāya* classification is supported by Bhāskarakaṇṭha's quotation here of a verse concerning the seal/symbolic orientation of Śambhu (*śāmbhavī mudrā*). BIPV 4.1.11, 2:301. This quotation was pointed out by Navjivan Rastogi in personal conversation.

166. IPV 4.1.12, 2:303.

167. IPK 4.1.12, 2:303. It is notable that Śivopādhyāya's version has the word *pratyabhijñātah* instead of the word *parijānataḥ*, which I in any case

translate as "recognizing." See *The Vijñāna-Bhairava with Commentary Partly by Kṣhemarāja and Partly by Shivopādhyāya,* 109. This discrepancy was pointed out by Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 425n. In personal conversation Rastogi suggested that Śivopādhyāya's version may have been the original. Rastogi states that, "according to the unanimous verdict of Śaiva authors," IPK 4.1.11 and 12 are understood as treating the *śāmbhava upāya* and the *śākta upāya.* Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 394.

It should be clear that the connections adduced here between the Pratyabhijñā and the *śākta upāya* may only be taken as showing that the former should be classified within the latter, and not that the two are identical. Indeed, both the revealing of Śakti and Pure Wisdom/good reasoning in the *śākta upāya* comprise a variety of other practical themes, including nonphilosophical studies of sacred scriptures and discussions of them with gurus, and elaborate meditations on *maṇḍalas.*

4. *The Challenge of the Buddhist Opponents*

1. See Matilal, *Perception,* 53, 74, 80. Decision (*nirṇaya*) is another Nyāya category.

2. Many nonphilosophical *śāstras* are also structured in this manner. For example, there may be doubt or debate about interpretations of texts, doctrines, or practices that are assumed to be correct. This sort of proceeding is common to nonphilosophical academic (and of course nonacademic) discussion around the world. Which of these discourses should and should not be considered philosophical perhaps ultimately depends upon the degree of explicit reflexivity. There are gray areas.

3. IPV I.2 introduction, 1:82. Cf. IPV 4.1.16, 2:309–10.

4. IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:82. The verse is in *The Stava-Chintāmaṇi of Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa with Commentary by Kṣhemarāja,* ed. Mukunda Ram Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 10 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1918), 71, 80.

5. See TA 4.105, 3:726. Abhinava is again here interpreting traditional conceptions. The significance of doubt in tantric practice is briefly discussed in Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 592–94.

6. TA 4.18–32, 3:636–53; TS 4, 31–32. Abhinava explains that the mistake of the followers of rival systems is that they consider as liberation what are only lower perfections (*siddhis*) of human nature. TA 4.19–22, 3:638–41. Likewise see IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:26. Abhinava compares those who follow traditions other than Śaivism to those who disparage the enjoyment of the sovereignty of a king in favor of lesser ones. TA 4.18b–19a, 3:636–37; 4.22b–24a, 3:641–42. See Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 360, on how "the diversity of philosophic systems . . . in fact represent the various stages of freedom of consciousness." Cf. Sanderson, "Purity," 203, on the application of such a view in exegetics.

7. TS 4.4–5, 21–22. Cf. Jayaratha's discussion of the difference between the good reasoning of the Śaivas and the non–good reasoning (*asattarka*) of others at TAV 4.17, 3:636.

8. TA 4.39–40, 3:659–60.

9. IPV conclusion 2, 2:317.

10. The Śaivas' understanding of Buddhist logic clearly centers around the interpretation of Dharmakīrti. However, Abhinavagupta mentions various other earlier and later Buddhist thinkers.

11. This is well demonstrated by Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School (Critique of Indian Realism)*, with a foreword by Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (Agra: Agra University, 1964; repr., Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1976).

12. See Jean Naudou, *Buddhists of Kashmir*, trans. Brereton and Picron (Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1980). One sees nonphilosophical criticism of the tantrics in this period, for example, in the satire of Kṣemendra. This sort of criticism is also found in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*.

13. Cf. the characterization of the Pratyabhijñā by Alexis Sanderson as "a socially ambitious avante-garde which presented the new idealism to a wider public by clothing it in the philosophically reasoned, anti-Buddhist discourse of high Brahmanism." Sanderson, "Purity," 203. I believe that Sanderson understands monistic Śaivism too exclusively in terms of the currently pervasive analysis of social relations of power. We may observe in the Śaivas some sort of effort of "upward mobility." However, it is my contention that the interpretation of other cultures, particularly of such intellectually self-conscious and sophisticated representatives as the Pratyabhijñā thinkers, must begin at the level of *what they say they are doing*. I have already referred to Paul Griffiths's similar concept of hermeneutic charity. Griffiths, *Apology*, 20–21. Questions about alternative motivations must be integrated into the more primary assessment of the validity of the Śaivas' communicative and soteriological agenda.

14. I repeat the point made in the introduction that the description of the skepticism of the Buddhists concerns the problem of the interpretation of enduring entities in experience, and does not deny their positive soteriological and moral agendas. On the skepticism of the Mādhyamika, see Matilal, "Scepticism," chap. in *Perception*, 46–68. Cf. with what has been said in the present discussion with the point made about the commonality between the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra idealism in Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 28. For an interpretation of Dignāga in the perspective of wider Buddhist orientations of skepticism and nominalism, see Richard P. Hayes, *Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs*, Studies of Classical India, vol. 9 (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). I disagree, however, with Hayes's attempt to distinguish a skepticism proper to Buddhism from "arrogant" polemics and apologetics. (Some unfairly condemning suggestions are also made regarding Dharmakīrti on account of his more elaborate polemics—leaving aside the question of whether Dharmakīrti was less skeptical than Dignāga.) The categories of polemics and apologetics formally classify communicative agendas, and do not make reference to the views in question or the moral qualities of their authors.

15. IPK 1.2.1–2, 1:85.

16. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:86.

17. On the Buddhist conception of *svasaṃvedana* in the context of other efforts to explain the validation of cognition, see Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Problems of Knowledge and Perception," chap. in *Logic, Language and Reality: An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 203–68.

18. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:86.

19. IPV 1.2.9, 1:87. The explanation of apparent objects in terms of forms of cognition was advocated by various Buddhist philosophers as an alternative to the in some ways "realistic" views of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. It was however rejected by the more radical Mādhyamika skepticism. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, of the synthetic Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, refuted this view as held by both Sautrāntika "representationalists" and Yogācāra "idealists." For an interpretation of these arguments see Yuichi Kajiyama, "Later Mādhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation," in *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice*, ed. Minoru Kiyota, assisted by Elvin W. Jones (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1978), 114–43.

20. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:86. The description of that which is uncharacterized is at least inherently paradoxical.

21. Matilal has made among the most sophisticated interpretations of the concept of *vikalpa* for Western philosophy. See Matilal, "Imagination, Perception and Language," chap. in *Perception*, 309–54. Matilal has pointed out that the parallel between the terms *vikalpa* and imagination is not restricted to their technical philosophical meanings. *Kalpanā* also has much of the ordinary sense of imagination in English as "an inventive, fanciful or playful application of concepts to things." Matilal, *Perception*, 313.

22. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:87.

23. *Dignāga, On Perception, Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, from the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan Versions*, ed. and trans. by Masaaki Hattori, Harvard Oriental Series, ed. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, vol. 47 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1.3.

24. Strawson's article "Imagination and Perception," was cited in the first chapter. Matilal applies it to the interpretation of *vikalpa* at *Perception*, 312.

25. Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," 47.

26. Later chapters will consider in more detail some of Bhartṛhari's views as they were appropriated by the Śaivas.

27. I note that Dignāga seemed to understand the correlation of language and construction as invariable. Dharmakīrti, however, in order to account for apparently nonlinguistic constructed experience such as of infants or the dumb, only states that the conceptualization is "capable of coalescence with language" (*abhilāpasaṃsargayogya*). *Nyāyabindu of Acharya Dharmakīrti: With the Commentaries by Arya Vinitadeva and Dharmottara, and Dharmottara-Tika-Tippani*, ed. Dwarika Das Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1985), 1.5, 25. I have only

slightly modified the gloss of F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, 2 vols. (repr., New York: Dover, 1962), 2:19. The Pratyabhijñā thinkers do not seem to have been concerned with such details as whether Dignāga's view could be defended on Buddhist grounds. It will thus be faithful to their exposition as well as economical for us to keep the issues of language and construction together.

28. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:86–87. The gloss of *saṃskāra* as well as the word *vāsanā* as "mnemonic impression" is made only for the epistemological context of the discussion of memory and the resources of memory in interpretation. They have other meanings in the broader contexts of "spiritual psychology" and the doctrine of karma.

29. IPVV 1.2.1–2, 1:115. This basic recognition of reference comprises all forms of interpretation in worldly life, distinguished as memory, recognition, discrimination, comparison, and so on.

30. *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, kāṇḍa 2, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 2.128. Quoted in IPVV 1.2.1–2, 1:115. This statement occurs in the course of Bhartṛhari's presentation of a series of semantic theories. There is a discussion of *abhijalpa* in the Buddhist text *Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācarya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary "Pañjikā" of Shri Kamalashīla*, 2 vols., ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981), 888–90, 1:351.

31. *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* 1.5, 27.

32. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:88.

33. IPVV 1.2.1–2, 1:115.

34. These examples are from the interpretation of the *Nyāyabindu* commentaries by Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, 2:20–21n. The passage cited from Dharmottara as well as this explanation by Stcherbatsky were pointed out by Navjivan Rastogi, "Recognition in the Pratyabhijñā School: A Study in Epistemology," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 58–59 (1977–78), 852n.

35. IPVV 1.2.1–2, 1:115. The ways in which a deeper sort of recognition may be related to the ordinary experiences of recognition (which seem to depend upon the contingencies of experience and memory) will be further elucidated in the next chapter, on the Śaivas' theory of recognition.

36. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:87. Cf. IPV 1.5.19, 1:283–84.

37. The classic expression is David Hume, "Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses," chap. in *A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects*, 2nd ed., ed. with index by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 187–218. The same project underlies the development of logical atomism. See J. O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis: Its Development between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956; paperback, 1978). I suggest that there is an analogy between phenomenalism and a historicism that repudiates "essentialism" at the same time that it tries to avoid a full relativism.

38. Stephan Beyer used this expression to describe the realization of the evanescence of things in a class on Buddhist philosophy at the University of Chicago. Hume of course does not prescribe methods for such cultivation. However, as Mary Warnock has explained, he does seem to believe that we can know our experience as he describes. "If we open our eyes and ears, if we stretch out our hands to feel, what we actually *get* is a series of impressions." Warnock, *Imagination*, 28.

39. In personal conversation, Matilal supported my interpretation of the way in which recognition epitomized the debates between the Buddhists and the Hindus. Summaries of the related debates about recognition and memory between the Buddhist logicians, the Hindu realists, and other schools may be found in: Jadunatha Sinha, *Indian Psychology*, vol. 1: *Cognition* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), 94–103 and 376–409; and vol. 3: *Epistemology of Perception*, 68–76 and 155–77; along with Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, 144, 201–9, 227–30 and 456–71 (especially 457–58). Also see Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, 203–68, and *Perception*, 309–54. I note that in many discussions recognition and memory were invoked by Hindu thinkers as proofs of a persisting Self functioning as substratum for the impressions of the past. See *Nyāya Bhāṣya*, *Nyāya Vārttika*, and *Nyāya Vārttikatātparyaṭīkā* in *Nyāyadarśanam*, 1.1.10, 184–93. One of these arguments on the basis of memory will be considered shortly. The independence of the persisting Self from the means of cognition was further seen as evinced in cases of intersensory recognition, for instance, the recognition through touch of what was previously seen with the eyes. See the commentaries, ibid., 3.1.1, 697–712. The Advaita Vedāntin Śaṅkara takes up some of the same arguments for a substratum Self as the realists. Though they are sometimes used to defend epistemological points, these are in themselves arguments of philosophical psychology.

40. The direct realist approach changed with the advent of the Navya-Nyāya.

41. See *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: With the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārthi Miśra*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1978), 4.111–33, 121–23. This is discussed at Matilal, *Perception*, 323.

42. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in *Nyāyadarśanam* 1.1.4, 118.

43. *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in *Nyāyadarśanam* 1.1.4, 118. The two passages of Vācaspatimiśra just given were pointed out, and the translations were influenced, by Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, 458–59. See the whole discussion at *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, 1.1.4, 93–131. For another sample of Nyāya arguments about the presumptiveness of recognition for establishing the continuity of objects, see the general discussion of this, amidst other issues, at *Nyāyavārttika* and *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in *Nyāyadarśanam* 2.1.16, 432–40.

44. See Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality*, 269–371.

45. I mention some other interesting issues connected with these discussions: Dharmendra Nath Shastri has shown how the Nyāya arguments for the perceptual character of recognition paved the way for the later theory of "transcendental contacts" (*alaukikasaṃnikarṣa*). With this theory thinkers moved to

the claim, for example, that one can know the smell of sandal *directly through visual perception*. This conception emphasizes the point already discussed, that there is a basis for the application of qualifications of the past to present perceptual experience. See Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, 462–71. Not all recognition is valid for the Naiyāyikas. See the refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka attempt to justify the eternality of sounds of *Nyāyavārttika*, in *Nyāyadarśanam* 2.2.31, 624ff. It is explained here that the recognition of sounds depends upon *similarity* rather than identity. The Nyāya theory of error may be interpreted as describing overextended recognition. See the discussions of what Matilal calls the "misplacement theory," as contrasted with other Indian theories of error, in *Perception*, 180–220 and *Logic, Language and Reality*, 215–28. Matilal supported my interpretation of the concept in terms of overextended recognition in personal conversation.

46. See the discussions of *liṅgaparāmarśa* by Uddyotakara, *Nyāya Vārttika* in *Nyāyadarśanam*, 1.1.5, 132–68 (e.g., 142–43); and Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhīmācarya Jhalakīkar, *Nyāyakośa, or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy*, revised and re-edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudev Shāstrī Abhyankar (Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1978), 709–10; Abhinavagupta and Daniel Ingalls explanation in *The "Dhvanyāloka" of Ānandavardhana with the "Locana" of Abhinavagupta*, trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and M. V. Patwardhan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 3.33b, 546 and 547–48n7; and the remarks about later Nyāya in Daniel Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Harvard Oriental Series, ed. Walter Eugene Clark, no. 40 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 32–33. Correspondingly, all recognition in conceptual construction was understood to be inferential. See Matilal, "Perception as Inference," in *Perception*, 255–91. For a general explanation of the application as the most important step within the inference for the sake of others, see Matilal, *Perception*, 78.

47. See the explanation of the structure of the Pratyabhijñā inference in the previous chapter. Statements I quoted in the final section on the connections between the Pratyabhijñā system and the *śākta upāya* approximate the structure of the application step of the inference. Thus from the *Vijñānabhairava* there is: "I, who have the qualities [*dharmas*] of Śiva, am none but He." *Vijñāna-Bhairava* 109. Cf. Utpaladeva's advice at IPK 4.1.12, 2:303.

48. See Abhinava's summary of the chapter at IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:82–84.

49. Another favorite Buddhist strategy is based on the ontological criterion of purposeful action or causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*). The claim is that only the phenomenal data and not the constructions can do anything. This point is referred to by Abhinava at IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:87. However, it is not applied in the chapter of the IPK and IPV focusing on the Buddhist criticisms.

50. See IPK 1.2.1–2, 1:85; IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:86; IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:89–90; IPV 1.2.5, 1:99; IPK 1.2.6, 1:99 and IPV 1.2.6, 1:101.

51. IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:86. Also see IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:83; IPK 1.2.1–2, 1:85; IPV 1.2.1–2, 1:90–91. Amidst all the differences, the basic position is again very similar to that of David Hume. The following excerpt is representative: "For

my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him. . . . But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." Hume, *Treatise*, 252–53.

52. IPV 1.2 introduction, 1:83–84.

53. IPK 1.2.5, 1.98. For the realist the access to the past is valid. For the Buddhist, though it has provisional value, it is invalid.

54. IPV 1.2.6, 1:99.

55. The Naiyāyikas believe that material cause and effect/residing quality are different, and that they are united by the relationship called inherence (*samavāya*). Inherence is covered by the Buddhist refutation of relation which will be considered below. See IPV 1.2.6, 1:100.

56. This is a loose gloss of *viśeṣa*, "special/intrinsic quality," to convey the idea in the context. The idea is further explained in the text.

57. IPV 1.2.6, 1:100–101. Also see IPK 1.2.5, 1:98; IPK 1.2.6, 1:99; IPV 1.2.6, 1:99–100.

58. See the interpretation of BIPV 1.2.6, 1:98–102.

59. IPV 1.2.6, 1:99–100.

60. IPV 1.2.6, 1:101. Abhinava explains that there would be the same problems for the Self serving as substratum to other qualities such as cognition, pleasure, suffering, desire, hatred, *dharma*, and *adharma*. IPV 1.2.6, 1:100.

61. IPV 1.2.6, 1:101. I here follow the different order of lines for this verse in *The Īśvarapratyabhijñā of Utpaladeva with the Vimarśinī by Abhinavagupta*, 2 vols., ed. Mukunda Rama Shastri and Madhusudan Kaul Shastri (Delhi: Butala & Co., 1984), 1.2.6, 1:67. Pt. Srinarayan Mishra stated in personal conversation that he has seen this maxim quoted many times in Naiyāyika and Advaita Vedāntin texts.

62. IPV 1.2.7, 1:102.

63. IPV 1.2.7, 1:102.

64. That is, it must be self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*).

65. IPK and IPV 1.2.7–8, 1:102–11.

66. IPV 1.2.9, 1:113.

67. IPK 1.2.9.pt.1, 1:111.

68. IPV 1.2.9, 1:111–12.

69. IPV 1.2.9, 1:115.

70. IPV 1.2.9, 1:112. Cf. David Hume: "The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity." Hume, *Treatise*, 205.

71. IPV 1.2.9, 1:114–15.

72. IPV 1.2.9, 1:113.

73. IPV 1.2.9, 1:115. I have elided statements concerning the point already made that perception is not a means of establishing action.

74. IPV 1.2.10, 1:116; IPVV 1.2.10, 1:197.

75. Two texts presenting the views that the Śaivas outline in this section are Dharmakīrti, *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, in *Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya Śāntaraksita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the Commentary of Acharya Prabhachandra*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1972), 139–63; and "*Sambandhavicāra*" in *Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary "Vritti" of Acharya Manorathanandin*, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1984), 4.232–41, 328–32. For some surveys, of varying quality, see: *Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* (1925), s.v. "Relations (Buddhist)," by C. A. F. Rhys Davids; David J. Kalupahana, "The Philosophy of Relations in Buddhism (1)," *University of Ceylon Review* 2 (1962): 19–47; N. S. Dravid, "The Problem of Relation in Indian Philosophy," *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* 5 (October 1977): 39–52; and Chhote Lal Tripathi, "The Idealistic Theory of Relation," chap. in *The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism* (Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1972), 222–39.

76. IPK 1.2.10, 1:116.

77. IPV 1.2.10, 1:117. I note that in the mere reference to priority and posteriority the Buddhists have already contradicted their denial of temporal sequence in the construction of action. The discussion of even a very minimalist causal relation necessitates more reified categories. What I view as the inevitable contradiction in a skeptical account becomes more obvious.

78. IPV 1.2.10, 1:116–17.

79. IPK 1.2.10, 1:116.

80. IPV 1.2.10, 1:116–17.

81. BIPV 1.2.10, 1:117.

82. IPV 1.2.10, 1:117.

83. IPV 1.2.11, 1:118.

84. IPV 1.2.11, 1:118.

85. IPVV 1.2.11, 202–3.

86. IPV 1.2.11, 1:118–19.

87. IPK 1.2.11, 1:118; IPV 1.2.11, 1:119.

5. A Summary of the Śaiva Theory of Recognition

1. The Navya-Nyāya in some ways parallels the Pratyabhijñā in its development of Bhartṛhari's ideas (to be treated below) on the impossibility of making sense of cognition without interpretation. Their thought however is a species of direct realism, rather than a monistic idealism. On the approach of the Navya-Nyāya, see Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Conception-free Awareness: Gaṅgesa," in *Perception*, 342–54.

2. Kṣemarāja explains that there is the self-recognition (*ahaṃvimṛśya*) of even the nothingness of the Mādhyamikas. SN, 1.12–13, 28.

3. The emanation and return of Śiva-Śakti should not be simply identified with these processes in Neoplatonism involving such conceptions as admixture with nonbeing/matter and participation.

4. After much analysis Alper came to the conclusion that, though there may be some differences of connotation, the *mṛś* terms basically have the same meaning. Alper, "*Svabhāvam Avabhāsasya Vimarśaṃ.*" The same view was supported by Alexis Sanderson in personal conversation. Rastogi along with myself believe that there may be differences of connotation in some contexts. I will say more about the meaning of *vimarśa* and related terms in treating the Śaiva approach to perception.

5. Matilal has described *pratisaṃdhāna* in perception as a "connective-recollective cognition."

6. The term *anusaṃdhāna* also has some backgrounds in spiritual practice.

7. Here I may record some textual support for my interpretation: I have already discussed Abhinavagupta's definition of *pratyabhijñā* in terms of *anusaṃdhāna* and *pratisaṃdhāna* at IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:36–38. Abhinava similarly defines *pratyabhijñā* in terms of *anusaṃdhāna* at IPV 1.4.8, 1:188–89. The later Pratyabhijñā text, *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā*, simply classifies the "This is that" experience as *anusaṃhiti*. VPP 3.38, 16. The commentator Vidyācakravartin again makes the equation: "*Anusaṃhiti* is *pratyabhijñā*." VPPV 3.38, 16. Also see VPPV 3.39, 17. The free alternation between the terms *pratyabhijñā* and *anusaṃdhāna* is seen in the discussions of action, e.g., at IPV 2.1.5, 2:17.

Bhāskarakaṇṭha equates the terms *parāmarśa* and *pratyabhijñā* in commenting on IPV 2.2.2, 2:39. Bhāskarakaṇṭha on 1.5.20, 1:294 uses the word *pratyabhijñā* to describe the means (by using the instrumental case) by which *parāmarśa* unifies word and object. (I must recall, however, the ultimate identity between means and goal in monistic Śaivism.) At 2.3.10–11 Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta use the words *vimarśa* and *pratyavamarśa* identically to *pratyabhijñā* as invoked by the Naiyāyikas against the Vijñānavādins. They

explain through it the knowledge "This is that thing" regarding objects that appear successively as far and near, inferred and directly perceived, external and internally imagined, and as seen in incorrect and correct cognitions. IPK 2.3.10–11, 2:117; IPV 2.3.10–11, 2:117–19 and BIPV 2.3.10–11, 2:117–19. Abhinava similarly uses the expression *pratyavarmṛśyate* to describe the recognition of the continuity of material cause and effect at IPV 2.4.18, 2:194. *Parāmarśa* and other *mṛś* terms are used to describe the soteriological recognition at IPV 4.1.16, 2:310–11 and IPV 4.1.17, 2:314–15.

Bhāskarakaṇṭha identifies *anusaṃdhāna* with *pratyavamarśa* in his commentary on IPV 1.6.10, 1:340. Terms such as *anusaṃdhāna* and *anusaṃdhi* are employed in synonymous or intrinsic functional relationships with those such as *vimarśa* and *pratyavamarśa* at IPK 1.5.19, 1:284; IPV 1.5.19, 1:291–92. In commenting on IPV 1.6.1, 1:301, Bhāskarakaṇṭha identifies *anusaṃdhāna* as the effect (*kārya*) of *pratyavamarśa*.

The terms are used disjunctively in analyses of states with different degrees of contingent empirical, rather than transcendental, recognitive synthesis. In elaborating a typology of cognitive states, Abhinava thus describes a form of direct experience (*anubhava*) that lacks synthesis (*abhisaṃdhi*), despite his usual stress on the invariable concomitance of synthesis with consciousness. He is endeavoring to describe what seems to be the most discrete, uninterpreted sort of experience. However, Abhinavagupta emphasizes that even here there is (recognitive) judgment (*parāmarśa*), which is necessary for awareness. IPV 1.4.8, 1:187–88. On the basis of differentiation of such an underlying or transcendental judgment (*parāmarśa*), he analyzes in this section a great variety of sorts of direct experience, memory, and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). IPV 1.4.8, 1:187–89 and IPVV 1.4.8, 2:58.

8. For a survey of speculation about Speech from the Vedas through tantrism, see André Padoux, *Vāc: The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu Tantras*, trans. Jacques Gontier, SUNY Series in the Shaiva Traditions of Kashmir, ed. Harvey P. Alper (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

9. The term *parāvāk* comes most directly from Somānanda's interpretation of Bhartṛhari's analysis of the levels of concretization of language. It is not clear whether Bhartṛhari actually intended to indicate such a level. See Gaurināth Śāstrī, *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning: Some Indian Approaches with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Bhartṛhari*, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, no. 5 (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959). A level of Speech that is "Supreme" is easily homologized with the Trika Goddess/cosmic–level Supreme (*parā*). This will be discussed below.

10. *Vākyapadīya* 1.1, 1. This translation is influenced by both *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari*, chapter 1, trans. K. A. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Deccan College, 1965), 1.1,1; and David Carpenter, "The Light of the Word: A Comparative Study of the Phenomenon of Revelation," 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1987), 120. With the former, I follow the *Vṛtti* in taking *akṣara* as referring to the cause of the phonemes; I follow the latter in glossing the word *śabdatattva* as "Word-Principle."

11. See K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartṛhari on Vyākaraṇa as a Means of Attaining Mokṣa," *Adyar Library Bulletin* 28 (1964): 112–31.

12. *na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta.*

13. *Vākyapadīya* 1.116–17, 190–92. The commentaries suggest that in referring to recognitive judgement (*pratyavamarśa*), Bhartṛhari is talking primarily about the judgment about the meaning of a sentence from the combination of its words. This is understood to include a recognition of reference, that is, of meaning in experience.

14. However, as observed in the last chapter, Bhartṛhari's analysis of the role of language in experience also had a great influence on the Buddhists' understanding of *vikalpa.*

15. See SD 2, 36–93. Somānanda also devotes much space to showing the ultimate identity of Śiva and Śakti. He argues, nevertheless, that it is more correct to speak of the highest deity as the former rather than the latter. See SD 3, 94–142.

16. For Utpaladeva's identification of self-recognition with Supreme Speech, see IPK 1.6.1, 1:302 and IPKV 1.6.1, 22. Utpaladeva lists Supreme Speech along with recognition (*pratyavamarśa*) and Lordship as descriptions of consciousness at IPK 1.5.13, 1:250. Utpaladeva even identifies the Lord Himself as semantic intuition (*pratibhā*). IPK 1.7.1, 1:341. The thinkers keep the significance of a deeper interpretation of revelation in the epistemological theory. Abhinavagupta states that "that which is called scripture has the nature of internal verbalization and of very firm recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]." IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:84. On the further identity of self-recognition/Supreme Speech with mantra, see IPV 1.5.14, 1:262–64 and IPVV 1.5.14, 2:206; on the identity with mantric sound (*dhvani*), see TA 4.181, 3:827. For further discussion of these identifications in additional sources, see Rastogi, "Philosophy of Krama," 458, 753–55. Cf. the discussions by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta of the recognition of the relation of poetically suggestive language and sense, along with Ingalls's comments, at *The "Dhvanyāloka" of Ānandavardhana with the "Locana" of Abhinavagupta* 1.8, 124–26.

17. IPV 2.4.15, 2:190. This conception recalls the Upaniṣadic quest for the thread persisting through and connecting together the world. Abhinavagupta is aware of the theme: "The subject, who has the nature of self-consciousness, is like the inner thread and the life of the garland of cognitions." IPV 2.2.3, 2:42.

18. IPV 2.4.18, 2:195.

19. IPVV 2.4.18, 3:233. The two expressions referred to, respectively *pratyakṣānumānāgamānyatamapramāṇamūlāṃ pratyabhijnām* and *pratyakṣānumānāgamādyanyatamamānapratyabhijñānabalena*, could be interpreted differently. These interpretations were supported by Chakravarty, Matilal, and Rastogi in personal conversations. The basic point is substantiated in the analysis below and in subsequent chapters.

20. DMSM 7.16, 143.

21. Chapter 1 noted the chief sources of the Christian synthesis. The parallel of Bhartṛhari's own (nontheistic) metaphysics with Western logos theology has been treated in several studies. For example, see David Carpenter's comparison of Bhartṛhari with Bonaventure in "The Light of the Word."

22. There are in fact emanationist features in most classic Christian theologies, dialectically qualified by the ex nihilo doctrine. This cannot be pursued in this work. However, see my constructive suggestions about contemporary panentheism at the end of chapter 8.

23. St. Anselm, *Monologium,* in *St. Anselm: Basic Writings,* trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1990), chap. 32, 141.

24. Ibid., chap. 34, 144.

25. E.g., see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* 5 vols., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminister, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981), 1.14.1–8, 1:72–79; and *Truth,* 3 vols., trans. Robert W. Mulligan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 2.1–4, 1:52–83. Also see the discussion of "Does the Father Utter All Creatures in the Word by Which He Utters Himself" (which explains the first quotation of Anselm above), ibid., 4.4, 1:184–88.

26. Sergei Bulgakov, *The Wisdom of God,* 98. (We cannot here get into Sophiology's idiosyncratic understanding of the relation of Sophia and logos.) Cf. the following explanation by Pseudo-Dionysius:

> And thus the Mind of God embraces all things in an utterly transcendent knowledge and, in Its causal relation to all things, anticipates within Itself the knowledge of them all—knowing and creating angels before the angels were, and knowing all other things inwardly and (if I may so put it) from the very beginning, and thus bringing them into existence. And methinks this is taught by the Scripture when it saith "Who knoweth all things before their birth." For the Mind of God gains not its knowledge of things from those things; but of Itself and in Itself it possesses, and hath conceived beforehand in a causal manner, the cognizance and the knowledge and the being of them all. And It doth not perceive each class specifically, but in one embracing causality It knows and maintains all-things—even as Light possesses beforehand in itself a causal knowledge of the darkness, not knowing the darkness in any other way than from the Light. Thus the Divine Wisdom in knowing Itself will know all things: will in that very Oneness know and produce material things immaterially, divisible things indivisibly, manifold things under the form of Unity. . . . And hence God doth not possess a private knowledge of Himself and as distinct therefrom a knowledge embracing all the creatures in common; for the Universal Cause, in knowing Itself, can scarcely help knowing the things that proceed from it and whereof It is the Cause. With this knowledge, then, God knoweth all things, not through a mere understanding of the things but through an understanding of Himself.

The Divine Names, in *Dionysius the Areopagite on the Divine Names and Mystical Theology,* trans. C. E. Rolt (New York: Macmillan, 1920), 150–51. Cf. the discussion of the self-recognition of the Absolute Idea in G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic,* trans. A.V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989), 743.

27. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1.14.8, 1:79.

28. Ibid., 1.16.5, 1:92. Cf. the following passage of Martin Heidegger's discussion of the medieval roots of contemporary formulations of truth as correspondence:

> *Veritas* as *adaequatio rei ad intellectum* does not imply the later transcendental conception of Kant—possible only on the basis of the subjectivity of man's essence—that "objects conform to our knowledge." Rather, it implies the Christian theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (*ens creatum*), *is* only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the *intellectus divinus*, i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense is "true." The *intellectus humanus* too is an *ens creatum*. As a capacity bestowed upon man by God, it must satisfy its *idea*. If all beings are "created," the possibility of the truth of human knowledge is grounded in the fact that matter and proposition measure up to the idea in the same way and therefore are fitted to each other on the basis of the unity of the divine plan of creation. *Veritas* as *adaequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum (divinum)* guarantees *veritas* as *adaequatio intellectus (humani) ad rem (creatam)*. Throughout, *veritas* essentially implies *convenientia*, the coming of beings themselves, as created, into agreement with the Creator, an "accord" with regard to the way they are determined in the order of creation.

Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 120–21.

29. Chapter 1 has already cited the studies of Eliade, Vernant, Coomaraswamy, Yates, and Babb on sacred memory in India and elsewhere. Sacred memory is often understood to pertain more generally to higher realities, rather than to sacred speech per se. The Śaivas seem usually to connect it with sacred speech.

30. IPV 1.4.2, 1:160–61.

31. IPV 1.4.1, 1:154. The note in the edition of Mukunda Rama Shastri and Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, 1:120, glossses *mantrādiprāṇitam* as *śuddhavidyāparāmarśaprāṇitam*. I follow Pandey's gloss of *vitaraṇacatura*. IPV 3:42. The verse is also cited at IPVV 1.4.1, 2:4, where the author is identified as one Divākaravatsa.

32. TA 5.136b–139, 3:1065–68. This translation was influenced by discussion with Pt. Chakravarty and by the translations of *Luce delle Sacre Scritture (Tantrāloka)*, trans. Raniero Gnoli (Turin, Italy: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1980), 205; and Padoux, *Vāc*, 397–98. Though I still have some uncertainty about it, I think the basic idea comes through.

33. IPV 1.4 introductory verse, 1:147.

34. The nature of recognition as reexperience is articulated in the doctrine of self-luminosity, which we took up in the discussion of the Śaiva propaedeutics.

The self-luminous reality itself fills the "counter" of memory. This is brought out in a passage that interprets recognition from the soteriological (rather than epistemologically/ metaphysically primordial) angle. In the same context in which Abhinavagupta explains the soteriological recognition as the application of the knowledge of the Lord from the scriptures to one's present experience, he states: "There is the recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] of Him, i.e., of the Great Lord. Recognition [*pratyabhijñā*] is the cognition, i.e., awareness [*prakāśa*], which is directed back [*pratīpam*] to the Self. It [is directed] "back" because the manifestation of one's Self was not unexperienced previously, since that [Self] is uninterrupted [*avicchinna*] awareness [*prakāśa*]. It will be explained, however, that due to His own Śakti He is experienced as if differentiated conceptually [*vikalpita*, as an object distinct from the limited subject], i.e., as if interrupted [*vichinna*]." IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:36. One may compare my treatment of memory with the discussions in Padoux, *Vāc*, 198–99, 397–98. I mention that memory also has much significance in Indian aesthetics related to the religious ideas discussed here.

35. The classic argument is made in Plato, *Meno*, translated by W. K. C. Guthrie, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series 57 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 353–84.

36. Of course without the concept of reincarnation, with rare early exceptions such as Origen.

37. Augustine's reformulation of *anamnesis* as inner light influenced even Aristotelian Christian theology. Thus Thomas also maintains that God is present to us through memory. *Truth*, 10.72:34. Augustine's influential analogy of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with human memory, intelligence, and will provided a more elaborate foundation for human epistemic and volitional acts in divine self-recognition and self-love. See St. Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press, 1991), 10.17–19, 298–99. On the deepest human memory of an inner word not belonging to any particular language, also see 15.40, 426–27. Anselm succinctly explains the analogy of human memory and word with those of the divine: "Since the human mind is not always thinking of itself, though it ever remembers itself, it is clear that, when it thinks of itself, the word corresponding to it is born of memory. Hence, it appears that, if it always thought of itself, its word would be always born of memory. For, to think of an object of which we have remembrance, this is to express it mentally; while the word corresponding to the object is the thought itself, formed after the likeness of the object from memory. Hence, it may be clearly apprehended in the Supreme Wisdom, which always thinks of itself, just as it remembers itself, that, of the eternal remembrance of it, its coeternal Word is born. Therefore, as the Word is properly conceived of as the child, the memory must appropriately take the name of the parent." *Monologium*, 58, 158–59. Thomas also followed Augustine's Trinitarian analogies.

The Kantian understandings of synthesis also reflect the issue being considered. Kant did not equate the transcendental synthesis of the imagination with ordinary recognition. For him, because the latter formally approximates the latter, it is only "the last and highest of these merely empirical elements of experience." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 146–47. On Kant's understandings of the

transcendental versus the empirical types of imaginative synthesis, also see Strawson, "Imagination and Perception," 54–55; and Warnock, *Imagination*, 30ff. Heidegger's understanding of historicity actually emphasizes the contingencies of interpretations known in *alētheia*. On the other hand his idea of the call of Being suggests something noncontingent. See Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?* trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

38. Correspondingly, ordinary recognition depends upon ordinary memory. See IPV 1.3.6, 1:136–37; IPV 1.6.6, 1:326–27.

39. On Bhartṛhari's scheme and the interpretation of the Śaivas, one may see Gaurinath Shastri, "Correspondence of Form and Matter," chap. in *The Philosophy of Word and Meaning*, 66–82; along with Padoux, "The Levels of Word," chap. in *Vāc*, 166–222. For a discussion of some other sources on the levels of speech, see Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," 227n1.

40. The Śaivas believe that the Lord differentiates His self-recognition into types of experience such as cognition, memory, decision, and doubt through His Māyā Śakti. IPK and IPV 1.5.18, 1:280–83. Cf. BIPV 1.6.10, 1:340 on the subtle judgment (*pratyavamarśa*) in all forms of experience. Also cf. IPK and IPV 1.5.21, 1:296–98.

41. In the last two sentences Abhinava is glossing words from Utpaladeva's verse.

42. IPV 1.5.13, 1:252–55. Cf. IPV 1.8.11, 1:423–24; IPK and IPV 4.1.13–14, 2:305–7.

43. There is a related discussion at IPK and IPV 1.6.1, 1:301–5. Here Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are concerned to show that the higher nature of self-recognition/Speech lacks the distinctively bifurcative nature of conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*), though it is their source and inner reality.

It is not possible here to survey Christian theories of the cosmogony. However, I note that classic Christian theology also understands God's self-understanding within the logos in similarly monistic terms. As Thomas puts it (reflecting on the Aristotelian understanding of the identity of intellect and object in the divine): "Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself." *Summa Theologica*, 1.14.2, 1:73. Like the Pratyabhijñā (as we shall consider in chapter 7), Christian theology also emphasizes that God's act of intellect is entirely without temporal sequence. The exemplary discussion is Augustine, "Time and Eternity," book in *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), XI, 221–45. Thomas explains it briefly: "For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and

not successively. . . . [A]s God sees His effects in Himself as in their cause, His knowledge is not discursive." *Summa Theologica*, 1.14.7, p. 1:78.

44. This is the awareness of Pure Wisdom, which was discussed in chapter 3. I will develop this point below.

45. Thus he skips Bhartṛhari's "Middle" (*madhyamā*) level.

46. See IPK 1.6.6, 1:324; IPKV 1.6.6, 24; IPV 1.6.6, 1:324–27. The entirety of IPK and IPV 1.6, 1:299–344 is about the differentiation inherent to ordinary conceptual constructions.

47. This equivalence has already been indicated by the discussion above in another way. I have explained that Somānanda identifies Śakti with Supreme Speech, and that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta identify Supreme Speech with self-recognition.

48. IPK 1.5.20, 1:294.

49. Bhāskarakaṇṭha explains this word: " 'Judges' [*parāmṛśanti*] [means] brings to the condition of object of judgement [*parāmarśaviṣayatām*] by means of recognition [*pratyabhijñā*], which has the nature of the unification of word and object [*śabdārthaikīkaraṇarupa*]." BIPV 1.5.20, 1:294.

50. IPV 1.5.20, 1:294–95. Likewise Utpaladeva states: "His Śaktis of Cognition, etc. are the synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] between the cognitions of the numerous things." IPKV 1.3.7, 10. Abhinavagupta explains that: "The Supreme Lord's nature as creator consists of nothing but such synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*]." IPV 1.6 introduction, 1:301. Abhinava also explains the status of judgement (*vimarśa*) as the Lord's fundamental power of creation at IPV 1.5.15–16, 1:266–73. Here is a passage from Utpaladeva's APS that places Śakti and synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*) in a sort of close functional relationship: "She is explained to be one due to [Her] synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of all experiences. She is the beginningless essential nature of the subject [*mātṛ*], which is a synonym for self-consciousness [*svasaṃvedana*, a term favored by the Buddhists]. That synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] is the omnipresence [*vyāpitvam*] of the one possessing I-hood, on whom depends the establishment of things." APS 25–26, 10–11. (With the reference to synonymity, Utpaladeva is spelling it out that Śakti/*anusaṃdhāna* demonstrates an enduring subject, contra the Buddhists' understanding of a self-consciousness that is episodic.)

51. IPK 1.8.11, 1:1:421. See also IPV 1.8.11, 1:423–24.

52. The account of levels referred to is the scheme of principles (*tattva*) that the monistic Kashmi Śaivas hold in common, with some variations, with other Śaivas. Sadāśiva and a lower deity called Īśvara both possess Pure Wisdom, in different ways.

53. IPVV 1.6.6, 2:314. This description seems to be made on the basis of Utpaladeva's *Vivṛti*.

54. IPV 1.6.6, 1:324–27; IPVV 1.6.6, 2:314.

55. IPV 1.6.6, 1:326–27.

56. IPV 1.6.6, 1:325–26.

57. IPV 2.3.13, 2:129. All of this is the operation of Pure Wisdom. I will provide here another interesting passage from the *Tantrasāra*. This is from the section where Abhinavagupta reduces the limbs of yoga to the gnoseologically internalized practice of good reasoning/Pure Wisdom. He further explains this gnoseological conception of yoga: "Thus, the Ultimate Reality is integral [*svābhāvika*] and not dependent on conceptual constructions [*vikalpa*]. It appears [*prakaśate*] through diverse conceptual constructions [*vikalpa*], that have the nature of aspects of Pure Wisdom. Yoga is a particular sort of conceptual construction [*vikalpa*] that has the nature of the recognitive synthesis [*anusaṃdhāna*] of the essential nature of that [Ultimate Reality], in order to develop the awareness of [that Ultimate Reality] which is always such [as just explained]." TS 4, 27. I was assisted in this translation by Navjivan Rastogi. One may also relate what is being treated here to the discussion by the thinkers of the three levels of experience of the bound, liberated, and the Supreme Lord at IPK and IPV 4.1.13–14, 2:305–7.

58. The recognition found in understanding the recognitions constituting experience is held to be filled with wonder (*camatkāra*). This is brought out in the discussion of memory at IPK 1.4.3, 1:162 with IPV 1.4.3, 1:165–66. I will treat this section in the next chapter. Mystical-aesthetic wonder is also characteristic of *anamnesis* incorporated in logos theology. In our time, Proust is most well known for his conception that the self can recognize itself in its extratemporal nature through perceptual recognition. See the discussion of Proust at Warnock, *Memory*, 99–100.

59. TA 1.145, 2:184.

60. TA 2.10–11, 16–17, 2:319–23. The reader will recall that in his *śākta upāya* Abhinavagupta identifies the tool, good reasoning, with the goal, Pure Wisdom.

61. I interpreted this and another passage as delineating a sort of transcendental inquiry.

62. IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:34.

63. APS 15, 6. Among Abhinava's references to APS 15 are IPV 1.1 on IPK benedictory verse, 1:35; IPV 1.5.11, 1:1:244; IPV 1.5.17, 1:279; IPVV 1.1, 1:54.

64. This is my attempt to interpret the expression, *jīvitasthānīyo*.

65. *Vṛtti* on APS 15.1–2, 6–7. I mention a couple of other passages more modestly illustrating the "teleology" of phenomena in self-recognition. Abhinavagupta explains: "All judgements [*parāmarśa*] only rest [*viśrānti*] upon the pure and unitary judgement [*parāmarśa*] 'I.' " IPV 1.5.18, 1:280. Similarly, Bhāskarakaṇṭha describes recognitive synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*) as "having the nature of rest [*viśrānti*] in the Self." BIPV 1.4.8, 1:187–88.

66. IPV 1.5.17, 1:278–79.

67. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures.*

68. See the characterizations of myth and ritual in Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return, or, Cosmos and History,* trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); and *Myth and Reality,* trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). With regard to Eliade's theory of history—both linear and cyclical narratives get their sense from the transtemporal origin.

For a variety of approaches to the problem being discussed, applied to a variety of traditions, see Robert W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, eds., *Cosmogony and Ethical Order: New Studies of Comparative Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

69. Cf. the very different monistic and mystical (but not philosophical-apologetic) collapsing of the distinctions of original nature, meditation, and wisdom in *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch,* ed. and trans. Philip B. Yampolsky (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

70. Important limiting considerations are the intellectual moment of God's transcendence of His ex nihilo creation and the doctrine of free will.

71. Bernard Lonergan explains, "God is the unrestricted act of understanding, the eternal rapture glimpsed in every Archimidean cry of Eureka." Lonergan, *Insight,* 684.

72. See the classic discussion in Augustine, *The Trinity,* 14, 370–94.

73. The theory of myth and recapitulatory ritual of Mircea Eliade—who suggests that Plato is the "outstanding philosopher of the 'primitive mentality' " (*The Myth of the Eternal Return,* 34–35) and who links his understanding of the archetype directly with Augustine (ibid., xv)—is perhaps most at home in describing the kinds of metaphysical formulations of Christianity and monistic Śaivism considered here. Besides it general inheritance, along with other classic "prehistoricized" history of religions, of the natural theology of *logos spermatikos* and *prisci theologi*—Eliade's phenomenology includes Renaissance Neoplatonism, German romanticism, and Hindu tantrism among its strongest metaphysical influences.

74. As emphasized in the introduction, the real closedness lies in not admitting one's foundationalist assumptions and engaging in dialogue about how they might be mediated with the divergent claims of others.

75. Cf. Martin Heidegger on the hermeneutic circle: "But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look for ways of avoiding it, even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood from the ground up." *Being and Time,* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), 194.

76. IPV 2.1.1, 2:8–9.

77. IPV 2.2.2, 2:37–38.

78. IPV 2.2.2, 2:35–36.

79. IPK 2.2.2, 2:36.

80. Also see IPV 2.2.2, 2:37–40.

81. IPV 2.2.5, 2:52; IPV 2.2.1, 2:33–34.

82. IPK and IPV 2.2.3, 41–46; IPV 2.2.4, 2:51; IPV 2.2.6, 2:55. Also see IPK 2.2.1, 2:33.

83. As explained in this chapter, this is philosophically accomplished through a clarification of the recognitions transcendentally constituting all experience as the self-recognition of the Lord.

84. This follows the edition of Mukunda Rama Shastri and Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, 2:30, which has *ekanekarūpo 'rthah kriyā,* instead of *ekanekarūpa kriyā.*

85. IPV 2.2.1, 2:33–34. See the discussion of coherence as a test of truth in the following chapter. Utpaladeva also mentions the criterion of usefulness (*upayoga*) as indicating the reality of these external categories. IPK 2.2.1, 2:33. Abhinava explains that even if, as the Buddhists claim, the conceptual construction of such categories were illusion (*saṃvṛti*), this illusion itself belongs to reality! IPV 2.2.3, 2:46.

86. The following statement of Abhinava reveals the puzzlingly direct transition from the idea of the reality of all that is experienced to that of its ultimate nature as unity: "Therefore, something exists as much and in whatever way it is recognitively apprehended [*vimṛśyate*] and unsublated. Therefore substance, action, relation, etc., though extended across places, times and forms—exist in Ultimate Reality [*paramārthasanta*] as unitary." IPV 1.1.3, 1:62.

87. See IPK and IPV 2.4.19, 2:197–200.

88. IPV 2.4.20, 2:204. I note that the chief adversaries being addressed here are the Advaita Vedāntins.

89. The word is *padārthātmā.* In the parallel discussion at IPVV 2.1.1,3:2, Abhinava glosses this word as "the essence of manifestations [*ābhāsasāra*]." Bhāskarakaṇṭha glosses it as "the essence of [experienced objects] such as blue, yellow, etc. [*nīlapītādisārabhūta*]." BIPV 2.1.1, 2:9.

90. IPV 2.1.1, 2:9. Also see IPVV 2.1.1,3:2.

91. For other examples of the analogy of reflection, see IPV 1.6.3, 1:309 and IPV 2.4.19, 2:199–200. On the unitary view of the diverse things in a city from a mountain, see IPV 2.4.19, 2:200. Abhinava compares the Lord's manifestation of the universe to a painting on a wall of a woman with a deep navel and elevated breasts. IPV 2.3.15–16, 2:135–36. On the dancer see IPVV 2.4.19, 3:244. On the waves of a river see IPV 2.1 benedictory verse 1, 2:1. On streams uniting in the ocean see IPV 1.7.2, 1:356–57. For a general survey of Abhinavagupta's uses of analogies, see Navjivan Rastogi, "Some More Nyāyas as Employed by Abhinavagupta," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 65 (1984): 27–42.

92. Utpaladeva comes close to putting things in this manner. In the first verse of the book on action, he suggests that the topic has already been established by the epistemological discussion of the Lord's self-recognition in the previous book: "Thus the assertion that there is no action, which is sequential,

unitary and belonging to what is unitary has been refuted. For that which is unitary has been established." IPK 2.1.1, 2:7. Abhinava's comments on this verse, already considered, bring out Utpaladeva's concern with the logical problems of action. IPV 2.1.1, 2:7–9. We shall see that in the book on action the emphasis is again on working out the positive ontological implications of the theory of recognition, regarding relation, syntax, and so on—rather than answering the reductios.

6. Epistemological Applications of the Theory of Recognition

1. One important area outside of our focus should at least be mentioned. Much epistemological discussion in India centers around the concept of *pramāṇas*, "means of cognition." For the Śaivas a means of cognition has the characteristic of bringing about a recognitive judgment (*vimarśa*) that is uncontradicted. IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:82–83. The latter qualification in effect makes coherence a test criterion; see the further remarks on this point at the end of the discussion of cognition below. The Śaivas do not give as much attention to the details of defining and cataloging the means of cognition as some other schools. Abhinavagupta mentions the three commonly accepted *pramāṇas* of perception, inference, and scripture. Aspects of the Śaiva understandings of perception and scripture, as Supreme Speech, will be taken up in this chapter. I note that Abhinava has much of interest to say about scripture in the ordinary, concrete sense, aside from its transcendental nature. Thus he describes it as "having the nature of very firm recognitive judgement (*vimarśa*)." IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:84. He admits that for people who "have taken heart" and "have firm conviction" there is the status of revelation for the Veda as well as the scriptures of orthodox Śaiva Siddhānta, Buddhism, and Jainism. IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:84–91. Abhinava follows both Bhartṛhari and Vātsyāyana in stating that both scripture and direct perception can sublate inference. IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:89. He also states that more can be known about the categories of reality (*tattva*) from scripture (*āgama*), which has as its ultimate nature the recognitive judgment of the Great Lord, than from direct perception and inference. IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:212–14. For a concise discussion of inference, see IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:84. I also note that *pramāṇas* are focused upon in the book on action of the Pratyabhijñā texts. This is, first, because of their pertinence to the discussion there of the reality of synthesized ontological categories. More particularly it is because *pramāṇas* are understood to have the structure of *relation*. IPV 2.3 introduction, 2:66–67; IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:82–83. In their character as relation, as will be seen in the next chapter, they are structured with the special *syntax* that the Śaivas use to interpret the ontological implications of their theory of recognition.

2. It is notable that this triad is taken directly from *Bhagavadgītā* 15.15, which Utpaladeva quotes in IPKV 1.3.7, 10. Here is the actual verse: "I make my dwelling in the hearts of all: from Me stem memory, wisdom, the dispelling [of doubt]. Through the Vedas it is I who should be known, for the maker of the Vedas' end am I, and I the Vedas know." *The Bhagavad Gītā: With a Commentary Based on the Original Sources*, ed. and trans. R. C. Zaehner (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1969; paperback, 1975), 366. This is from a section of the *Gītā* describing the immanence of Kṛṣṇa in both the world and the human being. The meaning in the *Gītā* verse of the last term, *apohana,* is mysterious. It could not have been a reference to the philosophical concept of exclusion, which was not developed by the Buddhists until much later. Zaehner admits that he is uncertain about his translation.

3. Note that I am changing the order of the Śaivas' treatment of these topics. The Śaivas' order parallels the Buddhist attacks on the Pratyabhijñā inference, where memory was considered first as evidence for the existence of the inferential subject—a continuous self. Though there is an extra emphasis on the continuity of the self in the Śaiva discussion of memory, it seems best to treat cognition first. I believe that their discussion of cognition best typifies their epistemology, most directly pertains to the problems of interpretation considered in the first chapter, and is the most impressive of their efforts to demonstrate the person's Lordship. Abhinavagupta himself asserts the primacy of the treatment of cognition over the other epistemological topics. Thus he states that "Direct perception [*anubhava*] is the life of memory, conceptualization [*vikalpa,* which comprises semantic exclusion], etc." IPV 1.5.1, 1:195. Also see IPV 1.4.8, 1:191–92; IPV 1.5 introduction, 1:194 and IPV 1.4 introduction, 1:147.

4. Other terms used to indicate cognition in the most general sense are *pramā* and *pramiti*. These are derived from the same root and prefix as the word *pramāṇa*.

5. Abhinava also places the cognition of inner feelings such as pleasure and yogic cognition in the category of direct perception. IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:83. However, the Śaivas' discussion focuses on the ordinary sense perception of objects.

6. See Matilal, "Knowledge as a Mental Episode," in *Perception,* 97–140. I have chosen the gloss as cognition rather than knowledge to lessen connotations of a disposition.

7. See Matilal, "Memory" in *Logic, Language and Reality,* 262–68.

8. IPV 1.3.7, 1:140–41. The texts provide many similar descriptions of the Cognition Śakti. See IPV 1.5 benedictory verse, 1:193; IPK 1.5.1, 1:196 as explained by IPV 1.5 introduction, 1:194; IPV 1.5.1, 1:197. Cf., IPV 1.5.18, 1:282.

9. See the end of the previous chapter on the ways the Śaivas deal with the logical problem of the relation of the one and the many.

10. Sometimes these *vimarśa* arguments also use *anusaṃdhāna* and its cognates.

11. Alper has gone so far as interpreting the Pratyabhijñā epistemology as comprising separate *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* theologies. See Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," "Śiva and the Ubiquity of Consciousness," and "*Svabhāvam Avabhāsasya Vimarśaṃ.*"

12. The relation of these concepts in the Pratyabhijñā will be brought out further in the discussion of ontology in the next chapter.

13. However the Śaivas conspicuously avoid the Vijñānavāda arguments trying to raise doubts about the validity of ordinary experience on the basis of the occurrence of perceptual illusions.

14. Alper speculates about aesthetic backgrounds of the term. Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," 70n4.

15. On different Indian approaches to the validation of cognitions, see Matilal, "Knowing That One Knows," in *Perception*, 141–79. Abhinava explains that a cognizer who is not self-luminous would be not be able to establish anything else. IPV 1.1.1, 1:49. He would be like a stone. IPV 1.1.1, 1:55.

16. IPK 1.5.2, 1:198.

17. Abhinava emphasizes in the IPVV that the object of which there is awareness (*prakāśamāna*) is not different from the awareness (*prakāśa*), and the awareness is not different from the object. IPVV 1.5.2, 2:68. In the first portion of the chapter on cognition Abhinavagupta offers some additional ontological criticisms of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika understandings of external objects. Thus he argues that this school's conceptions of the part and whole and of the union of atoms are inherently contradictory. Many of these criticisms can be found in such classic Vijñānavāda works as the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* of Vasubandhu. Abhinava explicitly refers for further details to the *Prajñālaṃkāra* of Śaṅkarānanda, an important mediator of the critiques of Vasubhandhu and Dignāga in Kashmir. IPV 1.5.6, 1:223–25. The details of these ontological criticisms need not presently concern us. However, they are notable for indicating the Śaivas' explicit willingness to proceed part of the way with the Vijñānavāda idealism. On Śaṅkarānanda as a mediator of the critiques of Vasubandhu and Dignāga in Kashmir, see Alper, "Abhinavagupta's Concept of Cognitive Power," 140–41n5; Raniero Gnoli, introduction to *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, Serie Orientale Roma 23 (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960), xiii–xxvii; and Jean Naudoux, *Buddhists of Kashmir*, 121–27.

18. These thinkers are being interpreted as holding the view that awareness is intrinsically without forms (*nirākāra*), which was noted in chapter 4.

19. IPK 1.5.4, 1:210.

20. IPV 1.5.4, 1:210–12. The Śaivas also present a Sautrāntika refutation of a Vijñānavāda effort idealistically to account for the multiplicity in experience on the basis of latent tendencies (*vāsanā*). At this point the discussion sounds like an inter-Buddhist debate. This is again of interest as evincing the Śaivas' indebtedness to the Buddhist idealists. Apparently the Sautrāntika objection is allowed to stand, as the Śaivas hold a different theory of the cause of diverse manifestations. IPK and IPV 1.5.5, 1:210–21.

21. IPV 1.5.8–9, 1:230–35.

22. IPK 1.5.8–9, 1:230. I note that Utpaladeva and Abhinava also attempt to defend the consistency of a desired inference of sense-faculties with the restriction of inference. The discussion is found at IPK 1.5.8, 1:230 and IPV 1.5.8–9, 1:230–35. This issue is not important to the present discussion.

23. Abhinava is referring to IPK 1.5.2, quoted above.

24. IPV 1.5.9, 1:235.

25. IPV 1.5.6, 1:222. Also see IPK 1.5.6, 1:221.

26. Augustine, *The Trinity,* XV.22, 414.

27. Anselm, *Monologium,* chap. 34, 144.

28. *Summa Theologica,* 1.14.5, 1:75.

29. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* 1.14.8, 1:79. Also see *Truth,* 2.14, 2:129–33.

30. Perhaps Aristotle himself should be considered an idealist with respect to his understanding of the divine intellect. In any event I believe that Thomism should be understood in this way. Medieval Aristotelianism was of course heavily influenced by Neoplatonism.

31. As Michael Forster has shown, one of Hegel's two main strategies for defending his system against skepticism is argumentation for the identity of subject and object in the Absolute. With this (idealistic) contention, Hegel attempts to solve the problem of "concept instantiation," or what I have described as the recognition of reference. Michael Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 117–26. Also see below notes 49 and 70.

32. George Berkeley, *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* in *The Principles of Human Knowledge, With Other Writings,* ed. with introduction by G. J. Warnock (Glasgow: Fontana, 1977), 66.

33. For an example of Berkeley's argumentation against the inference of substance (rather different than the Śaivas' refutation of inference), see *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* 73–74.

34. *The Principles of Human Knowledge,* 76.

35. George Berkeley, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,* in *The Principles of Human Knowledge, With Other Writings,* 3, 225–26.

36. IPK 1.1.4, 1:70; IPV 1.1.4, 1:78.

37. This is APS 13, 5. It is quoted in full in note 41 below.

38. IPV 1.1.4, 1:75–77. Abhinavagupta says that agency is to be explained in the same manner. IPV 1.1.4, 1:77. Abhinava also touches upon these issues in his *Tantrasāra.* He explains that awareness (*prakāśa*) is unitary because it is impossible for it to have an essential nature that is other, i.e., as nonawareness. Awareness again is not differentiated by place and time because it is their own essential nature. TS 1, 5–6. Elsewhere Abhinava explains that the modifier *sarva,* "all," does not add any additional meaning to the terms "cognizerhood" (*jñātṛtva*) or "agency" (*kartṛtva*). IPV 1.1.1, 1:49–50.

39. Abhinava also adduces a logical consideration for the unity of selves. He explains that just as living beings partake of differentiation due to the differentiation of accidental properties such as objects of cognition and the body, so such insentient things partake of differentiation due to the differentiation of living beings. Because such reciprocal dependence for differentiation is not valid, there is really no differentiation of living beings. IPV 1.1.3, 1:66–67.

40. IPV 1.5.4–5, 1:209–10 and IPV 1.5.9, 1:235.

41. IPK 1.5.7, 1:226. Cf. Utpaladeva's APS: "Thus insentient things in themselves amount to nonexistent. They exist only as belonging to awareness [*prakāśa*]. There is only the awareness of one's Self as oneself and others." APS 13, 5. This is quoted by Abhinava at IPV 1.1.3, 1:64; IPV 1.1.4, 1:76; IPV 1.5.3, 1:208; and IPVV 1.1, 1:97. Kṣemarāja also quotes it at SN 1.5, 18.

42. Such illusions are used as paradigmatic in the Vijñānavāda conception of the (latent-tendency activated) generation of objects as forms (*ākāra*) of awareness. See Matilal, "Analysis of Perceptual Illusion," in *Perception*, 183–90, 229–33. Here the Śaivas are indicating that they part from the views of the Vijñānavāda.

43. IPV 1.5.7, 1:226–29.

44. The Buddhist argument that the application of language is a kind of secondary reaction ungrounded in phenomenal experience is repeated in the chapter on cognition at IPV 1.5.19, 1:283–84.

45. IPV 1.5.14, 1:265. Following Iyer's edition, the first quotation is *Vākyapadīya* 1.115–16, 1:188–90. (1.116 was quoted in the previous chapter.) The next two sentences are 1.118a, 1:193, and a close approximation to the second half of a verse quoted by the *Vṛtti* at 1:118, 1:193. It is possible that these formed one verse in the version of the text that Abhinavagupta used. Abhinava also cites the *Mālinīvijayatantra*, along with an unidentified scripture, on mantra as intrinsic to experience. IPV 1.5.14, 1:264. In the discussion of means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), Abhinavagupta likewise makes the claim that scripture (*āgama*) "amounts to the life of direct perception." IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:84–85.

46. St. Justin Martyr, *The First Apology*, in *Writings of Saint Justin Martyr*, trans. Thomas B. Falls (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1977), 46, 83.

47. E.g., see Augustine, *Confessions*, XI, 220–27.

48. Augustine, *The Trinity*, XV.19, 409. For Augustine's early treatment of skepticism, see *Against the Academicians*, trans. Mary Patricia Garvey (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957). Augustine also propounded arguments against doubt precursory to Descartes' cogito. Even one doubting cannot doubt his/her own existence and life in doubting. See *The Trinity*, 10.14, 296–97; 15.21, 411–13. These and other discussions are brought together in Josef Seifert, "From Relativism and Skepticism to Truth and Certainty," *Truth Journal* 1 (1985) [electronic journal], http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/truth/1truth14.html. St. Anselm developed the Augustinian view on how truth comes from God in *Concerning Truth* (De Veritate), in *Truth, Freedom and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues*, ed. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 91–120. St. Bonaventure elaborated one of the most important mystical interpretations of the Augustinian understanding of inner language-illumination. Thus see *The Mind's Road to God*, trans. George Boas (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953); and *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, trans. Emma Thérèse Healy (Saint Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1955).

49. *Truth*, 11.1, 2:82. This point is explained in various ways by Thomas. E.g, less technical are the arguments that all truths are from God as first truth,

ibid., 1.8, 1:36–40. On Thomas's understanding of the agent intellect, see Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1967), 78–84. There are also discussions where Thomas derives human knowledge of truth from self-knowledge (his variant of the precursory *cogito*). This is treated, ibid., 74–75.

Berkeley, who thematized the *esse est percipi* principle, described the intrinsic-interpretability of the world in terms that approach contemporary semiotics. All experienced states of affairs have the characteristic of signs sent by the creator. He elaborates this view in his theory of vision: "Upon the whole, I think we may fairly conclude that the proper objects of vision constitute a universal language of the Author of nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain to those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their information that we are principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of life." George Berkeley, *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, in his *Works on Vision*, ed. Colin Murray Turbayne (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), 147, 91–92. In this conception Berkeley anticipates the pan-semioticism of C. S. Peirce. I will refer to Peirce again in chapter 8, note 21 to further support the analogue of the *vimarśa* arguments in Bernard Lonergan.

In Hegel's highly rationalist philosophy, the thesis being discussed presently takes the form of his contention against skepticism that the Rational has no opposite. Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism*, 118–20. See also notes 31 and 70 in this chapter, and note 21 in chapter 8.

50. On this theory in contemporary hermeneutics, see James J. DiCenso, *Hermeneutics and the Disclosure of Truth: A Study in the Work of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990).

51. Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," 124–25; also see 129.

52. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 188–95. This section is discussed in Merold Westphal, "Phenomenologies and Religious Truth," in *Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion*, ed. Daniel Guerriere, 111–12.

Cf. the careful distinction made between seeing and seeing as in the discussion of the duck-rabbit in Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 193f. I would say that from the point of view of the Śaiva *vimarśa* arguments, along with the logos metaphysics and Heideggerian disclosure theory, this distinction pertains only to a secondary level of usage. Seeing as occurs at the most rudimentary level of configuring experience and applying words to it, and is only further elaborated in interpretations explicated as interpretations. Before the interpretations of "rabbit" and "duck" are the interpretations of some sort of pattern, the use of the words "this" or "picture," and so on.

53. David Tracy uses the disclosure model to explain the truth arrived at through the arguments of fundamental theology as well as the interpretation of religious classics in systematic theology. In his fundamental theology he refers to the disclosure model of Ian Ramsey (*Blessed Rage*, 22, 150; *Analogical Imagination*, 63) as well as the stronger arguments of Heidegger (*Analogical Imagination*, 63). On his understanding of the recognition of truth through aesthetic and religious classics see *Analogical Imagination*, 108, 139n35. In more explicated accounts Tracy

correlates revelation with the manifestation/disclosure-concealment of the religious object and recognition with faith; and explains their interaction with the hermeneutic category of conversation. See "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 564; *Plurality and Ambiguity*, p. 28. Cf. the argument that religious faith is a particular kind of a recognitive "experiencing-as" intrinsic to all experience in John Hick, "Religious Faith as Experiencing-As," in *Talk of God*, ed. G. N. A. Vesey (London: Macmillan, 1969), 20–35. Also see the discussions of faith at Farley, 72–74; and of aesthetic recognition in George Steiner, *Real Presences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 180f.

54. According to Bhartṛhari, it is the innateness of the subtle form of language which accounts for infants' beginning to move their vocal organs. See *Vākyapadīya* with *Vṛtti* 1.114, 187–88.

55. IPV 1.5.19, 1:288–89. My chief point with this quote is that the linguistic source is supposed to provide the ground for the reconnection of words and objects in learning conventional reference. I also note that in the last two sentences Abhinava is expounding an idea presented in the *Mahābhāṣya*, that before the establishment of referential conventions all words can mean all things. This was first brought to my attention by Chakravarty.

56. IPV 1.5.19, 1:284–88. Another argument given by Bhartṛhari for the presence of linguistic interpretation in all experience is the purposeful behavior of newborn children and animals, which would nowadays be explained in terms of instinct. This idea is actually mentioned by Bhāskarakaṇṭha. He explains that recognitive ascertainment (*pratyavamarśa, anusaṃdhāna, yojanā*) is the basis for the baby's seeking pleasure in sucking the breast of his mother. BIPV 1.6.10, 1:340. I recall the passage of Dharmottara using this example that was quoted in chapter 4.

The argument about the learning of language may bring up associations of Noam Chomsky's theory of deep structures of language. However, it also has analogies in earlier, more metaphysically explicit Western understandings of the universal logos, such as Augustine's theory of the human inner word. Wilhelm von Humboldt elaborated such a conception in his linguistics: "Aside from the bodily existence of things, their outlines are clothed, like a magic intended for man alone, with external beauty, in which regularity and sensory material enter an alliance that still remains inexplicable to us, in that we are seized and carried away by it. All this we find again in analogous harmonies within language, and language is able to depict it. For in passing, by means of it, into a world of sounds, we do not abandon the world that actually surrounds us. The regularity of language's structure is akin to that of nature; and in thereby arousing man in the activity of his highest and most human powers, it also brings him closer, as such, to an understanding of the formal impress of nature, since, the latter too can after all be regarded simply as the development of mental powers." Wilhelm von Humboldt, *On Language: The Diversity of Human Language-Structure and Its Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind*, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 61. Likewise: "Language must be considered as immediately laid down in man; for as a product of his understanding in the clearness of consciousness it is completely unexplainable . . . language could not be invented if its type did not already exist in the human understanding. In order to enable man to understand only one single word . . . as an articulated sound which designates

a concept, the whole of language in its structure must already lie in him." Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium," quoted and trans. in Apel, "The Transcendental Conception of Language-Communication and the Idea of First Philosophy," 94. Humboldt also analogized language with the instinct of animals, and talked about the deeper form of language as an "intellectual instinct." Ibid.

57. See *Vākyapadīya* with *Vṛtti* 1.115, 1:188–90. Cf. the discussion of Norman Malcolm's ideas on the role of linguistic interpretation in making memory possible at Warnock, *Memory*, 44.

58. IPV 1.5.19, 1:289.

59. IPK 1.5.19, 1:284.

60. IPV 1.5.19, 1:291–92.

61. IPV 1.5.19, 1:292–93. I note that besides these arguments about the necessity of recognition in the perception of objects, the Śaivas make some claims that the self-luminosity that validates cognitions has the nature of self-recognition. Thus they assert that it is this self-recognition that distinguishes the subject from insentient reflective things such as crystals. IPV 1.5.11, 1:242–43. If there were not such self-recognition, the universe would be intense darkness or worse. IPV 1.1.4, 1:71.

62. IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:75–77. In the course of a discussion of another issue, Abhinava explains: "It has been explained here [in the Pratyabhijñā] that objects are nothing but manifestations. They are sometimes mixed through the unification of recognitive judgement [*parāmarśa*], when they have the form of the particular. And sometimes they are recognitively judged [*parāmṛśyante*] as unmixed, when they have the form of the universal." IPV 4.1.7, 2:292–93.

63. Edward Farley makes an analogous point about the primordiality of the experience of universals in his interpretation of the Heideggerian understanding of truth in terms of the surpassing of time. He does not, however, invert universals and particulars like the Śaivas: "*Even as there is no manifestness without enduring, neither is there a manifestness without the expression of enduring.* Even as manifestness is the primordial sense of truth, *the expression of enduring is the primordial sense of the universal*. Hence, all cognitive acts (apprehending the sense of something; perceiving; or grasping structural makeup, causal connections, and implications) presuppose the initial capacity to grasp the enduring (that is, the manifestness of things) and thus also depend on and make use of expressions of enduringness." Farley, 71. Also see the discussion of the synthetic character of perception, ibid., 67.

64. IPK, IPV 2.3.3, 2:92–94.

65. IPV 2.3.4–5, 2:97–98.

66. See IPK and IPV 1.8.5–9, 1:408–21. There is discussion relevant to the syntheses of universals and particulars throughout IPK and IPV 2.3.1–14, 2:67–134. On this also see IPV 1.5.19, 1:293; IPK 2.3.1–2, 2:68; IPV 3.1 introduction, 2:214.

67. As I have said, the Śaiva treatment of memory provides the most focused considerations for the continuity of the subject of the Pratyabhijñā inference—the Self. However, I note that the nature of cognition as recognitive is also understood as precluding the Buddhist doctrine of the impermanence of awareness. For example, see IPV 1.5.2, 1:203; IPV 2.3.15–16, 2:135–36.

68. The idea is that there would be no way of knowing anything about something that is unrecognized, including whether or not it exists.

69. IPV 1.1.3, 1:61–62. For statements of the identity of awareness and recognition (*vimarśa*) also see IPK and IPV 1.5.11, 1:241–44; and IPV 1.5.17, 1:273.

70. As observed (in notes 31 and 49), the two chief strategies of Hegel's defense of his metaphysics against skepticism broadly parallel the argumentation typified here in the *vimarśa* and *prakāśa* arguments. As exposited by Michael Forster, these strategies comprise: (1) Arguments that the Rational has no opposite. (2) Arguments for the identity of subject and object in the Absolute. I am not advocating Hegel's logic or phenomenology. I believe that Hegel's two modes of argumentation may be taken as confirmation of my analysis of a much broader orientation of philosophical theology. Hegel was quite explicitly propounding a philosophy of the divine logos.

See Simon Evnine, *Donald Davidson* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991) on the idealistic features of Donald Davidson's dissolution of the scheme-content/subject-object dichotomy. If these were emphasized sufficiently, could we could arrive at a Davidsonian formulation of the philosophical theology of self-recognition/logos advocated here?

71. This word, *kartṛtvaśakti*, could also be translated as "the Agency Śakti." As such it addresses the syntax of self-recognition to be taken up in the next chapter.

72. Abhinava is answering a question brought up in the introduction to the verse about why *vimarśa* is being emphasized.

73. Bhāskarakaṇṭha states that such causes include material causes (*upādāna*). BIPV 1.5.15, 1:268. Abhinava is referring to the refutation of external objects as the causes of the diversity in perception. (He may also be referring to the Sautrāntikas' refutation of the Vijñānavāda theory that latent tendencies cause such diversity.) In lieu of such other causes, the Subject/Lord is Himself the cause.

74. He is interpreting a word in Utpaladeva's verse.

75. IPV 1.5.15, 1:267–68.

76. IPK 1.5.13, 1:250.

77. IPV 1.5.14, 1:255.

78. IPK 1.5.14, 1:255.

79. IPV 1.5.14, 1:262.

80. IPV 1.1.3, 1:62.

81. IPK 2.3.1–2, 2:68; IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:82–83. Also see IPV 1.5.8, 1:232.

82. See the discussion throughout IPK and IPV 1.7.6–13, 1:364–89.

83. IPV 2.3.7, 2:106.

84. Cf. the characterization of the entire Śaiva metaphysics of ignorance as *apūrṇakhyāti* in Navjivan Rastogi, "Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 14 (1986): 1–33. Perhaps this could be classified as a kind of "process realism."

85. Tracy links disclosure/recognition with the first position in James's criteriological triad of possibility, coherence, and ethical consequences. See Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 560–61, 565–67; and the longer analysis in "The Question of Criteria for Inter-Religious Dialogue: On Revisiting William James," in *Dialogue with the Other: The Inter-Religious Dialogue*, Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs 1 (Louvain, Belgium: Peeters Press, 1990), 27–47.

86. See IPK and IPV 2.2.1, 2:31–35.

87. "If theologians expect certainty they are doomed to failure. But if theologians are faithful to the logic of the subject matter they presume to study (the nature of ultimate reality) and the coherence of the self-manifestations of God and the logic of inquiry itself with what we otherwise reasonably hold, they cannot avoid asking this question of ultimate coherence." Tracy, "Uneasy Alliance Reconceived," 568.

88. IPV 1.3.7, 1: 143. Cf. IPV 1.4.7, 1:183.

89. IPK 1.3.2, 1:126; IPV 1.3.2, 1:128–30.

90. IPV 1.3.1, 1:125.

91. IPV 1.3.2, 1:128–29. Elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*) is itself a kind of impression (*saṃskāra*), as is momentum (*vega*). The analogy of the elasticity of the branch is also brought up in the presentation of the Buddhist position. IPV 1.2.5, 1:99.

92. The previous chapter along with the treatment of cognition above should make it clear how "this" is itself a recognition.

93. See IPV 1.3.1, 1:124–25.

94. IPK 1.3.1–2, 1:124–26. On this point also see IPV 1.3 introduction, 1:123; IPV 1.3.2, 1:127–29; IPV 1.4 introduction, 1:149; IPK and IPV 1.4.4, 1:166–71; IPV 1.4.8, 1:187.

95. IPK 1.4.3–4, 1:162–67. Cf. IPV 1.4.4, 1:167–69.

96. IPV 1.3.2, 1:129. Also see IPK and IPV 1.7.5, 1:362–64.

97. The validating and temporal-connective features of memory described here have been discussed in various ways in Western philosophy. For example, Bertrand Russell explained memory as comprising both a feeling of familiarity and a feeling of pastness. See the survey of philosophical theories of memory

(focusing on whether memory should be understood in terms of images) in Warnock, *Memory*, 15–36.

98. IPV 1.7.5, 1:363–64. This same point is made at IPV 1.3.7, 1:140; IPV 1.4.5, 1:176–77; and IPK 1.7.5, 1:362.

99. IPV 1.3.7, 1:141–42. Sometimes the term recognitive synthesis (*anusaṃdhāna*) or recognitive judgment (*parāmarśa*, etc.) is used as a synonym for memory in a manner that entails that the latter is an instance of the former. For example, see IPV and BIPV 1.8.1, 1:402–3.

100. It is a widespread idea that there is required in memory a sense of self, which I am calling self-recognition. This idea is found in thinkers as diverse as Bishop Butler and Jean-Paul Sartre. See the discussion at Warnock, *Memory*, 58–63.

101. Abhinava is stating that it is experienced at the gross level of emanation, lacking the comprehension of absorption belonging to the Supreme level of self-recognition, according to the scheme explained in the previous chapter.

102. The original experience ends.

103. IPV 1.4.1, 1:152–53. Cf. IPK 1.4.1, 1:149; and IPV 1.4.3, 1:164.

104. IPK and IPV 1.3.3, 1:130–31. For the Buddhist, the only validity in the illusion of memory, its only real similarity with the original experience, lies in the fact that it is itself an innate form (*svākāra*) of the succession of self-luminous experience (*svasaṃvedana*). See IPK and IPV 1.3.5, 1:133–35.

105. After the believers in external objects are refuted by the *prakāśa* arguments.

106. See IPK and IPV 1.3.6, 1:136–38. Also see IPV 1.3.4, 1:132.

107. IPV 1.3.7, 1:138–39. Statements that the Buddhists' view would destroy worldly behavior are also found at IPV 1.3 introduction, 1:123; IPK and IPV 1.3.5, 1:133–35; IPK and IPV 1.3.6–7, 136–45. The Buddhists believe that their account of memory is adequate: "By impressions [*saṃskāra*] there is given support for the collection of behaviors of the world." IPV 1.2.5. 1:99. The Śaivas differ from them in contending that such affairs cannot be grounded on an illusion.

108. IPV 1.3.4, 1:132. Also see IPK 1.3.4, 1:131 and IPV 1.3.5, 1:133.

109. IPK 1.4.3, 1:162.

110. This word, *ācchāditasya*, is the same one Abhinava uses to refer to the condition of the original experience when it is in the form of the impression. See IPV 1.4.1, 1.152.

111. IPV 1.4.3, 1:165–66.

112. As just suggested regarding the explanation of memory, I believe that such an account is impossible for them.

113. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, 1:205.

114. Ibid., 2:417.

115. It is because it has this rudimentary epistemological function that Abhinava asserts that the Semantic Exclusion Śakti aids both the Memory and Cognition Śaktis. IPV 1.6 introduction, 1:299–300.

116. Abhinava is trying to show that the non-pot is a viable alternative.

117. IPV 1.6.2, 1:306. Also see IPV 1.6.1, 1:303–4.

118. *Bādha* is explained similarly. Cf. IPK and IPV 1.7.6–13, 1:364–89.

119. IPV 1.6.3, 1:309. According to Bhāskarakaṇṭha, there is only supposed to be the awakening of the mental impression of that which is similar to an object of cognition. BIPV 1.6.3, 1:308.

120. IPK 1.6.3, 1:309. Abhinava supports the idea of the subject's comprehension of both the that and the not-that with the analogy of a city reflected in a mirror. IPV 1.6.3, 1:309. Cf. the explanation of *pratibhā* by Abhinavagupta at IPV 1.7.1, 1:352–55. Here he identifies it with the Great Lord/subject having the nature of self-recognition, and asserts its effectuation of both the conjunction and disjunction of things.

121. I note that the creative freedom evident in *acts of fantasy* (e.g., of an elephant with a hundred tusks and two trunks) is also taken by the Śaivas as demonstrating the principle that all dichotomizing conceptual construction is generated by the Lord's Exclusion Śakti. See IPK and IPV 1.6.10–11, 1:337–43.

122. Though the Lord's self-recognition synthesizes the exclusion in gross conceptual construction, the Śaivas stress that this recognition is not made through any exclusion. They deny the possibility of a superimposed alternative to be negated on the basis of the familiar idealistic premise that "there cannot be the manifestation of another, like awareness, which is different [from awareness]." IPK 1.6.2, 1:305. Also see IPV 1.6.1–2, 1:301–8.

123. IPV 1.3.7, 1:142–43. Cf. Abhinavagupta's benedictory verse to the chapter on exclusion: "We praise Śiva. Through His own will, dividing entities which are a compact mass not different from His own nature, with the chisel of semantic exclusion, He creates marvelously diverse forms." IPV 1.6 benedictory verse, 1:299. For a description of the creation of the limited subject distinguished from objects that invokes both the terms Māyā and Exclusion, see IPK and IPV 1.6.4–5, 1:312–23. For a discussion of the discrimination of the pot from the non-pot, such as the self, cloth, etc.—which also invokes both these terms, see IPV 1.6.3, 1:309–10.

124. IPV 1.6.11, 1:341. Cf. IPV 1.6 introduction, 1:301.

125. This is APS 20, 8.

126. IPV 1.3.7, 1:143–45.

7. Features of the Ontology of Recognition

1. *sattā bhavattā bhavanakartṛtā.* IPKV 1.5.14, 19.

2. *sattā ca bhavanakartṛtā sarvakriyāsu svātantryam.* IPV 1.5.14, 1:258–59.

3. The conception here is much more inclusive than Heidegger's. Ontology, as I understand it, can be distinguished from metaphysics only by a different emphasis.

4. This word is also used to denote the direct object case in Sanskrit linguistics. The relation of the religious and grammatical meanings will be discussed below.

5. See *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, kāṇḍa* 3, ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer (Pune: Deccan College, 1963–73), part 2, 3.8, 1–40, particularly 3.8.1,1; 3.8.27, 22; and 3.8.35, 26. There are alternative semantic theories in India. The Naiyāyika understanding of the sentence, for example, is more similar to the Western conception of predication/qualification.

6. The ritualistic philosophical school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā elaborated at great length on the injunctive nature of language, describing the dispositional and concrete "bringing about" (*bhāvanā*) of actions conveyed by the inflected verbs in sentences.

7. An influential earlier study is Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality of Experience," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 39 (September 1971): 291–311.

8. See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition;* and Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative,* 3 vols., trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984–88).

9. Of course, this does not obviate the epistemological question of how we know what exists.

10. SD 1.24, 19. Abhinavagupta cites this statement in the course of explaining the ultimately internal nature of the Action Śakti. IPV 1.1.4, 1:74.

11. Abhinava is referring to the Lord's cosmic acts.

12. Agency will be discussed in the treatment of syntax below.

13. IPV 1.8.11, 1:423–24. Likewise: "Therefore Cognition and Action are not different. Cognition is animated by recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. And Action is nothing but recognitive judgement [*vimarśa*]. And Action does not belong to one devoid of the Cognition Śakti." IPV 3.1.1, 2:215–16. For identifications of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* with the Cognition and Action Śaktis, and assertions of the priority of Action, also see IPV 1.1.1, 1:53–54; IPV 1.5.15, 1:237; IPV 1.8 introduction, 1:397–98; IPVV 2.1.2, 3:3; IPV 4.1.4, 2:285–86. On the different forms taken by the Cognition and Action Śaktis in the course of emanation, see IPV 1.1.3, 1:69–70. For further reflection about the ultimate identity of Cognition and Action, see IPK and IPV 3.1.1, 2:214–16.

14. It should be clear that in an idealistic system epistemology inevitably functions constitutively in ontology.

15. The Time Śakti will be mentioned again below.

16. IPK 2.1.2, 2:10. Also see on this point IPV 2.1.2, 2:9–11; IPK and IPV 2.1.6–7, 2:19–23; IPV 2.1.8, 2:23–29; IPK 3.1.1, 1:214. The Christians also understand the act of the divine intellect as without sequence in itself. See chapter 5, note 43.

17. See IPV 2.2.1, 2:33–34. Here the Śaivas are again accommodating the semantics of Bhartṛhari within their theistic vision. Cf. the following statement: "That [action] is without sequence due to its unity. It is experienced as having before and after due to the qualification of it [*dharmena tadarthena*] by what is before and after." *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 2, 3.8.18, 18.

18. IPV 2.1.1, 2:9. (Part of this passage was quoted in the fifth chapter.) On the temporal fragmentation of the Lord's action, also see IPV 2.1 introduction, 2:5–6; IPVV 2.1.1–2, 3:2–4; IPK and IPV 2.2.2, 2:35–40.

19. IPV 2.1.5, 2:17. This translation incorporates some of that of Pandey, IPV 2.1.5, 3:123. Cf. the similar explanation of a man's action of walking at IPV 2.2.1, 2:33–34.

20. IPK 2.2.4, 2:49.

21. IPK 2.2.2, 2:36.

22. IPV 2.2.4, 2:51.

23. The Saivas' theory of relation is also largely developed from ideas of Bhartṛhari. For Bhartṛhari the root relation is that of word and object. This is a kind of approximation of the unity of word and object in the Word Absolute. The semantic idea is present in the Śaiva account, but I cannot do justice to it now. (I only list it as an example below.) In any case, the Śaivas generalize Bhartṛhari's conception to describe the structure of unity-in-multiplicity. Bhartṛhari's discussion is found in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, in *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 1, 3.3, 122–82. Utpaladeva focuses on relation in his SS, 1–15.

24. I have taken out of the passage several examples of relation. These and others will be discussed shortly.

25. IPV 2.2.4, 2:46–49. Abhinava continues by quoting the first benedictory verse of Utpaladeva's *Sambandhasiddhi:* "We praise Śiva. By His will there is the creation [*kṛti*] of worldly affairs. [This creation] is accomplished through all things possessing relation, the nature of which comprises both differentiation and nondifferentiation." SS introductory vs. 1, 1. Abhinava likewise elsewhere describes relation as "the yawning open of the Action Śakti," IPV 2.2.6, 2:57; and "the chief expanding-manifestation of the Action Śakti," IPV 2.4 introduction, 2:151.

26. See IPV 2.2.4, 2:47 and IPV 2.2.6, 2:55.

27. IPV 2.2.4, 2:47.

28. See IPK 2.2.6, 2:54 and IPV 2.2.6, 2:54–55. More will be said about syntax shortly.

29. IPV 2.2.4, 2:47. I have already discussed in the previous chapter the Śaivas' use of their theory of the transcendental nature of recognition to reverse the Buddhist understanding of the cognitions of universals and particulars. It is unfortunately not possible for me at present to work out systematically the relations of universals and particulars to the broad frameworks of action and relation.

30. IPV 2.2.4, 2:47.

31. Unfortunately it is not possible for me now to go further into the Śaivas' interesting ideas about time. See the discussions of the nature of time, its classification as relation, and its recognitive synthesis at IPK and IPV 2.1.3–5, 2:11–19; IPV 2.2.4, 2:47; IPV 2.2.6, 2:56–57; IPVV 1.4.3, 2:37.

32. IPK 2.1.2, 2:10; IPV 2.1.2, 2:10–11; IPV 2.1.4, 2:14–16.

33. See IPV 2.2.4, 2:47; IPV 2.2.6, 2:55.

34. IPV 2.2.4, 2:47–49; IPV 2.2.6, 2:56–58.

35. Most of the basic ideas on *kārakas* explained here may be found in *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakāhnika (P.1.4.23–1.4.55)*, ed. with introduction, translation, and notes by S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen (Pune: University of Poona, 1975). Also see the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*, in *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 2, 3.8, 1–40, and the *Sādhanasamuddeśa*, in *Vākyapadīya, kāṇḍa* 3, part 1, 3.7, 230–370. Some of the more important secondary studies, representing a variety of viewpoints, are: K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari: A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries* (Pune: Deccan College, 1969), 283–344; George Cardona, "Pāṇini's Syntactic Categories," *Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda* 16 (1967): 202–15; George Cardona, "Pāṇini's *Kārakas:* Agency, Animation and Identity," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1974): 231–306; Sergiu Al-George, "Le sujet gramatical chez Pāṇini," Studia et Acta Orientalia Bucaresti 1 (1957): 39–47; Sergiu Al-George, "The Extra-Linguistic Origin of Pāṇini's Syntactic Categories and Their Linguistic Accuracy," *Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda* 18 (1968): 1–7; Rosane Rocher, " 'Agent' et 'objet' chez Pāṇini," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 84 (1964): 44–54; Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (*Vākya*)," *Foundations of Language* 2 (1966): 377–93; Bimal Krishna Matilal, "The Doctrine of Karaṇa in Grammar-Logic," *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* 17 (1960): 63–69; Bimal Krishna Matilal, "The *Kāraka* Theory," chap. in *The Word and the World: India's Contribution to the Study of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990): 40–48; Frits Staal, "Syntactic and Semantic Relations in Pāṇini," *Foundations of Language* 5 (1969): 83–117; Edwin Gerow, "What is Karma (Kiṃ Karmeti): An Exercise in Philosophical Semantics," *Indologica Taurinensia* 10 (1982): 87–116.

36. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

37. I prefer the term "instrument" rather than Burke's "agency" in order to avoid confusion with the category of the "agent." The term "instrument" is also more commonly used in grammar and philosophy.

38. After I had developed my ideas on the analogy between Burke and aspects of *kāraka* theory, I discovered the following: The use of terminology for dramatic roles is applied to understanding the sentence by D. Terence Langendon. The roles are actually used to describe semantic relationships that are turned into syntactic relationships through transformational rules. D. Terence Langendon, *Essentials of English Grammar* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 61ff. This approach in turn is suggested as a way of understanding *kārakas* by S. D. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen, introduction to *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya: Kārakāhnika*, iii–iv.

39. Though he attempts to derive his categories from Aristotle, was Burke actually reflecting upon the Indo-European case structures?

40. According to Burke, Marxism also features the scene. However it attributes to the scene a degree of its own conscious agenthood. While it is illuminating to view such approaches as emphasizing the "scene," there is more to be said on the subject. It seems to me that Burke should have included a separate category of the "object." Scientific or empirical research methodologies in the "hard" sciences as well as culture studies have of course been preoccupied with "objective" knowledge. This does not contradict Burke's analysis, as the approaches he identifies emphasize the "scene" as what is known objectively. Also see the following note.

41. As explained in chapter 1, the scientific-technological, instrumental-causal approach has also been extremely important to modern and postmodern theories of interpretation. Such theories clearly feature object/scene and instrument. Some further remarks on the syntactic orientation of contemporary academic thought will be made in the next chapter.

42. For example, Burke has been used to analyze different sociological and legal approaches to the problem of drunk driving. Some explanations emphasize the category "drunk driving" as an *act* carrying with it liability, and others emphasize the "drunk driver," an *agent* acting with intention and at fault. See Joseph R. Gusfield, *The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

A study that, although it only mentions Burke, laid the groundwork for later uses of the grammar of motives is C. Wright Mills, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," *American Sociological Review* 5 (1940): 904–13. For assessments of Burke's grammar of motives along with other aspects of his theory of symbolic action, including reviews of applications of his ideas, see Joseph R. Gusfield, introduction to *Kenneth Burke on Symbols and Society*, ed. Joseph R. Gusfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 1–49; Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, *Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric* (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1985), 153–88, 291–304 (with a good bibliography); Herbert W. Simons and Trevor Melia, eds., *The Legacy of Kenneth Burke* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989); and George K. Zollschan, "Reasons for Conduct and the Conduct of Reason: The Eightfold Route to Motivational Ascription," in *Social Change: Explorations, Diagnoses and Conjectures*, ed. George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (New York: John Wiley, 1976), 270–317.

43. It should be understood that the inquiry here, in purposes and method, is completely different from earlier efforts to characterize civilizations on the basis of their languages, as for example in Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking, of Eastern Peoples: India, China, Tibet, Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1971). I view such projects of generalization as highly problematic. I am concerned here with *competing* philosophical *theories* of Sanskrit syntax.

I must also distinguish my approach from Frits Staal's syntactical analyses of Vedic ritual. See his "Ritual Syntax," in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls,* ed. M. Nagatomi et al. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1980), 119–43. Staal does not examine Sanskritic understandings of the motivation of action. Moreover, whereas I am concerned with theories of *mythico*-ritual syntax, he abstracts the syntax of ritual from semantics on the basis his well-known conception of the "meaninglessness of ritual." He explains the highly convoluted synchronic structure of ritual in terms of Chomskian categories such as "phrase structure," "transformational," and "self-embedding" rules. (It would be interesting to relate such analysis to the indigenous understandings considered here.) He also claims that the meaningless ritualistic syntax preceded, and still affects, the structures of actual languages. Staal further elaborates his ideas in his *Rules without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences,* Toronto Studies in Religion, vol. 4 (New York: Peter Lang, 1989).

44. Gerow, "What Is Karma."

45. Nakamura continues these discussions. See my remark in note 43.

46. It should be understood that the critical remarks made here and below are not meant to disparage Gerow's innovative study. They endeavor only to advance further the inquiry into these subjects.

47. Sanderson, "Purity," 196.

48. Ibid., 196–97.

49. The explanations and quotations of Śaṅkara are my own. I note that while the Śaivas indicate familiarity with Advaita Vedānta they never quote Śaṅkara. It does not matter here whether they knew his works, or those of other representatives of Advaita, for I only wish to show how they subvert a common mode of thinking.

50. Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara, Vācaspatimiśra, Amalānandasarasvatī, and Appayyadīkṣita, *The Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya: With the Commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala,* 2 vols., ed. K. L. Joshi (Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1987), 1.1.4, 1:130.

51. Ibid., 4.1.13, 2:954. Cf. 3.4.16, 2:876.

52. Dumont emphasizes that this individuality is achieved through the renunciation of action in the sphere of worldly caste and other social relationships. I agree with his sociological observations about the reciprocal and complementary relationships that nevertheless exist between renouncers and the worldly, and about the cultural creativity of renunciant traditions. See Louis

Dumont, "World Renunciation in Indian Religions," appendix in *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications*, trans. Mark Sainsbury, Louis Dumont, and Basia Gulati (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 267–86.

53. Sanderson, "Purity," 197–98.

54. The other two *malas* are those of limited individuality, the *āṇava mala*, and of Māyā, the *māyīya mala*.

55. See *The Spandakārikās of Vasugupta with the Nirṇaya by Ksemarāja*, ed. and trans. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 42 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1925), 3.16, 71–72; Abhinavagupta, *Śrī Mālinīvijaya Vārttikam*, ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 31 (Srinagar: Kashmir Pratap Steam Press, 1921), 1.313–15, 30–31; TA and TAV, 13.266–68a, 5:2363–65; IPK and IPV 3.2.4–10, 2:248–56.

56. In this respect, there are analogies between the ordinary agent and the agent of the causative conjugation.

57. There are no indications that Bhartṛhari identifies the higher, nonsequential nature of action with the agent.

58. The Śaivas commonly describe the unitary, eternal Lord's emanation of temporal diversity as a kind of agitation or vibration. This is the understanding articulated in the doctrine of Śiva's *spanda*. Abhinava emphasizes the connection with this doctrine here in describing the movements of the one cooking as *spandas*.

59. IPV 2.1.8, 2:24–25.

60. SS 9.

61. IPVV 2.4.5, 3:189–90.

62. The classic contemporary reading of Indian philosophical positions in terms of the issue of causality is Karl H. Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963). Unfortunately I cannot here get into all of the technicalities of the Śaiva theorization on causality. I can only point out some of the key ways in which they structure the subject with their understanding of syntax. Causality is the focus of the whole of IPK and IPV 2.4, 2:150–209.

63. For elucidation of the correspondence of *kāraṇa* and *karaṇa*, see Matilal, "The Doctrine of Karaṇa in Grammar-Logic."

64. IPK 2.4.2, 2:153. Abhinavagupta is not sure exactly how to take Utpaladeva's reference to the existent and the nonexistent. In my translation, I have taken the assertion as indicating the fact that the successive moments of an action, and thus the constituent "processes" of cause and effect, become existent and then nonexistent. The action itself is the Being (*sattā*) that unifies these moments. This interpretation seems to be supported by the following statement of Bhartṛhari: "Therefore that which is nonexistent [*asat*] has disappeared. And that which is existent [*sat*] is experienced. [Action] is understood as the unitary essential nature

[*ātman*] of the existent [*sat*] and the nonexistent [*asat*]." *Vākyapadīya*, 3.8.19, 18. Another possibility is that Utpaladeva is asserting the inadequacy of both the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya theories of causality. According to the former, the effect preexists in the cause, and arises as a sort of transformation of it. (This view will be discussed further below.) According to the latter, the effect is nonexistent in the cause, and "emerges" as something new. For Abhinava's discussion of the alternative interpretations, see IPV 2.4.2, 2:154 and IPVV 2.4.2, 3:186. Also see BIPV 2.4.2, 2:154. In any case the basic point expressed by Utpaladeva regarding the role of the agent remains the same.

65. Abhinava is referring to the interpretation of the verse in terms of the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya theories, as explained in the previous note.

66. As a gerundive, *kārya*, "effect," literally means "that which is to be done."

67. I have used this awkward phrase to indicate that the verb *kāryate* is conjugated in the causative.

68. IPV 2.4.2, 2:153–54. Utpaladeva explains the Lord's creation of things through His agential intention (*icchā*) at IPK 2.4.1, 2:152. Abhinavagupta epitomizes this verse as also asserting that the relation of cause and effect is nothing but the relation of agent and direct object. IPV 2.4 introduction, 2:151. Cf. the explanation more focused on the idealistic character of causality at IPK 2.4.4, 2:153.

69. This is spelled out at IPVV 2.4.8, 3:192.

70. See IPV 1.8.9, 1:411; IPV 2.4.4, 2:157–59; and IPV 2.4.9, 2:169–70.

71. That is, *asmin satīdam asti*.

72. See IPV 2.4.14, 2:188; IPVV 2.4.14, 3:218.

73. IPK 2.4.14–15, 2:187–90. See the discussion of the qualifications existent and nonexistent above.

74. This term, *samanvaya*, also has the significance of syntactic coordination.

75. It is notable that Abhinava refers to other ostensible relations as "dry" (*śuṣka*). Bhāskarakaṇṭha glosses this term as *niḥsāra*, "without essence," and lists as examples conjunction (*saṃyoga*), etc. It is clear that Abhinava's "moist" relationship is that which involves action by the agent.

76. IPV 2.4.16, 2:192–93.

77. IPV 2.4.18, 2:194–95.

78. As asserted above, Utpaladeva may have briefly expressed disagreement with the Sāṃkhya account in IPK 2.4.2, 2:153.

79. Abhinava is explaining the verse.

80. Cf. the discussion of "dry" relations above.

81. Abhinava is referring to the Sāṃkhya technical conceptions of the various transformations of the material cause. These are not important here.

82. IPV 2.4.18, 2:196–97. The translation of the last sentence is rough, but the idea is clear for our purposes. See the discussion of the Sāṃkhya view throughout IPK and IPV 2.4.17–19, 2:193–200. The thinkers further argue that only a conscious agent can logically arbitrate unity and multiplicity at IPK and IPV 2.4.19, 2:197–200.

83. The Nyāya also maintains that an agent must be conscious. See Cardona, "Pāṇini's *Kārakas:* Agency, Animation and Identity." They even use grammar to explain God's agency as a sort of efficient cause of the creation of the world from preexisting matter, and as the foundation of cultural traditions. However, they are "dualists" rather than monists, their God is rather limited in capabilities and activities, and they hold the causal theory of *asatkāryavāda.* They would not accept that all cre-ation emanates from a single agent God/ Self.

84. The Advaita Vedāntins maintain that illusion is not strictly nonexistent, because it is experienced. However, it is not existent, because it disappears when one attains self-realization.

85. Śaṅkara's theistic *saguṇa brahman,* as ultimately illusory, does not address the Śaivas' considerations on the requirement for a genuine creator.

86. IPV 2.4.20, 2:203–5. See the whole discussion through IPK and IPV 2.4.20, 2:201–6. There are scattered arguments against Advaita Vedānta throughout the Śaiva literature.

87. IPV 2.4.21, 2:207.

88. I note that the Pratyabhijñā syntax of the *tripuṭī* also rationalizes features of Krama tantric contemplations of circles of Śaktis—of great importance to Abhinavagupta. In these, the *pramātṛ, pramāṇa,* and *prameya* are respectively identified with fire, the sun, and the moon. The latter are in various ways contemplated as "absorbed" in the former. See TA 4.122ff., 3:740ff.; TA 5.19ff., 3:945ff.

89. IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:74–75.

90. I note that in this explanation the Śaivas are subverting and reformulating within their own syntax the Buddhist understanding of means of cognition. As we have seen, the Buddhists believe that action is an invalid projection on experience. Thus they completely identify the means (*pramāṇa*) with the result of cognition itself (*pramā*), thereby claiming to be artificial the notion of an enduring, agent-located process (*vyāpāra*) connecting them. At IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:75, Abhinavagupta cites *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.309, 193 on the means-result identity. For a discussion of Buddhist philosophy as denying the essential features of action-syntax, which as explained here is articulated with reference to this syntax, see Nandita Bandyopadhyay, "The Buddhist Theory of Relation between Pramā and Pramāṇa," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 7 (1979): 43–78. This Buddhist conception of the identity of cognitive means and result may be understood as a non-agential formulation of *esse est percipi.* It also instantiates in a particular epistemological context the syntactic trajectory against agency exposited by Gerow. While accepting the Buddhist idealism, the Śaivas place it within the processual nexus of an enduring cognitive agent. See the discus-

sion throughout IPV 2.3.1–2, 2:73–76. The Śaivas also express in terms of syntax their transformation of the partial "objectivity" admitted by Buddhist logic. This admission comes from the more Sautrāntika-influenced direction of thinking in the Buddhist system. We might say that phenomenalism presents the idealistic unity of *esse* and *percipi* as a series of evanescent object-experiences. Abhinava explains that it is by demonstrating that there is the establishment of manifestations through recognitive judgment (*pratyavamarśa*) that it is shown that the operation (*vyāpāra*) of the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) is not dependent on the object which has the nature of the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*). IPV 2.3 introduction, 2:67.

91. IPV 1.1.3, 1:63.

92. The grammatical analysis of a unitary discourse into sentences, and sentences into parts of speech, roots, suffixes, declensional endings, etc., is frequently said to be artificial and heuristic. The idea here is that it is artificial to reify cognition as a separate entity rather than as a process integral to the subject.

93. IPK 1.4.6, 1:178. Also see on this IPV 1.4.6, 1:177–82.

94. That is, the past passive participle "was seen" agrees grammatically with the word denoting the object of perception.

95. IPV 1.4.6, 1:180. Bhāskarakaṇṭha here cites the familiar principle of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.49. BIPV 1.4.6, 1:180.

96. In the sentence in Utpaladeva's verse, "It was seen by me," the direct object is not given a pronoun but is clearly expressed, according to normal Sanskrit usage, as the referent of the participle.

97. Abhinava is referring to the comparison of ordinary experience to the midpoint of a journey, discussed in chapter 5.

98. IPV 1.5.17, 1:279. The thinkers engage in an involved grammatical discussion of epistemology throughout IPK and IPV 1.5.17, 1:273–80, in the course of treating the apparent objectification inherent to any designations of one's self-recognition as "Lord," "Self," Śiva," "subject," etc.

99. IPV 1.4.6, 1:182. This is explained in terms of an alternative gloss of Utpala's verse. Utpaladeva uses the objectless syntax to explain the awareness in memory of an original experience at IPK 1.4.4, 1:167. See Abhinavagupta's grammatical explanation at IPV 1.4.4, 1:169–70.

100. It must be understood that tantric "purity" (*śuddhi*) pertains to the realization of Śiva's/the Self's unity, and is transgressive of the ostensibly objective (and hierarchically defined) purity of Hindu orthodoxy. Abhinava himself is very careful to make the distinction. See TS 4, 31; TA 4.118–19, 3:737 and TA 4.218–20, 3:858–59.

101. My interpretation of the analogy of the horse is influenced by that of *Luce delle Sacre Scritture (Tantrāloka)*, trans. Raniero Gnoli (Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 1980), 454.

102. TA 15.147–51, 6:2516–18.

103. TA 15.157–58, 6:2520. Also see TS 13, 135ff. As pointed out above in note 88, Abhinava also employs the syntax of *pramāṇas* to explaining the Krama meditations on circles of Śaktis.

104. IPK 4.1.16, 2:309. Also see IPV 4.1.16, 2:310–11. The direct equivalence between agency and Śakti is illustrated at IPV 1.4.8, 1:191. I recall Abhinava's interpretation of Utpaladeva's statement in the treatment of memory "This is that cognizer" as disclosing recognition. Here Abhinava also draws attention to the cognizer as agent. See IPV 1.4.3, 1:164–65.

105. I briefly mention a couple of topics related to the discussion in this chapter to which I plan to return in future studies: At an abstract level, inference per se may be understood in terms of the Śaiva syntax. The thinkers engage in an elaborate discussion of the nature of inferential rationality (*hetutā*) in the course of their chapter on causality, IPK, IPV and IPVV 2.4. They reduce all forms of inferential reason (*hetu*) to the reason that identifies the origin of phenomena (*utpattihetu*), which is ultimately Śiva's self-recognition/agency (*kartṛtā*)/agential intention (*icchā*).

Besides all of the connections between the Pratyabhijñā and the Śaiva mythico-ritual narrative there are some explanations of spiritual practice in terms of the "more static" ontological category of relation (*sambandha*). Unity-in-multiplicity is a sort of metaphor pointing toward the ultimate unity. Both Bhartṛhari's *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (perhaps even the whole *Vākyapadīya*) and Utpaladeva's *Sambandhasiddhi* can be understood as sorts of meditation on the unity intimated by relation. At IPV 1.7.14, 1:391, Abhinava cites the support of the *Vijñāna-Bhairava* 106, 92 on the contemplation of the relation of subject and object. These practices do not undermine the narrativity discussed in this chapter. Even "horizontal relations" between objects in the world depend upon the vertical syntactic relation with the agent. This approach via relation may be compared to what has been called a "henological" argument for the existence of God on the basis of the unity we comprehend in things. See John Macquarrie, *In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism* (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 203–6; and Herbert W. Richardson, *Theology for a New World* (London: SCM Press, 1968).

8. Conclusion

1. There is still discussion of the ontological, cosmological, teleological, moral, and religious-experience arguments in Western philosophy of religion. However, this discussion has a rather marginal position in the wide field of contemporary philosophy, and most philosophers believe that the proofs are unwarranted flights of speculation. When looked at sympathetically, the proofs are usually conceded to be inconclusive and useful only as demonstrations of the coherence of theism as an intellectual option. I am more optimistic about the proofs, though I cannot evaluate them here. Good selections of classic and contemporary writings on the arguments are John Hick, ed., *The Existence of*

God (New York: Macmillan, 1964); and Baruch A. Brody, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1974). A useful study is John Hick, *Arguments for the Existence of God* (London: Macmillan, 1970). See below, note 33 on Lonergan's claim that his proof encompasses all other cogent ones.

2. My interpretation of the challenge of Derrida to the Pratyabhijñā will focus chiefly on his *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

3. Though I do not wish to confuse matters, I note that in *Of Grammatology* Derrida is especially concerned to deconstruct a particular conception of the *separation* of the linguistic signified from the signifier, in which the former corresponds to or connects with the latter as presence. He asserts that this conception of separation depends upon the logocentric postulate of their primordial *unity*. However, Derrida's collapse of interpretations into a play of signifiers asserts *another kind of separation* between signifier and signified. As the signified does not really exist, the signifier cannot connect with it. For the sake of clarity, the discussion in the text will only consider the problem as whether or not language accesses presence. This will be explained in terms of whether or not recognition is valid.

4. Like others who discuss the problem of interpretation, Derrida sometimes refers to these issues of memory and recognition without thematizing them. See his use of Leroi-Gourhan's concept of a "liberation of memory" in *Of Grammatology*, 84.

Kevin Hart has observed that Derrida does not make a "skeptical" argument for equipollence like Pyrrho. *The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstructionism, Theology and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 173. This does not matter for our purposes. My conception of skepticism is broader than Hart's. The argument for equipollence would also fit into my classification.

5. In raising this topic, I indicate my strong disagreement with the well-known view of Richard Rorty that Derrida does not actually make any kind of argument but only shows us what it would be like not to have logocentric beliefs. Richard Rorty, "Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida," chapter in *Consequences of Pragmatism (Essays: 1972–1980)* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 90–109. Derrida's entire corpus endeavors to persuade by means of complex arguments. The self-referential contradiction involved in such an effort will be taken up below.

6. Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Roy Harris (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1992), 116. Also see the elaboration of the nature of writing as an arbitrary system based on difference at 117–18, which is quoted in Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 52, 326–27n17.

7. See *Of Grammatology*, 52–53.

8. Derrida thus subverts the "phonocentric" tradition articulated in a variety of ways since Plato that views writing as a secondary copy of speech. For Derrida, writing in the sense of a differentially defined system of signs of signs is the nature of all language. For some of the key discussions, see *Of Grammatology*, 44–65.

9. Ibid., 49.

10. Umberto Eco has emphasized the disagreement between Peirce's understanding of "semiotic drift" and Derrida's endless deferral. The former does not obviate the community's search for the correct interpretation. Eco also interestingly distinguishes both Peirce's and Derrida's theories from the long chains of equivalences in hermetic texts or "hermetic drift." See "Unlimited Semiosis and Drift: Pragmaticism and Pragmatism," in *The Limits of Interpretation,* 22–43. For a deconstructive reading of the chains of homologies in Kabbalistic texts, see Harold Bloom, *Kabbalah and Criticism* (New York: Continuum, 1993).

11. On this also see Jacques Derrida, "Différance," chap. in *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs,* trans. David B. Allison, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, ed. John Wild (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 129–60.

12. See Derrida, *Of Grammatology,* 10f., 97–100.

13. Ibid., 10–13, 71–73, 97–100.

14. Lonergan, *Insight,* 634–86. I note that George Steiner, *Real Presences,* has advocated the conception of God's logos specifically against Derrida. This book presents less a systematic argument than a suggestion that we best wager, contra Derrida, on the intuition of a transcendent source of meaning if we are to account for our ability to understand and communicate, particularly in the creation and appreciation of art. Another argument that we have the direct experience of presence in relationships and in art, figuring the ultimacy of God's presence, is Ralph Harper, *On Presence: Variations and Reflections* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991). Harper explains that his work was written independently but in a remarkable parallelism to Steiner's.

15. For a less elaborate argument made in the course of general considerations of intellectual method, see Bernard J. F. Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (reprint, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 101–5. Lonergan's reflections on his historical inheritance may be found in his *Verbum.*

16. To explain things a bit more fully, Lonergan actually talks of three "basic positions," the denials of which are three "basic counter-positions." Lonergan explains "It will be a basic position, (1) if the real is the concrete universe of being and not a mere subdivision of the 'already out there now'; (2) if the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known yet in any prior 'existential' state; and (3) if objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, and not as a property of vital anticipation, extroversion and satisfaction." Lonergan, *Insight,* 388. The "positions" and "counter-positions" respectively cohere with and contradict the basic positions. My discussion of Lonergan's proof will simply refer to positions and counter-positions. See the discussion throughout *Insight,* 385–90. On these categories in relation to the argument for the existence of God, see 685.

17. Lonergan, *Insight,* 672. There is a summary of the argument throughout 672–74.

18. While the minor premise is in effect expounded by the analyses throughout the book, Lonergan gives a summary treatment of it in *Insight*, 672–73.

19. Lonergan makes it clear that the unlimited desire to know is coupled with a "limited capacity to attain knowledge." See Lonergan, *Insight*, 636–39. For Lonergan, the assertion of the unrestricted desire to know itself articulates a position about a transcendental of human experience. Accordingly the denial of this desire is a counter-position inviting reversal: "Every doubt that the pure desire is unrestricted serves only to prove that it is unrestricted. If you ask whether X might not lie beyond its range, the fact that you ask proves that X lies within its range. Or else, if the question is meaningless, incoherent, illusory, illegitimate, then X turns out to be the mere nothing that results from aberration in cognitional process." Lonergan, *Insight*, 352. Also see Lonergan, *Insight*, 638. Cf. Lonergan's argument for the self-contradictoriness of denying the operations of transcendental method in *Method in Theology*, 16–20.

On being as the objective of the unlimited desire to know, see Lonergan, *Insight*, 348. For Lonergan being includes both what is known and what is not yet known. Lonergan, *Insight*, 350. Again, the complete identity of reality with being is a necessary truth or position, the denial of which is a self-contradictory counter-position: "One may wonder just how all-inclusive being is. That wonder may be formulated in a variety of manners. But no matter how it is formulated, no matter whether it can be formulated, it can serve only to show how all-inclusive being is. For the wonder is inquiry. It is the desire to know. Anything it can discover or invent, by that very fact is included in the notion of being. Hence, the effort to establish that being is not all-inclusive must be self-defeating; for at the root of all that can be affirmed, at the root of all that can be conceived, is the pure desire to know; and it is the pure desire, underlying all judgements and formulation, underlying all questioning and all desire to question, that defines its all-inclusive objective." Lonergan, *Insight*, 350–51.

20. Ibid., 352.

21. At first glance, it may appear that Lonergan formulates his premise too strongly in requiring that reality be *completely* intelligible. However, I do not believe this is so. The minor premise follows necessarily from Lonergan's explanatory definition of being/reality as the object of intellectual inquiry. The question is whether or not it makes sense to talk in any way of anything as existing, or being the case, which could never be understood. Lonergan's definition is strengthened by the idealism characteristic of the philosophical theology of logos discussed below.

There is recorded some debate on the minor premise between Lonergan and David Burrell. Burrell objects that Lonergan has no warrant to "extrapolate" from a definition of being that is merely "heuristic." We can never know anything about, and thus not affirm, the condition of complete intelligibility. In his answer Lonergan emphasizes that he does not claim that we ever achieve the complete intelligibility of being. He affirms this as what is *intended* by the ongoing process of inquiry, which makes known more and more of what is previously unknown. David B. Burrell, "How Complete Can Intelligibility Be? A Commentary on *Insight:* Chapter XIX," and Bernard Lonergan, "Response," in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 41 (1967): 250–

53, 258–59. To quote Lonergan: "To say that being is completely intelligible is not an idle, empty phrase. It is true that we have no immediate knowledge of complete intelligibility, for we have no immediate knowledge of God. It remains that our intelligence, at its living root, intends intelligibility but not incomplete intelligibility and so complete intelligibility. Further, since intending is just another name for meaning, it follows that complete intelligibility, so far from being meaningless to us, is in fact at the root of all our attempts to mean anything at all." Ibid., 259.

Lonergan's minor premise has an interesting analogue in Hegel's argument against skepticism that "the Rational has no opposite." See chapter 6, notes 49 and 70. Michael Forster has traced influences on Hegel's argument back to the poem of Parmenides. Hegel supports his arguments by Parmenides' contention that the concept of nonbeing, as describing something that is supposed to be, is incoherent. According to Forster, Hegel's appropriation of Parmenides was mediated especially by works of Hölderlin such as *Judgement and Being*. Michael Forster, *Hegel and Skepticism*, 118–20.

Support for the thesis of the complete intelligibility of reality may be found in features of C. S. Peirce's semiotics. Peirce maintains that all thoughts are necessarily signs about other signs/thoughts, thereby overcoming the subject-object duality. However, at the same time, he maintains an interpretive realism—too often ignored by contemporary poststructuralists and pragmatists. (I am not denying substantial areas of divergence between Peirce and the theories being discussed. For example, his replacement of notions of a direct intuition of thoughts with the semiotic triad is certainly contrary to the Pratyabhijñā doctrine of the identity of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*.) Peirce contends that, for the very reason that concepts can only pertain to what is cognized in judgments about signs, one cannot coherently conceive of an object that is incognizable, even in universal or hypothetical propositions. As he states: "Not-cognizable, if a concept, is a concept of the form 'A, not-A,' and is, at least, self-contradictory. Thus, ignorance and error can only be conceived as correlative to a real knowledge and truth, which latter are of the nature of cognitions. Over against any cognition, there is an unknown but knowable reality; but over against all possible cognition, there is only the self-contradictory. In short, *cognizability* (in its widest sense) and *being* are not merely metaphysically the same, but are synonymous terms. To the argument from universal and hypothetical propositions, the reply is, that though their truth cannot be cognized with absolute certainty, it may probably be known by induction." Charles Sanders Peirce, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man," in *Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic*, ed. James Hoopes (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 50.

In the terms of a nonrelativist reading of Heideggerian disclosure, we could say that we cannot coherently deny the primordial seeing-as of universal Being.

22. On this point, see Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 57, 63, 167.

23. Steiner, on the other hand, is welling to let deconstructionism off on the self-referential contradiction, apparently because deconstructionists say that they do not mind it. Steiner, *Real Presences*, 129–30.

24. I also do not find acceptable Bimal Krishna Matilal's effort to make defensible Mādhyamika skepticism through J. R. Searle's concept of illocutionary negation. He does this in various places; for an example, see *Perception,* 66–67.

25. In this regard, his work may be understood as an attempt to provide a Thomist logos-theological answer to the famous question of Plato's Meno: "But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don't know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know?" Plato, *Meno,* translated by W. K. C. Guthrie, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters,* edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Bollingen Series 57 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 80d, 363.

26. Lonergan, *Insight,* 644.

27. Ibid., 643. Cf. Hastings Rashdall's formulation of the moral argument for the existence of God: "A moral ideal can exist nowhere and nohow but in a mind; an absolute moral ideal can exist only in a Mind from which all Reality is derived. Our moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God." Hastings Rashdall, *The Theory of Good and Evil,* selection in *The Existence of God,* ed. John Hick, 149–50. Among the classic theistic proofs, the moral argument comes closest in expression to the logos argument, for it is directly concerned with the grounds of judgments/recognitions, in this case those of morality. I believe that even Kant's moral argument may be understood against the background of the logos conception, despite his cagey formulation of God as a postulate of practical reason. For a sophisticated contemporary restatement of the moral argument, see Franklin I. Gamwell, *The Divine Good: Modern Moral Theory and the Necessity of God* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990). In note 33 I will briefly discuss Lonergan's suggestion that all cogent theistic proofs are encompassed by his argument.

28. Lonergan, *Insight,* 648. On the understanding of all things through the unlimited act of the intellect's understanding of itself, also see *Insight,* 646. Lonergan also explains this idea in terms of an analysis of different kinds of intelligibility. The unlimited act of the intellect exemplifies the perfect variety of "spiritual intelligibility." Ibid., 674.

Cf. the simpler expression of the following passage in which Lonergan explains Thomas Aquinas: "God's being is identical with God's understanding; by that single act of understanding, God understands himself, and so he understands his own power, and so he understands all that by that power could be produced. God, then, is the act of understanding that grasps everything about everything." Ibid., 371.

29. Ibid., 674. Cf. George Berkeley: "Sensible things do really exist: and if they exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God." *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,* 198. What is described by Lonergan in terms of theoretical intelligibility is described by Berkeley in terms of bare sensible ideas. On Berkeley's "proto-semiotic" understanding of ideas as signs, see chapter 6, note 49.

30. "As man, so God is a rational self-consciousness, for man was made in the image and likeness of God. But what man is through unrestricted desire and limited attainment, God is as unrestricted act." Lonergan, *Insight*, 668.

31. Ibid., 684.

32. IPV 1.6.6, 1:326–27.

33. I note that, though the Śaivas have an advantage in their sensitivity to narrative, Lonergan does engage in some considerations analogous to their theory of agential syntax. First of all, Lonergan approaches an explicit syntax of agency in an explanation of *causality* supporting his cognitive argument for the existence of God at *Insight*, 651–57. Lonergan attempts to demonstrate that causality is "intelligent emanation" rather than natural causality, David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970), 69. This involves "the transition from familiar but anthropomorphic notions of external causality to their root in a universally applicable principle," Lonergan, *Insight*, 652. This principle is an originating "unconditioned intelligent and rational consciousness." Ibid., 657. Lonergan's argument takes the form of demonstrating the necessity of God as the ultimate representative of three of Aristotle's causes, that is, the efficient, final, and formal (which Lonergan calls exemplary) causes. While we cannot go into this technical discussion here, it may be observed that the three notions of cause are *roughly* similar to some of the Indian conceptions of agency radicalized by the Śaivas on the basis of their idealism of recognition. The conception of God as final cause may be related to the idea of the transcendental self-recognitive agent as having the intention or desire (*icchā*) to make the effort (*yatna*) to act. The conception of God as efficient cause may be compared with the notion of the agent as independent or noncontingent (*svatantra*) instigator (*prayojaka*) of the subordinate actions in all of the verbal cases. And the conception of God as formal cause may be related to the idea of the agent as supporting/synthetic locus of the subordinate actions (*vyāpārāśraya*) in his self-recognition.

Here I am only talking of what Lonergan calls external causality. At another level, of internal causality, Lonergan attempts to demonstrate a complex isomorphism between the stages of human knowledge and the structure of reality. Ibid., 486; and Hugo A. Meynell, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1991), 83–85.

"Proto-syntactic" considerations are also adduced by Lonergan in a section where he tries to show that his proof for the existence of God subsumes all other theistic proofs. (Lonergan makes this claim in the statement at *Insight*, 672, which I quoted at the beginning of the consideration of his proof.) He takes as examples that are encompassed by his proof the five theistic arguments of Thomas. Again, Thomas's three cosmological proofs may perhaps be related to the Śaiva conception of God as instigator, as independent, and so on, and the teleological to those of God as having the originative intention and as the locus of the cre-ative process. Perhaps there is no Śaiva parallel to Thomas's inference of God from the levels of being. Anyway, for Lonergan all of these arguments are "so many particular cases of the general statement that the proportionate universe is incompletely intelligible and that complete intelligibility is demanded." *Insight*, 678. In our terms, we may suggest that various parameters of the philosophical syntax of superagency—

thematized in the theistic arguments—are justified by idealistically positing the divine self-recognition as the source and foundation of all human recognitions as well as their objects. This also suggests that the many Western thinkers over the centuries who have contended that idealism is the most coherent philosophical interpretation of theism are correct.

34. For valuable sources illuminating the purposes and presuppositions in the idealist-realist debates, see A. C. Ewing, ed., *The Idealist Tradition: From Berkeley to Blanshard,* The Library of Philosophical Movements, ed. Paul Edwards (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957); Roderick M. Chisholm, ed., *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology,* The Library of Philosophical Movements, ed. Paul Edwards (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960); and Edwin B. Holt and others, *The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1912). For an excellent early study, critical of but sympathetic with the insights of the idealists, see A. C. Ewing, *Idealism: A Critical Survey* (London: Metheun & Co., 1934; reprint 1974). A useful short study of the change in orientation of philosophy is Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis: Its Development between the Two World Wars.*

35. See G. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in Ewing, *The Idealist Tradition,* 289–310; and Russell, "The Fallacies of Idealism," in Ewing, *The Idealist Tradition,* 311–16.

36. Chapter 1 already cited Martin Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology," which characterizes such thought as viewing the world as intellectually controllable and practically exploitable "standing reserve."

37. See Richard Rorty, "Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism," chap. in *Consequences of Pragmatism,* 139–59; and Juliet Sychrava, *Schiller to Derrida: Idealism in Aesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

38. Have I retreated to the position of Steiner, for whom the logos presumption regarding the existence of God is a best wager of meaning against the skepticism of deconstructionism? No, for I actually hold that the proof is cogent. I have suggested a more "probabilistic" interpretation of the argument only with the hope of giving it greater appeal.

39. Indeed, the transcendental arguments discussed in chapter 6 centered around demonstrating a foundation to worldly experience and behavior.

40. See Utpaladeva, *The Śivastotrāvalī, with the Sanskrit Commentary of Kṣemarāja,* ed. Rajanaka Laksmana (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1964).

41. Lonergan, *Insight,* 660.

42. Panentheism means "all-in-God-ism." According to this viewpoint the world is real as it exists in some sense in God. God accordingly is both transcendent of and immanent in the world.

As my comments on dialecticity just made indicate, I believe that traditional Christianity has always had ways of describing the immanence of God. This is often underestimated in the rhetorical formulations of contemporary panentheists. I believe that in virtually all theological doctrines, from the

Hebrew prophets, the Koran, and Calvin to Eckhart and Spinoza, there is some dialecticity. While the contemporary panentheists may thus to some extent use the terms "traditional theism" and "pantheism" as strawmen, I believe that they are placing a significant new emphasis on dialecticity to address the conflicts of tradition and modernity.

Of course, this metaphysical strategy has not been accepted by all contemporary theists attempting to grapple with the conflicts of tradition and modernity, and postmodernity. Many neo-orthodox thinkers as well as postmodernists such as Levinas continue to emphasize the transcendence of God in the face of secularity and pluralism.

43. John Macquarrie, *In Search of Deity,* is a useful recent attempt to summarize historically and argue constructively for an alternative formulation of God as both transcendent and immanent.

44. The classic historical survey of doctrines of God from a panentheistic viewpoint is that of Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

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Index

EASTERN THOUGHT/RELIGIOUS STUDIES

REDISCOVERING GOD WITH TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT

A Contemporary Interpretation of Monistic Kashmiri Śaiva Philosophy

David Peter Lawrence

"Other scholars have written on Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, and other philosophical giants in the tradition of monistic Śaiva thought. But there is very little on this system of thought written by a scholar so well-read in Western philosophy and so versed in the issues pertaining to comparative philosophy as is Lawrence. His wide horizon invites readers to a fuller and more expansive understanding of Pratyabhijñā in particular and of the philosophical structure and dynamics of transcendental logic in general, both in India and in the West.

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Rediscovering God with Transcendental Argument provides a comparative philosophical study of the Pratyabhijñā system of the medieval Kashmiri Śaiva thinkers Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. Beginning with intensive descriptive and prescriptive reflections on the nature of philosophy itself, the book examines the special characteristics of the Pratyabhijñā discourse as both philosophical apologetics and spiritual exercise. Lawrence situates the Pratyabhijñā speculation within the larger context of Hindu and Buddhist deliberations about the role of interpretation in experience, and gives a groundbreaking exposition of the epistemology and ontology of Śiva's self-recognition. He observes the similarities and differences of the Pratyabhijñā with Christian understandings of the divine logos, and argues that the Śaiva philosophy elucidates a cogent way of demonstrating the reality of God against contemporary relativism, deconstructionism and other forms of skepticism.

David Peter Lawrence is Assistant Professor in the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

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